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2. Abstract 
This thesis develops a model for the fair resolution of internet disputes. The internet 
has the potential to lead to international~ cross-border disputes. being a powerful 
ommunications medium, that allows data exchanges in various media formats 
between a wide range of different users situated in distant locations. It explores the 
meaning of fairness for the resolution of such disputes. 
This thesis refers to the existing literature examining the private international law 
issues arising from cross-border interactions and transactions on the internet which 
make litigation and enforcement more costly and lengthy. 
For many disputes arising on the internet, alternative ways of resolving such 
disputes have to be found. This thesis contains a detailed exploration of the use of 
mediation and arbitration, using online technology. obviating the need for the 
parties and lawyers to meet face-to-face and leading to more efficient information 
processing, and thereby reducing cost and delay in dispute resolution. 
Binding dispute resolution and enforceability in cross-border cases are important 
for internet disputes and can be provided by online arbitration. Therefore, this thesis 
proceeds to examines in great detail the legal issues surrounding online arbitration. 
It looks at questions of due process in arbitration and covers the legal issues 
surrounding business-to-consumer arbitration comparing the European approach to 
that in the us. The thesis contains a detailed analysis of the Uniform Domain Name 
Dispute Resolution Procedure (UDRP) and considers to what extent the dispute 
resolution model established by the UDRP could or should sene as a model for 
other types of internet disputes. 
The conclusion from this examination of all aspects of internet dispute resolution is 
a model of dispute resolution. which encourages the use of online arbitration for 
internet disputes. but. where there exists a substantial power imbalance between thc 
disputants (such as the traditional business-to-consumer paradigm). subjects 
traditional commercial arbitration to more stringent due process standards for 
disputes. 
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-'I 
Table of Contents 
Table of Contents 
Chapter 1: The Dissertation 
1. Introduction 
2. The SUbject 
3. The Hypothesis 
4. The Literature Review 
5. The Contribution 
Chapter 2 : The Concepts of Fairness 
1. Introduction 
2. Definition of Fairness in Dispute Resolution 
2.1 Equal treatment of the parties 
2.2 A rational approach to dispute resolution 
2.3 Effectiveness 
2.3.1 Access 
2.3.2 Counterpoise 
2.4 Conclusion 
3. Process Values and Forms of Procedural Justice 
3.1 Process values 
3.2 The Rawlsian concept of procedural justice 
4. Due Process 
5. The Difference Principle: Counterbalancing Existing Inequalities 
6. The Inherent Conflict Between Due Process and Effectiveness 
7. Conclusion 
Chapter 3: Internet Disputes 
1. Introduction 
2. Characteristics of the Internet 
2.1 Location irrelevant for functionality 
2.2 Difficulty of establishing location of internet users 
2.3 Increase in transnational contacts- a quantitative and 
qualitative change 
2.4 Conclusion: the implications for internet disputes 
3. Examples of Internet Disputes 
4. Contract and Tort 
5. Power in Dispute Resolution 
5.1 Resources 
5.2 Repeat player effect and power 
5.3 Yulnerability 
6. Definition of Relevant Disputes in Respect of the Parties 
6.1 Meaning of 'Consumer' under different laws and regulations 
6.2 A preliminary definition: widening the scope 
Table of Contents 
6.3 The definition of relevant internet disputes and its purpose 
7. Definition of Relevant Disputes in Respect of the Size of the Claim 
8. Charge Backs and Refunds by Payment Service Providers 
8.1 Credit card charge back and joint liability 
8.1.1 Credit charge back explained 
8.1.2 UK joint liability for breach of contract and 
misrep resen ta ti on 
8.1.3 Protection against fraudulent misuse of all payment 
cards 
8.1.4 Conclusion as to charge backs 
8.2 Paypal 
8.3 Conclusion 
9. The Jurisdictional Challenge of the Internet 
9.1 The complexity of jurisdictional rules 
9.2 Cross-border enforcement 
9.3 Other cross-border aspects 
9.4 Conclusion 
10. Conclusion 
Chapter 4: ADR and Applicable Law 
1. Introduction 
2. The Nature of Disputes and What to Do About Them 
3. ADR 
3.1 Mediation 
3.1.1 Mediation explained 
3.1.2 How mediation works and its purpose 
3.2 Arbitration 
4. Applicable Law 
4.1 Law of the arbitration agreement, the lex arbitri and applicable 
law distinguished 
4.2 Options 
4.3 Determination of the applicable law 
4.3.1 Choice of law 
4.3.2 No choice of law 
4.4 Conclusion: the challenge of applicable law 
4.5 Mandatory laws 
4.5.1 Mandatory laws explained 
4.5.2 Applicability of mandatory laws in arbitration of 
internet disputes 
4.5.3 Mandatory rules applied in practice 
4.5.4 Conflict of law rule on mandatory laws for internet 
disputes 
5. Conclusion 
Table of Contents 
Chapter 5: ODR and Access 
1. Introduction 
2. Definition of ODR 
3. Forms of ODR 
3.1 Brief overview 
3.2 Case-study: Austrian Internet Ombudsmann 
4. Technologies Used 
4.1 Online Mediation 
4.2 Automated Negotiation-Negotiation Assistance 
4.3 Automated Negotiation-Blind Bidding 
4.4 Online Juries/Mock Trials 
4.5 Online Arbitration 
5. Transformative Power of ODR 
5.1 Technology as the fourth party in ODR 
5.1.1 Overcoming distances 
5.1.2 Empowering communication 
5.1.3 Saving human labour cost 
5.1.4 Psychological effect of online communication- dealing 
with negative emotions 
5.1.5 Jurisdictional problems overcome in cross-border 
disputes 
5.1.6 Faster information processing 
5.2 Transformative power: greater access to justice 
6. The Paradox of Low Take-up 
7. Conclusion 
Chapter 6: Arbitration and Due Process 
1. Introduction 
2. Sources of Legal Due Process 
2.1 Professional codes of conduct and contract for arbitral services 
2.2 Institutional and other arbitration rules 
2.3 National arbitration acts 
2.4 English common law 
2.5 Human rights standards 
2.5.1 ECHRI European Convention of Human Rights 
(a) The due process rule of the ECHR and its application to 
arbitration 
(b) Delegation theory 
(c) Indirect applicability 
(d) Direct or indirectly applicable 
(e) Distinction between voluntary and compulsory 
arbitration 
(0 Absolute waiver theory 
(g) Significance of waivers 
6 
Table of Contents 
(h) Requirements for waivers 
(i) Conclusion 
2.5.2 US constitutional due process standards 
2.6 International conventions 
2.7 Conclusion 
3. Impartiality and Independence in Adjudication 
3.1 Impartiality and independence of judges 
3.1.1 Defining impartiality and independence 
(a) Impartiality (no actual bias) 
(b) Independence (no appearance of bias) 
3.1.2 Independence and the relevant risk assessment 
(a) Automatic disqualification: more serious conflicts 
(b) Lesser conflicts: appearance of bias 
3.2 Impartiality and independence of arbitrators 
3.2.1 The English Arbitration Act 1996 and the common law 
3.2.2 Important differences between arbitrators and judges 
3.2.3 Arbitrators as men or women of business 
3.2.4 Payment and the repeat player syndrome 
3.2.5 Appointment by the parties 
3.2.6 Systemic bias 
3.2.7 Disclosure 
3.3 Conclusion 
4. Fair Hearing 
4.1 Prior notice 
4.2 Opportunity to present one's case and rebut that of the other 
party- fair hearing in a narrower sense 
4.2.1 Fair hearing -the principle 
4.2.2 Amorphous nature of the requirements of fair hearing 
4.2.3 Fair hearing in arbitration 
(a) Party autonomy, flexibility and fair hearing 
(b) Equal treatment and rationality as the outer boundaries 
4.2.4 Conclusion 
5. Duty to Give Reasons 
6. Transparency versus Confidentiality 
6.1 The case for transparency 
6.1.1 Informational equality 
6.1.2 Scrutiny as quality assurance 
6.1.3 Development of the law 
6.2 Presumption of confidentiality in arbitration 
6.3 What should be kept confidential? 
6.4 Who is under a duty of confidentiality? 
6.5 Contract and institutional rules 
6.6 Arbitration laws 
6.7 Conclusion: an inadequate balance under English law 
7. Right of Appeal/Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards 
8. Conclusion 
7 
Table of Contents 
Chapter 7: Internet Disputes and Fair Arbitration 
1. Introduction 
2. Legal Controls on the Use of Arbitration Clauses in Consumer 
Contracts 
2.1 Subject-matter arbitrability 
2.2 Control of consumer arbitration under English law 
2.2.1 Small claims disputes 
2.2.2 Regulation of unfair contract terms 
(a) Example in the Annex to the Directive 
(b) The fairness test 
(c) Substantial fairness in the context of pre-dispute 
arbitration clauses 
2.2.3 Conclusion: English law 
2.3 Control of adhesion contracts under US State law 
2.4 A critique of consumer arbitration 
2.4.1 The risk of systemic bias against consumer 
complainants 
2.4.2 Transaction costs 
2.4.3 Confidentiality 
2.4.4 No reasons and no appeal 
2.4.5 Applicable law 
2.4.6 One-sided procedure 
2.5 Conclusion 
3. UDRP as a Model for Online Dispute Resolution 
3.1 Brief description of the UDRP 
3.2 A critique of the UDRP 
3.2.1 Independence and impartiality 
(a) Complainant win rates 
(b) Impartiality and independence of the panellists 
(c) Selection of panellists 
(d) Allocation of panellists 
(e) Conclusion 
3.2.2 Notice and service to the respondent 
3.2.3 Fair hearing: minimum standards and equality 
(a) No (online) hearings 
(b) Further submissions 
(c) Complainant has no right of reply 
(d) Narrow word- or page limit 
(e) Short time limit for filing the Response 
(f) Conclusion 
3.2.4 Language 
3.2.5 Use of online technology 
3.2.6 Lack of appeal and inconsistency of decisions 
(a) Challenge on procedural matters 
Table of Contents 
(b) Substantive appeals 
(c) Conclusion as to appeals 
3.2.7 Court proceedings as parallel proceedings 
(a) Rectifying mistakes under the UDRP 
(b) Jurisdiction and conflict of law issues 
(c) Conclusion 
3.2.8 Transparency 
3.3 Conclusion 
4. Proportionate Model of Dispute Resolution 
4.1 Two spheres one public-one private 
4.2 Privatization of public functions 
4.3 The waiver doctrine- fully informed and voluntary approach 
4.4 Internet disputes and the waiver doctrine 
4.5 The proportionate model explained 
5. Conclusion 
Chapter 8: A Model of Dispute Resolution for the Internet 
1. Introduction 
2. Bringing the Parties to Arbitration 
2.1 Contractually mandated schemes 
2.1.1 Arbitration agreement between participants 
2.1.2 Arbitration agreement for the benefit of a third party 
claimant 
2.1.3 Contractually mandated schemes in practice 
(a) Codes of practice and trust marks 
(b) Disputes arising from a platform 
(c) The examples in Chapter Three 
2.2 Compulsory, statutory arbitration 
2.2.1 Ombudsman schemes for communication disputes 
2.2.2 Financial Ombudsman Service 
2.2.3 Classification of compulsory arbitration/ ombudsman 
services as arbitration 
(a) The position under English law 
(b) Enforcement under the New York Convention 
(c) An argument for classifying compulsory arbitration 
based on agreement as arbitration under the New York 
Convention 
2.2.4 Compulsory adjudication/an ombudsman scheme for 
internet disputes 
3. Standards for Online Arbitration of Internet Disputes- Findings 
from Previous Chapters 
3.1 Applying the "weaker' part)"s mandatory laws 
9 
Table of Contents 
3.2 Independence and impartiality of the provider and the 
arbitrators 
3.2.1 Independence and impartiality of the arbitrators 
3.2.2 Independence of the institution 
3.3 Fair hearing 
3.4 Reasons for decisions & transparency 
3.5 Judicial review/appeal 
4. Implementation of the Standards 
4.1 Institutional rules 
4.2 National legislation 
4.3 An international convention on enforcement of awards 
4.4 Referral systems/clearing house 
5. Proportionality, Costs and State Funding 
6. The Model: Resolution of Internet Disputes 
6.1 Non-binding forms of ODR 
6.2 Payment reverse mechanisms 
6.3 Online arbitration 
6.3.1 De Minimis 
6.3.2 Due process standards & their implementation 
6.3.3 Contractually mandated online arbitration 
6.3.4 UK National Online Ombudsman Office 
6.3.5 New Convention to overcome two potential obstacles to 
New York Convention 
6.4 Litigation 
7. Conclusion 
List of Abbreviations 
Bibliographies 
Tables 
Annex (not examined) 
Annex: The Jurisdictional Challenge of the Internet 
1. Introduction 
2. Jurisdictional Rules 
2.1 Unsatisfactory rules for internet disputes 
2.2 English/EU law 
2.2.1 Contract-difficul~' to pinpoint activities 
(a) Contract made within the jurisdiction 
(b) Place of performance of contractual obligation or 
breach of contract 
2.2.2 Tort-ubiquitous effects 
10 
Table of Contents 
(a) The fear of being sued everywhere or in an unexpected 
location 
(b) Connecting factors: place of the commission of the tort 
and the place of damage 
(c) The place where the tort was committed 
(d) The place where the damage occurred 
(e) Limitation of jurisdiction under forum non conveniens 
under the common law 
2.2.3 Consumers 
(a) Asymmetrical jurisdiction rules 
(b) Applying (at least) consumer protection law mandatory 
in the consumer's residence 
(c) Applicablity of the rules on consumer protection 
(d) Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Directive 
2.3 Conclusion 
2.4 The US approach to jurisdiction 
2.4.1 The due process tests 
2.4.2 Principles developed in internet cases 
2.4.3 Jurisdiction in defamation cases 
2.4.4 Consumers 
2.4.5 Conclusion 
3. Cross-Border Enforcement 
4. Cross-Border Aspects 
5. A European Small Claims Procedure 
5.1 Jurisdictional rules 
5.2 Formality 
5.3 Enforcement 
5.4 Summary 
6. Conclusion 
1 1 
Chapter 1 : The Dissertation 
Chapter 1 : The Dissertation 
1. Introduction 
In the year 1532, Michael Kohlhaas l , described as an honest and law-abidino-b 
Brandenburg merchant, was on his way to an important trade fair in Leipzig. At the 
border post with Saxony, two of his horses are unlawfully seized and his stable boy 
is beaten by the local squire. Michael Kohlhaas later seeks justice in the local courts 
but is denied civil redress. He gathers a gang of rebels, eventually commits murder 
and bums down and pillages houses in the Saxon squire's town. As the story 
progresses, his crusade becomes more and more excessive. He loses his wife, his 
possessions and finally his life when he is executed some eight years later. 
The story of Michael Kohlhaas and his frustrated quest for justice are proverbial in 
Germany and reflect how, in an extreme case, an unresolved dispute can slowly 
escalate to a cross-border bloodshed. If he had obtained a remedy at the outset of 
the story this bloodshed and destruction could have been avoided. This story is 
relevant to the internet, since, as this thesis will show, the internet brings persons 
interacting from different countries into conflict with each other, sometimes without 
access to redress through the state courts. This thesis examines how cross-border 
internet disputes for which the state courts cannot provide redress can be solved 
fairly. 
2. The Subject 
The starting point for the thesis was the legal and practical obstacles to dispute 
resolution placed by the traditional rules on jurisdiction and enforcement in cross-
border internet cases. These obstacles make it disproportionately expensi\'e and 
I Novella by Heinrich \on Kleist (1777-1811) 
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complex to litigate and enforce small claims in internet disputes.2 In business-to-
business (B2B) disputes the parties frequently use alternative forms of dispute 
resolution (ADR). This raises the question whether it is fair to transplant this model 
used in B2B disputes to all internet disputes. In answering this question the thesis 
develops a Model for the fair resolution of internet disputes. 
The reader may find a discussion of what are the relevant internet disputes in 
Chapter Three. Essentially, this thesis is primarily concerned with (i) small3 cross-
border internet disputes, where (ii) the parties are subject to a power imbalance. 
This question about fairness means that the thesis places special emphasis on 
internet disputes where the parties are subject to a power imbalance.4 The power 
paradigm for internet disputes as defined in this thesis is wider than (but inclusive 
of) the classic business-to-consumer (B2C) paradigm of consumer protection law. 
The definition of power paradigms can be found in Chapter Three. It encompasses 
all disputes where one party is an individual and the other party an incorporated 
. 5 
entIty. 
This raises the question whether small cross-border internet disputes between two 
individuals, such as two consumers (C2C) are covered.6 Since there is no power 
imbalance, such disputes are not as problematic from a fairness point of view. 
However, such disputes are important for the second generation internee and are 
not excluded from the scope of the thesis, as individuals have problems with 
gaining access to the courts in small claims internet cases and access is one of the 
2 Small claims are defined for the purpose of this thesis as a claim in a cross-border internet dispute where 
the costs of litigating and enforcing it across a border make it disproportionately expensive to do so. Wh~t 
figure this amounts to depends on the jurisdictions involved and has to be assessed on a case-by-case baSIS. 
Figures in Chapter 3-7 and also Chapter 8-5 . 
3 The reference to the size of the dispute refers to the value of the claim 
42 -2.3.3 and 2-5 and 3-5 and 3-6 
5 3-6.3 
6 See 3- 6.3 
- Taking into consideration the rise of user-generate~ content, auction plat.forms. s~cial n~t\\'orki~g and 
other interactive web-services, peer-to-peer file shanng and other applicatIOns leadmg to mteractlons 
between individuals. 
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elements of fairness. 8 Therefore, the recommendations made in the Model described 
in Chapter Eight 9 also address disputes between individuals. 
In terms of methodology the thesis has been based on an extensive literature review, 
both in the legal and social science field 10 and literature on jurisprudence and on 
legal analysis of primary legal sources, including a comprehensive and original 
review of relevant case law. The research focuses mainly on English and US law 11. 
These jurisdictions have been chosen, since there the debate on ADR and arbitration 
is most developed. In some instances the thesis also uses a wider comparative 
approach, drawing on the laws of other jurisdictions by way of example to illustrate 
particular points, where relevant. The law is up-to-date until 1. July 2007, unless 
stated otherwise. 
3. The Hypothesis 
The Hypothesis of this dissertation is that online arbitration is a suitable binding 
redress mechanism for disputes arising on the internet, but that for disputes between 
individuals or where the parties are subject to a significant power imbalance, the 
traditional arbitration model has to be adapted to implement due process standards. 
Accordingly, this thesis develops a Model for the resolution of internet disputes 12. 
4. The Literature Review 
The internet has the potential to lead to an increase in cross-border disputes, since 
the internet is a powerful communications medium, that allows data exchanges in 
various media formats between a wide range of different users situated in distant 
locations. Much has been written about the increase of direct cross-border 
8 2-2.3.1 
<) 8-6 
10 The latter mainly in respect of the forms and functions of ADR 
II Lookin o mainl\' at federal law and some State law 
o -I~ 8-6 
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interactions enabled by the internet's borderless nature and the jurisdictional 
problems for internet disputes this causes. 13 
Readers may be aware of the substantial literature about the difficulty of applying 
private international law rules to the internet, from which many academics and 
practitioners have concluded that for small cross-border internet disputes, forms of 
dispute resolution other than traditional litigation have to be used. 14 It should be 
pointed out here that the thesis concentrates on extrajudicial dispute resolution 
mechanims. It does not examine in detail how judicial cross-border dispute 
resolution could be made more accessible (eg through greater adoption of 
technology, international judicial co-operation, investment of financial resources).15 
ADR using online technologies, which has been given the term Online Dispute 
Resolution (ODR) has frequently been hailed as the solution to the internet's 
jurisdictional problems. In this context a whole new discipline on ODR has been 
formed, discussing the benefits and methods of using online technologies for 
dispute resolution. 16 
This is the state of the discussion at present. However, no-one has undertaken a 
systematic analysis of whether the current forms of ADR (transposed into ODR) are 
best suited to provide fair redress for internet disputants and whether and how ADR 
has to be adapted for this purpose. 
The main concern of this thesis is fairness in the extra-judicial resolution of internet 
disputes. Accordingly, this thesis examines ODR from an ethical perspective. While 
it is accepted that the availability of ODR may enhance trust so that users engage in 
online activities and that ODR reduces transaction costs and hence creates greater 
1.\ Bibliography to Chapter 3 
1-1 Bibliography to Chapter 3 
15 Topic for another thesis 
16 Bibliography to Chapter 5 
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wealth for the participants in an activity, this has not been the central focus or 
concern for this thesis. 
Being concerned with fairness, it was necessary to review some of the philosophical 
approaches of what amounts to fairness in dispute resolution procedures. This part 
of the thesis is largely, but by no means exclusively, based on John Rawls' 
influential book A Theory of Justice. 17 Having worked out the core ingredients of 
procedural fairness it was then necessary to look at some fundamental and basic 
concepts and questions in dispute resolution, such as what is a dispute and what is 
the function of different forms of ADR. 18 
This examination of the forms and functions of ADR has led to the conclusion that 
the thesis should mainly focus on online arbitration. The reason for this is not that 
mediation is unimportant, on the contrary, the thesis argues that mediation should, if 
practical, be attempted as it has the important function of filtering out disputes 
where a compromise can be found. The reason for the focus on arbitration was that 
arbitration is the only binding ADR form 19 and therefore, in this sense, the only real 
1 · d' 20 a ternatlve to court procee lngs. 
Therefore, this thesis focuses on fairness in arbitration and asks whether the model 
set by traditional commercial arbitration would be a suitable model for the 
resolution of internet disputes. For this purpose, a detailed examination of due 
process in arbitration21 and the law applicable in arbitration22 was necessary. As 
readers may perceive from the literature used, the topic of due process and human 
rights in arbitration is currently vigorously and critically discussed. 23 
17 Bibliography to Chapter ~ 
18 Bibliography to Chapter 4 
19 A more precise distinction has to be made between: binding nature of the ADR agreement, finality, res 
judicata effect and enforceability . ' . . 
:!o Taking a legal equivalence approach, rather than a fun~tIOnal ~qul\'alence approach. An examination of 
the legal issues arising from mediation warrant another dIssertatIOn. 
~I Bibliography to Chapter 6 
~~ Bibliography to Chapter 4 . 
~.\ In particular the contributions by T Carbonneau. A Jaksic. C Jarrosson. M K.urkel~. W Park. G 
Petrochilos. W Robinson and B Kasolo\\isky. A Samuel and A Tweedale mentIOned In the footnotes above 
16 
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Arbitration is based on the parties' agreement to use an alternative to the court 
system, in a way contracting out of the state court system. Arbitration is based on 
the premise that the parties should be free to solve disputes in the manner that they 
agree (the principle of party autonomy) and the waiver doctrine, ie the principle that 
the parties have waived their right to solve their dispute by litigation entailing full 
due process. 
Since arbitration is a form of quasi-judicial dispute resolution, readers may find it 
surprising that the examination of arbitral due process in this thesis reveals that due 
process standards are lower than before the courtS.24 These lower due process 
standards may be justified by the waiver doctrine and the principle of party 
autonomy where the parties are of roughly equal bargaining power and both have 
voluntarily entered into the arbitration agreement. The aim of this thesis has not 
been to criticise commercial arbitration as traditionally understood. 
However, the crucial point is here that the internet has changed the traditional 
paradigm. For many cross-border internet disputes the parties are not voluntarily 
choosing arbitration as a preferred way to solve disputes. Here, arbitration is not an 
alternative form of dispute resolution; it may well be the on~y practical form of 
dispute resolution. More importantly, arbitration is not voluntary where the parties 
are subject to a significant power imbalance and where one party imposes 
arbitration on the other. 25 To illustrate this point, the thesis reviews26 previous 
research in relation to other non-consensual forms of arbitration, such as the 
UDRPn and consumer arbitration. 2~ 
:!4 Chapter 6 
25 7-1 and 7-2 
26 Chapter 7 .. . _ 
:!7 The UDRP is not strictly speakIng arbltratloll- by way of analogy 
:!8 Bibliography to Chapter 7 
1 7 
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5. The Contribution 
The original contribution of this thesis is the finding that online arbitration 
modelled on commercial arbitration is not fair for internet disputes involving 
individuals and in particular, where there is a significant power imbalance between 
the parties29 . The research having crystallised that arbitration has to be adapted for 
such internet disputes, this thesis explains that a new model is needed to make 
online arbitration fair for such disputes. This thesis establishes a Model for the 
resolution of internet disputes, which encourages the use of online arbitration for 
internet disputes, but subjects traditional commercial arbitration to more stringent 
due process standards. The thesis defines the relevant power imbalances and sets 
out minimum due process standards based on the experience with commercial 
arbitration, the UDRP and consumer arbitration, and projects how these standards 
could be implemented in the future. 
Most books in the ODR field are purely descriptive (describing what Online 
Dispute Resolution is and its benefits), written from the viewpoint of ADR 
practitioners. By contrast, this thesis proceeds from the viewpoint of internet law 
and regulation and the specific challenges that the internet poses for dispute 
resolution. At the same time it contains a very detailed, rigorous and practical 
analysis of arbitration law and due process and applies this profound analysis to 
internet disputes. 
The original contribution to the current debate on ODR is that the thesis (i) 
recognises the value of online arbitration for the resolution of internet disputes (ii) 
proposes how to bring the parties before the online arbitrator (iii) synthesizes the 
current thinking on private international law , internet regulation. dispute resolution, 
ADR, ODR and due process in arbitration, (iv) establishes a theory of how the 
traditional arbitration model needs to be adapted to suit the challenges posed by the 
29 Defined as a dispute between a corporate entity and an individual 
18 
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internet and (v) develops a comprehensive and profound Model for fair dispute 
resolution on the internet. 
19 
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Chapter 2 : The Concepts of Fairness 
"An appreciation of unfairness develops early. A child of jive, perhaps younger, is 
likely to know the meaning ofunfairness ( ... ). What any child might have more 
difficulty in doing is to give expression to the converse notion, the idea offairness. 
Unfairness shouts out. Fairness goes un remarked. " 
(JG Riddall Jurisprudence (Butterworths London 1999) 196) 
1. Introduction 
This thesis is concerned with the fair resolution of internet disputes. It is necessary 
to define procedural fairness at the outset. 30 
First it is necessary to distinguish procedural fairness from distributive fairness. The 
latter is concerned with the allocation ofresources31 , whereas procedural fairness is 
not concerned with the outcome of the allocation, but the procedure of getting 
there. 32 Therefore, a theory on dispute resolution (such as this thesis) is about 
procedural fairness. Hence, this thesis does not explore the issues of fairness of 
substantive laws and distributive justice. 
Fairness is an extremely amorphous and elusive notion and it is frequently used in 
an emotive way. While most people have an instinctive idea about a procedure 
30 The terms 'fair' and 'just' and 'fairness' and 'justice' are used interchangeably in this thesis- it seems 
that there is little difference in meaning, see also HLA Hart The Concept of Law (2nd Edition Clarendon 
Press Oxford 1994) 158: 'most of the criticisms made in tenns of just and unjust could almost equally well 
be conveyed by the words 'fair' and 'unfair' 
31 Such as property rights and their limitation, contractual entitlements and obligations, social security etc. 
Distributive justice is concerned with the fair allocation of resources. 
3.::! A Tschentscher 'The Function of Procedural Justice in Theories of Justice' in K Rohl, S Machura (eds.) 
Proccc/llml Justice (Ashgate Dartmouth Aldershot UK 1997) 105-119. 105-106 
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being 'unfair' or 'unjust', it is much more difficult to build a comprehensive 
concept of the converse: fairness in dispute resolution. 
This Chapter builds a concept of fairness using the building blocks of the traditional 
principle of due process33 and relates this to general theories of procedural fairness. 
In doing this, the theory of fairness adopted in this thesis leans heavily on Rawls' 
Theory of Justice. However before looking at Rawls and legal due process, the 
following section starts by deliberating on the elements of procedural fairness in a 
more general manner. 
2. Definition of Fairness in Dispute Resolution 
By way of overview, this section puts forward that procedural fairness in dispute 
resolution should consist of three main principles: equal treatment. a rational 
approach to decision-making (adjudication34, such as litigation or arbitration) or to 
negotiation (and mediation) and effectiveness, which in turn consists of general 
access and mechanisms to counter-balance existing procedural inequalities between 
the parties ('the counterpoise'). 
2.1 Equal treatment of the parties 
The notion of equal treatment has been at the core of fair treatment. 35 A dispute 
resolution process, which disadvantages one of the parties. which prevents only one 
of the parties from advancing any evidence or which involves a decision-maker 
biased towards one of the parties is self-evidently unfair. 
33 The phrases 'due process' and 'natural justice' are used interchangeably with the same meaning. 'Due 
process' is more commonly used in the US and 'natural justice' more commonly in the English legal 
tradition. see HJ Friendly 'Some Kind of Hearing' (1975) 123 University of Pennsylmnia Lml' Ret'jell' 
1267-1317.1276 
34 The term 'adjudication' in this thesis is used as a neutral term to mean a form of dispute resolution 
invoh'ing a thi;d party making a decision binding on the parties, and is to include arbitration, ombudsmen 
and litigation rather than in the meaning of 'expert determination'. 
15 JG Riddall Jurisprudence (Butterworths London 1999) 197 
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The Oxford English Dictionary defines fair as 'treating people equaUy,36. John 
Rawls in his Theory of Justice posits the greatest possible equality as the first 
founding principle of a just society.37 He argues that this would be the first and 
foremost principle the imaginary founders of a just society would agree upon. 
While equal treatment is an obvious ingredient of fairness it is only part of the 
picture. In addition there must be a qualitative element to dispute resolution. 
2.2 A rational approach to dispute resolution 
The second element of procedural fairness in dispute resolution is taking a rational 
approach to solving a dispute. 
For Lon Fuller the defining characteristic of adjudication, particularly compared to 
other forms of social ordering such as voting, is participation by presenting proofs 
and reasoned argument and he therefore posits that the results from adjudication are 
subject to a high standard of rationality. 38 
Dispute resolution consists of fact-finding processes, problem-solving and law 
application.39 These processes should be governed by logic and reason. so that no 
irrelevant considerations are taken into account. 40 
Applying the law in a rational manner also means that like cases should be treated 
in a like manner. Logic in applying and interpreting the law should determine when 
two factual scenarios are the same and should be treated the same and when two 
36 C Soanes and A Stevenson Concise Oxford English Dictionary (11 th Edition Oxford University Press 
Oxford 2004) 
37 ibid 53 
38 L Fuller 'The Fonns and Limits of Adjudication' (1978-79) 92 Harl'ard Law Re\'ieH' 353-409.364.366. 
370 
39 As to the different types of dispute resolution and the processes they involve 4-3 
4l) W Park Procedural E\'oillfion in BlIsiness Arhitration (Oxford University Press Oxford 2006) 54 
Chapter 2: The Concepts of Fairness 
factual scenarios are different and should be treated differently.41 Hence rationality 
implies a degree of regularity in law application.42 This is encapsulated by the 
principle of the rule of law. HLA Hart points to this close connection between due 
process and proceeding by rule.43 
Fact-finding processes should be in accordance with logic and accurate, for a 
decision based on wrong facts is by definition unfair. Therefore a rational approach 
to dispute resolution additionally involves a degree of accuracy as to the factual 
basis of any decision.44 
2.3 Effectiveness 
A third element of procedural fairness in dispute resolution is the effectiveness of 
the procedure. Effectiveness means that a procedure leads to a decision or solution 
of a dispute. It consists of two elements: access and the counterpoise. 
2.3.1 Access 
If a dispute resolution procedure is so cumbersome, drawn out and expensive that a 
decision or solution is never reached or only after excessive cost and delay, this 
would mean that such a procedure is not fair. 45 This is encapsulated in the saying 
'justice delayed becomes justice denied'. 
41 HLA Hart fn 30 159: 'Hence justice is traditionally thought of as maintaining or restoring a balance or 
proportion, and its leading precept is often formulated as 'Treat like cases alike'; though we need to add to 
the latter 'and treat different cases differently'. 
4~ 
- See also L Fuller fn 38 380-381 
4.~ HLA Hart The Concept of Lent' (2nd Edition Clarendon Press Oxford 1994) 160 
44 The Oxford English Dictionary accords the expression 'fair and square' the meaning 'with absolute 
a~curacy, honestly and straightforwardly'; fn 36 ., . . 
4) EU Recommendation 98/257IEC Principle IV 'Effectiveness: see also the .1 unsprudence of the ECtHR 
finding that excessive delay is a breach of the right to a fair trial under Art.6 (l) ECHK see cg Hentrich \' 
France A Series No. 296-A (1994) 18 E.H.R.R. 440 
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2.3.2 Counterpoise 
While the principle of access looks at effectiveness of the procedure itself, the 
counterpoise takes into account obstacles to effective participation which are not 
inherent to the procedure, but arise from a party's inability to take part in the 
procedure on an equal footing. Thus the counterpoise is concerned with pre-existing 
power imbalances between the parties and consists of measures to reduce them. 
Formal equal treatment of the parties by the judge/mediator/arbitrator and a rational 
approach to dispute resolution are necessary, but not sufficient, if the parties cannot 
participate in the dispute resolution process on an equal footing because of pre-
existing procedural power imbalances. For example if one party only has no access 
to legal advice, no experience in litigation and no financial resources to fight a case, 
he or she would be less equipped to take part in a dispute resolution procedure than 
the other party.46 
In particular, power imbalances are a problem for effectiveness since it is more 
likely that the dominant party imposes its terms on the weaker party.47 Furthermore, 
the dominant party is less likely to agree to binding dispute resolution in the first 
place, if the weaker party is the claimant. 48 
Therefore, it must be recognised that there should be some counterpoise to pre-
existing power imbalances for the purposes of dispute resolution to enable equal 
participation by both parties.49 
46 3-5 (power in dispute resolution) 
4~ 6-4.2.3 (a) (party autonomy) 
48 8-2 
49 M Cappelletti 'Alternative Dispute Resolution Processes within the Framework o:the World-Wide- . 
Access-to- Justice Movement 56 The Modern Law Revieow 282-296, 283: G PetrochIl~s Procedural L~H' 111 
International Arbitration (Oxford University Press 2004) 128-1.29: L Nader' Altemat!v_es to ~he Am~~can 
J d · . 1St m' ~-':;1 ')9 and L Nader & C Shugart 'Old SolutIOns for Old Problems )7-10_,04-0) In L u ICla ys e .... -
Nader /\'0 Access to L(/\\' (Academic Press New York 1980) 
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2.4 Conclusion 
This section has introduced a concept of fairness in dispute resolution consisting of 
three main principles of equal treatment, rationality and effectiveness. Effectiveness 
is concerned with access and a counterpoise to existing procedural inequalities. as 
illustrated in Fig. 1. All three principles must be met to some minimum level to 
achieve fairness in dispute resolution. 
In the next sections this conceptualisation will be deepened by synthesizing the 
traditional notion of due process and Rawls' Theory of Justice and Habermas' ideas 
about fair participation. 
/ 
J 
Equal Treatment of 
the Parties 
Figure 1: Fairness Definition: 
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Effectiveness 
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3. Process Values and Forms of Procedural Justice 
I 
Counterpoise 
Having enumerated the principles which make up the concept of procedural 
fairness, it may be worthwhile to pause for a moment and consider process values 
more generally. Process values are legal principles governing procedures (such as a 
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rule against torture, for example). Process values have been extensively discussed in 
literature under the question whether they are important values in their own right or 
whether they are only important to the extent that they lead to a good outcome (such 
as a fair decision or a fair settlement). In other words the question to be answered is 
whether process values are to be judged according to the results they produce or 
whether they have a value independent of any result they engender. 
3.1 Process values 
Some US scholars have argued50 that particular features of legal processes are 
'process values' independent of whether or not these features contribute to better 
outcomes of legal processes. They argue that an infringement against such values 
would be wrong, even if the infringement leads to a 'good outcome' 51. The rationale 
behind this argument is that its verity is reflected in the saying that the ends do not 
always justify the means. In other words adherents to the theory of process values 
argue that certain features of legal processes must not be changed, even if they have 
no apparent positive effect on the outcome. 
It is submitted that this vague concept of 'process values' is not particularly 
helpful. 52 The notion of 'process values' in fact only describes the problem of 
balancing conflicting results caused by different processes. While the ends may not 
always justify the means, the means can only be judged by the effects they cause 
(balancing the intended results and the unintended effects). 53 
50 RS Summers 'Evaluating and Improving Legal Processes-A Plea for "Process Values" (1974) 60 Cornell 
Law Revic1t' 1-52; MH Redish, LC Marshall 'Adjudicatory Independence and the Values of Procedural Due 
Process' (1986) 95 Yale La1t, Journal 455-505. 482-491; G Richardson, H Genn "Tribunals in Transition: 
Resolution or Adjudication"[2007] Public Law 116-141,120 
51 The argument that infringement of process values is always wrong, is also unconvincing as it is never 
explained how to ascertain what amounts to a 'good' outcome. 
5~ DJ Galligan Due Process and Fair Procedures (Clarendon Press Oxford 1996) 9; Even John Allison, 
who supports the notion of 'process values' admits: 'These values are a bit more slippery than instrumental 
ones such as accuracy, efficacy and efficiency ( ... ) their amorphous nature also makes them less 
susceptible to consensus.' 'A Process Value Analysis of Decision-Maker Bias: The Case of Economic 
Conflicts of Interest' (1995) 32 AII/crica/l Blisiness LG1t, Journal 481-540,499 
D See Art.by Joci1C/l BittnCl" in Die Zeit ~ www.zeit.de2003'31 uneil 2S070Y!pa!.!c.' all [on 14, 
September 2007] 
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For example, if we imagine a (truthful) confession resulting from torture- it could 
(superficially) be argued that an unfair procedure (torture) has lead to a fair result 
(ascertainment of the truth) and that the apparently fair (intended) result does not 
make the unfair procedure fair. In fact, the torture has not only lead to a fair result, 
but also to unintended unfair results, in the sense that the torture left the tortured 
person psychologically and physically injured and upset the confidence in the legal 
system. Hence the positive and negative results of the procedure have to be 
carefully balanced. A recent case in 2003 has renewed the discussion about whether 
torture could ever be justified and undermines the absolute nature of process values: 
a law student named Magnus Gafgen had kidnapped a boy from a banker's family 
for a ransom. When the police arrested and interviewed Gafgen they thought that 
the victim may still be alive and would have to be found very quickly to save his 
life. When Gafgen showed reluctance to admit the location of his victim the police 
threatened to cause him considerable pain. Gafgen revealed the location of the 
victim and it turned out that he had murdered the boy. These illegal police tactics 
caused a loud outcry in Germany and demands that torture should never be used 
regardless of the circumstances. However the discussion largely overlooked that 
torture here was not used to obtain a confession for conviction (which would have 
been inadmissible in court) but in order to save another person's life. Balancing the 
boy's right to life with the right to bodily integrity of the accused may lead to the 
conclusion that torture could be justified in some very rare and extreme cases (albeit 
that it is far from clear whether torture is ever an effective means). 
Legal processes are never an end in themselves, but are designed to lead to 
particular results (such as, eg ascertaining the truth or the correct and fair 
application of the law to the facts). The aim of a fair procedure is not the process 
itself, but the fact that it leads to a fair result and it is the result by which the 
procedure is judged. 54 Where a process has been tainted with unfairness, eg a biased 
judge, the result will be unfair, since there is a risk that the outcome may have been 
affected (since it cannot be shown with certainty whether or not the outcome was in 
54 See also OJ Galligan fn 52 65 
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fact affected) and since trust in the integrity of the legal system has been 
undennined. 55 
In other words, procedures have an instrumental or defining function they serve the 
purpose of making the process and its result fair. 56 This cannot be more clearly 
expressed than through Raw Is' concept of procedural justice, which will be 
discussed in the next section. 
3.2 The Rawlsian concept of procedural justice 
John Rawls has distinguished between four fonns of procedural justice. 57 For the 
first two fonns (perfect procedural justice and imperfect procedural justice) it is 
clear what the fair outcome of the procedure would be and the purpose of the 
procedure is to achieve or approximate this outcome. In other words for perfect and 
imperfect procedural justice it can be objectively ascertained a priori what a fair 
outcome is and the procedure is instrumental in achieving this. 
In particular, for cases of perfect procedural justice the procedure, if properly 
applied, realises the fair outcome. An illustration for this is the rule applied between 
two persons sharing a cake that one person cuts the cake into two pieces and the 
other chooses which piece he or she takes. In this case the fair outcome is equal 
treatment and this is achieved by the cake-cutter having an incentive to cut two 
pieces as equal as possible. In cases of imperfect procedural justice, the procedure 
has only an approximating function. In other words, here the procedure merely 
increases the chances of the fair outcome. Examples for this are fact-finding 
procedures in civil and criminal trials, where (part of) the fair outcome is finding 
the facts of what happened. However. these procedures are called imperfect, since 
the rules of evidence only imperfectly lead to the truth: 'the characteristic mark of 
55 R,' Sussex Justices. c:rp McCarthy [1914] 1KB 256 (Divisional Court) and 6-3 
5<> DJ Galligan fn 52 62 _ 
5" J Rawls A Theory (?f Justice (Revised Edition Oxford University Press Oxford 1999) 74-7,:" 176 
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imperfect procedural justice is that while there is an independent criterion for the 
correct outcome, there is no feasible procedure which is sure to lead to it. ~ 58 
By contrast, for the other two forms of procedural justice~ pure and quasi-pure 
procedural justice, rules are defining the outcome as being fair. Merely looking at 
the outcomes of these procedures it is not discernible whether or not the outcomes 
are fair-there is no independent criterion to assess whether or not the result is fair. 
In other words it is the design of the procedural rules and their correct application 
which define the outcome as being fair. 59 
Pure procedural justice defines an outcome as fair, for example a game of chance 
allocating statistically equal chances of winning or losing to each participant. While 
it cannot be said that it is fair that this or the other participant wins, provided the 
rules have properly been applied, the outcome will be fair. Quasi-pure procedural 
rules also define the outcome as fair, but the rules might be contentious, as it is not 
statistically verifiable whether or not they lead to a fair result. According to Rawls, 
the function of quasi-pure procedural justice is to define the limits of discretion of a 
decision-maker for the selection of an outcome, which is merely one fair outcome 
of many possible other fair outcomes.60 
Applying Rawl's conceptualisation to dispute resolution, dispute resolution involves 
both fact-finding processes and processes requiring the exercise of discretion, such 
as contract bargaining (eg in mediation) and law applying (eg in adjudication, such 
as arbitration), for the latter to the extent that the application of law involves a 
power of discretion, eg in the application and interpretation of the law. 
The fact-finding part of the processes should be governed by rules of imperfect 
procedural justice to ensure that there is a great likelihood that the facts are found 
out correctly. However, contract bargaining and the exercise of discretion in 
58 ibid 75 
59 DJ Galligan fn 5~ 62 
60 ibid 176 
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applying and interpreting law require procedural rules to define them as fair. as it is 
impossible to discern from the outcome itself whether or not a particular 
interpretation of the law is fair or unfair. 61 
Lisa Bingham in her examination of the fairness of arbitration awards in 
employment arbitration emphasizes the difficulty of measuring the fairness in terms 
of distributive justice of the outcome and accuracy of fact-finding and law-applying 
in dispute resolution: 'accuracy, both positive in the sense of correct fact finding 
and normative in the sense of correct application of decision standards is 
notoriously hard to measure in any dispute resolution process' .62 For this reason the 
standard of fairness has to be measured by the procedure. Lon Fuller also argues 
that the procedure of participation by presenting proofs and reasoned arguments by 
both parties defines the fairness and integrity of adjudication.63 
Imperfect procedural justice and quasi-pure procedural justice both deal with 
deficiencies in human knowledge- the procedure is instrumental to fill this gap in 
human knowledge. In other words we have no way to find the absolute factual 
accuracy nor have we any means of ascertaining what the right decision is in the 
sense of normative regularity, but only procedures, which we have good reason to 
believe, will lead to the right result. This deficiency of knowledge explains the 
importance of public confidence in legal procedures and notions such as 'justice 
must be seen to be done' .64 
In conclusion, rather than defining absolute procedural values (such as process 
values), it is more helpful to regard dispute resolution processes as governed by two 
types of procedural rules: rules that are instrumental in establishing the truth 
underlying factual disputes and also rules defining the boundaries of a fair exercise 
61 John R Allison fn 52 493 
6:! L Bingham 'On Repeat Players, Adhesive Contracts, And the Use of,Staystic~~in ~udicial Review of 
Employment Arbitration Awards' (1998) 29 McGeorge Lm\' ReView 22_~-2)9, 2) /-2)9 
6J L Fuller fn 38 364 
64 DJ Galligan fn 52 66, 72 
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of discretion in applying and interpreting the law. The next section explains how 
due process realises both these functions. 
4. Due Process65 
John Rawls considers the principle of due process as critical for securing the 
greatest equal liberty of citizens.66 He maintains that 'even in a well-ordered society 
the coercive powers of government are to some degree necessary for the stability of 
social co-operation'. 67 Hence it is critical that these coercive powers are exercised 
in an impartial manner and in accordance with the rule of law. 68 
The notion of due process (or natural justice) comprises the two fundamental 
principles that no-one should be a judge in his or her own cause, meaning that 
judges should be independent and impartial, and the principle of a fair hearing, 
meaning that each party should have an equal opportunity to present evidence and 
I 69 aw. 
The purpose of the principle of impartiality is to ensure that the judge treats the 
parties equally, maintains an open mind and does not take into account irrelevant 
considerations 70, hence contributing to equal treatment and the rationality of the 
decision and thereby to the fairness of the decision. An impartial mind is also 
required to ascertain the facts and is therefore a rule of imperfect procedural justice. 
But it is also a rule of quasi-pure procedural justice in that it means that the judge 
applies his or her discretion without pre-judgment or prejudice and therefore defines 
any resulting interpretation of the law as fair. 
65 Elements of due process, see Chapter 6 
66 J Rawls fn 57210-211 
67 ibid 211 
68 ibid 210; for the argument that arbitration is coercive and should therefore comport with notions of due 
process 6-2.5 
h" SH Bailey, JPL Ching, MJ Gunn, DC Ormerod Smith. BailC1' and GUI111: 011 the Modern Legal SysTem 
(4 1h ed Sweet & Maxwell London 2002) 1315.280- see also Chapter 6 
70 I urther in 6-3 
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Similarly the purpose of the principle of a fair hearing7! is to ensure that each party 
participates in the process and has an opportunity to present their side of the case. 
thereby ensuring equality between the parties and rationality of the ensuing 
decision, and hence, ultimately, fairness. Furthermore a fair hearing is instrumental 
to finding the facts underlying the case and can therefore be described as a rule of 
imperfect procedural justice. But to the extent that the parties present legal 
arguments the principle of fair hearing also leads to a balanced application of 
discretion and it is therefore also a rule of quasi-pure procedural justice. 
The principle of due process has become so settled by now that it is easy to forget 
the underlying justification. 72 In essence, the procedural principles encapsulated in 
the notion of due process ensure equal treatment and rationality and thus contribute 
to fairness. 
While due process is concerned about equal treatment it ignores pre-existing 
inequalities between the parties. It gives each party a formally equal opportunity to 
participate, but ignores any difference in the parties' actual ability to participate. 
5. The Difference Principle: Counterbalancing Existing 
Inequalities 
John Rawls in his contract theory establishes two main principles for ensuring 
fairness in a well-ordered society.73 As has been mentioned, the first principle is 
that of the greatest possible equal liberty, conferring equal basic rights and duties on 
all individuals. The second principle has two limbs, ie that there should be fair 
equality of opportunity and that the interests of the most disadvantaged groups of 
society should be advanced to close the gap between the most disadvantaged and 
the most advantaged: 
71 
. See 6-4 
-~ DJ Galligan fn 52 64.349 
n ibid 53 
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'social and economic inequalities, for example inequalities of wealth and authority, 
are just only if they result in compensating benefits for everyone, and in particular 
for the least advantaged members of society.' 74 
John Rawls argues that these two principles would be chosen as the governing 
principles of justice by the imaginary founders of society (he calls this the original 
position), if they were not acting in their own self-interest. This absence of self-
interest could be guaranteed by the founders wearing what he calls the 'veil of 
ignorance', ie they would not know their position in society, which groups or class 
they would belong to. John Rawls uses this fiction of the 'veil of ignorance' (which 
is in itself an example of quasi-procedural justice) to convince us that the resulting 
. . I .c:' 75 pnnclp es are lair. 
Although equality is stipulated as a principle, it is also significant, that Rawls 
acknowledges that equality cannot be achieved by mere equal treatment. Rawls' 
second principle demonstrates that it is necessary to counter-balance the inequalities 
existing in real societies. Hence in a Rawlsian sense, fairness is more than mere 
equal treatment. This argument that fairness transcends mere equality is a very 
important contribution to the conceptualisation of fairness. 
Likewise, for Jurgen Habermas the defining (quasi-procedural) determinant of 
fairness is equal participation in legal discourses. This equal participation is more 
than the formal equality we have found in the notion of due process. In Habermas' 
view it is critical that the parties can participate on an equal footing in legal 
processes. 76 
-.) ibid 13 
75 ibid 118-122 
7(, .J Habermas Fa/.;-ti::irc"it lind Ge/tllng (Suhrkamp Frankfurt am Main 1992) 187,516 
.... 3 
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Habermas effectively, like Rawls, argues that power imbalances must be levelled 
out through procedural fairness77 and he expressly refers to Rawl 's quasi-procedural 
justice.78 However Habermas assumes that this is less important for adjudication for 
the reason that judicial proceedings have institutionalised fair participation of both 
parties. 79 Habermas distinguishes between negotiations which require procedures 
to ensure that all interests are represented, that power imbalances are levelled out 
and that coercive powers do not prejudice the outcome80 and judicial proceedings, 
which have already institutionalised legal discourses inbuilt81 . Judicial proceedings 
define and limit the space in which the argumentation takes place: participation, 
roles, issues and the processes forming opinions and decisions are regulated. These 
procedural regulations are necessary to endue judicial proceedings with quasi-
procedural justice. 82 Habermas like Rawls argues that equal participation of the 
parties has to be guaranteed through procedural rules. 
For dispute resolution, Rawls' and Habermas' theories mean that due process (as 
defined above: equal treatment and rationality) in itself is not sufficient. It is not 
sufficient to merely ensure that the parties are treated equally and that decisions are 
rational, accurate and according to the rule of law. In addition, in cases in which a 
significant power imbalance exists between the parties, fairness means that 
measures must be taken to redress this power imbalance to ensure equal 
participation by the parties. Therefore, the principle of due process in dispute 
resolution is only a sine qua non condition, but not sufficient to guarantee fairness 
of procedures. Additional steps must be taken to redress power imbalances. This 
requirement of a counterpoise to existing power imbalances is an important aspect 
of fairness which is neglected if one merely focuses on due process. 
77 ibid 205 
78 ibid 220 
79 L Fuller fn 38 366-367 
80 J Haberrnas fn 76 218 
81 ibid 219 
H~ 'b'd ')'"10 1 1 __ 
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Various methods can be used to redress such power imbalances, the most important 
of which are legal aid or other mechanisms which give the disadvantaged party 
greater access to redress (such as small claims procedures in consumer cases). 
Many of these mechanisms will be of a distributive nature (such as legal aid). A 
detailed discussion of these distributive mechanisms is outside the scope of this 
thesis, which merely focuses on procedural rules in extra-judicial dispute resolution. 
Furthermore, this thesis only considers power imbalances in dispute resolution. It 
does not examine the existence of power imbalances generally and whether and 
how the substantive law should address or redress such power imbalances. In other 
words this thesis does not discuss whether there should be new substantive laws to 
redress power imbalances not recognised at present or whether the scope of 
coverage of some protective laws, such as consumer protection should be 
expanded.83 This would be a topic for another examination. 84 
Chapter Three discusses power imbalances in the context of internet disputes. It 
considers the factors giving power in dispute resolution and puts forward general 
criteria for legally determining the presence of a power imbalance between 
disputants. However, it would be costly and cumbersome to carry out such an 
assessment on a case-by-case basis for each dispute ex post. The approach has to be 
a general, ex ante approach which establishes an irrebuttable presumption that a 
power imbalance is present, if the parties have a certain status. This is the approach 
taken in consumer protection law. This will be further discussed in Chapter Three. 85 
The following figure illustrates how the three elements of fairness discussed in the 
first section relate to due process and Habermas' and Rawls' theories: 
8~ Briefly discussed in 3-6 for finding a definition for r~levan~ intem~t disputes. . _ 
X-I Substantive issues are excluded from the scope of thIS theSIS. applIcable law IS mcluded 4-4.) 
85 .., 6 
.'-
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The next question is how the three elements of fairness relate to each other. The 
more all three elements of fairness could be augmented at the same time, the fairer 
the ensuing procedure would be. Regrettably, this may not be possible as the next 
section will explain. 
6. The Inherent Conflict Between Due Process and 
Effectiveness 
It is posited here that an inherent conflict exists between due process and 
effectiveness (access and the counterpoise). Due process requirements make legal 
procedures more elaborate and more strategic involving the expenditure of precious 
resources and time and are therefore apt to render legal processes lengthy and 
costly. They are thus likely to reduce the effectiveness of dispute resolution. 
Increased costs and delay, however makes procedures not only less effective and 
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less accessible, but may also reinforce existing power imbalances86. Increased costs 
and delay put the stronger party at an advantage and the weaker party at a 
disadvantage. Therefore, a high degree of due process in legal procedure 
necessitates even greater efforts at providing access and a counterpoise to existing 
inequalities. If such efforts are not made, a higher degree of due process may well 
be counter-productive for fairness. Since there is a limit to the extent to which it is 
possible to use resources to increase access and to counter-balance existing 
inequalities, there is logically also a limit to due process. 
This conflict is reflected in Axel Tschentscher's criticism of Habermas' discourse 
theory and Rawl 's contract theory. He argues that they are unrealistic in practice. 
Factually existing inequalities in society make equal and non-coercive participation 
in legal processes impossible.87 
Judge Friendly has also eloquently described this conflict between fairness and 
cost-effectiveness: 
'It should be realized that procedural requirements entail the expenditure of limited 
resources, that at some point the benefit to individuals from an additional safeguard 
is substantially outweighed by the cost of providing such protection, and that the 
expense of protecting those likely to be found undeserving will probably come out 
of the pockets of the deserving. ,88 
This conflict is also the underlying cause for the difficulty of balancing funding and 
fairness of dispute resolution procedures. If the procedure is expensive, access is 
restricted (in particular for a party with little resources, such as a consumer) or the 
cost might be disproportionate to the value of the claim. If the procedure is initiated, 
set-up, designed, financed and subscribed to by one stakeholder only (such as a 
business association in B2C disputes) it is likely that the procedure may not be 
86 ~-5 for power in dispute resolution 
87 A Tschentscher fn 32 114-115 
88 HJ Friendly fn 33 1276 
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neutral and contrary to due process requirements. In the reverse, a procedure with 
limited due process which is fast and cheap is likely to be 'rough justice' and 
infringing on due process principles. 
William Park tells the anecdote of a shoe shop in Boston which displayed a notice 
in a window listing the following characteristics of its service 'fast service' and 
'low price' and 'high quality' with the caption 'pick any two'. 89 The same applies to 
dispute resolution.9o Hence the challenge is to find the "right' balance between due 
process and effectiveness. 
However in the reverse it is also true to say that if effectiveness can be increased 
(for example through state funding91 or through technology92) more due process can 
be afforded. Hence it can be argued that measures should be taken to increase both 
due process and effectiveness and this will be discussed in the final Chapter Eight. 93 
7. Conclusion 
This brief Chapter has advanced the proposition that fairness consists of three 
fundamental principles of due process and access and a counterpoise to reduce pre-
existing inequalities. Traditionally, the notion of due process has insured that the 
parties are treated equally and that dispute resolution is a rational, accurate and 
regular process. However in the 20th century there has been more emphasis on 
power imbalances and the need to equalise pre-existing equalities, as for example 
espoused in Rawls' difference principle. If one accepts that fairness requires due 
process, access and a counterpoise to pre-existing inequalities a conflict results. If 
due process is increased, access is likely to be reduced and a greater counterpoise is 
required. The Chapter has shown that there is an inherent conflict between due 
process, which tends to lnake dispute resolution less accessible and effectiveness. 
89 W Park fn 40 50 
90 See also VI' Park fn 40 48-50 
9] 8-5 on the need for a subsidy from general taxation 
92 5-5 on ODR & access to justice 
93 8-5. 8-6 . 
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which requires that access to dispute resolution is increased. Therefore the 
challenge of any fair dispute resolution system is to find the 'right' balance between 
these principles. There is a wide range of methods which might be used to increase 
access and to reduce pre-existing inequalities; this thesis will look at one particular 
method: Chapter Five discusses the potential of Online Dispute Resolution (ODR) 
to increase access to justice and its ability to act as a counterpoise against existing 
procedural power imbalances. This thesis will also show in Chapters Seven and 
Eight that concerns exist as to whether ODR complies with due process 
requirements. However before these aspects of fairness are debated and weighed up 
it will be expedient to demonstrate why ADR and ODR is needed for internet 
disputes in the first place. This will be the task of the next two Chapters. 
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Chapter 3: Internet Disputes 
rf there is a technological advance without a social advance, there is, almost 
automatically, an increase in human misery. 
(Michael Harrington (1928-1989)) 
1. Introduction 
The purpose of this Chapter is to circumscribe the types of disputes this thesis is 
concerned with. It starts by conceptual ising the characteristics underlying the 
internet and why this makes the resolution of internet disputes difficult. The 
Chapter discusses the nature of the internet as a powerful multi-media 
communications channel, which has enabled individuals and consumers to take part 
in international interactions, cross-border e-commerce and international publishing 
on an unprecedented scale. By way of illustration, this Chapter sketches some 
typical international disputes, which arise (or hypothetically may arise) on the 
internet as a cross-border communications medium. This leads to a concern about 
cross-border disputes involving individuals and their access to cross-border 
litigation and power imbalances, where one party has much more resources for 
disputing than the other. 
2. Characteristics of the Internet 
By way of overview, this Section very briefly outlines the main characteristics of 
the internet and assesses the implications of these characteristics for internet 
disputes. This Section is organised under three aspects. The first aspect is that the 
location of the actors is irrelevant for the functionality of the internet, hence 
interaction is possible between any locations in the world. The second aspect is that 
it is difficult to map the geographical location of the actors and activities. Thirdly, 
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the internet has led to an increase in cross-border contacts and interactions by 
individuals on a mass scale. 
Before discussing the characteristics of the internet, a definition of the term 
'internet' is called for. The internet essentially is a medium for communications that 
allows data exchanges between computers across the world. The internet consists of 
hardware, a set of protocols called the TCP-IP set of protocols and various software 
applications such as the world-wide-web, email, peer-to-peer file sharing systems, 
ftp and news groups, allowing computers (and ultimately the persons sitting behind 
these computers) to communicate with each other. 94 The technology of the internet 
interconnects networks of networks of computers world-wide. It is important to 
point out that the phrase 'on the internet' (just like the phrases 'on the television' or 
'on the telephone') does not relate to a particular place but to a communications 
medium for the provision or collection of data. 95 
2.1 Location irrelevant for functionality 
The internet is a transnational communications medium that enables the seamless 
exchange of information through various applications (such as email or the world-
wide-web) across national borders at a high speed. 
Location is irrelevant for the functionality of applications used on the internet. In 
principle, information on a networked computer can be exchanged with any other 
networked computer, regardless of its geographical location. The reason for this is 
that the internet Protocol (IP) address system used to locate computers on the 
networks is not structured according to geographic or political borders.96 In other 
words, the logic underlying the IP address system is not congruent with 
94 Sometimes, the word 'internet' is used in a loose sense to refer to the world-wide-web, but strictly 
speaking this is incorrect and I avoid such use of the term. 
95 See CReed lntcmct Law (::!od edition Cambridge University Press 2004) 8-13 
96 D Johnson. D Post 'Law and Borders-the Rise of Law in Cyberspace' (1996) 48 SfG1!ford Lml' R('\'ie1l' 
1367-1402. 1370-1371; J Reidenberg 'Governing Networks and Rule-Making in Cyberspace' (1996) 45 
EmOll' Law Journa1911-930, 913-914: H Perritt, 'The internet is Changing the Public International Legal 
Syste~' (1999-2000) 88 Kentllcky LaH' Journal 885-955, 886-888 
41 
Chapter 3: Internet Disputes 
geographical borders. For this reason, the internet can be described as 'borderless' or 
ubiquitous and the location of computers on the network of networks is irrelevant 
for both receiving/accessing and providing/sending information. 
David Johnson and David Post in their famous article 'Law and Borders-The Rise 
of Law in Cyberspace' have emphasized the borderless nature of the internet: 
'Cyberspace has no territorially based boundaries, because the cost and speed of 
message transmission on the Net is almost entirely independent of physical 
location. Messages can be transmitted from one physical location to any other 
location without degradation, decay or substantial delay, and without any physical 
cues or barriers that might otherwise keep certain geographically remote places and 
people separate from one another ( ... ) The system is indifferent to the physical 
location of those machines. ,97 
Also Christopher Marsden writes: 
'The ubiquity, rapid penetration and commonplace necessity of international data 
flows over digital communications networks ( ... ) combined with the economic 
and social effects of such flows, makes the internet the paradigm of globalisation: 
it was "born global". ,98 
This ubiquity of the internet is of course subj ect to the proviso that the 
infrastructure conditions, such as the fixed telephony network, affordable internet 
access and availability of broadband are not the same in each country. But provided 
there is capacity to access the network, communication is not contingent on 
physical proximity between sender and recipient. The internet enables 
communication over large distances at low cost. 
'1- 0 Johnson. D Post fn 96 1370-1371 
98 C Marsden 'Introduction: information and communications technologies, globalisation and regulation' in 
C Marsden (ed.) Regulating the Globall1?formation Society 1-40.2 
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The borderless nature of the internet means that more interactions and transactions 
are involving parties located in different jurisdictions. Therefore there is a 
likelihood of a greater number of small value, cross-border disputes. For such 
disputes it is difficult and complex to find a competent court, determine the 
applicable law and ensure enforcement, see the discussion below in section Nine. 
2.2 Difficulty of establishing location of internet users 
IP addresses, URLs and email addresses are opaque in the sense that they do not 
necessarily reveal the location or identity of the person operating the computer(s) 
thus identified on the internet. 
Any particular access point on the internet is identified by an IP address. IP 
addresses contain four numbers, each in the range of 0-255, separated by a dot. IP 
addresses are not structured according to geographic locations. Therefore an IP 
address does not by itself disclose the geographical location of a user. 
However it should be pointed out that, as a reaction to the difficulty of determining 
the location of internet users, technologies have been developed, which look up the 
likely location of the user from that user's IP address. 99 Since IP addresses have 
been allocated in blocks it is possible for such technologies to map most IP 
addresses. Some editorials have argued that they mean that borders are returning to 
the internet. 100 However this is an exaggeration- it is debatable how accurately 
geolocation tools can predict the location of a computer connected to the internet lOI 
and they are not used for all internet interactions and transactions. 
99 Examples: <www.quova.com> and < http://w\\.w.digitalen\.()v.net/> [14. September 2007] 
100 B Tedeschi 'E-commerce: Borders Returning to the internet' j\'ClI' rod Times (2. April 2001): 'Putting it 
in its place' The Economist (9. August 2001) 
101 In LIeR..! and UEJF 1" Yahoo! Inc and Yahoo France. Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris. 20. 
November 2000 the appointed expert panel found that IP mapping is about 70°'0 accurate (mapping the IP 
addresses to a particular country). For a more detailed description of geolocation tools and their limitation 
see IT AA 'E-commerce Taxation and the Limitations of Geolocation Tools' available from 
http:/ \\W\\ .itaa.org/taxfinancedocs !!eolocationpaper.pdf [ 1-+. September 2007] 
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Domain names do not reveal much about the user's location. A domain name is an 
alphanumeric label corresponding to an IP address. 102 Domain names were 
introduced as they are easier to remember than a string of IP numbers. URLs 
(locating a resource on the world-wide-web such as hnP:/iwww.iana.org/root-
whois/tm.htm ) and email addresses (such as s.cromey(a)qnlu1.ac.uk ) are based on 
domain names. Domain names are hierarchical. The last suffix such as .edu or .uk is 
the top-level domain, which can either be generic (such as .edu, .com, .biz, 
.museum, .pro, .name, . aero , .int, .net, .org) or country-specific (so-called country-
code domain names, such as .uk). However, even a country code top-level domain 
name does not necessarily indicate that the registrant of that name is located in that 
country. Some country-code top-level domain registries (such as that of 
Turkmenistan 103) register non-resident users for their country-code top level 
domain. 
This difficulty of establishing a user's location means that users interact and 
transact without being aware of the geographical location of each other. If a dispute 
arises they may have to face the fact that their counteryparty(ies) is (are) 
unexpectedly located in another jurisdiction or many locations, as the case may be. 
Twinned to the question of location is the question of identity. The only trace a user 
leaves is anything they choose to disclose about themselves and their IP address, 
neither of which are, in many cases, sufficient to establish a person's identity. 104 
The recipient of an internet communication cannot presume that the sender is the 
person he claims to be. Attributes of a person such as his or her name, geographical 
address are more difficult to assess and verify in an internet communication than in 
102 W Black 'The Domain Name System' in L Edwards, C Waelde La1\' & the internet (2nd ed Hart Oxford 
2000) 125-132, 115-126 
10~ .tm is popular for trade mark domain names, anyone can register. see the .tm Registry website 
httr:nvww.nic.tm [14. September 2007] 
104 Some access providers allocate IP addresses dynamically so that several connections share it. If the 
access provider keeps a record as to which connection used which IP add.ress at which time it is possible to 
trace the connection. Furthermore, several users might share one connectIOn or se\"eral persons may have 
access to that same connection. 
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face-to-face communication. 105 Some internet interactions (such as po stings on 
discussion boards) are routinely carried out under a pseudonym. These factors mean 
that for many claimants in internet disputes it may be difficult to establish the 
defendant's identity and to trace his or her whereabouts and assets, which is clearly 
a pre-requisite to starting proceedings. While tracing the defendant is an important 
practical, preliminary aspect of dispute resolution, it is not a point directly related to 
the dispute resolution procedure and hence, the question of how to establish a 
person's identity on the internet will not be further discussed in this thesis. 
2.3 Increase in transnational contacts- a quantitative and qualitative 
change 
To some extent, international trade, shipping, aviation and 'older' communications 
media (telex, telephone and fax) have also crossed borders and therefore posed a 
challenge to dispute resolution. However, the internet multiplies and amplifies that 
challenge, as it allows for many more and multi-media applications. Unlike such 
'older' communications media, such as telephone and fax, the internet allows for 
truly multi-media applications. Not just voice, not just text, but also images, 
graphics, video, audio, music and software can be transferred from any computer to 
any other computer on a connected network. 
In the offline world, international trade and international publishing traditionally 
was largely confined to 'sophisticated' business or professional people. By contrast, 
on the internet, everyone can publish on an international scale l06 and consumers and 
small business entities, such as sole traders, can buy/sell directly from/to an 
individual located abroad 107. The internet has lowered barriers to transactions and 
105 A discussion of technology for online identity checks is outside the scope of this thesis. 
106A Reed 'Jurisdiction and Choice of Law in a Borderless Electronic Environment' in Y Akdeniz. C 
Walker, D Wall (eds.) The internet Lal1' and Socie(l' (Longman Harlow 2000) 79-106.104: L Edwards 
'Defamation and the internet' in L Edwards and C Waelde Lall' & the internet (2nd ed Hart Oxford 2000) 
249-273. 250 
10i V Heiskanen 'Dispute Resolution in International Electronic Commerce' (1999) 16 Journal of 
International Arbitration 29-44. 29-30; I Lloyd Legal Aspects of the Information Socie(l' (Butterworths 
London 2000) 268 
-+5 
Chapter 3: Internet Disputes 
interactions by lowering communication costs and other transaction costs (such as 
those associated with payment). 
With respect to internet publication, Lilian Edwards has put it graphically 
'the internet provides a global audience at almost zero cost. No one needs a town 
cryer or a speaker's comer, a television studio or a radio mike, when they have 
access to the net; an obsolete PC or street cybercafe will do.' 108 
Moreover, the arrival of the internet and in particular the world-wide-web is 
changing the distribution and communication patterns of trade. In the pre-internet 
age, consumers mostly bought from retail suppliers located in their own country, 
and cross-border transactions were largely confined to organised B2B distribution. 
Now, consumers can easily buy goods and services directly from a vast network of 
foreign suppliers on the web. Likewise, a small business may procure its input 
requirements through a B2B exchange from a small or large player located on the 
other side of the planet. 
For business on the internet, the cost of setting up an international business. which 
previously has required the establishment of branches and agencies in different 
countries, are almost the same as for a purely local one. This is even more so if the 
internet business sells digitalised products (ie information products downloaded via 
the web) and uses automated decision making and processing. 109 Therefore, these 
low barriers of entry and access have enabled even very small businesses to offer 
their goods and services on a global scale to small and large players alike. In 
addition, auction platforms such as Ebay enable consumers (and small businesses) 
to sell internationally on a large scale. Social networking sites such as Facebook or 
108 f 9 l Edwards n 106 24 
109 CReed fn 95 5 
Chapter 3: Internet Disputes 
110 5-5 
MySpace and game providers such as Second Life also enable transnational 
interactions between individuals. 
Thus it seems fair to state that the internet has intensified international contacts and 
transactions at and between all levels. This entails a greater number of cross-border 
disputes involving small businesses, consumers and other non-professionaL 
'unsophisticated' parties. Therefore the internet gives rise to many disputes with a 
significant power imbalance between the parties. 
2.4 Conclusion: the implications for internet disputes 
The characteristics of the internet which inform this discussion are its borderless, 
ubiquitous nature, the difficulty to establish a user's location and the fact that it 
allows direct, multi-media communications and transactions between individuals on 
a global basis. It follows from these characteristics that the internet is causing an 
increase in cross-border disputes, a number of which will be of small value and/or 
involve a significant power imbalance between the parties. In other words, there are 
three features which cause issues for dispute resolution: (i) parties located in two 
different jurisdictions, (ii) small value of the dispute and (iii) power imbalances, 
especially if in many internet disputes these factors are combined. 
Figure 3 illustrates the characteristics of the internet and their implications for 
disputes. Cross-border disputes are difficult to solve because of the jurisdictional 
challenges, explained in section Nine. Small value disputes are difficult to solve, as 
the cost of dispute resolution may be disproportionate to the value of the dispute, 
causing problems for access to dispute resolution for individuals. However, these 
first two issues, cross-border nature and small value can. at least partially, be 
addressed by the use of ODR and this will be discussed in Chapter Five. IIO The 
third concern, effectiveness. is even more difficult to address. Power imbalances are 
a matter of concern as they infringe the equality principle the significance of which 
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has been discussed in Chapter TwO. III It is the function of the following sections of 
this Chapter to describe and illustrate the types of cross-border internet disputes 
which give rise to significant power imbalances. 
Ubiquity 
Potential for 
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disputes 
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Figure 3: Characteristics of the internet and implications for internet disputes 
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3. Examples of Internet Disputes 
In this thesis internet disputes are disputes connected to the use of the internet in a 
wide sense. This includes all disputes arising from the parties communicating~ 
interacting or transacting through the internet as well as disputes about the 
technology itself (such as disputes about the registration of domain names). Thus 
the phrase 'internet disputes~ encompasses all types of private disputes based on 
actionable rights and entitlements. 
For the purposes of this thesis, e-commerce disputes are a sub-category of internet 
disputes, ie disputes of a commercial nature, which are based on a contractual 
relationship between the parties. Depending on the nature of the parties to the 
dispute, a further distinction can be made between business to business (B2B), 
business to consumer (B2C) and consumer to consumer (C2C) e-commerce 
disputes. 
Clearly the phrase 'internet disputes' is indeterminate. An endless variety of 
disputes occur on the internet or about the internet. Since this thesis is concerned 
about the fairness of dispute resolution, the task is to describe and illustrate the 
types of 'internet disputes' giving rise to concerns about fairness. As has been 
outlined in the preceding section, these are particularly those internet disputes the 
parties to which are of significantly unequal power, if the parties are located in two 
different jurisdictions. Hence this thesis ignores internet disputes, where the 
disputants are fairly sophisticated business parties, even if both parties are in 
different jurisdictions, as such disputes can be and are in practice resolved by 
traditional litigation or arbitration. This section briefly illustrates examples of the 
disputes this thesis is most concerned about. 
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Example One 
A sole trader in Nigeria concludes a contract with a company, manufacturing 
locally in China and trading internationally, for some widgets through a B2B e-
commerce trading platfonn. The widgets are defective and the sole trader seeks 
redress for breach of contract. 
Example Two 
A consumer in Chile enters into a contract with a large US travel company for a 
cruise holiday through an e-commerce website. However the cruise is cancelled at 
the last minute and the deposit of $ 2000 has not been refunded. The consumer 
seeks return of the deposit paid. 
Example Three 
The owner of a bricks and mortar shop located in Dublin has named her shop 'Crate 
& Barrel' and she also operates a website connected to her shop under the domain 
www.crateandbarrel.biz . A large US company running an extensive chain of stores 
present in most states of the US claims infringement of their US Federal trade mark 
in the same name and commences infringement proceedings against the 
unincorporated Irish trader before a US District Court. The owner cannot afford 
litigation in the US and the US District Court enters default judgment in favour of 
the US corporation. The domain name is transferred to the US corporation. 112 
Example Four 
A US-based corporation publishes an online article on an interactive online news 
platfonn, accusing a named Egyptian civil servant of belonging to a terrorist 
organisation. The Egyptian individual seeks redress for defamation. 
112 See Euromarket Designs Inc l' Crate & Barrel Ltd and Peters 96 F Supp 2d 8:24 
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Example Five 
A US citizen uploads potentially defamatory comments about an internationally 
famous Australian film star on his own website. These comments are copied and 
downloaded widely and thus propagated on a global basis. The film star commences 
proceedings against the US citizen before his local Australian court for defamation. 
Example Six 
A large Russian company illegally hacks into the server of an English inventor in 
order to obtain confidential, sensitive information. The English inventor seeks 
redress for damages arising from this unlawful action. 
Chapter Eight l13 will return to these examples and consider if and to what extent the 
Model of dispute resolution developed in this thesis can provide for a fair resolution 
of such disputes. 
All six examples of internet disputes involve parties in two different jurisdictions 
whose contact is enabled and intermediated by the internet. It is unlikely that these 
parties would have come into conflict in the offline, pre-internet world. All six 
examples pitch an individual against a large incorporated organisation, either as 
claimant or defendant. These examples illustrate the cross-border nature of some 
internet disputes coupled with a power imbalance between the parties. The 
examples mentioned are not limited to contractual disputes, but include tortious and 
other disputes. 
This raises the question whether this thesis covers disputes between individuals 
(such as, but not limited to, a C2C dispute). These disputes are less problematic 
11.< 8 ') 1 '1 ') 
-_. ._"' (c 
51 
Chapter 3: Internet Disputes 
from the point of view of fairness 114 as it is less likely that there is a significant 
power imbalance between the parties 115. The lack of a power imbalance makes it 
more likely that the parties can successfully use ADRlODR to solve their dispute. 
However even if there is no pre-existing power imbalance between the parties, in 
small claims, cross-border internet disputes, the parties will have no access to the 
courts. This means that the parties have no effective access to the courtS. 116 Since 
ADRlODR operates in the 'shadow of the law,117, this will impact on the 
effectiveness and fairness of extra-judicial dispute resolution. Therefore, such 
internet disputes between individuals are covered by the thesis and the Model 
outlined in Chapter Eight 118 will include them. 
4. Contract and Tort 
Only courts have are co-ercive without an agreement of the parties. Extra-judicial 
means of dispute resolution require an agreement between the parties to 
participate. 119 This agreement can be concluded before or after the dispute has 
arisen. Parties to a contract may well incorporate a clause about dispute resolution 
in their contract and thereby bind themselves to participate in dispute resolution 
long before a dispute arises. By contrast, parties to a tort dispute frequently have 
had no previous relationship or contact with each other, which raises the question of 
how these parties can agree to extra-judicial dispute resolution. In some instances 
the parties may agree to use such dispute resolution after the dispute has arisen, but 
in other instances this is unlikely. If the weaker party is a claimant who cannot 
afford litigation, it is unlikely that the stronger defendant agrees to use other forms 
of settlement, as in Examples Four and Six. By not agreeing to use alternative forms 
of dispute resolution, the defendant can stall the claimant's attempts to obtain 
redress. 
I 14 Chapter 2 
115 ~-5 
116 2_2.3.1 
I 1- 4-3.1 
118 8-6 
IIC) 4-1 
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However, there might be models other than a bilateral agreement to bind a 
defendant to extrajudicial dispute resolution. For example if the unlawful act is 
committed using technology controlled by a third party intennediary. such as a 
platfonn provider, this third party may bind the users of that technology to take part 
in extra-judicial dispute resolution. 12o Therefore, the use of extra-judicial dispute 
resolution is not limited to contractual disputes. 
5. Power in Dispute Resolution 
A power imbalance essentially arises if one party has significantly more power than 
the other. This raises the question of what gives power in dispute resolution. 
Power manifests itself in different fonns and power relationships are frequently 
complex. Power itself is affected by the perception the parties have of their own 
power and that of the other party. 121 
This Section considers the meaning of power in dispute resolution and negotiation 
of legal relationships, suggesting that three main factors can be distinguished: 
resources, whether a party is a repeat player and vulnerability. 
5.1 Resources 
One obvious factor is a party's resources to fight a case or negotiate a contract. By 
way of illustration, this encompasses financial resources, human resources, legal 
know how, access to internal or external legal advice (in particular on foreign law) 
and the ability to engage top lawyers in the relevant jurisdiction(s).122 
120 8_2.1.3 (b) 
121 H Brown, A Marriott ADR Principles and Practice (Sweet & Maxwell London 1999) -1-79 
122 H Brown, A Marriott fn 121 479, L Nader & C Shugart fn -1-9 64-65 
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5.2 Repeat player effect and power 
Marc Galanter has coined the tenns 'repeat player' for parties, who have been 
regularly involved in similar types of disputes. This can be contrasted with the 'one 
shotters', for whom the dispute at issue is the only dispute of that kind they have 
ever been involved with. 123 The repeat players are at a substantial advantage for 
several reasons 124: 
(i) They have acquired legal knowledge and access to specialist lawyers through 
their previous involvement; 
(ii) They have knowledge and experience of the relevant dispute resolution 
processes and institutions; 
(iii) They benefit from economies of scale in their dispute resolution practice; 
(iv) They can engage in strategic behaviour by settling some cases but not others. 
thereby creating precedent favourable to them; 
(v) They can engage in lobbying activities to change the law in their favour; 
(vi) They have infonnal continuing relationships with the relevant institutions and 
have established a client relationship with such institutions. 
For these reasons, repeat players have strategic advantages and more power in their 
disputes with one-shotters. 125 Lisa Bingham in her empirical study of 1998 
comparing the statistics of non-repeat and repeat appointments of arbitrators by 
employers has clearly shown that employers are at an advantage over employees 
h k . 126 where t ey rna e repeat appOIntments. 
This raises the question of who are the typical repeat players in internet disputes. In 
the examples mentioned above. it seems that the 'bigger' party is also likely to be a 
I~, M Galanter 'Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change' (1974) 9 
Law and Society Review 95-160, 97 
I~.j M Galanter fn 12398-103; L Bingham fn 62, 240-244 
1::!5 Also 6-6.1.1 
1::!6 L Bingham fn 62 236-239; see also AS Rau 'Integrity in Private Judging' (1997) 38 South Texas Lall' 
Rel'j(,\\, 485-539, 524 
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repeat player, in the sense that they are more frequently involved in similar 
disputes. In Examples 1 and 2, the large manufacturer of widgets or a large travel 
company is more likely to have encountered similar complaints by other sole 
traders or consumers. Large and sophisticated owners of IP, such as a trade mark 
registration (Example 3), are likely to defend their rights on a regular basis and have 
strategies in place for doing so. Finally, large publishers of news are periodically 
sued for defamation and will likewise have strategies in place for defending 
themselves against such suits (Example 4).127 If one party pays for dispute 
resolution and regularly makes appoints the arbitrator or mediator, this also causes a 
"repeat player' effect. 128 
5.3 Vulnerability 
The relative importance of the case for each party is another factor. 
One party may only be marginally concerned by the result of the dispute resolution 
or contract negotiation, whereas the other may be crippled by an adverse resolution 
or the failure to reach an agreement. 129 In other words the parties may have very 
different stakes: for one party the outcome is critical, for the other the stake (and 
risk) is small. If this is the situation the party for whom the outcome is critical is 
more vulnerable and has therefore less power. 
On the other hand, one party may be more vulnerable than the other for the reason 
of exactly the opposite problem: the stake is so small that it is inefficient to invest 
much resources, with the consequence that the other party is not held liable for its 
breach or infringement. This is the case in many consumer claims, where individual 
consumers may not bother to pursue a claim, as the stake is too small. 
m However this does not mean that the more powerful player (in terms of size and resources) is always the 
repeat player; one could think about an individual who is a serial cybersquatter registering the domain 
names of various large entities and hence gets involved in various pieces oflitigation or other domain name 
dispute resolution. 
I:!S R Reuben 'Constitutional Gravity: a Unitary Theory of Alternative Dispute Resolution and Public Civil 
Justice' (2000) 47 [lCLA Law RCl'iC)I' 949-1104.1063-1066 
I'Y . 9 
- H Brown, A Mamott fn 121 47 
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130 2-5 
Vulnerability can be a complex factor and can include emotional aspects, such as 
one party's desire to seek justice or revenge, which are impossible to quantify and 
which playa role in disputes regardless of the status of the parties. 
Therefore, vulnerability is difficult to assess. Furthermore, vulnerability as a factor 
can only be assessed on a case-by-case basis. However general assumptions based 
on the preponderance of power in certain relationships have to be made, if a 
workable definition for power imbalances is to be found. Generally speaking, a 
party with less resources and who is a single shot player is likely to be more 
vulnerable for the reason that he or she has more at stake. For this reason it is 
suggested here that these two factors, financial resources and repeat player status, 
are more reliable (if perhaps stereotypical) than an assessment of the vulnerability 
of a party. 
6. Definition of Relevant Disputes in Respect of the Parties 
It is one thing to identify 'a problem' with power imbalances and to describe some 
situations in which a power imbalance exists and quite another to define 
conclusively when the Model of dispute resolution, which this thesis identifies, 
should apply. As has already been pointed out in Chapter Two 130 this thesis 
suggests that the presence of power imbalances cannot be assessed on a case-by-
case basis. Therefore it is necessary to develop general categories, linked to the 
status of the disputants which are presumptive of the presence of a power 
imbalance. 
The closest existing legal paradigm to the issues examined here is that of consumer 
protection laws. If one party satisfies the legal definition of the status 'consumer' 
and the other party satisfies the legal definition of the status 'business'. there is a 
legal presumption that a power imbalance exists and hence consumer protection law 
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applies as a mandatory form of law. As a consequence, special rules protecting 
consumers apply in certain defined business to consumer relationships. In this 
section the definition of 'consumer' under different laws will be examined and it 
will be argued that this definition needs widening for the purposes of this thesis on 
internet dispute resolution. 
6.1 Meaning of 'Consumer' under different laws and regulations 
The definition of what amounts to a business to consumer relationship varies 
between different pieces of legislation in a piecemeal fashion. Summarizing the 
thrust of these different pieces of legislation, essentially two components 131 can be 
distinguished: 
(i) Generally speaking, the consumer must be an individual who does not act in a 
business capacity.132 Some legislation, however, includes unincorporated business 
entities (such as a sole trader or a partnership) in the definition of a consumer133 and 
there is caselaw 134 suggesting that even a company can act as a consumer under the 
Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977. 135 
131 Some legislation in addition requires that the goods or services supplied must be intended for private, 
non-business use, s.12 (1) (c) Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977, not if the consumer is an individual, s.12 
(lA) 
132 S.12 (1) (a) Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977; Art.2 (b) Directive 93113IEEC on Unfair Terms in 
Consumer Contracts; Art.2 (e) E-commerce Directive 2000/311EC; Art.2 (2) Distance Selling Directive 
1997171EC and Art.15 (1) Jurisdiction Regulation EC/44/2001 
m Example: s. 189 Consumer Credit Act 1974: the term 'individual' includes an unincorporated body. 
such as a partnership 
134 R&B Customs Brokers Co Ltd v United Dominions Trust Ltd [1988] 1 WLR 321 (CA) 330 
\1) Clear from s.12 (1) (a) Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977, but if the party is not an individuaL then 
according to s.12 (l) (c) the goods must be of a type ordinarily supplied for private use and consumption. 
An example of this would be a company buying drinks or a car for their employees' private use. By 
contrast, European legislation makes clear that a consumer must be a natural person acting for purposes 
which are outside his trade, business or profession, see Art.2 (b) oDirective 93/13/EEC on Unfair Terms in 
Consumer Contracts; Art.2 (e) E-commerce Directive 2000/311EC; Art.2 (2) Distance Selling Directive 
199717 lEe. Art.15 (1) Jurisdiction Regulation EC/44/200 1 only refers to 'persons', not natural persons, 
however the ECJ has made clear that only natural persons are protected by the consumer provisions in the 
Jurisdiction Regulation, see Case C-150/77 Bertrand l' Ott [1978] 1431 (ECJ) Para 22 and also Case C-
269/95 Benincasa l' DcntalJ..-it [1997] ECR 13767 (ECl) para.17. Similarly the ECJ has also found that the 
notion of 'consumers' does not extend to legal persons in the context of Directive 9Y13/EC. Joined Cases 
C-451 and 451199 Cape SNC l' Idealsel .. icc SRL [2003] 1 CMLR 42 (ECJ) para. Rl. The tendency i~ that 
under EU legislation the notion of consumers has a narrower meaning, ~ee for example the case of C-
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(ii) Conversely, the supplier must act in a business capacity. 136 It seems that for the 
purposes of civil liability this criterion is interpreted widely. There is no need that 
the transaction is an integral part of the business, in the sense that the business 
trades in the type of goods or services sold. Hence a fisherman selling his boat was 
acting in the course of business. 137 Generally speaking, there are no limitations on 
the size of the entity of the supplier and the definition of the business party includes 
natural persons (such as sole traders and traditional partnerships) as well as 
incorporated entities such as companies. 
The traditional B2C paradigm just described can be criticised on three grounds. 
First, it is problematic to subject all businesses, regardless of their size and 
operation to the same types of consumer protection rules. However, this criticism is 
probably slightly less important in the context of fairness of dispute resolution 
mechanisms, and more important in the context of a discussion on substantive 
. I 138 consumer protectIOn aws. 
The second criticism is that the criteria are sometimes inaccurate in assessing power 
imbalances. An example of this would be a hypothetical case of an extremely 
wealthy and sophisticated consumer who contracts with a sole trader. In Standard 
Bank of London Ltd v Apostolakis two high net worth individuals (husband and 
wife) entered into an investment contract to acquire foreign currency worth US $ 7 
million and the court found that they acted as consumers. 139 The problem this 
464/01 Johann Gruber \' Bay Wa AG OJ C5711 of 5. March 2005. In that case, the ECJ found that in the 
context of the Brussels Convention, where the contract is for goods partly intended for private and partly 
for trade purposes, the consumer provisions only apply if the trade purpose is so limited as to be negligible. 
Contrast this with the case of R&B Customs Brokers Co Ltd l' United Dominions T11lst Ltd fn 134 330 in 
which the court said that in the case of mixed use, the business use only pre\'ails if there is a high degree of 
regularity of the business use. 
136 For example, s.12 (1) (b) Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 
1.'\7 Stn'el1S0111' Rogers [1999] 2 WLR 1064 (CA) 1039-1042 
I3R The only significant burden imposed on businesses in the Model proposed in Chapter 8-6 is that the 
'stronger' party should pay a greater share of the costs of dispute resolution. 
139 [2000] ILPr 766 (Comm) 772 
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illustrates is the general proposition that it is impossible to find general criteria for 
assessing power relationships which fit all individual cases. While even a small 
business party on superficial consideration may be more powerful than an 
individual of very modest means, this power imbalance may shift if the individual 
obtains general legal aid. Likewise, while a multi-national corporation seems more 
powerful than a consumer in terms of vulnerability, this power imbalance may be 
reversed in some, possibly rare cases, if the multi-national corporation is very 
sensitive to publicity. However legal criteria have to rely on generalized 
assumptions, without which it would be impossible to formulate policy principles. 
The third and most important criticism is however that the scope of the traditional 
consumer paradigm should be widened for this discussion of fairness in the 
resolution of internet disputes. The traditional paradigm would only apply to 
Example Two above and would ignore all other power imbalances. 
It is interesting to note that in two recent ombudsman dispute resolution schemes 
the class of eligible complainants has been widened to include not only individual 
consumers, but also small businesses. In the Ombudsman scheme for the resolution 
of disputes between communication service providers and their customers set up by 
the Communications Act 2003, small business customers, defined as those with no 
more than 10 employees, can also file a complaint under the scheme. 140 In the 
Financial Ombudsman Service scheme, as far as it relates to financial services, an 
eligible complainant includes a business which has a group annual turnover of less 
than a million and a charity which has an annual income of less than a million and a 
trust which has a net asset value of less than a million.141 Furthermore it is stated 
h· 141 expressly that a complainant can be a sole trader, company or partners Ip. -
1·1(1 S. 51 (6) (b) Communications Act 2003- scheme briefly discussed in Chapter 8 
141 Financial Services Handbook, Rule 2.4.3 
l.j~ Financial Sen'ices Handbook, Rule 2.4.-+ 
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The Chartered Institute of Arbitrators has also set up a special arbitration procedure 
for disputes between a company and a small business 143 or individual consumer. 144 
These examples also indicate that the paradigm has to be widened. 
By contrast, for complaints relating to consumer credit, which are heard by the 
Financial Ombudsman Service since April 2007, the definition of eligible 
complainant is narrower: only unincorporated entities and only partnerships with up 
to three partners can use this service. 145 This is similar to the definition put forward 
in the next section. 
6.2 A preliminary definition: widening the scope 
The main conclusion from the discussion of the B2C paradigm is that it is 
unsuitable for this discussion of fairness in the resolution of internet disputes. It is 
too narrow to deal with power imbalances in the resolution of internet disputes. For " 
the Model proposed in this thesis the scope here should be wider and encompass 
both contract and tort disputes. Moreover the subject-matter of internet disputes is 
wider, not merely including disputes about commoditised, consumer goods and 
services, but includes a whole variety of other issues. Hence the traditional B2C 
paradigm does not fit well. 
For the purposes of the argument of this thesis, the definition of power imbalances 
in internet disputes should be restricted to disputes where one party is an 
individual 146 and the other party is a corporate entity.147 For this it is irrelevant 
143 Defined as a business with no more than 10 employees 
144 Independent Consumer Arbitration Service (lCAS), Rule 1. L rules available from 
http:!\\\\\\.idrs.ltd.uk/ConsumerPDF/ICAS Rules Application.pdf [ 14. September 2007] 
145 Financial Services Handbook Rule 2.4.3 
14<, A I natura person 
147 A legal person, SeX' the discussion about the Financial Ombudsman Sen'ice above. In the Proposal for a 
EU Regulation establishing a European Small Claims Procedure a similar pattern of power imbalance is 
also assumed, see for example Art.l4 (2) on Costs which prO\ides that a natura! person who is not 
represented by a lawyer is not obliged to pay the costs of the other part}. if that party is represented. See the 
Proposal of 15. March 2005, COM(2005) 87 final- the Explanatory T\1emorandum e"prc'ssly states that the 
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whether or not the individual acts for private, non-profit purposes or acts in the 
course of a trade, business or profession. The criterion for the' stronger' party 
should be that this party is incorporated, ie a legal person. The assumption made 
here is that entities above a certain size and sophistication are likely to be 
incorporated. Arguably this definition should also include incorporated 
partnerships. Unincorporated partnerships should be treated as natural persons. 
This definition of relevant power imbalances is admittedly crude, but it has the 
beauty of clarity and simplicity. It would not catch power imbalances between 
individuals and between incorporated entities. The assumption here is that power 
imbalances between such entities are, relatively speaking, less severe than those 
between individuals and corporations. The definition would falsely catch disputes 
if, for example, a company and an individual are of equal power in dispute 
resolution, which it is assumed to be comparatively rare. 
An alternative approach would be to define the business entity by setting threshold 
values relating to its power (for example market capitalisation of a company, 
turnover, size of employees, number of offices) but it is submitted here that this is 
likely to be complicated, unclear and equally inaccurate. 
Thus redefined, the definition would capture the power imbalances in Examples 
One, Two, Three, Four and Six. It would not apply to Example Five, involving a 
dispute between two individuals, but this result is probably correct, as it would be 
impossible to encapsulate the respective 'power' of individuals by legal rules. 
6.3 The definition of relevant internet disputes and its purpose 
The definition of relevant internet disputes for the purposes of the argument in this 
thesis is as follows: disputes directly resulting from one party's activities or both 
Proposal is not limited to consumers. as owners of small businesses equally face difficulties when pursuing 
claims in ()ther Member States. see p. 3. 
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parties' interaction on the internet if at least one party is an individual. 148 The main 
concern of this thesis are such disputes between a corporate entity and an individual 
because of the presumed power imbalance. 
As has already been pointed out in the previous Chapter TW0 149, this thesis is only 
concerned with fair dispute resolution, not with power imbalances generally. Hence 
the purpose of the definition of relevant internet disputes is not to define or re-
define the scope of substantive laws protecting the weaker party, nor to discuss such 
laws as such. The argument presented here is not about widening the law on 
consumer protection, but merely to discuss a model incorporating fair procedural 
rules for the resolution of internet disputes. 
However, it should be pointed out that there is no clear dividing line between 
substantive and procedural issue. One area of overlap is the area of applicable law 
and in particular the question of in which situations mandatory laws, protecting the 
weaker party in the situation of a power imbalance should apply. This discussion is 
within the scope of the thesis and will take place in Chapter Four150. 
Furthermore where both parties are individuals there may not be a power imbalance 
(as just defined). However if the claim is small, the parties may not be able to 
litigate (as discussed in section 9). Hence there is lack of access (second principle of 
151 h d· . I d d . fairness as discussed in Chapter Two ) and therefore suc Isputes are Inc u e In 
the Model discussed in Chapter Eight I52 . 
Therefore the Model in the thesis applies to cross-border internet disputes, where 
the value of the claim is small and the parties are either both individuals or an 
individual pitched against a corporate entity. 
148 This includes, but is not limited to B2C disputes. 
149 2-5 
150 2_4.5 
151 2-2.~.1 
15~ 8-6 
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7. Definition of Relevant Disputes in Respect of the Size of the 
Claim 
The main issue in this thesis is the fact that the parties to an internet dispute are 
likely to be located far from each other, possibly in different jurisdictions. This 
factor increases the cost and complexity of internet dispute resolution. It has its 
greatest impact on small disputes, as here the costs of resolution may easily be 
disproportionate to the value of the claim. 153 Hence the distinction made between 
small and large disputes. 
As has been mentioned in Chapter One, this distinction refers to the value of the 
claim in dispute. A small claims dispute involves a claim in a cross-border internet 
dispute where the costs of litigation and enforcement across a border make it 
disproportionately expensive to do so. This raises the question of what falls in the 
category of small disputes. In the UK the domestic small claims track, triggering a 
less formal court procedure, is £5000 154 . Since cross-border disputes are more 
expensive to litigate and to enforce, it is likely that the figure as to what amounts to 
a 'small' international dispute is considerably higher. 155 Under the proposed 
European Small Claims Procedure the value of small claims is even smaller, ie Euro 
2000 156. These limits give some guidance as to the relevant values in litigation. The 
Model developed in Chapter Eight will distinguish between and adopt different 
solutions for, small disputes on the one hand and large disputes on the other hand. 
153 A study commissioned in 1995 by the European Commission found that on average the total costs of 
realising a cross-border claim by litigation in the EU was Euro 2489 (about £1673) (proceedings at the 
defendant's residence), see H von Freyhold, V Gessner. E Vial and H Wagner (Eds) Cost of Judicial 
Barriers for Consumers in the Single Market. A Report for the European Commission. Zentrum fur 
Europaische Rechtspolitik an der Universitat Bremen. OctoberlNovember 2005. Table p. 123. Since this 
Study is more than ten years old it is likely that this figure has risen in the meantime. For disputes involving 
a country outside the EU this figure will be substantially more. 
1)4 Civil Procedure Rules. Rule 27.1 0) 
155 In the Euromarket case the English judge mentioned that the parties had already incurred more than 
£100.000 in costs up until the preliminary hearing on jurisdiction Euromarket fn Designs Inc \. Peters and 
Cra/(' & Barrel LId [2001] FSR 20 (ChD) para 8 
156 About £ 1 .144. see Art. 1 (1). Proposal for a Regulation establishing a European Small Claims Procedure. 
dated 15. March 2005. COM(2005) 87 final 
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At that point, it will also outline and develop value limits specific to online 
arbitration. Is7 
8. Charge Backs and Refunds by Payment Service Providers 
This thesis will demonstrate the need for online arbitration for certain internet 
disputes. It has already been argued in this Chapter that the internet as a 
communications medium has amplified the number of disputes in which the parties 
are located in two (or more) different jurisdictions and involving an individual and a 
corporate entity.IS8 The argument is that for internet disputes out-of-court, ADR 
mechanisms are crucial. This argument will be further refined in Chapters Five and 
Six explaining that online arbitration can provide a suitable, binding form of dispute 
resolution for some disputes. 
However, it should be pointed out at the outset that a subset of internet disputes, ie 
consumer e-commerce disputes involving certain forms of payment mechanism, 
may, in some circumstances, be resolved by intervention of the payment service 
provider. Charge backs and refunds by payment service providers are free to the 
individual user and may provide redress to consumer/59. Hence, this section briefly 
describes these mechanisms and points out that, where such mechanisms are 
available and effective, online arbitration may not be necessary. But these 
mechanisms do not incorporate due process as outlined in Chapter Six and are 
hence not a complete solution for all e-commerce disputes. 
8.1 Credit card charge back and joint liability 
The first of these interventions by payment providers is the mechanism of charge 
backs by credit card issuers, which are partly backed up by legislation in the UK 
providing for statutory joint liability and by EU and UK legislation dealing with 
15- 8-5 
15S 3-~ . .f 
159 Not to all individuals in internet disputes. though! 
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fraudulent transactions. Credit cards are currently the most common form of 
payment for B2C e-commerce transactions. 160 
8.1.1 Credit charge back explained 
A credit card charge back is essentially a reversal of a payment instruction moving 
from the credit card holder, to the credit card issuer and down the chain to the 
merchant bank and the merchant, re-crediting the holder's credit card account and 
cancelling a credit on the merchant" s account. 
There may be many reasons for a credit card charge back, such as processing errors, 
authorization issues or duplication, but in the context of this thesis customer 
disputes and fraud are the only two reasons of interest. 
A charge back mechanism essentially allows an individual afier having authorized 
payment for goods or services via a credit card to reverse payment, if the trader is in 
breach of contract (such as non-delivery of goods or goods being defective or not as 
described) or if the payment has been made fraudulently. Credit card charge back is 
based on and established by the Rules of the major credit card networks, such as 
Visa 161 and Mastercard 162 • 
8.1.2 UK joint liability for breach of contract and misrepresentation 
In the UK, legislation goes much further in relation to credit cards issued by 
domestic providers. It provides not only for charge back of the purchase price to the 
consumer, but in the case of the supplier's breach of contract or misrepresentation 
160 OECD 2006 Report 'Online Payment Systems for E-commerce' (18. April 2006) available from 
~_\\'\\'\\ .occd.()r!2dataoecd<n I 19/36 736056.pdf [14. September 2007] 
161 See Visa, Rules for Visa Merchants. Card Acceptance and Chargeback. Management Guidelines 2006 
Edition VRM 08.1.2.06, s.6 pp. 69 et sequi available from 
http://merchants.\'isa.com ds "drs Card, Acceptance and Char!!eback Guidelines.pdf [1'+. September 
2007] 
16:.' Mastercard Merchant Rules. Chapter 3. Chargeback Guide available from 
h!.!Q: \\'\\'w.masterc<1rd.com/u~ wee PDF i\lERC-Entire Manual.pdf [1'+. September 2007] 
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gives the consumer a right to pursue the credit card issuer for damages or any other 
remedy available. Such damages may vastly exceed the amount of the purchase 
price paid. Section 75 (1) of the Consumer Credit Act 1974 provides that the credit 
card issuer is jointly liable with the seller for breaches of contract and 
misrepresentation, provided that the cash price for the goods or services is in the 
range of £1 00-£30,000 163 • 
In a landmark ruling, the Court of Appeal has recently clarified the jurisdictional 
scope of these provisions: they also apply in respect of consumers entering into 
internet (and other) transactions with foreign suppliers, irrespective of the place 
where the transaction was entered into and irrespective of the location of the 
supplier. 164 The Court of Appeal held that section 75 (1) applied to all supply 
transactions where the consumer uses a credit card regulated by the Consumer 
Credit Act 1974, even if the supply transaction was concluded abroad or with a 
foreign supplier. 165 The main issue in the case was whether section 75 (2), which 
confers a right of indemnity on the creditor to recoup the loss suffered in satisfying 
the liability and the costs of defending the action brought by the consumer. would 
lead to extra-territorial application of the Act in cases where the supplier is located 
abroad. 166 The Court of Appeal rejected this reasoning on the basis that the primary 
purpose of section 75 was to provide additional protection to consumer debtors 
under domestic credit agreements 167 and that the creditors' right under section 75 
(2) to recover against the supplier was merely ancillary to that primary object. 168 
Furthermore the Court of Appeal found that there was nothing in section 75 that 
justified a distinction to be drawn between domestic and foreign supply 
transactions. 169 Finally the Court of Appeal also rejected the argument that the 
practical difficulties which a creditor may face in enforcing a claim against a 
foreign supplier are insurmountable. The Court of Appeal found that these problems 
163 S. 75 (3) (b) Consumer Credit Act 1974 
164 q[fic(' of Fair Trading l'Lloyds TSB [2007] QB 1 (CA) 29. 40 
165 p 1'1'1 ara ~ ... 
166 P 77 . ara et seqUi 
167 Paras 76. 120 
168 Paras 88, 120 
169 P 1'10 ara _ 
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are not so great as to conclude that Parliament can be presumed to have intended to 
exclude foreign transactions from the scope of the Consumer Credit Act 1974. The 
Court held that the difficulties of enforcing an indemnity claim against a supplier 
abroad is part of the price credit card issuers have to pay for the benefits obtained 
by allowing such cards to be used abroad.l70 
The Court of Appeal decision is highly significant for internet disputes based on 
contractual claims or misrepresentation involving consumers. If a UK consumer has 
paid for an e-commerce transaction by credit card and claims breach of contract or 
misrepresentation and merely wishes to rescind the contract, he or she can rely on 
s. 75 (1) of the Consumer Credit Act 1974, even if the supplier is located abroad. 
Section 75 (l) therefore provides statutory backing to credit charge backs against 
foreign suppliers. Since many if not most consumer e-commerce transactions are 
now paid for by credit card, this statutory backing of the mechanism entitles the 
consumer to fast and effective relief. 
If the consumer in this situation claims damages (over and above the purchase 
price) he is entitled to sue the UK based credit card issuer, obviating the need to sue 
the foreign supplier and/or enforce a judgment abroad. In this case s. 75 (l) relieves 
the consumer of the burden of cross-border litigation and shifts that burden to the 
creditor. Nevertheless the consumer would have to litigate and online arbitration 
foc • h 1'" 171 may be more cost-e lectlve t an court ItlgatlOn. 
Furthermore section 75 (1) does not apply if the purchase price is £100 or less ln. 
Many consumer e-commerce transactions are of very small value and will slip 
underneath this threshold. In these low value transaction cases, consumers have to 
rely on the rules of charge back established by the credit card networks discussed 
above. 173 
1:(1 Para 87 
1 -I - -)-) 
1 -, 
- s. 75 0) (b) 
m 8.l. 1 
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8.1.3 Protection against fraudulent misuse of all payment cards 
Section 83 of the Consumer Credit Act 1974 provides that a credit card holder is not 
liable for the fraudulent misuse of a credit card 174. Hence. within the confines of 
this provision there is a legal obligation on credit card issuers to provide a charge 
back mechanism in the case of fraudulent abuse175 . For payment cards other than 
credit cards used for e-commerce (and other forms of distance selling), Regulation 
21 of the Consumer Protection (Distance Selling) Regulations 2000/2334 provides 
that the consumer should be able to reverse a payment or obtain a full refund in the 
case of fraudulent use of his or her payment card. Moreover Regulation 21 (3) 
provides that the burden of proof of showing that the use was not authorized rests 
with the payment card issuer. 
These provisions implement legislation within the EEA Member States providing 
that card issuers must cancel/re-credit payments made as a result of the fraudulent 
use of all payment cards in connection with a distance selling transaction. including 
internet transactions. 176 
8.1.4 Conclusion as to charge backs 
In e-commerce transactions paid by credit card, the credit card charge back 
mechanism effectively shifts the power from the merchant (who usually demands 
pre-payment for goods and services) to the consumer (who can use the mechanism 
to receive back that payment). A credit card charge back may avoid a dispute 
between the consumer and merchant and provide the consumer with a remedy. In 
this scenario it obviates the need for dispute resolution from the credit card holder's 
1'-1 Similar prO\isions for all other types of banking cards are contained in the UK Banking Code (Version 
March 2005), Para. 12.12. available from 
http: \\'ww.bankin£codc.or£.uk/pdfdocsiBANKINGo;o20CODE.pdf [14. September 2007] 
175 Althouuh it should be noted that ioint liability is of course much wider 
176 See A:'8 Distance Selling Dire~tive 199717EC. There are no harmonised EU-wide provisions on joint 
liability of supplier and credit card issuer 
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(consumer's) point of view. However, to the extent that the credit card charge back 
system is abused by card holders, there is still a need for dispute resolution from the 
merchant's point of view. Furthermore, and crucially these charge back systems do 
not provide for due process in the sense of a fair hearing as described in Chapter 
S· 177 IX. 
8.2 Paypal 
Other payment mechanisms may provide some form of complaints assistance or 
mediation. An example of this is PayPal, an e-money provider, transferring money 
between two account holders and whose services have gained prominence through 
its use by buyers and sellers on the online auction provider eBayl78. 
PayPal essentially deals with two types of disputes: the first type is where goods 
have not been delivered and the second type is where goods do not match their 
description, ie false description of goods. 179 Its 'Buyer Protection Programme' 
works at three levels 180: 
First, at the informal level, PayPal obliges buyers to file a dispute and use an online 
platform to negotiate with the seller a solution and in some instances, PayPal may 
recommend a solution to the parties (mediation). 181 
Secondly, if the dispute cannot be solved this way, PayPal allows buyers to file a 
formal complaint and it will investigate (for example checking the seller's tracking 
system in the case of non-delivery of goods) and it may order the seller to make a 
177 G-P Calliess 'Transnational Consumer Law: Co-Regulation ofB2C E-commerce' (2007) 3 (3) 
Campara/in' Research in Law & Political Economy 2-54, 15 
178 PayPal is now owned by eBay . 
179 PayPal Buyer Complaint Policy (\Tersion 12. October 2006) Para 1 avaIlable f~om . 
https: \\\\\\ .P<1\"P<1l.C011l Ukcul-bm webscr'!cmd-p "ell llCl poilc\ bUYer complamt-outslde [14. 
September 2007] . ' . . . 
180 It the buyer has paid money into the PayPal account by credIt card. the buyer may In addItIOn avaIl 
hersel Uhimself of a credit charge back 
181 PayPal Buyer Complaint Policy (\'ersion 12. October 2006) Paras::: and 3 
69 
Chapter 3: Internet Disputes 
refund from his or her PayPal account (if the goods have been falsely described it 
may order the buyer to return the goods first), provided there are sufficient funds in 
the seller's PayPal account to make such a refund. 182 In its terms and conditions 
PayPal expressly provides that it retains the right to freeze any payments made into 
the seller's account on complaint by the buyer. 183 However, if the seller has already 
redeemed the payment, PayPal will not be able to order a refund. 184 
Finally, for certain transactions, PayPal provides (limited) insurance. I8S 
It should be noted that PayPal's "Buyer Protection Programme' is limited as it only 
applies to tangible goods which can be delivered in the pOSt.I 86 Furthermore its 
refund policy for goods significantly not as described only applies to eBay 
transactions 187 and its insurance policy is limited to certain eBay sellers possessing 
a good track record 188 . 
Within its terms of reference the PayPal Buyer Protection will provide a remedy for 
the buyer using PayPal. But it should also be pointed out that its reach is limited. 
8.3 Conclusion 
The intervention of payment providers in the form of credit charge backs and buyer 
protection programmes is apt to provide a remedy for consumer buyers in many e-
commerce disputes, especially those of small value. Therefore such mechanisms 
and programmes have an extremely important role in practice to play in e-
18~ P 6 ara 
183 PayPal User Agreement Para 10 available from https:!/ww\\',palval.com/llk'cei-
hin.\\ebscr?dispatch~5g85dSOaI3cOdb 1 t702b5e20651 bee68365c"25eOa" 15'74aaI281 977a7050a:;a [14, 
September 2007] 
IS .. Fn 179 Para 6 
185 For more detail see the PavPal Buyer Protection Policy (Version 11. January 2007) available from 
Imps: \"W" ,pa\'pal.com uk c'~I-bin \\t'bscr',)cmd~p ~en lIa policy pbp-olltside [ 14, September 2007] 
186 Fn 179 Para 1 
IS- Para 1 
188 Fn 185 Para J (a) 
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commerce consumer protection. 189 However their reach is limited. First they only 
apply to disputes where the remedy is the reversal of the payment. Secondly. as 
discussed, the application of the various schemes is limited. 19o They form one piece 
in the intricate jigsaw of dispute resolution on the internet. 191 Finally in the context 
of a thesis on the fair resolution of internet disputes it also has to be pointed out that 
they do not provide for due process and a fair hearing. Saying that charge backs 
provide a remedy to buyers in e-commerce transactions in many instances is not the 
same as saying that they provide a fair means of dispute resolution. Hence despite 
the availability of a charge back to the buyer, in some instances the merchant 
supplier may need a means of dispute resolution in order to obtain payment or 
recoup the goods. 
9. The Jurisdictional Challenge of the Internet 
As has been discussed above l92global interactions on the internet lead to an increase 
in international contacts and hence ample opportunities for cross-border disputes 
and conflicts between various type of disputants. This creates the jurisdictional 
challenge for the internet. 
The problems private international law creates for the internet have been discussed 
elsewhere in the literature193 • The consequence of these problems are that cross-
189 The main focus of this thesis is much wider than consumer protection. This thesis is concerned with the 
fair resolution of internet disputes, not consumer redress in e-commerce. Hence payment mechanisms are 
not further examined here. Their role in the jigsaw of dispute resolution on the internet will be further 
acknowledged in Chapter 8. 
190 Credit charge backs apply to credit cards not debit cards: the protection under the distance selling 
regime discussed above only applies to fraudulent abuses, not breach of contract; the PayPal programme is 
limited to tangible goods, etc. 
191 Model in 8-6 
192 3-2 
193 R Schu 'The Applicable Law to Consumer Contracts Made Over the internet: Consumer Protection 
Through Private International Law';' 5 International Journal of Law and Information Technology 192-229; 
M Burnstein 'A Global Network in a Compartmentalised Legal Environmenf in K Boele-Woelki, C 
Kcssedjian (eds.) internet Which COllrt Decides? Which Lall' Applies? (Kluwer Law International The 
Hague 1998) 2~-34: H Perritt 'Dispute Resolution in Cyberspace: Demand for ~e\\. ~orms of A.DR' (2000) 
15 Ohio State Journal on Dispwe Resolution 675-703: C Reed Internet Law (2 edItIOn Cambndge 
Uni\t~rsit\' Press 20(4). A Reed 'Jurisdiction and Choice of Law in a Borderless Electronic Environmenf 
in Akdeniz, Y & V,ialker. C & Wall, D (eds.) The Internet Law and Socie(r (Longman Harlow 2000) 79-
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border litigation and enforcement is so expensive and time-consuming that access to 
this fOlm of dispute resolution is barred but for the largest claims and that for small 
claims the costs and delay of cross-border litigation are frequently not proportionate 
to the remedy eventually obtainable. Because this topic has been treated elsewhere. 
it is not necessary, and for lack of space also not possible, to make this argument in 
detail again here. 194 
In summary. there are three reasons for the high costs and delay: (i) the complexity 
of jurisdictional rules stalling the finding of the appropriate forum, (ii) cross-border 
enforcement (where necessary) and (iii) other cross-border aspects. 
9.1 The complexity of jurisdictional rules 
As has been shown elsewhere195, the existing rules on jurisdiction (determining the 
competent court) pose a significant challenge for internet disputes, as they are based 
on localisation factors, ie the localisation of an activity or the location of an actor. 
either of which is difficult or even impossible to determine196. For internet disputes, 
litigation may involve multiple sets of private international law rules, even within 
the EU. despite some degree of regional harmonisation in the EU. For these 
reasons, the application of conflicting jurisdictional rules is enormously complex, 
unpredictable and uncertain. As has been shown in the literature197, the application 
of the rules may have surprising or ubiquitous effects and this uncertainty enables 
106, L Gillies, 'European Union: Modified Rules of Jurisdiction for Electronic Consumer Contracts' (2000) 
17 Computer LQ1l' & Secllri(v Report 395-398; J Hornle, 'Private International Law and E-finance: the 
European Perspective' (2001) 8 Thc ED! Lall' Rel'ic11' 209-229, H Kronke 'Applicable Law in Torts and 
Contracts in Cyberspace' in K Boele-Woelki, C Kessedjian (eds.) internet Which Court Decides? Which 
LOll' Applies? (Kluwer Law International The Hague 1998) 65-87 
194 A chapter for the forthcoming 2008 edition of L Edwards, C Waelde CLaw & the internet (3nd ed Hart 
Oxford 2008) deals with these problems in detail and is attached to this dissertation as Annex 
195 CReed fn 95 223, 230; M Burnstein 'A Global Network in a Compartmentalised Legal Environment' in 
K Boele-Woelki. C Kessediian (eds.) internet Which Court Decides? Which Law Applies? (Kluwer La\\' 
International The Hague 1998) 23-34. 24, 27; H Kronke . Applicable Law in Torts and Contracts in 
Cyberspace' in K Boele-Woelki, C Kessedjian (eds.) internet Which Court Decides? WMch LQ1\' Applies? 
(Kluwer Law International The Hague 1998) 65-87, 65. 85; H Penitt 'Dispute Resolution in Cyberspace: 
Demand for New Forms of ADR' (2000) 15 Ohio State Journal on Dispute Resolution 675-703. 675-676 
196 ~-2: also H Perritt 'Dispute Resolution in Cyberspace: Demand for New Forms of ADR' (2000) 15 Ohio 
State Journal on Dispute Resolution 675-703, 675-676 
l'J"Fn 195 
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the parties to engage in strategic behaviour C forum shopping') entailing 
proceedings to detennine jurisdiction and these by itself add significantly to the 
final legal bill and lead to further delay. 
9.2 Cross-border enforcement 
It has been discussed in the literature 198 that if a judgment must be enforced across a 
border, enforcement also involves some procedure entailing costs and delay and 
differences between national approaches means that successful claimants have no 
right to have foreign judgments enforced against defendants' assets, introducing an 
element of unpredictability. On an international level, absent any hannonisation of 
jurisdictional rules and an agreement of reciprocal enforcement, courts at the place 
where a defendant has assets may refuse to enforce a judgment. By contrast to 
litigation, arbitration awards are more easily enforced, as a consequence of the New 
York Convention. 1990n a regional level in the EU this may be less of a problem, as 
for civil and commercial matters, recognition and enforcement of a judgment is 
guaranteed. However even within the EU, enforcement entails a separate procedure 
and this enails additional costs and delay. 
9.3 Other cross-border aspects 
More generally200 cross-border litigation imposes higher costs and delay for the 
parties, because of the need to instruct a foreign lawyer (frequently in addition to a 
local lawyer), because of travelling costs of the parties and witnesses, translation 
costs and because enforcement is more expensive. 
198 P Schlosser 'Jurisdiction and Intemational Judicial and Administrati\e Co-operation' (2000) 284 
Rcel/cit des COllrs 9-430, 237 
199 See 6-2.0 and 6-7 
200 P Schlosser' Jurisdiction and Intemational Judicial and Administrati \·e Co-operation' (2000) 284 
RCCI/cit des COllrs 9-430, 215-216 
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9.4 Conclusion 
These factors mean for claimants that legal redress is practically unattainable and 
effectively, that access to justice is barred in small claim cross-border internet 
disputes.201 For defendants, the 'jurisdictional challenge' in internet disputes means 
that they may be sued in a distant foreign court or even multiple foreign courts202 
and that such a dispute may be impossible to defend, again because of cost reasons, 
so that a default judgment becomes inevitable. 
Scholars have therefore drawn the conclusion that international litigation is 
unsuitable to solve disputes in many small value internet disputes.203 An empirical 
study on the cost of litigation in EU cross-border consumer disputes conducted in 
1995204 found that if a consumer pursues a claim of Euro 2000205 at the place of the 
defendant's residence the costs vary between Euro 980206 and Euro 6600207 
depending on the combinations of Member States, with an average of Euro 2489208 . 
If a consumer pursues a claim of Euro 2000 at his or her state of residence and then 
enforces in the defendant's Member State the costs vary between Euro 950209 and 
Euro 5850210, again depending on the combination of Member States, the average 
costs being Euro 2437211 • 
201 See also the OECD's conclusions in relation to consumers in OECD Report 'Consumer Dispute 
Resolution and Redress in the Global Marketplace' 2006 p. 44: H Perritt "Dispute Resolution in 
Cyberspace: Demand for New Forms of ADR' (2000) 15 Ohio State Journal on Dispute Resolution 675-
703,675-676 
202 H Perritt 'Dispute Resolution in Cyberspace: Demand for New Forms of ADR' (2000) 15 Ohio State 
Journal on Dispute Resolution 675-703, 675-676; Law Commission 'Defamation and the internet' Scoping 
Study No 2 December 2002, para 4.21 
203 V Heiskanen fn 10738; H Perritt 'Dispute Resolution in Cyberspace: Demand for New Forms of ADR' 
(2000) 15 Ohio State Journal on Dispute Resolution 675-703, 675-676 
204 H von Freyhold, V Gessner, E Vial and H Wagner (Eds) Cost of Judicial Barriers for Consumers in the 
Single Market, A Report for the European Commission, Zentrum fUr Europiiische Rechtspolitik an der 
Universitiit Bremen, OctoberlNovember 2005 
205 About £ 1344 
206 About £659 
207 Abl)llt £-1-435 
208 About £I 673 
209 About £ 638 
210 About .0931 
211 About £1638 
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Academic scholars212, policy-makers213 and legal practitioners214 have demanded 
the use of alternative forms of disputes resolution. For this reason this thesis focuses 
on Online Dispute Resolution (ODR) as a way forward for the resolution of internet 
disputes. 
Not just in the context of e-commerce, but more generally there is a noticeable 
tendency to overcome the cost factor of (even merely domestic) litigation by the use 
of ADR. Courts in England have now accepted the importance of ADR in 
complementing litigation. Since the introduction of the Civil Procedure Rules the 
courts are under an obligation to encourage ADR215 , if appropriate, and the courts 
are empowered to impose cost penalties on parties who unreasonably refuse to 
participate in ADR216. Furthermore, the courts have recognised the validity and 
enforceability of ADR clauses in commercial contracts.217 
ODR may provide a solution for some internet disputes and the significance of 
ODR in this respect and how it should be evolved from existing Alternative Dispute 
Resolution (ADR) is further discussed in the following chapters. 
10. Conclusion 
This Chapter has explained the characteristics of the internet which make it more 
likely than before the use of the internet became widespread that individuals 
become embroiled in cross-border disputes. This involvement of individuals in 
~12 A Patel 'Consumer protection and redress-the wider context' (2000) 3 Electronic Business Lmt' 9-10. l 
Gillies 'A Review of the New Jurisdiction Rules for Electronic Consumer Contracts Within the European 
Union' [2001] Journal of Information Law & Technology (e-journal). V Heiskanen fn 10738 et seq 
w Art.l7 of the E-commerce Directive 2000/31IEC published in OJ L178/l of 17. July 2000 encourages 
the Member States to establish out-of-court dispute resolution mechanisms 
214 J Gunn & W Roebuck 'White Paper on Alternative Dispute Resolution in a Supply Chain Transformed 
by On-Line Transactions' May 2001. available from the ecentre Legal Advisory Group 
215 CPR Part 1.4 (2) (e): Cowl)' Pzvmouth City Council [2002] 1 WLR 803 (CA) 
216 CPR Part 44.5: Dunnett l' Railtrack [2002] 2 AllER 850 (CA): Royal Bank of Canada l' Secretary of 
State!i,,' DctclIC(' [2003] EWHC 1841 (ChD) unreported, para 11-13: but cf ~lIrst l' Leeming [2003] 1 
Lloyd's Rep 379 (ChD). where the refusal to mediate was justified on the basIS that there was no real 
prospect of success 381. 
217 CliMe & Wi,.cless Pic 1'IBM [2002] 2 AllER 1041 (Comm)-upholding the validity of an ADR clause. 
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international disputes leads to concerns about access to and power imbalances in 
dispute resolution and, hence to concerns about fairness. As to power imbalances, 
this Chapter has described the notion of power in dispute resolution and concluded 
that this is an extremely multi-facetted concept, but that an important role is played 
by access to resources and the repeat player effect. In order to simplify the extremly 
complicated concept of power paradigms a presumption has been introduced that 
power imbalances are likely to exist for internet disputes in the relationship between 
a corporate entity and an individual. 
This Chapter has explained that the discussion is not limited to e-commerce 
disputes, but that a wide approach is taken, including all disputes arising from 
interactions mediated by the internet, including disputes about domain names. It has 
been acknowledged that some B2C e-commerce disputes (a subset of internet 
disputes relevant to this thesis) can be solved by intervention of payment providers. 
In summary, the main focus of the thesis is on cross-border internet disputes where 
(i) one party is a corporate entity and the other party is an individual and (ii) there is 
no access to the courts, because of costs. However the scope of this thesis also 
encompasses disputes between individuals, where there is no access to the courts 
for the same reason. 
This Chapter has also briefly explained that cross-border litigation is complicated 
and expensive and will therefore not be suitable for many internet disputes. ADR 
may provide the way forward and the next chapter will look at ADR and its 
significance. 
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Chapter 4: ADR and Applicable Law 
Those, who in quarrels interpose, 
Must often wipe a bloody nose. 
(John Gay (1685-1732)) 
1. Introduction 
The function of this Chapter is to explain the meaning of Alternative Dispute 
Resolution (ADR). This serves as background to the discussion of Online Dispute 
Resolution (ODR) in the following Chapter. This Chapter concentrates on the two 
main forms of ADR, mediation and arbitration, discussing their main 
characteristics, function and limitations. In doing so this Chapter explains why only 
arbitration is to be regarded as a true alternative to litigation and why mediation is 
in the nature of a filter for disputes, a complementary, rather than an independent 
form of dispute resolution. 
Since it has been argued that a variant of arbitration (ie online arbitration) is the 
main mechanism to solve such disputes and since arbitration is a form of binding 
adjudication, this Chapter will also discuss how to identify the applicable law for 
online arbitration of internet disputes for the Model proposed. 
2. The Nature of Disputes and What to Do About Them 
Since this thesis is concerned with the fair resolution of internet disputes. it is 
essential to deliberate about the function and role of different mechanisms to deal 
with disputes. In this context it is first necessary to consider what amounts to a 
dispute. In plain and general language, it seems that we talk about a dispute if one 
person, belieying he or she has a right or entitlement. wants something from another 
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person or wants that other person to do something, which this other person is not 
willing to give up or do. Defined in this way, a dispute is essentially a legal 
claim218 , amounting to a disagreement about justiciable issues.219 
One way to deal with such a situation is adjudication22o• The essence of 
adjudication is to have a neutral third person decide whether the second person 
should give that something to the first person or do what the first person demands. 
The adjudicator thereby defines the first person's legal rights and entitlements.22l 
Alternatively, the first person may want to bargain with the other person. 
Bargaining by its very nature involves the first person persuading the second person 
that it is in his or her interests to give to the first person what they wish to obtain or 
to do what the first person wants him or her to do.222 
Hence, adjudication and bargaining are the two basic methods for resolving 
disputes. Most disputes are solved informally by the parties (or their lawyers) 
negotiating between themselves.223 Some disputes are formally solved by courts 
adjudicating. Between these opposite ends of the spectrum of formality lies a range 
of dispute resolution mechanisms, which do involve a neutral third party, but which 
are kept outside the courts. These are called Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR). 
m See similarly D Foskett The Lml' and Practice oj Compromise (4 th edition, Sweet & Maxwell London 
1996) 5. The courts had to consider the meaning of the word" dispute' in the context of an application for a 
stay of arbitration proceedings under s.9 (l) Arbitration Act 1996. if the arbitration agreement, for example, 
allows" any dispute' to be referred to arbitration. The mere fact that the other party does not respond to the 
claim and stays passive is sufficient for a dispute to exist, see Ellerine l' Klinger [1982] WLR 1375 (CA) 
1382-1383 
219 H Brown & A Marriott fn 121 2 
220 Adjudication includes litigation, arbitration and ombudsmen. The term 'adjudication' in this thesis is 
used as a overarching term to mean a form of dispute resolution involving a third party making a decision 
binding on the parties. 
221 Lon Fuller argues that it is the very essence of adjudication that it ultimately defines rights and 
entitlements, see L Fuller fn 38 369 
222 There are different strategies for negotiation. for example strategies focusing on positions and strategies 
focusing on interests. The Harvard Negotiation Project has developed a negotiation method. focusing on 
interests, called 'principled negotiation'. a method from which mediation has greatly benefited. see below. 
A detailed discussion of negotiation theory is outside the scope of this thesis. 
22.' DJ Galligan fn 52 273: M Galanter, M Cahill "Most Cases Settle: Judicial Promotion and Regulation of 
Settlements' (1994) 46 S!m?!ord Lml' RC1'ic)\' 13.39-1391, 133G-1340 
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3. ADR 
ADR is a collective expression for all dispute resolution mechanisms interposing a 
neutral third party, but outside the courts, and is a synonym for extrajudicial or 'out-
of-court' dispute resolution?24 In this thesis the term includes other adjudicative 
techniques such as arbitration.225 The following Figure illustrates the relationship 
between different forms of dispute resolution: 
I' 
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Figure 4: Illustrating the basic methods and mechanisms of dispute resolution. 
~~.j G Kaufmann-Kohler, T Schultz, Online Dispute Resolution: Challengesfor Contemporary Justice 
(Kluwer Law International The Hague 2004) 6; C Rule Online Dispute Resolutionfor Busincss (Jossey-
Bass San Francisco 2002) 13; H Brown & A Marriott fn 121 12; The Central London County Court Pilot 
Mediation Scheme, Evaluation Report by H Genn. Lord Chancellor's Department lui) 1998 para. 1.1.1 
~25 Some authors exclude all adjudication/arbitration from the scope of ADR see N Vidmar 'Procedural 
Justice and Alternati \'e Dispute' Resolution' Chapter 6 in K Rohl. S Machura (eds) Procedural Justice 
(Ashgate Dartmouth 1997) 121-D6. 121: K Mackie. D Miles. W Marsh. T Allen The ADR Practice Guide 
(Butterworths London 2000) 9 
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The adjective 'alternative' in ADR connotes that ADR was conceived to be an 
alternative to the state court system. In the 1970s and 1980s the ADR movement, 
consisting to a large part of academic scholars, advocated the increasing use of 
ADR and conceptualised ADR as a distinct subject, in response to deficiencies in 
the official court system, particularly in the US.226 However, it should be pointed 
out that the mechanisms of arbitration and mediation have been used long before in 
various contexts.227 
The foundation of all ADR processes is the agreement of the parties to submit their 
dispute to the neutral third party- this consent is necessary for all dispute resolution 
mechanisms outside the courtS?28 
The advantages of ADR are that the parties, at least in theory, have more control 
over the process and it has been shown in empirical research that process control is 
important for the parties' satisfaction with the dispute resolution process.229 The 
parties to ADR can choose the procedure to be used and influence the procedural 
rules. Furthermore the parties select the arbitrator(s) or the mediators. The parties 
may well choose someone with expertise in the subject-matter of the dispute and 
they will select someone they trust, hence creating legitimacy of the process. In 
some cases the parties' preference may be for confidentiality230, which ADR, but 
226 G Kaufmann-Kohler. T Schultz fn 224 6; C Rule fn 224 15. Roger Fisher and William Ury first 
published their famous book Getting to res in 1974 or Laura Nader's No Access to LOlL Alternatl1'es to the 
American Legal Systcl7l (Academic Press New York 1980); C Menkel-Meadow 'Toward another View of 
Legal Negotiation: the Structure of Problem-Solving' (1983-1984) 31 UCLA Law Review 754-842 
22" A detailed discussion of the history and use in other cultural contexts of arbitration and mediation is 
outside the scope of this thesis. Many authors cite arbitration between merchants in Mediaeval Europe as 
the origin of contemporary arbitration. but arbitration was also known in Roman times. The first English 
arbitration statute dates from 1698 and one of the oldest arbitration institution was the London Court of 
International Arbitration. founded in 1892. see for more detail A Redfern. M Hunter Law and Practice of 
International Commercial Arbitration (4th edition, Sweet & Maxwell London 2004) 3-6. Mediation, as an 
informal dispute resolution process, has. in one form or another. been practiced in all societies. 
2~~ Consent signifies the waiver of the right to go to court, see 6-~.5. 7-2 
229 N Vidmar fn 225 125. P Houlden, S La Tour. L Walker, J Thibaut 'Preferences for Modes of Dispute 
Resolution as a Function of Process and Decision Control' (1978) 1.+ Journal of Experimental Social 
PsrcllOlogy 13-,)0, 26-27 
236 6_6 
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not the public state courts can provide. Finally, in most cases, ADR is more 
informal and in some cases also cheaper231 . 
Mediation in addition has further advantages over adjudication (both litigation and 
arbitration) in that it is even more informal, can resolve (or even remove) the 
dispute by more creative and efficient solutions and it is, at least in principle, less 
confrontational, thus preserving existing relationships (if applicable). Mediation can 
create more efficient solutions by 'enlarging the pie,.232 This is further discussed in 
the next section. 
While arbitration and mediation are the two basic forms of ADR, there are many 
variations and hybrid forms, such as med-arb (using the two forms consecutively), 
expert evaluation (mediation with an expert issuing a recommendation) or mini-trial 
(having a senior figure recommending a decision after representation of argument 
by the parties). 233 However a detailed discussion of these hybrid forms and variants 
is outside the scope of this thesis, which will focus on the two main forms, 
mediation and arbitration. 
3.1 Mediation 
3.1.1 Mediation explained 
Mediation is a form of dispute resolution whereby a third party mediator brokers a 
settlement between the parties. It is essentially a process of negotiation, which is 
structured and influenced by the third party mediator. His or her role in negotiation 
~.11 The degree of informality in ADR varies and so does the cost. Whereas judges are paid by the state. 
arbitrators and mediators will charge their time to the parties, a factor which makes ADR potentially more 
expensive than litigation. However to the extent that ADR uses shorter procedures and less evidence than 
the courts it may be cheaper. The role of using technology and the resulting efficiency is explained in 5-5. L 
5-5.2 
~.1~ Despite these advantages it seems that take-up of a voluntary option to me?iate a d~sp.ute is low among" 
parties in ci vii disputes, about 5° () during the Central London County Court PIlo.t ~edlatlOn Scheme. fn 2_-l 
paras. 1.1.4. 2.1.1. 2.1.2; S Merry, S Silbey 'What do Plaintiffs Wan!'? Reexamining the Concept of 
Dispute' (1984) 9 (2) Justice SystclI/ JOllrnaI151-178. 152 
~.13 See H Brown & A Marriott fn 121 17-19 
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is to facilitate the parties' endeavour to reach a settlement through a series of joint 
meetings and private meetings with each party separately ('caucuses,).234 
The parties can agree to submit their dispute to mediation either before or after the 
dispute arises. A mediation agreement is not a mere agreement to negotiate235 , but 
binding on the parties, if the parties' obligations are sufficiently clear.236 In Cable & 
Wireless pic v IBM UK Ltd a mediation clause was held to be enforceable, since it 
referred to an institution and specified procedure and the court held that the parties' 
obligation was to participate in the process of initiating the mediation, selecting a 
mediator and presenting the mediator with the case and relevant documents.237 
A distinction is usually made between facilitative and evaluative mediation.238 The 
former mode is slightly more limited in that the mediator merely assists the parties 
in finding their own agreement without making recommendations or suggestions. In 
the latter mode the mediator evaluates the parties' respective positions and makes a 
recommendation as to the tenns of the settlement. Such recommendations may be 
based on the mediator's view of the legal merits of the case or in a non-legalistic, 
pragmatic context on the mediator's view of what are reasonable terms of 
settlement. 239 
It should also be pointed out that a settlement agreement is a contract and cannot 
directly be enforced before the courts as a court order. Hence in the case of non-
compliance with a settlement, the deprived party would have to start court 
d·.!' I . I 240 procee lngs to enlorce contractua entIt ements. 
2J4 H Brown & A Marriott fn 121 127; K Mackie et al fn 225 11 
2,) Not enforceable under English law: Courtney and Fairbairn Ltd l' Tolaini Brothers (Hotels) Ltd [1975] 
1 WLR 297 (CA) 301 
2.,6 CaMe & Wirc/ess pIc )' IBM UK Ltd [2002] (Comm) paras 23-24,34 
2J 7· ') ') Ibid para _.+. _9 . 
2JR This distinction is slightly theoretical. as in reality there is no absolutely clear line between these two 
forms. which is more a matter of degree. 
~,l) K Mackie et al fn 225 11-12.49 
:4(1 Unless the settlement was reached in the context of pending litigation. in which case in England it can 
be drawn up as a Consent Order (or 'Tomlin' Order after the case of Tomlin)' Standard Telephones and 
Cables [1969] 3 AllER 201 CA) 
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The distinctive feature of mediation is that the parties agree the terms of their 
settlement. A mediator does not impose a decision or solution on the parties. The 
parties initially only agree to participate in the procedure. but ultimately decide 
during the process if they settle and on what terms. The parties can discontinue the 
process at any stage and 'walk away'. They are not bound until they have 
completed a binding settlement agreement and in this sense, mediation is a 
voluntary process.241 Even mediation under a binding mediation agreement is 
voluntary, as the obligation is limited to initiating and attempting the process. but 
this obligation does not prevent the parties from discontinuing the mediation.242 
From this description it should have become clear that the goal of mediation is an 
agreed settlement, not a decision about each party's rights and entitlements, as in 
adjudication. This means that the goal of mediation is fundamentally different from 
that of adjudication and this is further discussed in the next section. 
3.1.2 How mediation works and its purpose 
As has been discussed above, negotiation moves by the parties considering and 
measuring up their respective interests, albeit each from their own subjective 
perspective. This statement equally rings true for mediation, which, as has been 
pointed out above, is a form of third party assisted negotiation. 
One measurement of the parties' respective interests is an assessment of their legal 
rights and entitlements. In other words, the parties' rights and entitlements inform 
their respective interests to settle or not to settle. Both parties are likely to consider 
what would happen if they could not reach agreement and this entails an evaluation 
of how an adjudicator would decide the case. 
~.jl H Brown & A Marriott fn 121 1~9 Unlike arbitration, where, if the parties have entered into a valid 
arbitration agreement. and if the submission is in accordance with the arbitration agreement,. the arbitrator 
may issue a directly enforceable default award, even if the respondent refuses to co-operate In the 
~f()cedure. 
-.j~Cabl(! & Wireless pIc fn 236 paras 22.29 
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However, collaterally, the parties will also weigh up access to and the costs of 
adjudication.243 These costs include the delay involved and expense of adjudication, 
emotional factors and the fact that an adjudicator is restricted to particular remedies, 
whereas a settlement agreement may contain a variety of solutions244 . Hence a party 
usually will be prepared to accept slightly less than what they would obtain through 
adjudication or a party usually will be prepared to give slightly more than what they 
would have to if ordered by an adjudicator, taking into account the costs of 
adjudication. These factors depend, however on each party's subjective perception 
of the merits of the case and the costs of adjudication, as both factors are impossible 
to predict with certainty. Hence, the risk adverse person is likely to be in a 
disadvantaged bargaining position.245 
On the other hand, if it is clear that one party has no access to binding and coercive 
adjudication (since the costs vastly exceed the value of the claim) the other party (if 
defendant) may not be prepared to settle at all or the other party (if claimant) may 
obtain a settlement exceeding any adjudicated decision.246 As will be seen below, 
this raises serious questions of availability of redress and fairness. 
By way of illustration, if each party bears its own costs, the claimant's desire to 
settle could be expressed as S> A-CC, 'S' standing for settlement, A being the 
adjudicated decision and CC the claimant's costs. The defendant's desire to settle 
could be expressed as S<A + CD, CD standing for the costs of the defendant. 
Therefore if the claimant's costs are very high, the claimant will be prepared to 
settle low. If the defendant's costs are very high, the claimant can obtain a 
settlement substantially exceeding the adjudicated decision. However in a court 
system, where the winner pays the loser's cost, assuming that it is clear that the 
~43 See also R Mnookin, L Kornhauser 'Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: the Case of Divorce' (1979) 
88 The Yale LQ)\' Journal 950-997 , 971-972 
~.j.j See the music band e:\ample in the te:\t below. A court oflaw can only award the remedies pro\'ided for 
by law 
'.j-
-' R Mnookin, L Kornhauser fn 243 979 
~.jt, C Menkel-Meado\\' fn 21(1 834 
84 
Chapter 4: ADR and Applicable Law 
claimant will win, the respective settlement desires would be S>A (claimant) and 
S< A+ CC + CD (defendant). Hence, if the costs of either party are very high the 
claimant could obtain a settlement vastly exceeding the adjudicated decision. Under 
English civil procedure either party can make an offer to settle. If the offeree does 
not accept the offer, but does not succeed to obtain a better bargain at triaL that 
party will be responsible for the offeror's costs incurred after the offer has been 
made.247 The defendant could use a Part 36 offer to prevent the claimant from using 
its bargaining power to obtain a settlement vastly exceeding the likely adjudicated 
decision. On the other hand, if there is a chance that the claimant may lose the case 
and bear the whole costs, CC plus CD, the defendant may be less likely to settle at 
the likely adjudicated decision. Again the claimant in that case could use the Part 36 
offer to put pressure on the defendant. Hence under English civil procedure rules 
there are mechanisms to level out the unfair bargaining power derived from the cost 
risk. However this system is not perfect, as courts rarely award the whole costs to 
the winning parties and litigation is very expensive, which may lead a risk-averse 
party to settle well below or above the adjudicated decision. 
So, two important factors in mediating a solution to a dispute are the perceived 
outcome of adjudication balanced with the feasibility and costs involved in 
adjudication.248 This is the meaning of the phrase that mediation takes place 'in the 
shadow of the law,249. 
But it should also be pointed out that, in some disputes, factors other than those 
related to the feasibility and outcome of adjudication strongly influence the parties' 
respective interests in negotiation and mediation. 
If the dispute is genuinely about one single issue, such as how much compensation 
should a perpetrator of a tort pay to the victim, then there is little scope for aligning 
2~- Part 36 Civil Procedure Rules 1998 
~48 E Clark. G Cho, A Hoyle 'Online Dispute Resolution: Present Realities. Pressing Problems and Future 
Prospects' (2003) 17 (l) i17lcrnational RC1'ic1t' of Lml' Compllters and Technology 7-:'5. 16 
2~l) Coined lw the art.of R Mnookin. L Kornhauser fn 243 968: see also C Menkel-Meadow fn 226 766 
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the parties' interests through a compromise other than a linear solution. whereby the 
parties meet somewhere between the claimant's monetary demands and the 
defendant's offer to pay compensation. 
On the other hand, many disputes will involve multiple issues and the parties' 
preferences for each issue can be adapted to achieve the solution optimal for both 
parties.25o In fact, the most important task of mediation is to find such an optimal 
solution, satisfying as many interests of the parties as possible. 
This becomes clearer if one makes a distinction between positions and interests. A 
position is what the party says he or she wants, whereas his or her interests are the 
motivation behind that position. If a different position equally satisfies the 
underlying interest, parties may well be able and willing to change their position. 
Roger Fisher & William Ury argue that reconciling interests works much better 
than reconciling positions, as for every interest there might exist more than one 
position and frequently a different position than the one initially taken satisfies both 
., .. 251 partIes respectIve Interests. 
One famous and simple example252 for this is the story of two children arguing 
about who should have the last orange in the fruit bowl. A parent adjudicating this 
'case' might merely focus on the question of which of the two children has a better 
entitlement to the orange, for example one child may have eaten three oranges 
already, whereas the other child has had none. By contrast, mediating between the 
children might involve an examination of the reasons why each child wants to have 
the orange. The first child might want to have the orange in order to grind the rind 
for making a cake, whereas the other child may want to eat the flesh, in which case 
250 H Brown & A Marriott fn 121 130; C Menkel-Meadow fn 226 795: L Fuller 'Mediation-Its Forms and 
Functions' 44 Southern California LG11' Rel'iC1l' 305-339. 316-317 ~51 R Fisher. William Ury 'Getting to Yes: Negotiating an Agreement \\'ithout Giving In' C~nd edition 
Random House London 1992) 42-43 
252 C Menkel-Meadow 'Toward another View of Legal Negotiation: the Structure ofProblem-Sohing' 
(1983-1984) 31 UCLA Law Review 754-842. 771 or see also R Fisher. William Ury 'Getting to Yes: 
Negotiating an Agreement without Giving In' (2nd edition Random House London 1992) .. +!, 58-59 
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an obvious solution has been found, which fully satisfies both children ~ s interests 
underlying the demand to have the orange. 
However, whether such a straightforward solution can be found, depends on the 
peculiar facts and circumstances of each case. 
One further, less theoretical, but anecdotal example may further support and 
illustrate this argument. In one case solved by mediation, the claimant had ordered a 
jazz music band for a corporate entertainment function from the defendant's agency 
business organising such events. Through a series of unlikely and unfortunate 
events (rather than the defendant's incompetence) she had to cancel the band's 
performance at the last minute. It seemed that under the terms of the contract she 
was likely to be in breach of contract and a court would have been likely to award 
damages. However the claimant agreed to attempt mediation and was persuaded 
that the breach had not occurred because of the negligent or careless operation of 
the defendant's business, but because of a series of unfortunate events. Hence, the 
claimant agreed to have a certain number of free performances in lieu of 
compensation, but exceeding in monetary value the amount of damages, he was 
likely to receive from a court. This solution satisfied the interests of both parties: 
the defendant was spared negative publicity, did not have to pay damages and costs 
and obtained a satisfied customer, whereas the claimant obtained something of 
greater value than the monetary compensation he would have been entitled to. 
However, again this solution only worked because of the particular circumstances 
of the case. It worked for the reason that the defendant trusted the claimant to 
render satisfactory performances in the future and for the reason that he happened to 
require further, regular performances after the one that had failed. 
Clearly, only some disputes lend themselves to such neat solutions. It is argued here 
that it is exactly the function of mediation to find out the parties' respective 
interests and align the resulting preferences in such a way that the solution satisfies 
87 
Chapter 4: ADR and Applicable Law 
each party's interests. However not all disputes can be solved in this way. In some 
factual scenarios, the underlying interests of the parties cannot be aligned and it is 
therefore necessary to resort to adjudication.253 
In the literature on the purpose of mediation and its value, the debate is largely 
bipolar and focuses on a 'either or' approach- mediation is either a 'good 
institution' or a 'bad institution' . 
Some authors254 argue that mediation is preferable to adjudication for the reason 
that it makes eminent sense to base dispute resolution on the parties' interests rather 
than their legal rights or entitlements. These authors point to the advantages of 
mediation such as preservation of ongoing relationships255, parties having greater 
control over their dispute and the availability of more flexible solutions tailored to 
the parties' needs and possibly, in some instances, reduced costs. 
Other authors256, by contrast, argue that adjudication according to law is preferable, 
as mediation may lead a party to renounce his or her rights and entitlements. 
These authors also argue that mediation is contrary to the notion of justice and 
fairness 257. At first glance it may indeed seem that mediation is contrary to fairness, 
as mediation is partly an irrational process, not entirely based on the parties' 
rational arguments about facts and law, but on bargaining about interests.258 This 
involves strategic behaviour and inducing the opponent, regardless of the quality of 
his or her arguments, to agree to a settlement. This aspect of mediation may 
~5J A detailed examination of what types of disputes are suitable for compromise and a quantitative analysis 
of what percentage of disputes are suitable for settlement is outside the scope of this thesis. See also similar 
H Edwards' Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or AnathemaT (1986) 99 Harvard Law Revic11' 668-
684,678- he points out that the 'broken telephone' theory of disputes is wrong- disputes are not only about 
mis-communication, some conflicts may not be solved through mere realignment of interests. 
~5.j C Menkel-Meadow fn 226 757: K Mackie et al fn 226 14-15; M Cappelletti fn 49289-290 
~55 Mediation tends to adopts a problem-solving approach and is frequently less confrontational. H Brown 
& A Marri ott fn 121 13 1 
~5(, N Vidmar fn 225 123; DJ Galligan fn 52 16. 276; 0 Fiss 'Against Settlement' 93 rale Lmr Journal 
1073-1090, 1085-1086: M Galanter, M Cahill fn 223 1364, 1385-6 
~5" Ibid, see also 2-5 
, -s 
-), L Fuller fn 38 :'fl7 
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enhance power imbalances between the parties.259 Habermas for example, argues 
that the outcomes of negotiation processes260 are less fair than those reached 
through court procedures, which have institutionalised equality built into the 
process through due process.261 
It is argued here that the apparent conflict between these opposing views can be 
resolved if one regards mediation not as an alternative, but as complementary to 
adjudication. 
Mediation is not about fair resolution of disputes.262This is not to say that mediation 
is unfair. The function of mediation is to attempt to analyse the parties' interests 
underlying their position and reformulate their preferences in such a way that the 
dispute is removed. Therefore mediation is about removing disputes, not about 
solving them fairly. In the example of the children fighting about an orange it is 
irrelevant whether it is fair or not that the child who is allowed to eat the last 
orange's flesh has already consumed three oranges, whereas the child, who wants to 
hake the cake, has eaten none. The fact that child baking the cake merely wishes to 
use the rind has completely removed the dispute. Hence fairness in mediation is 
limited to enabling communication between the parties and reformulating positions 
and does not involve designing procedures to enable the fair resolution of disputes. 
However, mediation becomes unfair if one party feels pressurised in accepting a 
compromise, not reflecting that party's interests and not reflecting that party's 
rights and entitlements.263 This is more likely to occur if adjudication is not 
available or accessible because of the costs of adjudication discussed above. In 
other words a lack of accessible and affordable adjudication affects the fairness of 
mediation. Hence, access to adjudication guards against unfairness in mediation. 
~5'l The Central London County Court Pilot Mediation Scheme, Evaluation Report fn 224 para. 7.7.5-6 
~60 He speaks about negotiation generally 
~(,I J Habermas fn 76 21R-219: L Fuller fn 38 366-367 and 2-5. The problem with this argument though is 
that in practice. strategic behaviour in litigation and the costs of litigation also increase po\\'er imbalances 
between the parties. 
~6~ C Menkel-Meadow fn 226 816 and L Fuller fn 250 307-308 
~6J N Vidmar fn 225 124: DJ Galligan fn 52 274-279; 0 Fiss fn 256 1076-1078 
89 
Chapter 4: ADR and Applicable Law 
Furthermore, mediation should not always lead to a settlement for two reasons. As 
has just been discussed, mediation only works if the circumstances of the case lend 
themselves to a compromise.264 Secondly, as has been discussed in the previous 
section, mediation is voluntary, not coercive and for this reason also it cannot 
provide an avenue of redress for all cases, since a party can terminate the process at 
any stage. In other words mediation does not obviate the need for binding 
adjudication in some cases. 
For these reasons in this thesis, only arbitration is regarded as a true alternative to 
litigation. For this reason fairness and due process issues in mediation are not 
examined further. 265 
In conclusion, the argument advanced here is that mediation should be provided in 
conjunction with adjudication, rather than as an alternative to adjudication?66 
Mediation should be attempted before adjudication (unless it is obvious that it will 
fail). As a preliminary process, it has an important and useful filtering function. It 
filters out those disputes which lend themselves to a compromise, removing 
disputes and thereby making adjudication unnecessary. However, it is crucial that 
adjudication is available and accessible for those disputes not lending themselves to 
compromise. Hence the linchpin of the fairness argument is whether arbitration, as 
an alternative to litigation, can be made fair. This thesis will therefore focus on 
arbitration and how it can be made fair. 
~().j DJ Galligan fn 52 274-276 
265 It has been argued above that the purpose of mediation is to remove the dispute between the parties 
rather than to solve it fairly. This purpose can be jeopardized if a mediator is biased, for example. In fact 
neutrality of the mediator is a value asserted, but rarely measured- pointed out by S Cobb. J Rifkin 
'Practice and Paradox: Deconstructing Neutrality in Mediation' (1991) 16 Lml' and Social Inquiry 25-63, 
39. There are other due process issues such as accountability and confidentiality. eg P Robinson 'Centuries 
of Contract Common Law Can't Be All Wrong' [2003] Journal o(Dispu!c Rcsolwiol1 135-173. 16: see also 
S.6 US Uniform Mediation Act and Art.6 (3) (a) of the Draft EU Mediation Directi\'e of 22. October 2004. 
COM(2004) 718 final. Ho",e\'er, as this thesis focuses on arbitration, these issues are not discussed here. 
266 See also similar H Edwards' Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema?' (1986) 99 Harvard 
Lall' RCl'iC1I' 668-6R4. 675 
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3.2 Arbitration 
Arbitration is a form of private adjudication whereby a neutral third party, the 
arbitrator267 chosen and paid by the parties makes a binding and enforceable 
decision (called an award) as to how the dispute should be solved. The arbitrator 
will usually decide the case according to authoritative standards set by the 
applicable law(s).268 Therefore, like in litigation, the arbitrator will hear evidence to 
establish the facts and decide on the relevant law. However, unlike litigation, the 
procedure used to arrive at the award is more flexible and usually determined by the 
parties or rules chosen by the parties (principle of party autonomy).269 
The basis of the arbitrator's jurisdiction is the parties' agreement to submit the 
dispute (or disputes of this type) to arbitration. The agreement to arbitrate is the 
cornerstone of arbitration. There can be no arbitration without agreement.270 One 
exception to this is statutory arbitration, in England recognised according to 
sections 94-98 of the Arbitration Act 1996. 
This arbitration agreement can be made either before or after the dispute has arisen 
and it is binding on the parties. 271 If one party starts court proceedings in a dispute 
within the remit of the arbitration agreement and the other party objects, the court 
stays proceedings.272 
267 Or a panel of (usually three) arbitrators 
268 Applicable law in 4-4. The arbitrator's duty to give reasons in 6-5 
269 Sections 1 (b) and 34 (1) Arbitration Act 1996. Art.1460 (1) French Nouveau Code de Procedure 
Civile, the German Arbitration Act ~1042 (3) and Art.26 (1) Japanese Arbitration Act of2003- party 
autonomy is discussed in 6-2.5, 6-4.2.3 
270 A Redfern, M Hunter Law and Practicc of International Commercial Arbitration (4 th edition, Sweet & 
Maxwell London 2004) 6-7, 9,155; JDM Lew & LA Mistelis & SM Kroll Comparativc International 
CO/ll/llercial Arbitration (Kluwer Law International The Hague 2003) 3-4, 99; s.30 (1) Arbitration Act 
1996, which requires as one of the prerequisites to the tribunal's jurisdiction a valid arbitration agreement 
and Art.II (1) of the NYC which states that the Contracting States should recognise an arbitration 
agreement in writing and provides in Art.V (1) (a) that recognition and enforcement may be refused if there 
is no valid arbitration aareement- HanT L Revnolds l' International Amateur Athletic Federation (1996) 
b .' 
\:XI YBCA 715 and Oberlandesgericht (Collrt of Appeal) Rostock ]]. N01'ember ]001 ,\'0.1 Sell 0300 
(2004) XXIX YBCA 732 
~7~ Mediation argeement binding- '+-3.1.1 , . . . . 
• 7. S.9 (4) Arbitration Act 1996. Art.l'+58 French Nouveau Code de Procedure CIvIle. German ArbitratIOn 
Act ~ 1032 (1), Art. 1.+ (l) Japanese Arbitration Act of 2003 
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Unlike mediation, arbitration is mandatory, ie once the parties have submitted to 
arbitration they cannot withdraw from the process. If the respondent refuses to 
participate in the arbitration, the arbitrator may issue a default award.273 
The arbitration award can be directly enforced, similar to a j udgment. 274 Hence, 
unlike mediation, arbitration is coercive. Furthermore, the New York Convention275 
provides that, subject to narrow exceptions276, contracting states must enforce a 
foreign arbitration award.277 The wide-spread ratification of the New York 
Convention278 ensures that arbitration awards are enforceable across most borders, 
unlike court judgments, for which the enforcing party has to rely on notions of 
comity in the enforcement jurisdiction or a bilateral or multilateral enforcement 
treaty. 
An arbitration award is also final in the sense that awards have res judicata effect, 
ie once an award has been made and unless the award is successfully challenged, 
the same matter cannot be brought before a court or arbitration tribunal again.279 
Therefore, in contrast to mediation, arbitration is binding and mandatory, leading to 
a directly enforceable award with res judicata effect. Because of these 
characteristics of arbitration compared to the characteristics of mediation discussed 
above, only arbitration can be a true alternative to litigation as a binding and 
enforceable avenue for redress for internet disputes. 
m SA 1 (4) Arbitration Act 1996, German Arbitration Act ~ 1 048, Art.33 Japanese Arbitration Act of 2003 
~74 S.66 Arbitration Act 1996, Art.1476 French Nouveau Code de Procedure Civile, German Arbitration 
Act ~ 1055, AliA5 (l) Japanese Arbitration Act of 2003 
m 330 UNTS ~ (NYC) adopted New York 10. June 1958, entered into force on 7. June 1959 
~76 Art.\' NYC 
~77 Art.IlI NYC 
~78 On 1:2. September 2007 142 states had ratified the NYC 
m S. 58 (l) Arbitration Act 1996: A Redfern, M Hunter fn 270 459 
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4. Applicable Law 
It has been argued in this Chapter generally that mediation operates in the shadow 
of the law and that a binding form of resolution is required to complement 
mediation, if a dispute cannot be solved by way of compromise. For disputes 
internal to one jurisdiction, litigation complements mediation and vice versa. 
However it has been shown in the last Chapter that the jurisdictional challenge of 
cross-border litigation is an argument in favour of using extra-judicial means of 
dispute resolution for internet disputes. Combining these two arguments, for 
internet disputes, mediation should be complemented by arbitration as a binding 
form of extra-judicial dispute resolution, which has res judicata effect and which, 
thanks to the New York Convention can be enforced across national borders28o • 
Since arbitration is mainly based on decisions based on legal rules and standards, in 
cross-border internet disputes, it is necessary to answer the question of which legal 
rules apply or should apply to an international dispute. 
4.1 Law of the arbitration agreement, the lex arbitri and applicable law 
distinguished 
In arbitration, the question of 'which law applies' can be raised in three different 
contexts: (i) The law of the submission agreement or arbitration clause itself in 
deciding its validity and scope, (ii) the law of the seat of the arbitration, which 
provides the procedural framework for the arbitration, and (iii) the law applicable to 
the substantive issues between the parties (the applicable law). The main focus of 
this section is on (iii), applicable law, but the other aspects should be mentioned 
briefly. 
As to (i), this will frequently be the same as (iii) if the parties have made an express 
choice and the agreement to arbitrate is contained in a clause of the main agreement 
280 6_2.6,6_7. 8-4.3 
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between the parties.281 However, some courts have found that the scope and validity 
of the arbitration agreement (whether contained in a submission agreement or a 
clause) should be governed by the law of the seat.282 The courts in the place of 
enforcement, if this is in a state being a contracting state to the New York 
Convention, would have to examine validity in conformity with the provisions of 
that Convention and international public policy. 
As to (ii), the lex arbitri establishes the procedural framework of the arbitration283 
and attaches the arbitration to a jurisdictional forum284. The New York Convention 
still refers to the lex arbitri as the 'law of the country where the arbitration took 
place,285 or as the 'law of the country where the award is made,286. This actual 
territorial connection between the lex arbitri and the place where the actual 
arbitration is taking place is, as a matter of fact, becoming more and more tenuous, 
as with modem air travel and instant communication, the arbitration may be held in 
more than one place and, with online arbitration, in no particular place at all. 
Therefore, modem arbitration legislation and rules usually provides that the lex 
arbitri is chosen by the parties in their agreement to arbitrate. The parties can also 
empower the arbitral institution (if any) or the tribunal to designate the seat.287 
281 Union of India l' McDonnell Douglas Corp [1993] 2 Lloyds Rep 48 (Comm) 49-50, Sonatrach 
Petrolcum Corporation (BVI) l' Ferrell International Ltd [2002] 1 AllER 627 (Comm) para 32; see 
Hanseatisches OberIandesgericht (Court of Appeal), Hamburg 24. January 2003, No.11 Sch 06101 reported 
in (2005) XXX YBCA 509 para 16; CMV Clarkson, J Hill The Conflict of Laws (3 rd edition Oxford 
University Press 2006) 252 
282 Case No T1881-99 Bulgarian Foreign Trade Bank Ltd v Al Trade Finance Inc (2001) XXVI YBCA 291 
(Swedish Supreme Court), Judgment of 27. October 2000; XL Insurance Ltd v Owens Corning [2000] 2 
Lloyd's Rep 500 (Comm) 508; CMV Clarkson, J Hill fn 281 252 
283 The principle of party autonomy in arbitration means that the party can, to a large extent determine the 
Brocedure they wish to follow. Chapter 6 
_84 Some scholars have argued that international commercial arbitration should be delocalised, ie only 
controlled by the courts at the place of enforcement, see for example J Paulsson 'Delocalisation of 
International Commercial Arbitration: When and Why It Matters' (1983) 32 International and Comparatiw 
Law Quarterly 53-61. However this is only possible if the lex arbitri does allow for this. see A Redfern. M 
Hunter Lml' and Practice of international Commercial Arbitration (4 th edition, Sweet & Maxwell London 
2004) 108. A detailed examination of the arguments in favour and against delocalization are outside the 
scope of this thesis, 
285 Art. \' (1 ) (d) 
~~(, See Art.\' (1) (a). (e) 
287 S.3 Arbitration Act 1996 provides that the seat is designated by the parties or by the arbitral or other 
institution or person vested by the parties with powers in that regard, or by the arb,itral t~bunal i! so 
authorised by the parties. The UNCITRAL Rules, Art.16 (l) go even further by stlpulatmg that If the 
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Therefore, now. the seat of arbitration is a designated place rather than the actual 
territory in which the arbitration takes place. Since the seat and, hence the lex 
arbitri can be agreed by the parties. the choice of the procedural law is much more 
flexible than in litigation and hence more suitable to international. cross-border 
disputes. 
The law applying to the substantive issues in dispute is probably more contentious 
and the parties may find it harder to agree the applicable law. For this reason, the 
remainder of this section focuses on applicable law. 
4.2 Options 
Before discussing how the applicable law is determined, it might be useful to 
consider the different options amongst which a choice must be made. 
First in most cases, the applicable law will be the law of a particular jurisdiction 
(either a national, state or federal law). Applying the law of a jurisdiction has the 
advantage that this constitutes a developed, mature legal system, geared up to 
provide an answer for any legal problem and that such a system is capable of 
interpretation by lawyers trained in it, thereby providing reasonable certainty.288 
Secondly the applicable law may consist of internationallaw289, or an aspect of 
international law, such as the general principles of internationallaw29o. Applying 
parties cannot agree on the seat. the arbitral tribunal will make the choice for them and so does the 
UNCITRAL Model Law in Art.20 (l). Similar the ICC Rules which state in Art.14 (l) that the place of 
arbitration will be fixed tn the ICC's Court of Arbitration if the parties have not agreed. 
~XR A Redfern, M Hunter in 270 115 
~8C) S.46 English Arbitration Act 1996 only allows the tribunal to apply international law if the parties have 
agreed not to apply the law of a particular jurisdiction. S.l 051 (2) German Arbitration Act 1998 takes an 
even more consen'ative approach- it only allows the application of international law if the parties have 
expressly agreed that international law should apply. By contrast. Art.1-l9h the French Nouveau Code de 
Procedure Ci\ile allows the tribunal discretion- in the absence of choice the tribunal can apply any rules it 
considers appropriate. 
~90 Art..3X (1) (c) Statute of the International Court of Justice refers to the 'general principles ofla\\ 
rel'l)!!nised by ci\'ilised nations' as a source of law to fill any gaps in intemationallaw. These are common 
till'l1;L's and principles appertaining to many different legal orders. see M N Shaw International La\\' (5 th 
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international law to a dispute has the reverse advantage to applying the lav, of a 
particular jurisdiction, it is inherently more abstract and flexible and may appear 
neutral, but may lack certainty and may not be subject-specific. International law is 
not designed to answer detailed, specific questions of contract law.291 
Thirdly the applicable law may be transnationallaw292 such as the UNIDROIT293 
Principles294, the Lando Principles295 , CISa296 or Lex Mercatoria. 
Lex Mercatoria is a modem version of the mediaeval law merchant, consisting of 
rules and practices of the international business community/communities. It 
proceeds by comparing different national systems to extract common 
denominators297 and by looking at international law, such as the UNIDROIT 
principles, the general principles of international law mentioned above and trade 
usages (including codes of conduct) to close any gaps.298 
edition Cambridge University Press 2003) 94; R Wallace International Law (4 th edition Sweet & Maxwell 
2002) 22-23 
~91 
- A Redfern, M Hunter fn 270120-121 
292 S.46 English Arbitration Act 1996 only allows the tribunal to apply transnational law if the parties have 
agreed not to apply the law of a particular jurisdiction. S.l 051 (2) German Arbitration Act 1998 takes an 
even more conservative approach- it only allows the application of transnational law if the parties have 
expressly agreed that transnational law should apply. By contrast, Art.l496 the French Nouveau Code de 
Procedure Civile allows the tribunal discretion- in the absence of choice the tribunal can apply any rules it 
considers appropriate. 
29~ UNIDROIT, set up in 1926. is the International Institute for the Unification of Private Law, an 
independent intergovernmental organisation with seat in Rome 
294 Principles ofInternational Commercial Contracts (2004 Edition) containing general contract rules for 
international commercial agreements, available from 
http:! www.unidroiLorg·en!!lish·principles/contracts!principles200.+/blackletter2004.pdf [14. September 
2007] 
295 The Principles of European Contract Law formulated by the independent Commission on European 
Cnntract Law 
296 1489 UNTS 25567, 1980 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods 
(or '\'ienna Convention), governing aspects of the international sale of goods, where both parties are in 
Contracting countries or where thev have chosen CISG as applicable law 
2<)- Critical on this basis. see LJ M~still 'The New Lex Mercatoria-the First Twenty-Five Years' (1987)'+ 
(2) Arbitration International 86-119,92 
298 JOM Lew et al fn 270.+5.+ 
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Some scholars have accumulated lists of rules and principles299 , whereas others 
have adopted a functional approach30o • Under this latter approach, Lex Mercatoria 
is merely a method for finding the appropriate rule for the actual problem in 
question.301 Some scholars and practitioners have been sceptical or even hostile, 
doubting the existence of Lex Mercatoria as an identifiable body of law, to which 
reference can or should be usefully made.302 
Finally, in rare cases, the tribunal may be empowered to decide the case without 
applying any particular body of law, on the basis of what is fair and reasonable, ex 
aequo et bono303. This is not further discussed here. 
In litigation the courts are limited to applying the law of a particular jurisdiction to 
the substantive issues in dispute. By contrast in arbitration a wider range of options 
exists, including international and transnational law, giving the tribunal greater 
discretion and flexibility. 
4.3 Determination of the applicable law 
4.3.1 Choice of law 
The principle of party autonomy in arbitration means that the parties can choose the 
law applicable to the substantive issues of the contract and they can expressly avail 
299 See, for example the Central Transnational Law Digest & Bibliography by Klaus Peter Berger available 
from http:,"www.tldb.neU [ 14. September 2007] 
300A Redfem, M Hunter fn 270131-132 
101 E Gaillard (2001) 17 (1) 'Transnational Law: a Legal System or a Method of Decision-Making' 
.i. rhi tratioJl International 59-71, 64, 69 
1\)~L.J Mustill fn 297 92: F Mann 'The Proper Law in the Conflict of Laws' (1987) 36 Imernational 
Comparatil>c LQ)\' Quarter~1' 437-453,448 . 
303 S.46 English Arbitration Act 1996; s.l 051 (3) German Arbitration Act 1998 only allow the tnbunal to 
act as amiabh' compositcur if the partly have agreed this expressly 
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themselves of any of the options listed above. 304 This is subject to public policy 
concerns and the principle of mandatory laws discussed below305 . 
4.3.2 No choice of law 
If the parties have made no discernable choice at all, there are two possibilities of 
how to deal with this situation306 . The applicable law could either be determined 
according to conflict of law rules307, for example by deciding to which jurisdiction 
the dispute is most closely connected t0308, or by giving the arbitral tribunal a wide 
discretion in determining the rules and standards according to which it decides the 
dispute309. Whether the tribunal has to decide according to conflict of law rules or 
whether it has a discretion concerning the question of the most appropriate rules to 
apply to the substantive issues in dispute, depends on the arbitration law at the seat 
of arbitration or on the rules of the arbitration institution. 
If a tribunal decides that it has to apply "traditional' conflict of law analysis it will 
have to apply the law of a jurisdiction to which these conflict of law rules point. For 
this, it will have to decide which jurisdiction's conflict of law rules to refer to. In 
Europe, the law applicable to contracts has, of course, been harmonised in the 
Rome Convention310. Article 1 (2) (d) of that Convention provides that it does not 
apply to arbitration agreements. However, most scholars have interpreted this 
exception narrowly, meaning that the conflict of law rules in the Rome Convention 
do not apply to the submission agreement itself. but do apply to the determination 
304 JDM Lew et al fn 270413; A Redfern, M Hunter fn 270 111-112; S.46 (1) English Arbitration Act 
1996; s.1051 (1) German Arbitration Act 1998; Art.28 (1) UNCITRAL Model Law; Art.1496 French 
Nouveau Code de Procedure Civile; Art.36 (l) Japanese Arbitration Act 2003 
305 4 __ Ls 
306 ['he parties may not have been able to agree a 'neutral' applicable law . 
. 107 Art.28 (2) UNCITRAL Model Law and s.46 (3) English Arbitration Act 1996: 'the tribunal shall apply 
the ( ... ) conflict oflaw rules which it considers applicable'. not necessarily English conflict of law rules . 
. 10S :\1'1.36 (2) Japanese Arbitration Act 2003: s.l 051 (2) German Arbitration Act 1998. :\rt.187 (1) S\\'iss 
[clkral La\\' on Pri"ate International Law 1987 
30Q Art.l496 the French Nouveau Code de Procedure Ci"ile: Art.1 '7 (l) 1998 ICC Rules 
m Rome Convention of 19. June 1980 on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, OJ C027 of 26. 
January 1998 
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of the law applicable to the substantive issues.311 Article 4 (1 ) provides that this is 
the law of the country with which the contract has the closest connection and 
Article 4 (2) contains a rebuttable presumption that this is the place of habitual 
residence or place of business of the party carrying out the characteristic 
perfonnance. 
By contrast, if the arbitration tribunal can freely decide which rules to apply to the 
substantive issues, it is not bound by the results of conflict of law analysis. and. 
more importantly, it is not restricted to referring to the law of a particular 
jurisdiction, but may additionally or alternatively apply transnational rules of 
law312 . 
Finally, if the parties cannot agree on a choice of law. the question arises whether 
the parties are allowed to confer a power on the tribunal to make this choice for 
them, by providing. for example, 'that the arbitration tribunal may apply any rules it 
deems applicable'. Some arbitration laws, even if they do not generally confer 
discretion on the tribunal to detennine applicable law without a conflict of law 
analysis, allow the parties to expressly empower the tribunal to do SO.313 
4.4 Conclusion: the challenge of applicable law 
Applicable law is important in two respects. First of all, in the previous Chapter314 , 
this thesis has mentioned the complexity of applying jurisdiction rules based on 
localisation factors to internet disputes. For such disputes. detennining applicable 
law in court proceedings also involves considering localisation factors and is 
equally complex. Since arbitration. like litigation, is based on legal rules and 
-'II Report by M Giuliano and P Lagarde on the Rome Convention. OJ C282 of 31. October 1980. Para . .'i: 
CMV Clarkson. J Hill fn ~81 ~56: P North. J Fawcett Cheshire and Sort/; 's Pr;\'Q[c 1l1fcrnat;ollal LQ\I (13. 
ed Butterworths London 1999) ).+i\-).+9: A Redfern. T\1 Hunter fn 270 11~. 1.+.+ 
:112 Under the Rome Convention. the law to be applied must be the law of a state. not transnational law. see 
D McClean. K Bee\ers Morris The Conflicts ofLm\' (6th edition S\\eet & Max\\e1l London 200)) 339 
-,D S.46 (l) (b) English Arbitration Act 1996. Art.~~ (l) UNCITRAL Model Law 
-'1-1 ., 9 
.' -
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standards, the question arises whether finding the applicable law poses a similar 
challenge. 
This Section has shown that arbitration takes a more flexible and pragmatic 
approach than litigation. In arbitration, the choice is not limited to the law of a 
particular legal system, but may encompass international and transnational legal 
rules and trade usages, if the parties provide for this. Furthermore, in some 
jurisdictions, the arbitration tribunal is empowered with wider discretion in deciding 
which rules to apply. For example, as has been seen31S, in France the tribunal has a 
wide discretion to apply the appropriate rules in the absence of choice by the 
parties. In other jurisdictions, the tribunal may apply any conflict of law rules it 
determines appropriate, not only the conflict of law rules of the seat. This more 
flexible, less legalistic approach in giving power to the tribunal means that there 
will be less argument about applicable law and hence, less delay and expense 
wasted with preliminary issues. However, since this thesis is concerned with 
fairness in online arbitration, it should also be examined whether applicable law in 
arbitration raises fairness issues. 
4.5 Mandatory laws 
Clearly the determination of which laws and legal standards are applied to a dispute 
may be decisive for the outcome and may therefore be a crucial and hotly disputed 
question between the parties. Fairness issues may arise if, in a situation of power 
imbalance, the 'weaker' party is deprived of mandatory laws designed to protect 
this 'weaker' party and to counterbalance the weaker bargaining position of that 
party.316 This' deprivation' may arise because of an express choice of law clause 
inserted by "the more powerful party' or because of the tribunal not applying the 
mandatory law, in the absence of an express choice. 
315 Fn 289 
-'16 2-2,~,2. 2-5 ; Principle \' of EC Recommendation 98257 EC: S Ware 'Default Rules from Mandatory 
Rules: Pri\'atizing Law through Arbitration' (1999) 83 Minnesota Lall' RC\'icl1 70~- '754, 726 
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4.5.1 Mandatory laws explained 
The legal concept of mandatory laws in private international law is of course wider 
than merely counterbalancing power differentials between unequal contracting 
parties. Mandatory rules are all rules of a legal system which cannot be derogated 
from by contrary contractual provision317 or, in the international context, which 
cannot be avoided by an express choice oflaw318 in the contract and overriding 
provisions of the applicable law identified by conflict of law rules. 319 The rationale 
for mandatory laws is the protection of the public interest overriding party 
autonomy in contract and, in a conflict of law situation, the recognition that states 
other than that providing the applicable law may have a public interest in regulating 
the situation.32o Mandatory laws embody state, economic or social policy, such as 
exchange regulations, foreign export prohibitions, import regulation, competition 
and anti-trust law or mandatory rules which protect the weaker party in consumer, 
employment, insurance, commercial agents or landlord and tenant relationships.32 1 
317 Definition in Art.3 (3) Rome Convention; these are 'internal mandatory rules' 
318 Generally speaking it seems that before many US courts, the principle of the overriding effect of 
mandatory laws is much narrower (US doctrine does not express the principle by using the concept of 
mandatory laws, but in terms of policy. Thus the comparison has to be made by analogy). The US 
Restatement Second Conflict of Laws provides in § 187 (2) (b) that if there is an express or implicit choice 
of law by the parties, this choice will be overridden by the law applicable in the absence of choice, if (and 
only if) this chosen law is contrary to a fundamental policy of the state providing the applicable law in the 
absence of choice and if that state has a materially greater interest than the state providing the chosen law in 
the determination of the particular issue. This principle is narrower as Art.7 (1) Rome Convention as it 
only refers to the law applicable in the absence of choice, rather than any foreign mandatory law which has 
a close connection to the issues and as it only applies where the parties have made a choice of law. With 
regard to choice of law clauses in the standard terms of consumer contracts (or other contracts where there 
is a substantial power imbalance). the US applies the doctrine of adhesion contracts. Choice of law clauses 
contained in adhesion contracts are usually upheld. unless there is substantial injustice to the 'weaker 
party'. see Comment to * 187 in Restatement Second Conflict of Laws. This is in marked contrast to Art.5 
Rome Convention. Adhesion contracts are also discussed in relation to consumer arbitration clauses in 7-
2.3 
.,19 'International mandatory laws'; N Voser 'Mandatory Rules of Law as a Limitation on the Law 
Applicable in International Commercial Arbitration' (1996) 7 American Review of International 
Arbitration 319-357, 321; CMV Clarkson. J Hill fn 281; P North, J Fawcett fn 311576 
3~O CM\' Clarkson. J Hill fn 281 195-196: P North. J Fawcett fn 311 576 
3::'1 N Voser fn 319 32,5 
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There are two types of mandatory laws.322 The first type is the mandatory law of a 
country which is closely connected to the issues in dispute, but whose law is not the 
applicable law. Here the mandatory law is a foreign law, different from the 
applicable law and foreign to the forum. For this type it is necessary to examine the 
nature of the law itself to see whether it is intended not to be derogated from and to 
analyse whether there is a sufficient connection to the issues in dispute.323 
The second type is the limitation of the applicable law by the public policy of the 
forum. This, in tum, can take two forms. Firstly, the court may consider and apply 
mandatory norms of the forum itself324 and secondly the court may refuse to apply a 
particular aspect of the applicable law on the grounds of incompatibility with the 
public policy of the forum325 . 
4.5.2 Applicability of mandatory laws in arbitration of internet disputes 
Having (very) briefly sketched the concept of mandatory law in conflicts of law 
theory and in particular its implementation in the Rome Convention, it is necessary 
to return to the question on which this thesis focuses, namely whether an arbitration 
tribunal (as opposed to a public court) would have to apply mandatory law to 
internet disputes, in order to redress power imbalances. 
Here it should be remembered that the central concern of this thesis is internet 
disputes between parties subj ect to a power imbalance and for the purpose of this 
thesis this power imbalance has been defined as a corporate entity-individual 
d· 326 para Igm. 
3~~ . 
-- CMV Clarkson, J HIll fn 281 195 
32.' See for example Art.7 (1) Rome Convention generally providing for the application of this type of 
mandatory law- however this provision does not apply in the UK, see s. 2 (2) Contracts (Applicable Law) 
Act 1990. Subject-matter specific mandatory laws are contained eg in Art.5 (B2C contracts) 
32.+ Art.7 (2) R~me Convention 
325 Art.16 Rome Convention 
326 3-6.3 
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Traditionally, international commercial arbitration has been conceived to be a form 
of dispute resolution between business parties of (very) roughly equal bargaining 
power. 327 Thus, it is not surprising that questions of power imbalances, such as in 
B2C relationships, have not been central to the doctrines pertaining to international 
commercial arbitration. The online arbitration of internet disputes introduces a new 
paradigm here. 328 
To what extent arbitration tribunals should take into account mandatory laws is not 
entirely clear. 329 
Some argue that since arbitration is of a private nature, being founded on the 
agreement of the parties and being carried out by a private tribunal, the principle of 
party autonomy should playa greater role than in litigation and that therefore no 
regard should be had to mandatory rules (other than those of the law chosen by the 
parties).33o Furthermore, as far as the second type of mandatory laws, ie the public 
policy of the forum, is concerned, it can be argued that due to the private nature of 
the tribunal, there is no forum and hence no obligation to apply this type of 
mandatory rules, unless they amount to international public policy.331 
This argument is not convincing and in the opinion of the author and many scholars 
should be rejected332 . 
3~7 This conception is of course a generalization, to what extent this has been historically accurate will not 
be further examined here. 
3~8 3-2 
3~9 S.46 English Arbitration Act 1996, s.1051 German Arbitration Act 1998, Art.1496 the French Nouveau 
Code de Procedure Civile-all silent on the issue of mandatory laws. 
330 JDM Lew et al fn 270420-421, in particular para. 17-30: "There is no basis for a tribunal to ignore the 
express choice of the parties because it determines that there is a contrary mandatory rule in one of these 
national laws.' 
" I 
J, JDM Lew et al fn 270420; N Voser fn 319 330 
33~ N Voser fn 319 33 L 336-337, 342-343; P Mayer 'Mandatory Rules of Law in International Arbitration' 
(1986) 1 Arbitration Intcrnational 274-293,285; D Hochstrasser 'Choice of Law and "Foreign" Mandatory 
Rules in International Arbitration' (1994) 11 Journal of International Arbitration 57-86, 84-85; M Blessing 
'Mandatory Rules of La\\' versus Pal1y Autonomy in International Arbitration' (1997) 14 Journal of 
Imcrnational Arbitration 23-40, 31-32 (subject to conditions); A Lowenfeld "The Mitsubishi case: another 
\'iew' (1986) 2 Arbitration International 178-190, 186-187 
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The first reason for this rejection is specific to the narrow focus of the thesis, ie has 
to be seen in the specific context of internet disputes. Arbitration as adjudication 
according to laws and legal rules should include those fundamental public policy 
values agreed in a democratic state, as otherwise it loses its legitimacy as a legal 
process. To this one could object that the mandatory rules of the law chosen by the 
parties or that applying in the absence of choice would apply. However, this 
objection does not hold up against the fairness argument made in Chapter Two, ie 
that fairness requires that power imbalances be actively counterbalanced. If a 
stronger party directs its activities towards the territory of the weaker party and then 
imposes a choice of law on the weaker party, the mandatory rules of the weaker 
party's jurisdiction should apply in order to achieve this counterbalance. 333 
Secondly, if mandatory law was not applied to arbitration, courts and policy makers 
would ensure that areas of law containing mandatory laws would not be subject to 
arbitration. In other words, the consequence of a finding that mandatory rules are 
inapplicable before arbitration tribunals would be that certain subject-matters, 
governed by mandatory rules would have to stay outside the ambit of arbitration. 
The fact that disputes involving laws designed to promote public interest objectives, 
such as competition law disputes, are now considered arbitrable means that 
mandatory rules must apply.334 In fact, this argument could be a political tool in 
order to obtain agreement for the new conflicts of law rule for arbitration of internet 
disputes proposed in this thesis. The bargain could be to allow consumer arbitration 
more generally, against the concession that the mandatory laws in the individual's 
location apply if the corporate entity directed its activities there.335 
mprinciple V ofEC Recommendation 981257/EC; S Ware fn 316726 
334 MitslIbishiMotors COlP l' Soler Chrysler-Pfvmollth Inc 473 US 614, 629 105 Set 3346.87 (1985). where 
the US Supreme Court enforced an arbitration clause in a dispute involving anti-trust law: Swiss Federal 
Supreme Court Decision BGE 118 II 193 (1992), where the Court decided that the arbitration tribunal had 
to take into account EC competition law: N Voser fn 319: A Lowenfeld fn 332 186-187 
.,35 Chapter 8 
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The other two reasons relate to the nature of arbitration as private or public which 
will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter Six.336 
Arbitration fulfils the same function as court proceedings, ie adjudicating a dispute 
according to laws and legal rules, and that hence the same considerations of public 
interest as reflected in the mandatory rules itself and their applicability should 
apply. This reason essentially is based on an argument that there should be no 
discrimination between litigation and arbitration, since both forms of adjudication 
fulfil a public function. 
Finally, arbitration can also not be said to be entirely private, since the courts 
support arbitration through their supervisory and enforcement jurisdiction, and that 
this public element means that the principle of party autonomy may well have to be 
balanced with the public interest. 
For these reasons, it is argued in this thesis that party autonomy should be restricted 
to the extent that mandatory laws should be applied, at least in internet disputes337, 
if the conditions for their application are fulfilled. What these conditions should be, 
will be discussed in a later section.338 
4.5.3 Mandatory rules applied in practice 
It should be mentioned that while the applicability of mandatory laws in arbitration 
is not settled, tribunals will consider mandatory laws in some situations as a 
practical matter, in order to avoid a challenge of the award at the seat or on the basis 
that it is against the public policy of the enforcing court, but this is usually limited 
. . 1 bl' l' 339 to InternatlOna pu IC po ICy. 
336 6_2.5 
W The wider issue need not be decided here. 
33R 4-4 - 4 
.). 
3.~9 If England is the seat of arbitration under s.68 Arbitration Act 1996 (serious irregularity), or in the 
enforcement court under Art.V (2) NYc. However. the latter only applies if the transnational or 
international public policy of the enforcement court contradicts the applicable law and will be used 
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Furthennore in the specific context of B2C contracts arbitration tribunals in the EU 
may (although their obligation is unclear) decide to apply mandatory laws. Some 
jurisdictions impose restrictions on consumer arbitration, with the consequence that 
an arbitration clause in a consumer contract is invalid and hence the parties have to 
litigate. These restrictions will be discussed in detail in a later Chapter. 340 However. 
if the arbitration clause is valid and the dispute arbitrable, the question arises 
whether an arbitration tribunal would apply, the specific mandatory laws contained 
in Article 5 of the Rome Convention. If the tribunal chooses to detennine applicable 
law according to the conflict of law rules of a Contracting State to the Rome 
Convention341 , the answer to this question is positive. Article 5 (2) of the Rome 
Convention provides that the mandatory consumer protection law of the country of 
the consumer's residence applies if the contract was preceded by advertising or a 
specific invitation in the consumer's country of residence and the consumer took 
the steps to conclude the contract there. It has already been shown that this 
provision would apply to internet contracts. 
4.5.4 Conflict of law rule on mandatory laws for internet disputes 
For the Modee42 it is a~gued here that mandatory rules should be applied, on a 
similar basis as in Article 5 (2) of the Rome Convention, but modified in three 
respects: 
First, the concept of mandatory laws as expressed in Article 5 of the Rome 
Convention is unsatisfactory. If the contract contains an express choice of law other 
sparingly, see for example the Swiss Federal Supreme Court Decision BGE 120 II 155 (l994)-see also 6-
2.6 and 6-7. This consideration of course only applies if there is a conflict between the applicable law and 
the mandatory law at the seat or at the place of enforcement, it does not apply if the conflict arises with 
another state, such as the consumer's residence. N Voser fn 319335 
.'-10 7-~ 
3-11 As has been pointed out above, tribunals have a power of discretion in this matter. If the tribunal applies 
the conflict of law rules of a state who is not a party to the Rome Convention. or applies transnational rules 
directly, Art.5 (2) Rome Convention obviously does not apply. 
'" 
'''- 8-3.1 
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than the law of the consumer's residence, Article 5 (2) of the Rome Convention 
envisages that a mix of the chosen law and the consumer's law applies- the 
consumer's law to the extent that it is mandatory and the chosen law for the issues, 
where the consumer's law is non-mandatory. If the contract does not contain a 
choice of law, Article 5 (3) provides that the consumer's law shall govern all 
aspects. It would be simpler and clearer to provide, whether or not the contract 
contains a choice of law that the law of the consumer's residence should apply to all 
aspects of the dispute if the contract is a relevant consumer contract.343 
Secondly, the business to consumer relationship paradigm is unsatisfactory and 
should be extended to incorporated entity-individual relationships. In other words 
the conflict of law rules should not be limited to disputes between business and 
consumers, but should apply where there is an internet dispute between a corporate 
entity and an individual. This will not be discussed any further, as this argument has 
already been made in Chapter Three.344 
An important distinction has to be made here between (i) the relevant connection of 
the mandatory law to the situation of the dispute and (ii) the scope of the mandatory 
law itself. The connection is essentially the conflicts of law rule stating in what 
circumstances the mandatory law overrules the otherwise applicable law, essentially 
the trigger for the application of the mandatory law (such as the circumstances 
described in Article 5 (2) of the Rome Convention). The scope of the mandatory 
law is the provision or definition in the mandatory law itself describing when it is 
applicable, such as the definition as to who is a 'consumer' in a consumer 
protection law. For a mandatory law to be applicable, it has to pass two gateways, 
the conditions for applicability under the conflicts of law rule and the conditions of 
the mandatory law itself. Since this thesis is not concerned with substantive matters, 
it only examines the former. 
.'·n See Art.5 (1) EU Commission Proposal for a Regulation on the law applicable to contractual obligations 
(Rome I) COM(2005) 650 of 15. December 2005 
~.w 3-6.3 
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Thirdly the wording concerning the relevant connecting factors in Article 5 (2) is 
unclear in its application to internet disputes and should be improved in the 
proposed conflicts of law rule modelled on that Article. 
First of all, if, on an objective assessment of the online activity (such as selling 
goods or services on a website), this is targeted at a particular location, the 
mandatory laws of that jurisdiction should prima facie apply. 
But additionally, the issue is essentially one of fair risk allocation. One the one hand 
it could be argued that an incorporated entity actively seeking to enter into contracts 
with individuals in foreign jurisdictions via the internet should comply with the 
mandatory laws applying to these individuals at their place of residence and that the 
cost of this compliance is a concomitant factor to directing commercial activities 
abroad. 
However, corporate entities are legitimately concerned about how to limit the risk 
of being prosecuted or sued for not complying with the laws of numerous 
jurisdictions when using a communications medium that is essentially global. One 
way of limiting this risk would be to target only those jurisdictions with whose laws 
a corporate entity wishes to comply and therefore the issue is how to identify its 
individual clients' location. As has been discussed in Chapter Three345, establishing 
the location of a person communicating via the internet with certainty is a difficult 
and expensive (albeit not insurmountable) task. Hence to impose a burden on the 
corporate entity to establish the location of its individual customers with certainty 
would be too harsh. 
Therefore secondly it should be stipulated that the corporate entity may take some 
measures towards establishing the location of its customers by simply asking the 
customer to identify his or her location. If the customer then misleads the corporate 
108 
Chapter 4: ADR and Applicable Law 
entity as to location, he or she should lose the protection of the mandatory laws at 
the customer's location and the law of the corporate entity should apply.346 
Therefore a corporate entity can protect itself by enquiring about a customer's 
location before the transaction is completed and the mandatory law of the individual 
customer's residence should apply, if the corporate entity has directed its activities 
to that state, unless the customer has misled the corporate entity about his or her 
location.347 Such a conflict of law rule has the advantage that the customer's 
location is made transparent with simple means and protects the trader from 
unwittingly contracting with an individual in a jurisdiction it is trying to avoid. 
5. Conclusion 
This Chapter provides the background for the argument that a variant of arbitration, 
ie online arbitration should be considered to be the main binding form of dispute 
resolution for internet disputes. 
This Chapter has looked at the two main forms of ADR, mediation and arbitration 
and explained their function and significance. Mediation, being a voluntary, non-
coercive form of dispute resolution, based on consensus between the parties and not 
leading to a directly enforceable result, cannot be regarded as a true replacement for 
adjudication. It has also been shown that the nature of mediation is entirely different 
from that of adjudication. It has been explained that mediation is based on 
negotiation and compromise, rather than a decision on rights and entitlements. 
Therefore, it has been argued that mediation is only fair if the parties have access to 
adjudication, as otherwise a compromise may be based on a parti s desperation 
rather than a consideration of the merits of a case. This argument does not detract 
.'-16 The question could be asked whether the law of the falsely stated location should apply as this would 
accord with the expectation of the corporate entity. The argument against this is that that law has no real 
connection with the contract. 
347 Similar: Art.5 (2) EU Commission Proposal for a Regulation on the law applicable to contractual 
obligations (Rome I) COM(2005) 650 of 15. December 2005 
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from the significance of mediation as an important method to filter out disputes 
lending themselves to a compromise. Hence mediation should always be attempted. 
Having singled out arbitration as the primary form of binding dispute resolution for 
internet disputes, this Chapter also had to deal with applicable law. Since arbitration 
is adjudication based on law, in cross-border internet disputes it is necessary to 
determine the applicable law. This Chapter has shown that arbitration tribunals have 
adopted a more flexible approach to this issue, in particular by relying on notions 
such as Lex Mercatoria. However, this approach is not suitable where the 
application of a foreign law or mercantile rules would deprive the individual as the 
weaker party of the protection of national mandatory laws, such as consumer 
protection laws. 
This Chapter therefore argues that mandatory laws valid at the location of the 
individual should be adopted by the schemes of online arbitration which are part of 
the Model outlined in Chapter Eight, if the corporate entity has directed its activities 
to that jurisdiction, unless the individual has misled as to his or her location. 
The next step in the progression of the thesis is to show how technology can be 
used to transform ADR into ODR. 
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I have a spelling checker 
It came with my PC; 
It plainly marks for my revue 
Mistakes I cannot sea. 
I've run this poem threw it, 
I'm sure your pleased too no, 
Its letter perfect in it's weigh, 
My checker tolled me sew. 
(Janet Minor, US poet) 
1. Introduction 
This Chapter looks at online forms of mediation and arbitration and variants of the 
main forms of ADR and how they have been transformed by ODR. This Chapter 
essentially focuses on the online dimension of extrajudicial dispute resolution 
defining the meaning of the phrase 'online dispute resolution~ and its significance 
for the fair resolution of internet disputes. This Chapter explains the different forms 
of ODR and the technology currently being used or developed for dispute 
resolution. 348 Its main argument is that ODR is more than mere online ADR. The 
technology has a transforming effect- it makes dispute resolution for internet 
disputes more efficient and hence more accessible, thus contributing to fairness. 349 
'<-i~ This Chapter does 1101 contain an in-depth analysis, based on original research of what different fOnTIS of 
technology such as artificial intelligence, expert systems. processing systems and communication 
applications can achie\'e for ODR- this would be the subject of a PhD dissertation in its own right. 
W) ~-2.3.1 
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2. Definition of ODR 
The adjective 'online' refers to the use of computer and internet technology. best 
described by the phrase information and communications technology (lCT).35o 
ODR is therefore dispute resolution carried out combining the information 
processing powers of computers with the networked communication facilities of the 
internet. For the purposes of this thesis the following simple and short definition is 
proposed: 'ODR is a collective noun for dispute resolution techniques outside the 
courts using information and communication technologies (lCT), and in particular 
internet applications. ' 
The benefits of using such technology is crucial to the understanding of the 
significance of ODR so that the technology has been described by the metaphor of 
the 'Fourth Party,351. 
The phrase 'ODR' as used in this thesis encompasses processes which are 
conducted completely online, without the parties ever meeting face-to-face, as well 
as processes which are only partly online.352 ODR is based on variations of 
mediation and arbitration, as described in the previous Chapter, but new and 
innovative variants have developed, as will be seen in the next Section. 
J50 C Soanes, A Stevenson (eds.) Concise Oxford English Dictionary (11 th edition Oxford University Press 
2004) defines 'online' as 'controlled by or connected to a computer' or as 'available on or carried out via 
the internet'; D Ince Dictionary of the Internet (Oxford University Press 2001) defines 'online' as 'when a 
computer or user is directly connected into a network and is capable of interacting with it, for example by 
querying the contents of a database' . 
. 'SI E Katsh Online Dispute Resolution (Jossey-Bass San Francisco 2001) 93 
)S~ ABA Task Force on Electronic Commerce and Alternative Dispute Resolution. Final Report August 
200~. as updated on 28. October 2002 on file with author: M Conley-Tyler 'One Hundred and Fifteen and 
Counting: The State of Online Dispute Resolution 2004' in M Conley Tyler, E Katsh. D Choi (Eds.) 
Proceedings of the Third Anl1ual Forum on Online Dispute Resolution 2004 a\'ailable from 
<http://w\\.\\..odr.info/(.\·berweek.)O()~ librarv.php> [14. September 2007]: L-E Teitz 'Providing Legal 
Services for the Middle Class in Cyberspace: The Promise and Challenge of Online Dispute Resolution' 
(2001) 70 Fordham LaH' Re"iC1I' 985-1016,991: S Schiavetta 'The Relationship between e-ADR and :\rt.6 
European Convention of Human Rights pursuant to the case law of the European Court of Human Rights' 
[2004] Journal o(b?(ormation Law and Technology Issue 1 
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3. Forms of ODR 
3.1 Brief overview 
The first experiments in extra-judicial ODR were made during 199611997 in the US 
and Canada.353 Most of these were initially university projects evolving into 
commercial ventures. The European Commission and national governments in 
Europe and beyond have strongly advocated the use of ODR systems for consumer 
disputes.354 While this is a continuously developing field, ODR is far from merely a 
theoretical concept- it is already relevant to dispute resolution practice. Melissa 
Conley Tyler in her survey in July 2004 counted 115 ODR services worldwide.355 
Traditional offline arbitration and mediation institutions356 have been focusing on 
the possibilities raised by online technology. Furthermore, some statutory dispute 
resolution schemes have been established, which use ODR.357 Recent years have 
353 Virtual Magistrate (arbitration, Chicago-Kent College of Law), see www.vmag.org [ 14. September 
2007], the Online Om buds Office (mediation, University of Massachusetts) out of which eventually 
developed the Squaretrade venture, see www.squaretrade.com [ 14. September 2007] and the Cybertribunal 
(University of Montreal), out of which later developed E-Resolution, a commercial venture, albeit well-
known, ceased operations in December 2001 
354 Art.l7 E-commerce Directive 2000/311EC of 8. June 2000; the European Commission has funded a 
consumer mediation project called ECODIR, see www.ecodir.org [ 14. September 2007]; see also s. B 
OECD Guidelines for Consumer Protection in the Context of Electronic Commerce of 9. December 1999 
available from http://www.oecd.org/document'51 iO.2340.en 2649 34')67 1824435 1 1 1 1.00.html [14. 
September 2007]; see the documentation regarding the workshop organized by the US FTC and DOC in 
June 2000 Alternative Dispute Resolution for Consumer Transactions in the Borderless Online Marketplace 
available from http://www.ftc.gov/os·2000102/altdisputeresolutionfm.htm [14. September 2007]; a good 
overview of early private and public initiatives in this field is provided by A Wiener 'Regulations and 
Standards for Online Dispute Resolution' dated 15. February 2001 (on file with author) available from 
http:!www.me-diate.com/al1icies/a\ ... iener4.cfm [14. September 2007] 
355 M Conley-Tyler fn 352 
356 ICC Court of Arbitration's online filing platform 'NetCase' at 
https://www.iccnetcnse.org!Netcase!pdf!Pamphlet En.pdf, the Electronic Case Facility (ECAF) of the 
WIPO Mediation and Arbitration Center http: \\"ww.wipo.inuamClen!ecaf!index.html and the AAA's 
online filing platform, WebFile https:' apps.adr.org'webfile : Consensus Mediation's e-Mediator scheme 
http://www.consensusmediation.co.llk e-mediator.html; the ADR Group's online mediation platform 
http: "ww\\.adrgroup.co.uk ol1line-disputeionline-displlte-res.htm [ 14. September 2007] 
W See for example the Communications and Internet Services Adjudication Scheme (CIAS). for disputes 
between communication service pro\'iders and their customers, 8-2.2.1: Office of the Telecommunications 
Ombudsman (Otelo), also discussed in 8-2.2.1 http:.i/www.otelo.org.llkicontent.php'!pageID· 100; the 
Financial Ombudsman Senice. also discussed in Chapter 8, http: W\\·\\.financial-ombudsman.or~.uk [14. 
September 2007] 
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also seen some amount of private entrepreneurial activity in the ODR field358• albeit 
with mixed results, only some of which seem to have established a viable business 
model in the long run. 359 
3.2 Case-study: Austrian Internet Ombudsmann 
An interesting project in the ODR context is the Austrian Internet Ombudsmann36o 
founded in 1999. Consumers can bring disputes against business361 . arising from e-
commerce before this ombudsman service. Only consumers can make a complaint 
and initiate the procedure, but not businesses.362 
The Internet Ombudsmann service has worked on 4750 complaints in 2006, with 
the total of claims amounting to Euro 609000 (about £ 412969).363 This equals an 
average claim of Euro 128 (about £ 87). Hence this ombudsman scheme covers 
mainly small claims. 
The procedure is a two step procedure, consisting of online mediation and an online 
recommendation. At the first stage the Ombudsmann mediates between the parties. 
If this does not lead to a settlement and ifboth parties agree to a second stage. the 
Ombusmann makes a recommendation. 364 The process uses an online platform and 
electronic file. 365 
358 Squaretrade http://www.sguaretradc.com!cnt/jspinde.\.jsp ; Cybersettle 
http:I\\\\\\ .cvbersettle.com/infoiaboutcompanY/m'cr\'iew .asp" ; i-courthouse http:! w\\'\\ .i-
courthouse.comimain.taf!&redir=O [14. September 2007] 
m M Conley-Tyler fn 352 Appendix 3: two prominent providers Online Resolution 
(1111[1:1/0111 ineresolution.com) and eResolution (see 
h1tr: f' \\'\\'\\. theregi ster.co.u k '2001/12 104. cresol lit i on qu as domn i 11 arbi trati on ) [ 14. September 2007] 
ceased operation in 2003 and 2001 respectively. 
360 http:\\'\\'\\ ,ombudsmann.at ; This project has been copied in Germany in 2003 under 
\\'\Vw.ombudsman.de. see http:' \\'\\'\\.ecin.de news :om 12 09!06515 [14. September 2007] 
361 The Internet Ombudsmann offers conciliation sen'ices only for C2C disputes. 
362 http:w\\\\.ombudsmanl1.ntomblldsmann.plw c'at 2Hitle'H°!()E4ufi~e-l-Fra~en [ 14, September 2007] 
,'().' httP;;IW\\\\ .ombLldsm~!l1n.at ()mblldsmann.php cat 3 title ~e\\~ [ 14. September 2007] 
364 Confirmed by email by the Austrian Ombudsman (on file with author) 
'(1) http: \\~\\\\'.ombudsnl~ll1n.at omblldsmann.php cat'21title H~oE4ufi!!e-ha!..!en [ 14, September 200'7] 
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The Austrian ombudsman service is not mandatory. Consumers can choose it by 
initiating a claim. The company against whom a claim is made is asked whether or 
not it wishes to participate in the procedure. Some companies may have agreed to 
take part before the dispute by signing up to the Eurolabel Code of Conduct and 
trust mark scheme366. This does not make online arbitration generally obligatory. 
but, for a business who has opted to become a member of Eurolabel before the 
dispute arose and who has been certified in Austria, requires participation in the 
Internet Ombudsmann procedure.367 Such a business would have to accept a 
recommendation made by the Internet Ombudsmann service at the second stage of 
the procedure.368 
For other companies participation is based on voluntary agreement after the dispute 
has arisen. However, the Internet Ombudsmann publishes the names of companies. 
against whom multiple complaints have been made and who have consistently 
refused to take part in dispute resolution, on its website.369 Furthermore, the 
procedure will only continue to the second stage if both parties agree to this. In 
particular, the ombudsman only makes a recommendation if both parties agree to 
this.37o 
As to the jurisdiction of the Internet Ombudsmann. this is only available to 
consumers who are resident in Austria who complain against a business which is 
established within an EU Member State.37 ! 
The ombudsman service is free for the user, both the consumer and the company 
concerned. The parties only have to pay their own costs (if any). The parties may 
366 httP:'W\\,W.ellr0-lahel.col11 [14. September 2007]: 8-2.1.3 
W'http: \Vv.-\\ .0mblldsmann.aUom budsmann.php i cat21 laid S9/titJe'\\"ie+ J (l "F.:J.uft"'-das- Streihchlichtlln~"\ 
erfahren+heim+lntemct+Omblldsmann+ab(~'o~F and http: \\.\\\\ .!.!uetezeichen.at [14. September 2007] 
.~68 http:.iwww.glletezeichen.at [14. September 2007]: Para. 16 (3) Verfahrensrichtl.inien (Procedural 
Rules) a\'ailable from http:'/w\\'\\.!wetezeichen.at kritericn \' erJ'ahrell";rI chtlt1l1 en .pd t [ 14. September 
2007]; the Internet Ombudsmann had 127 Eurolabel cases in 2006. 
3(,<) http:// ww\\.ol11hlldsmann.at ombudsmann.php cat::: 1 tItkH(loE4ufi~e~Fragell [ 14. September 20()71 
370 ibid 
371 ibid' confirmed b\' email b\' the Austrian Ombudsman (on file \\'ith author) 
, . . 
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have legal representation, but this is not required, as the Internet Ombudsmann 
gives guidance to the parties during the procedure.372 The costs of the Internet 
Ombudsmann are born by Austrian public funds, through the Austrian Institute for 
Applied Telecommunication373, the Federal Ministry for Social Services and 
Consumer Protection374 and the Federal Work Commission375.376 
The Austrian Internet Ombudsmann is an example of a current application of ODR 
for internet disputes. The final Chapter of this thesis will draw some lessons from 
this scheme. However it should also be pointed out that, in some ways the Model 
based on the discussions in this thesis and outlined in Chapter Eight is quite 
different. 377 
4. Technologies Used 
This section briefly describes the technologies used in online mediation and online 
arbitration. 
4 1 0 I· M d' t' 378 . n loe e la 100 
As has been described in the previous Chapter379 mediation consists of a neutral 
third party brokering a settlement between the disputants. For this, communication 
between the mediator and each party and between the parties is obviously crucial. 
In Online Mediation the mediator assists the parties in negotiating their dispute 
P" 
. '- ibid 
m Dsterreichisches Institut fUr Angewandte Telekommunikation (DIAT) 
.'74 Bundesministerium fUr Soziales und Konsumentenschutz (BMSK) 
m Bundesarbeitskammer 
J76 Ibid; It has also received funding from the European Commission and the Austrian Internet 
Pri\atstiftung . 
,~~ The Austrian Internet Ombudsmann is not compulsory and it seems to coyer small consumer claIms. 
This thesis is concerned with a wider range of disputes and power imbalances which goes beyond small 
consumer claims. 
J7X l~ www.consensusmediation.co.uk e-mediatoLhtml or 
http~\\\\.conciliaonline.net'concilia;default.asp'!idtema=4 r 14. September 2007] 
379 4-3.1 
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using electronic communication such as email or specially designed websites 
providing virtual rooms in which the parties can communicate online.38o 
Email can provide a fast easy to use, readily available and convenient method of 
communication and negotiation. Email can be supplemented by other means of 
communication such as instant messaging, the telephone and face-to-face meetings. 
Intelligent filing forms, 'dynamic forms' on the web utilize the experience 
accumulated on particular types of disputes and allow the parties to file the 
statement of case and defence online. Such online forms are ordinarily easier to 
complete than offline forms as they change depending on the information entered. 
For example if the claimant classifies the type of dispute as 'non-delivery of goods', 
the questions the form asks are tailored to this particular type of dispute. 381 
Alternatively or additionally, the parties and the mediator may use an online 
platform.382 This is a computer linked to the internet hosting a set of linked pages 
containing instructions and information. Such an online platform is interactive, it 
allows the parties to post material, to view po stings and to respond to postings. The 
online platform may contain various technologies allowing for written 
communication and discussions, as well as voice or video-conferencing. 
One such technology is online chat, consisting of users exchanging written text 
messages, all in the same space of time. In online chat the parties immediately 
respond to each other's messages (synchronous discussion). By contrast threaded 
discussion boards are asynchronous- in other words there is a time lapse between 
the posting and reply. There is no requirement that the users are online at the same 
380 L Ponte, T Cavenagh Cybel:jusfice (Pearson Prentice Hall New Jersey 2005) 63 
,81 See for example the Squaretrade form 
https:· WW\\ .sguaretradc .('om odr/jspfi I/fi lin~ start a. i sp,?yhostid=tomcat4&stmp=squaretr;1de&cntid=fClITI 
Rhv9mdl or the AAA's WebFile https:apps.adr.or~ webcase2Iinde.\.jsp or the form used by OTELO 
http://Clteioapp.olelo.org.uktk,,ebrlo\, flow .asp\. '!f=OtelointemetComplai nt&template=oteICl\\ ebtpl&\. "I . 
Otelowebdtr\,.~c [14. September 2007] 
.~8~ Platform used by the ADR Group http>/ \\'ww.adrr:roup.co.uk;online-di~~ute online-dlspute-re".htm [14. 
September 2007] 
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time. As the name implies in threaded discussion boards the comments and replies 
are organised under headings and subheadings, which makes it easier to follow the 
flow of the discussion. 
Furthermore it is possible to segment the online platform into spaces, such that 
Space A is only accessible to one party and the mediator, Space B is only accessible 
to the other party and the mediator and Space C is accessible to both parties and the 
mediator. Space A and B could be used for virtual private caucuses and Space C for 
public discussions. In this way the platform can be used to replicate the traditional 
three- room procedure by virtual meetings on an online platform. The mediator and 
the parties in an online mediation can be simultaneously in space C and AlB, thus 
being in a joint meeting and caucus at the same time. This would be impossible in 
real-world, offline mediation.383 
Another obvious advantage of such virtual meetings is that they can be held at a 
distance, obviating the need to travel and if the meetings are held asynchronously, 
whenever the participant in the mediation has a convenient moment. 
The disadvantage of a virtual meeting is that the meeting is deprived of non-verbal 
communication such as postures, gestures, facial expressions and tonality of voice. 
It is often said that the lack of non-verbal communication makes it harder for the 
mediator to establish the parties' trust and confidence in the procedure.384 However, 
this disadvantage must be balanced against the opportunities computer 
communication offers. 385 
m C Rule Online Dispute Resolution (Jossey-Bass San Francisco 2002) 72 
384 G Kaufmann-Kohler, T Schultz fn 22423; C Rule fn 383 66-67; L Gibbons, R Kennedy, J Gibbs 
'Cyber-Mediation: Computer-Mediated Communications Medium Massaging the Message' (2002) 32 Ne>.1' 
Mexico La1\' Rel'inl' 27-72, 43; H-J Fietkau argues that face to face communication is a complex process 
which cannot be satisfactorily reproduced in textual communication. see his chapter 'Unscharfe 
Kommunikation und verzerrte Entscheidungen in der Online Mediation' in 0 Marker, M Trenel Online 
Mediatiol/ (Edition Sigma Berlin 2003) 82-104. 89-90 
3~5 R Gordon 'The Electronic Personality and Digital Self [February/April 2001] Displltc Resolltfion 
Journal 8-19; G Kaufmann-Kohler. T Schultz fn 224 23 and C Rule 383 66-67- better reflection. less 
pnwocation and intimidation through distance: L Gibbons et al fn 384 43 
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Computer aided communication is not limited to text and words but can be 
enhanced by other forms of visual expression such as the imaginative use of 
images, graphics, shapes and symbols. For example as a means of encouragement 
colourful graphics could illustrate to the parties the progress they have made in their 
rapprochement. Symbols and colours could be used to represent emotions. Thus, 
face-to-face communication is replaced by 'screen-to-screen' communication. This 
however requires mediators to adapt their communication skills from face-to-face 
interaction to screen-to-screen interaction.386 
Finally, translation software387 supports the translation of documents, an important 
factor in international, multilingual disputes. 
4.2 Automated Negotiation-Negotiation Assistance 
Another useful ODR mechanism, which can be deployed in conjunction with online 
mediation, is negotiation software assisting the parties in refining their interests. An 
example for this is the Smartsettle software388, which, with the help of a mediator, 
allows users to analyse their bargaining positions by evaluating and prioritising 
their negotiation objectives and calculating (through an algorithm) the outcome 
most efficient for all parties. 
The procedure has been influenced by modem negotiation theory moving away 
from position bargaining towards principled negotiation based on each party's 
underlying interests, discussed in the preceding Chapter389. Ernest Thiessen has 
386 E Katsh Online Dispute Resolution (Jossey-Bass San Francisco ~OOl) 132-134 
JR- An exampl e for a free translati on software can be found at http: ha hel fish .altavi sta.com/tr [ l·t 
September ~007] 
JRS 
. , http:/w\\\\.smartsettle.com [14. September ~007] 
W) 4-3 
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described this procedure as 'working towards the goal of Pareto efficiency390 in 
. . ,391 
negotIatIOn . 
The parties at first each state their initial positions (without making demands) and 
identify the underlying interests. From this, the software lists all issues whether 
qualitative or quantitative in a neutral manner. The mediator then helps the parties 
to further refine their underlying interests, priorities and the relative importance of 
each issue, as well as such matters as what they would expect from litigation (in 
other words their best alternative to a negotiated agreemene92). If the parties wish, 
this information can be maintained confidential and will not be disclosed to the 
other side. The software then generates various packages, trading off the various 
issues against each other, calculating the most efficient allocation of interests on the 
different issues. In this way, it is claimed, the most efficient solution can be 
found.393 
4.3 Automated Negotiation-Blind Bidding394 
A second form of automated negotiation is blind bidding, which can also be used in 
conjunction with online mediation. Automated settlement systems are a highly 
innovative form of ODR, suitable for settling monetary claims395 (ie where liability 
is not disputed, but only the amount of damages payable). The process involves the 
parties making successive blind bids, which are entered into a form on a secure 
website. 'Blind' means here that the bids are not disclosed to the other party, hence 
offers and demands remain confidential not prejudicing future negotiations.396 Once 
390 In other words the goal of finding an optimal solution, in which the gains of neither party can be 
increased any further without taking from the other 
J91 E Thiessen, J McMahon, 'Beyond Win-Win in Cyberspace' (2000) 15 Ohio State Journal on Displlfe 
Resolution 643-667, 666 
\li 24_3.1 
39.~[ Bellucci, J ZeleznikO\'. A Lodder 'Integrating artificial intelligence. argumentation and game theory to 
dc\'e\op and Online Dispute Resolution environment' Proceedings oIthe 16th IEEE International 
COII/en'lIce (2004) available from http: pub~,cli,\ u pub208.php [14. September 2007] 
;'J.jCyber~ettle http: \\ \\\\.C'\bL'l'~ettle.com 'info main.asp\ [14. September 2007] 
395 G Kaufmann-Kohler, T Schultz fn 224 19 
396 L Ponte, T Ca\'enagh fn 38044 
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the bids are within a certain range of each other, settlement will automatically be 
reached, for the median amount. The process is driven by software so that no 
human third party is directly involved and is therefore particularly cost-effective. 
The software keeps offers confidential until they come within the range. 
Communication applications such as email and web-based platforms support the 
settlement process. Such software can assist in avoiding posturing and conflicts 
'over the last few pennies' .397 
4.4 Online Juries/Mock Trials398 
Online summary jury trials or mock trials are an ODR mechanism, whereby a jury 
of peers makes a non-binding determination of the issues via a website. The parties 
upload their respective pleadings and evidence onto the site and the 'jurors' can ask 
questions and render an online verdict, recommending how the dispute should be 
solved. The neutral third party is replaced by a number of volunteering internet 
users acting as if they were jury in a truncated civil court trial by posting their 
questions and verdicts onto the website. This ODR mechanism assists the parties in 
their negotiations for a settlement by reality testing their positions against the 
supposed common sense of the volunteers forming 'the jury'. The mock jury is 
claimed to reflect the likely behaviour of a real jury and takes into account the US 
constitutional preference for jury trials in civil cases.399 
4.5 Online Arbitration 
Online arbitration replicates the offline, traditional fact-finding and decision-
making processes which are constituent of arbitration online by using ICT for 
communication and information processing. 
39~ C Rule fn 383 61 
398 Example: ~~\'w.i-courtboLlse.com [14. September 2007] 
399 H Brown, A Marriott fn 121 371 (mock trials) 
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Currently widespread is the exchange of electronic documents on a CD-Rom. 
allowing for an (almost) paperless hearing. It should be noted that there are some 
limitations to this technique. While any manuscript document can be turned into a 
photographic image, some information and evidence may be lost in the process. 
Furthermore the technology of scanning-in or Optical Character Recognition (OCR) 
is only about 90% accurate and therefore not (yet) perfect.4oo 
One extremely useful online information processing technique for arbitration is 
electronic file management, especially for complex, large-scale arbitration. 
Electronic file management means that all documents pertaining to the case in 
question are stored electronically in a systematic order. Electronic file management 
software permits individual documents or passages to be easily retrieved, displayed 
or printed, browsed, cross-referenced, compared, annotated and searched for 
keywords. Electronic file management reduces the time wasted searching for 
documents and it avoids the carrying of large amounts of paper. Cross-referencing 
allows the linking of text, e.g. in the pleadings, to evidence or law. It may also be 
combined with diary management functions such as automatically sending out 
notices of filing deadlines and integrated with word-processing functions, so that 
the database generates procedural documents, notices etc. 
Electronic file management is already widely used in practice, whether it is only 
used internally by the dispute resolution institution or also externally accessed by 
the parties and arbitrators via an online platform, described in the next paragraph. 
400 S Tanner, 'Deciding whether Optical Character Recognition is Feasible' Research Paper. Oxford Digital 
Library http://ww\\..odl.ox.ac.uk/papersiOCRFeasibilitv final.pdf [14. September 2007] 
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In terms of online techniques the next step forward is an online platform40I , which 
is normally combined with electronic file management. This allows the parties and 
arbitrators to upload documents directly onto a structured website. using a unified 
filing system, via a secure connection.402 An online platform is a website for 
document management creating one central, unified case database, which allows the 
parties, the arbitrators and the administrator to upload, view. browse, search and 
retrieve documents.403 The platform may also contain an electronic diary and an 
electronic secretariat, which automatically records the filing of documents and 
automatically at the required date sends out certain standard documents, such as 
acknowledgements, receipts or certain notices. Furthermore the online platform can 
additionally allow for electronic payment of arbitration fees by credit card. 
However online filing may entail security risks and precautions must be taken 
. h . d ~4 agamst unaut onse access. 
In this context it is interesting to look at the results of a user survey conducted by 
the AAA in 2004. They asked the users of their online filing platform, WebFile for 
what purposes they used the WebFile, the result was that only 16.2% of users 
completed the entire arbitration process online.405 This may indicate that users do 
not entirely trust or are not entirely familiar with online platforms as yet. However 
61 % of users said that if the other party suggested using the online platform, they 
would in principle agree to use it for some part of the procedure.406 
401 ICC Court of Arbitration's online filing platform 'NetCase' at 
l1ttps:ww\\.iccnetcase.orgINetcase;pd£'Pamphlet En.pdf, Electronic Case Facility (ECAF), WIPO 
Mediation and Arbitration Center http://www.wipo.intiamc/en/ecafindex.html and the AAA's online filing 
platform, WebFile https:liapps.adLorg/webcase2/demo/index.htm, online filing platform for .eu disputes, 
http:,\\,ww.adreu.eurid.euarbitration platforn1;overview!index.php; Online filing platforms for mediation, 
see Consensus Mediation's e-Mediator scheme, http://\VWW .consensusmediation.co.uk/e-mediator.html; the 
ADR Group's platform: http:/\\,\\,w .adrgroup.co.uk!online-disputelOnline-dispute-res.htm [14. September 
2007] 
40~ M Philippe "NetCase: A New ICC Arbitration Facility" ICC International COlirt of Arbitration Bulletin 
Special Supplement 2004 53-61, 54 
40.' ibid 
404 Such as encryption for transmission, passwords for authentication. \'irus protection and firewalls. If 
these protections are taken, online platforms are saver than unprotected email. see M Philippe fn 402 54 
405 Debi Millel'-Moore presentation- Joint Conference CCLS Queen Mary Uni\'ersity of London and 
Chartered Institute of Arbitrators, London 6. September 2004 
406 ibid 
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Concerning communication applications for online arbitration, interactive 
synchronous discussion applications such as instant messaging and online chat can 
be used. However relying on purely text-based communication has significant 
disadvantages for the reality of the communication, such as the assessment of non-
verbal cues such as body language, which has already been discussed in relation to 
mediation above. This is particularly significant for the cross-examination of 
witnesses and the assessment of a witness' credibility. 
Instead, means of visual distance communication such as web video-conferencing 
may be used to replace traditional face-to-face hearings. The great advantage of 
video-conferencing is that witnesses, parties and arbitrators do not need to travel, 
reducing time wasted and cost. On the other hand, the issue is to what extent it is 
possible for the tribunal to assess the credibility of a witness giving testimony per 
video-link. This depends to a large extent on the quality of technology used. 
This means in particular that the connection avoids delays and interruptions and that 
the witness can be clearly seen and heard. The physical demeanour and tone of 
voice should be easily detectable to assess the credibility of the witness. For 
example, it might not be apparent if a witness blushes because the colour resolution 
of the monitor is not sufficient. Therefore, the hardware used should be suitable and 
the connection should be of sufficient capacity.407 Also it may be difficult to make 
direct eye contact as the camera and the displaying screen are not in the same 
place.408 
It is sometimes discussed to what extent a witness giving oral, filmed testimony can 
be manipulated- for example it could be that there is someone prompting or 
coaching the witness what to say. This person would stand in front of the witness 
not being captured by the camera directed at the witness. In order to avoid a 
coaching of the witness, the picture should cover the whole room at the witness end, 
407 a dedicated link or broadband might not be available in all countries 
40X . L Gibbons et al fn 384 34 
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which necessitates at least two cameras. And there is the issue of identification of 
the witness. Therefore most weight can be given to evidence per video-link ifboth 
parties are represented or if a member of the tribunal is present at either end of the 
link. However this might not always be possible. Alternatively a trusted third party 
such as a law firm, an arbitral institution, a notary or a court could be used. 
It is now fairly common in adjudicative proceedings to examine and cross-examine 
a witness by two-way video link, for example, where it is impractical for the 
witness to travel to a hearing venue. This allows the evidence to be given directly to 
the tribunal without the witness having to travel far. Also the rules of civil 
procedure, for example in England and Wales and the US, allow for this under 
certain circumstances. 409 
In addition to seeing the faces of the persons communicating, evidence may have to 
be visually presented. Such a functionality may be provided by shared collaborative 
workspaces- these are online communication applications which do not only allow 
the parties and the arbitrator to communicate through synchronous chat and see 
each other through web-video conferencing, but in addition provide a facility to 
share visual information by displaying and manipulating a graphic interface, where 
a multitude of people see the same objects roughly simultaneously.410 This could be 
a 3D image of an object which can be rotated or zoomed in and out by each 
participant in tum, or it could be a drawing board used for graphical illustration. It 
can be used, for example to enable the participants to view pieces of evidence or 
illustrate an argument. Since arbitration is based on the establishment of facts, 
shared collaborative workspaces can be important for each party explaining, 
409 CPR Part 32, rule 32.3 or PD 32 Annex 3 by leave of the Court, it is pointed out however that evidence 
by video-link may be of a lesser quality and that hence convenience and fairness should be balanced, see 
PD 32 Annex 3 para 2. In Polanski l' Conde Nast Publications [2005] HRLR 11(HL) the House of Lords 
restored an order allowing the claimant to give evidence by means of a video link from France. The Court 
argued that evidence given by \'ideo-conferencing can be tested adequately (per Lord Nicholls para 14 and 
para 27: 'seeking a \'CF order is not an indulgence'). See also the US Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: 
Fed.R.Ci\.P. 43 (a) 
410 D Protopsaltou, T Schultz, N Magnenat-Thalmann 'Taking the Fourth Party Further? Considering a 
Shared Virtual Workspace for Arbitration' (2006) 15 (2) b?formation & Communications Technology LGl\' 
157-173.160-162.165 
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arguing and illustrating their case. The use of collaborative workspaces in 
arbitration increases understanding of factual issues and thereby makes the process 
quicker and more efficient. 411 
5. Transformative Power of ODR 
As the preceding discussion has shown, ODR is derived from and based on variants 
of the two main forms of ADR, ie mediation and arbitration. From a superficial 
point of view, it may seem that different forms ofODR are mere transplants of 
ADR into the online environment, in other words, ODR replicates ADR online. 
This superficial observation is fallacious in the same way as an argument that, for 
all forms of motorised transport, the horse that drew the cart has merely been 
replaced by an engine, but that the transportation itself has not changed. To say that 
ODR is merely online ADR, would similarly underestimate the transformative 
power of the technology. 
5.1 Technology as the fourth party in ODR 
Ethan Katsh and Janet Rifkin have expressed the critical role of technology and 
coined the metaphor of the 'fourth party': 
'The fourth party does not except in a few well-defined instances such as blind-
bidding, replace the third party. But it can be considered to displace the third party 
in the sense that new skills, knowledge and strategies may be needed by the third 
party. It may not be coequal in influence to the third party neutral. but it can be an 
ally, collaborator, and partner. It can assume responsibilities for various 
communications with the parties, and the manner in which the third and fourth 
411 ibid 162 
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parties interact with each other will affect many parts of the dispute resolution 
process. ,412 
This expression signifies that the technologies used are not merely subordinate tools 
in the same way that a pen and paper pad are for recording an award or mediation 
settlement. The metaphor expresses that the input of the technology is not 
subsidiary to that of the 'third party', but that the 'fourth party' is influential in 
shaping the process and in assisting the parties to reach a solution of their dispute. 
The implication from this metaphor is that ODR is fundamentally changing the 
ways disputes are solved. First of all, ODR is changing the underlying ADR 
processes413 and new dispute resolution mechanisms, such as blind bidding414, 
having no equivalent in the offline world, have evolved through the use of leT for 
dispute resolution. But secondly, more importantly, ODR has a trans formative 
power. How and why this trans formative power takes effect is explained in this 
section. 
5.1.1 Overcoming distances 
The use of online distance communication (email, bulletin boards, chat, web-
conferencing, online collaborative workspaces etc) obviates the need for face-to-
face meetings in mediation or arbitration hearings. This means that the parties, their 
representatives, witnesses, experts and the third parties need not travel. 
Furthermore, to the extent that asynchronous communication on an online platform 
is used, the parties also need not meet at the same time, avoiding co-ordination of 
busy schedules. If documents are filed on an online platform they can be accessed 
from everywhere, as the internet is ubiquitous. These features of ODR overcoming 
41~ E Katsh, J RifKin fn 351 93-94; the first two parties being the disputants, the third party the 
mediator/arbitrator 41~ Also M Philippe 'Where is Everyone Going with Online Dispute Resolution?' (2002) 2 international 
BlisinessLal1'JolirnaI167-210,168 
414 S d" ee the' prece mg sectIon 
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distances reduce costs and delay, making dispute resolution cheaper. quicker and 
more accessible.415 
5.1.2 Empowering communication 
One aspect of ODR is improving communication in dispute resolution processes. 
The technology aids the understanding of what a person is alleging or explaining by 
visualisation (such as in collaborative workspaces) or by providing access to 
knowledge resources (such as legal databases and case management systems, for 
example hypertext linking text with legal authority or evidence). Such technologies 
make the speaker more effective and more persuasive and potentially lead to better 
outcomes, which are more firmly grounded in law and evidence. 
5.1.3 Saving human labour cost 
The automation of certain functions previously performed manually may lead to 
cost-savings and may make dispute resolution cheaper. However, technologies 
replacing human intelligence by artificiaL computer intelligence416 are limited. 
Evaluating complex factual evidence and applying law to such complex factual 
scenarios (as in arbitration) or finding a solution which satisfies the needs of both 
parties (as in mediation) at present still have to be performed by a trained arbitrator 
or mediator417, whose services have to be paid by professional fees. However, 
artificial intelligence is used in smaller tasks such as online forms (legal expert 
415 G Kaufmann-Kohler, T Schultz fn 224 76; R Gordon fn 385 10-11; L Gibbons et al fn 38442-.+3: E 
Clark et al fn 248 9 
416 Webopedia defines artificial intelligence as 'the branch of computer science concerned with making 
computers behave like humans'. Two branches of artificial intelligence are of particular relevance here: 
e\pert systems, which are designed to make decisions in real-life scenarios and natural language systems. 
designed to make computers understand natural, human language. R Susskind defines artificial intelligence 
as 'the design, development and implementation of computer systems that can perform tasks and solve 
problems of a sort for which human intell igence is normally thought to be required' in Transforming the 
Law (O\ford University Press 2000) 162. An examination of artificial intelligence and npert systems is 
outside the scope of this thesis. 
41- S Ross Saxer 'One Professor's Approach to Increasing Technology Use in Legal Education' (1999-
2000) (1 Richmond Journal of L01I' and Technology 21-57. 35: A Lodder. J Zeleznikov 'De\eloping an 
Online Dispute Resolution Environment: Dialogue Tools and Negotiation Support Systems in a Three Step 
Model" (2005) 10 Har1'llrd Negotiation L01I' RC\'iell' 287-337.291 
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systems, where the form responds to the user's input by categorising the dispute and 
asking the questions relevant to the type of dispute), in automated negotiation 
systems (calculating the solution satisfying most interests of the parties), automated 
diary management functions (e.g. sending out notifications and registering any 
filings made by the parties to an arbitration), in legal research (through natural 
language searches) and automated translation software (but it has already been 
pointed out above, that automated translation is not as good as that performed by a 
human translator). 
5.1.4 Psychological effect of online communication- dealing with negative 
emotions 
Changing communication patterns from face-to-face to online, textual or video-
conferencing communication has ramifications for its emotional effect on the 
parties or their representatives. It has already been pointed out418 that mediators and 
arbitrators have experienced problems in establishing trust in ODR and that the loss 
of non-verbal cues in textual communication has to be compensated by different 
forms of graphic signs employed online. 
On the other hand, distance can also have a positive effect. It has been reported 
from mediators' personal experience that distance leads to a cooling down of 
acrimonious emotions and that asynchronous communication gives the party a 
chance to reflect. Likewise, textual communication may give opportunities for 
mediators to rephrase the parties' aggressive communication, thereby preventing an 
escalation of the dispute and speeding up its resolution.419 
m 5-4.1 
419 C Rule fn 224 66, 72; R Gordon fn 385 10-11: L Gibbons et al fn 384 33. ·B: E Clark et al fn 248 9 
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Another example for the positive impact of ODR on communication patterns is the 
use of automated negotiation software, which prevents posturing 'over the last few 
pennies' as discussed above 420. 
5.1.5 Jurisdictional problems overcome in cross-border disputes 
ODR, like ADR, being extrajudicial avoids any arguments between the parties as to 
which state court is competent. As has been discussed in 3-9, the determination of 
which court is competent can be complex, time-consuming and expensive. All of 
this is avoided through ODR.421 However issues of applicable law arise 
nevertheless for online arbitration, but these have been discussed in the last Chapter 
and need not be repeated here. 
5.1.6 Faster information processing 
A final point is that lCT enables processing of larger amounts of information in 
shorter spaces of time than that carried out by human beings. Electronic document 
management and information retrieval systems are an example for this. Faster 
information processing makes dispute resolution more efficient, reducing delay and 
costs. 
5.2 Transformative power: greater access to justice 
The features of ODR discussed above have the potential to transform dispute 
resolution by enabling access to justice at a much greater scale. ODR improves 
dispute resolution processes by making them more efficient, reducing delay and 
costs. These characteristics are not merely incidental: if dispute resolution is 
cheaper and quicker, this means that persons with limited resources may have 
.j~O 5-4.3 
·1'1 
- E Clark fn 248 9 
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access to ODR. The use of ICT in dispute resolution therefore widens access.422 In 
other words, the transformative power of ODR is that it widens access to justice. 
ODR is an important breakthrough in reducing pre-existing power imbalances, as 
conceptualised as the third element of procedural fairness in Chapter Two 423, by 
providing access to efficient dispute resolution for disputants with limited 
resources. 
6. The Paradox of Low Take-up 
This Chapter has briefly outlined the ODR schemes in existence and it has shown 
that the ODR field is varied. By way of summary, the following categories can be 
distinguished. First, there are dispute resolution schemes run by specific 
marketplaces and platforms, such as Squaretrade for the online auction provider 
eBay. Secondly, some successful and innovative entrepreneurial schemes in the US 
have been established such as automated settlement systems and mock juries. 
Thirdly, especially in the UK, statutory ombudsmen have been successfully 
established, using some elements of ODR. Fourthly, the traditional, well-established 
arbitration institutions have created dedicated systems and platforms for online 
arbitration. 
While some public and private ODR schemes are operating successfully it is 
equally true to say that coverage is extremely patchy and in particular that for 
internet disputes there is only very limited coverage.424 Most provision of ADR and 
ODR is specific to a particular sector or a provider's membership in a scheme.425 In 
422 More oenerallv in relation to IT and law by R.Susskind fn .+ 16 158 
, b .J 
4_3 2-2.3.2 
424 M Doyle. K Ritters and S Brooker Sf.'cking Resolution Research Report published by the DTI and the 
National Consumer Council in January 2004 URN 0]/1616. p. 1 (in respect of ADR generally) and p. 1.3 
.m For example there are specific ADR schemes for consumers run by IDRS. see 
http: i\\\\\\ .idrs.ltd.UK Business'~('niceList.asp [1'+. September 2007]. See below 8-2.2. 
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the UK, there is no organized, general ODR scheme, open to all internet disputes, 
regardless of the sector. 426 
The second issue is that take-up of (consumer) arbitration and other existing ADR 
schemes427 has been extremely low.428 The DTI Study of2004 found that for most 
ADR schemes the number of cases was in the double digits, some have no cases at 
al1.429 However, low take up of ADR schemes does not necessarily mean that there 
is no unsatisfied need for dispute resolution. 
This state of affairs raises the 'chicken and egg' question of whether the low 
availability causes the low usage or whether the low usage causes the low 
availability. Empirical research would be needed to investigate the reasons for the 
low take up of ADR or ODR schemes. This is outside the scope of this thesis. At 
this point, it is only possible to speculate about the reasons for this low take up of 
ADRlODR and online arbitration in particular. 
Possible reasons for this low take up are the following: 
First, one reason could be that claimants (and in particular consumers and 
individuals) and their advisors do not know about ADR. This was one of the results 
of the 2004 DTI Study.430 Given that ODR is an even more recent development it 
can be assumed that claimants are probably even less aware of ODR and online 
arbitration. 43 I 
426 Central London County Court Mediation scheme and LawWorks are mentioned in M Doyle et al fn 424 
55- but it is also pointed out there that the funding for such initiatives is usually short-term and access being 
ad hoc 60 
.j~- In the UK an exception to this is the Financial Ombudsman Scheme. It reports in its 2005/2006 Annual 
Review that it had 700,000 enquiries and 113,000 new cases, Chairman's Foreword, Annual Report 
2005/2006 available from http:.www.financial-ombudsman.org.uk /publicationsar06!arO(.-chair.htm [ 14. 
September 2007] and the Ombudsmen schemes in the communications sector, see 8-2 
.1', 
-, M Doyle et al fn 424 61 
.129 M Doyle et al fn 4.24 61- 62 
.130 M Doyle et al fn 424 63; see also OECD Report 'Consumer Dispute Resolution and Redress in the 
Global Marketplace' 2006 p.n 
.131 Awareness about ADR should be raised through education of users and ad\'isors- this is not discussed 
here 
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The second factor is frequently cited as the reason why the take-up of consumer 
arbitration is low: if there is no binding pre-dispute arbitration clause, the defendant 
is unlikely to agree to arbitration after the dispute has arisen.432 Chapter Eight will 
discuss how the parties can be brought to arbitration.433 
The third factor (which in a way causes the second one) is that the enforceability of 
consumer, pre-dispute arbitration clauses is restricted under EU and many national 
laws ofEU Member States.434 If pre-dispute clauses were binding, businesses might 
see some value in incorporating them.435 
Fourthly, while ODR may be cheaper than ADR. costs are, nevertheless, an issue 
for small claims. Online mediation and online arbitration both require human 
intervention in one form or another, which must be paid for by the parties.436 If the 
more powerful party pays and organizes the procedure this may raise problems of 
independence. This conflict and the issue of cost is further discussed in Chapter 
Eight.437 
The fifth factor has been briefly described above in this Section and is probably 
more important, namely that coverage of arbitration schemes is limited to specific 
sectors and membership schemes. As the DTI Study of 2004 points out: 
'usage cannot be high if availability is low-although ombudsmen are cited as one 
of the preferred ADR processes by consumer advisers, only three consumer goods 
and service sectors have ombudsmen schemes' .438 
43~ M Doyle fn 424 16: H Perritt 'Dispute Resolution in Cyberspace: Demand for New Forms of ADR' 
(2000) Ohio State Journal on Dispute Resolution 675-703, 687: Consumers International 'Disputes in 
CYberspace' December 2000, ISBN 19023 91 31 62, P 22 
4J~ 8-~ 
4'-i 7-2 
4J5 8-2 
4,(, M Doyle et al fn 4243.63.81 
437 R-3.2.2 
4J8 M Dovle et al fn 4~4 61 
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This is the reason why the Model outlined in Chapter Eight will propose an open, 
general scheme, not limited to a particular industry or consumer sector. 439 
Related to this first point is the sixth point, namely whether consumers (and other 
'weaker' parties in a situation of a power imbalance) trust private ADR procedures 
in the same way that they trust the established and impartial state courtS.440 This 
issue of trust is difficult to address, as it is a subj ective notion. The Model discussed 
in Chapter Eight implements due process and transparency and hence will 
contribute to increase trust in online arbitration.441 
In summary, therefore it is possible to observe an apparent paradox when 
examining ADRIODR: one the one hand there is a need for fair dispute resolution, 
one the other hand there is little availability and low usage. The Model for dispute 
resolution outlined in the final Chapter Eight will overcome these reasons, by 
creating trust through fair procedures, bringing the parties to arbitration and 
providing for a general open dispute resolution scheme. 
7. Conclusion 
This Chapter argues that ODR transcends traditional ADR, so that ODR is not 
merely online ADR. As has been seen, new forms ofODR have been developed 
which have no offline equivalent. More importantly, the technologies used have 
transformative power, which can be harnessed to increase access to justice and 
reduce pre-existing inequalities between the parties. In this sense ODR contributes 
to greater fairness in dispute resolution. This Chapter explains that ODR provides 
powerful technology for increasing access to justice by reducing delay and lowering 
costs of dispute resolution through efficiency gains, overcoming geographical 
439 See Chapter 8 
440 T Schultz 'Does Online Dispute Resolution Need Governmental Intenention'?' (2004) 6 Sorrh Carolina 
JOllrnal o/Lml' & Technology 71-106,89-92: E Clark et al fn 248 16- notes that culturally this may be 
more an issue in Europe than in the US 
441 8-.1, 8-6 
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distances, solving jurisdictional issues and overcoming power imbalances. While 
this Chapter shows that ODR does contribute to the second (access) and third 
(counterpoise) principle of procedural fairness, it has to be explored to what extent 
ODR does comply with the first principle of due process. Since mediation has been 
shown to be a mere filter before adjudication the discussion of due process in the 
next Chapters will focus on arbitration. 
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Chapter 6: Arbitration and Due Process 
Convenience and justice are often not on speaking terms 
(Lord Atkin in General Medical Council v Spackman [1943J AC 627 (HL) 638) 
1. Introduction 
This thesis develops a Model for the fair resolution of internet disputes. Since 
online arbitration has been suggested as the most important method to solve internet 
disputes for the Model, the fundamental question is whether the use of online 
arbitration based on the structures and principles of traditional commercial 
arbitration is fair for these types of disputes and, to the extent that the answer to this 
question is 'no', how arbitration should be adapted for the purposes of this Model. 
This Chapter concentrates on due process, which has been defined as a constituent 
element of fairness (alongside access and the counterpoise) in Chapter Tw0442. By 
way of reminder, Chapter Two has posited two elements of due process, equal 
treatment of the parties before an adjudicator and rationality, in the sense that the 
adjudicator must not take into account any irrelevant or irrational considerations. 
This Chapter applies these due process principles to arbitration. It starts by 
exploring the sources of law for due process in arbitration and examines the 
elements of due process, contrasting litigation and arbitration. This Chapter 
discusses the principles of independence and impartiality, fair hearing, 
transparency, the duty to give reasons and rights to judicial review or an appeal. 
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The purpose of this Chapter is to list the due process requirements for the Model. 
Because of the limited space, this Chapter focuses mainly on English law, using 
references to other jurisdictions and in particular, the US, for comparison only.443 
2. Sources of Legal Due Process 
Before the discussion can proceed it is necessary to explain the sources of law for 
the due process requirements. The following sources of law are relevant: 
professional codes of conduct, institutional (and other arbitration) rules, national 
arbitration legislation, common law, constitutional and human rights standards and 
international conventions and standards. As can be seen, these sources are a mixture 
of private and public law. 
Arbitration as a private dispute resolution process is largely governed by contract 
and by the principle of party autonomy, conferring the parties with the freedom to 
fashion the arbitration procedures according to their needs. Notwithstanding this 
important principle of party autonomy, arbitration as a dispute resolution process is 
also governed by 'hard' public law in the shape of arbitration acts, setting the 
framework for the procedure. The courts at the parties' chosen seat may support and 
intervene in the process by rulings on the validity of the arbitration agreement, 
staying legal proceedings in favour of arbitration, appointing a tribunal, by rulings 
on subject-matter arbitrability, on the removal of an arbitrator, by compelling 
witnesses to attend or by allowing the challenge of an award. Furthermore, the 
courts at the place of enforcement may refuse enforcement of a foreign award for 
public policy reasons. Most states have enacted specific legislation on arbitration 
which defines the courts' power in this respect. The sources of law discussed here 
reflect the hybrid nature of arbitration. 
-1.1.\ This chapter systematically covers English law on natural justice and show noteworthy similarities and 
differences of approach in other jurisdictions where appropriate. by referring to examples of legislation and 
cases in other jurisdictions. without claiming to paint a complete picture of the la\\'s in other jurisdictions. 
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2.1 Professional codes of conduct and contract for arbitral services 
The contracts444 between the parties, the arbitration institution and the arbitrator 
may impose an express duty on the arbitrator to act in accordance with due process 
principles, ie to act judicially and a duty to exercise proper care and skill in carrying 
out his or her function. 445 Furthermore an arbitrator who is also a member of a 
profession such as a doctor, architect, engineer, accountant or lawyer, is under an 
implied duty to carry out their work, including any adjudication or valuation, to 
professional standards. In the UK, section 13 of the Supply of Goods and Services 
Act 1982 implies into contracts for the supply of services a duty to carry out the 
service with reasonable care and skill. In measuring the reasonableness of the care 
and skill the courts take into account the professional standards of the service 
provider. 446 A definition of such professional standards can be found in the 
regulations of the appropriate professional body. Such body may have formulated 
professional rules of conduct when their members are acting in the capacity of 
arbitrators447 - breach of such standards may entail disciplinary action against the 
member.448 In addition there are codes of conduct or guidelines formulated by 
arbitration institutions or international associations449 , which may be incorporated 
by reference in the contract between the parties and the arbitrator or, at a minimum, 
as in the case of the IBA Guidelines, impose moral and ethical duties on arbitrators. 
These codes are referred to where relevant. 
444 A precise analysis of the relationship between these contracts is beyond the scope of this dissertation. 
44' 
. A Redfern, M Hunter fn 270284-285,291 
446 Arenson l' Casson BecA.7nan Rutley & Co [1977] AC 405 (HL). deciding that an accountant could be 
liable for ({ negligent valuation of a shareholding 419,425 
4·r See eg the English Law Society's Guide to the Professional Conduct of Solicitors, the ABA! AAA Code 
of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes of 1. March 2004 
448 OECD Report fn 430 19 
.j.j'i ICDR Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes of 1. March 2004: American Arbitration 
Association Standards of Ethics and Business Conduct available from 
<http: \\\\\\ .adr.or!!Ethics.-\ndStandards > [14. September 2007]: Chartered Institute of Arbitrators Code 
of Pwkssional and Ethical Conduct of September 2004 available from the Chartered Institute of 
Arbitrators and on file with the author and the IBA Guidelines of Conflicts of Interest in International 
Arbitration of 22. May 2004, the latter available from 
l~ \\\\,\\.ibanet.onupublicatil)Lb IBA Guides Practical Checklist" Precedents and Free I\laterial".cfm 
[ 14. September 2007] 
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This raises the question whether arbitrators are immune from suit.Under one school 
of thought, the arbitrator may be contractually liable for breach of the implied 
duties to act judicially and to exercise proper care and skill. Under the other. the 
arbitrator carries out a judicial role and hence is immune from liability.450 English 
law subscribes to the second school of thought by granting a large degree of 
immunity to arbitrators and arbitral institutions. Neither the arbitrator nor the 
appointing institutions are liable for any act or omission in carrying out the 
arbitration, unless the claimant can show bad faith. 451 Although in this Chapter, the 
focus is not so much on the arbitrator's or institution's liability for damages452, the 
questions of arbitral standards and the duties imposed on arbitrators are nevertheless 
relevant. Because of the high hurdle on liability, the issues relating to the 
arbitrator's duty to comply with due process arise in the context of a challenge of 
the award or proceedings for the removal of the arbitrator, as these may be avenues 
of redress an aggrieved party may seek, absent any evidence of bad faith. 
2.2 Institutional and other arbitration rules 
Arbitration institutions, such as the AAA, ICSID, CIArb, CIET AC, ICC, DIS, 
ICDR, LCIA have issued rules of arbitration governing arbitration procedures 
carried out under the auspices of the respective institution. Even where the parties 
do not choose to submit their dispute to arbitration through an institution, ie in an 
ad hoc arbitration, the parties usually refer to a set of arbitration rules (such as the 
UNCITRAL rules or some institutional rules) to govern the procedure. In either 
case, the rules are incorporated by reference into the arbitration agreement between 
the parties, the contract between the parties and the arbitrator and the contract 
between the institution and the arbitrator (if applicable). Hence the arbitrator. the 
parties and the institution are all contractually bound to comply with the rules, 
including any rules on due process . 
. 1'(1 ~ 287 
. A Redfern, M Hunter fn 270 28)-
4'1 S.29 Arbitration Act 1996 
.j5~ The question of immunity will not be further discussed. 
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This thesis also takes into account several important policy documents dealing with 
the issue of standards for online arbitration (and ODRJ ADR more generally): the 
European Commission Recommendation 98/257/EC and the Guidelines by the 
American Bar Association Task Force on E-commerce and ADR453, the OFT's 
Consumer Codes Approval Scheme and the Due Process Protocol of the American 
Arbitration Association 454. 
The 1998 EC Recommendation is addressed to the designers, operators and 
providers of arbitration for consumer disputes.455 Hence its scope is limited to 
consumer disutes. It provides for seven general principles which should apply to 
binding dispute resolution456: independence, transparency457, adversarial 
. . 1 458 f'C' 459 1 l' 460 l'b 461 d . 46') Th pnnclp e ,e lectIveness ,ega Ity ,1 erty an representatIon -. ese 
principles go some way to establishing minimum standards. but are very general 
and abstract and do not address some of the issues with due process, such as the 
conflict between funding and independence, the detailed fair hearing requirements, 
publication of awards and appeal systems. Hence it is suggested that the principles 
should be refined and developed along the lines discussed in this Chapter and 
Chapter Eight 463 to make them more useful and avoid divergent interpretation by 
the Member States.464 Ideally the principles should be clothed in a Regulation to 
make them binding on the Member States. 
453 Available from the ABA website: 
http://www .abanet.org/dispute/documents/BestPracticesFinaI1 02802.pdf [ 14. September 2007] 
454 http:'w\\w.adr.orgisp.asp?id=22019 [14. September 2007] 
455 Recommendation 98/257/EC, last sentence 
456 This applies to arbitration and ombudsman schemes, see the Recitals to the Recommendation 
457 This principle merely refers to infonnation about the dispute resolution procedure 
458 This refers to fair hearing in the sense discussed below 6-4 
459 Conglomerate of different aspects: no need for legal representation, procedure free of charge or 
moderate costs, no undue delay in the decision-making. judge taking an active role 
460 I' . h . f' d 1 ~ Consumer must be protected by the mandatory law app ymg III t e consumer s state 0 reSI ence- "t-"t 
and the duty to gi \'e reasoned decisions. 6-5 
461 The parties must have specifically agreed to the binding nature of the dispute resolution 
46' . d 
- PartIes may choose to be legally represente 
463 8 ., 
-,) 
464 See also BEOC (European Consumers' Organisation) Position Paper' Alternative Dispute Resolution' of 
21. November 2002 BEUCX048/2002, pp. 2. 8 
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2.3 National arbitration acts 
N ationallegislation is at the same time the most obvious and least obvious source 
of law in this discussion. Most obvious in the sense that it is not surprising that 
sovereign states can and do legislate with effect in their territory on any subject-
matter whether this subject-matter is in the realm of private contract law or not. 
National arbitration legislation seems at the same time the least obvious source of 
law for the resolution of cross-border disputes on the internet. Indeed the whole 
point of the discussion of due process in this Chapter is to overcome the limitations 
of the rules of private international law as a species of national law. Yet it has to be 
acknowledged that regulation within a system of nation states is (still) carried out to 
a large extent at a national level, but in the field of arbitration, national laws have 
increasingly been assimilated due to the pressure exerted by the needs of the parties 
in commercial cross-border disputes.465 
There is a convergence between different national rules in business arbitration. The 
result is that procedural rules have frequently evolved into an amalgam or hybrid 
between different legal cultures, as these different legal cultures cross-pollinate 
each other. 466 This convergence is caused by the quest to improve procedural rules 
and exchanges at all levels through academic debate, through discussions between 
the parties involved in a particular arbitration procedure or at the political level in 
international institutions such as UNCITRAL. Instrumental for convergence have 
been the UNCITRAL Model Law467 (which some states have modelled their 
legislation on), arbitration rules (some of which have been drafted without reference 
to a particular seat), academic, comparative texts elaborating standards for 
international commercial arbitration 468, international practice, and, most 
importantly, international conventions469 (which have limited states' power to 
refuse to enforce foreign arbitration awards). It is important to keep in mind this 
-It)' A Redfern, M Hunter fn 270 77 
466 W Park fn 40 7-8 
467 Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, adopted by UNCITRAL on 21. June 1985 
-It)~ A Redfern, M Hunter fn 270; JDM Lew et al fn 270 
469 6-2.6 
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process of convergence when discussing sources of law, as it means that there is no 
hard and fixed line between national and international sources of law, but rather a 
mutually interdependent relationship, one influencing the other and vice versa. 
Acknowledging the contribution and impact of international arbitration practice on 
national arbitration laws should, however, not be equated with ignoring the role of 
national arbitration laws, which are an important source of law, forming the 
interface for the different modes of regulation of arbitration. Most states have 
enacted national arbitration laws defining the rights and duties of the parties 
involved and delimiting the powers of the court to intervene in or to offer support to 
arbitration proceedings. 
National legislation on arbitration pursues two aims: first it draws the outer limits of 
arbitration, eg by defining what disputes can and cannot be brought to arbitration 
and by imposing certain due process standards (mandatory provisions). Secondly 
national arbitration acts facilitate arbitration by providing for default rules where 
the parties or arbitration rules have not addressed a matter and by facilitating 
arbitration by lending the courts' powers to the parties (eg by staying legal 
proceedings). N ationallaws apply by virtue of the parties choosing the seat of the 
arbitration to be within the territory of the state or by virtue of the fact that the 
award is to be enforced within the jurisdiction. 
This Chapter concentrates on due process requirements under English law and 
international commercial practice, referring to the English Arbitration Act 1996 as a 
starting point for the discussion and making comparisons to the legislation of other 
jurisdictions where useful for the argument, without claiming to paint a complete 
picture of arbitration law in these jurisdictions, as space does not permit this. 
At some stages in the discussion for the purposes of comparison, reference is made 
to US law and in particular the Federal Arbitration Act 192547°. In the US, of 
·PlI USC Title 9 
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course a distinction has to be made between federal and state law and arbitration 
laws can be found at both levels. The Federal Arbitration Act 1925 was enacted to 
overcome court rulings hostile to arbitration and refusing to order a stay of 
proceedings to enforce a pre-dispute arbitration agreement.471 All fifty states and 
the District of Columbia have passed specific arbitration acts, usually modelled on 
the 1920 New York Arbitration Law or the Federal Arbitration Act.472 Nevertheless, 
most arbitration law in the US is federal law, because of the wide definition of 
commerce in the Federal Arbitration Act itself and an even more elastic 
interpretation of the notion of interstate commerce by the US Supreme Court.473 
The Federal Arbitration Act essentially applies in a maritime transaction or in a 
contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce474 , which is defined as 
• commerce among the several States or with foreign nations, or in any Territory of 
the United States or in the District of Columbia ( ... ) ,475. In the case of Southland 
Corporation v Keating the US Supreme Court extended the application of the 
Federal Arbitration Act to the state courts and confirmed the validity of an 
arbitration clause in a contract governed by state law, where the state law was in 
conflict with the Arbitration Act. 476 The effect of this case law is that the Federal 
Arbitration Act now applies in federal question cases, diversity cases, in which state 
law applies and in cases before the state courts, applying state law but linked to 
interstate commerce. Thomas Carbonneau even calls the Federal Arbitration Act 
the 'national American law of arbitration ,477. Because of this supremacy of the 
Federal Arbitration Act over state arbitration law, the discussion of US law is 
largely restricted to the federal level. 
471 T Carbonneau Cases and Materials on the Law and Practice of Arbitration (2nd edition Juris Publishing 
2000) 50-51 
.. p') 
- R Reuben fn 128, 976 
471 
. T Carbonneau fn 471 1954-1955, R Reuben fn 128979-980 
474 USC Title 9 ~ 2 
475 USC Title 9 * 1 
47(> 465 US 1 (1984) 14-16; see also Doctor's Associates Inc l' Casarotto 517 US 681 (1996) 686-687: see 
also Allied- Bruce Terminix Cos "Dobson 513 US 265 (1995), concerning an arbitration clause in a termite 
protection agreement for a house, the Court found that the FAA displaces state law to the contrary. For a 
more recent case see Cooper l' MRM Investment Co 367 F3d 493, 498 (2004); however not all questions 
pertaining to arbitration are governed by federal law- for example the question whether the parties have 
concluded an arbitration agreement and whether the clause is conscionable may be determined by state 
contract law, see ('~ Plaskett l' Bechtel International Inc D Virgin Islands (2003) 243 FSupp 2d 334. 4__ c 
T Carbonneau fn 471 57 
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2.4 English common law 
Natural justice478 is a time-honoured doctrine of the English common law, which 
applies to all decision-making in judicial or administrative proceedings, affecting 
the rights, property or legitimate expectations of an individua1.479 It comprises two 
fundamental maxims guaranteeing equal treatment 480: nemo judex in sua causa481 
(impartiality and independence of the judge) and audi alteram partem482(fair 
hearing). This raises the question of whether common law natural justice equally 
applies to private dispute resolution processes, based, at least to some extent, on 
contractual relationships. 
The next section discussed in detail whether constitutional (as opposed to common 
law) due process applies to private decision-making. 
However, notwithstanding the recent incorporation of the European Convention of 
Human Rights (ECHR)483 into UK law, the legal tradition of the UK is different 
from that of states such as the US and other European countries with a written, 
higher-ranking constitution incorporating human rights standards such as due 
process and the right to a fair trial, but only (at least directly) applying it to state 
actors.484 Since the common law has developed incrementally drawing analogies 
between cases, there was no need for such a bold differentiation between public and 
private law. English judges have simply stated that natural justice also applies to 
someone acting in a private but quasi-judicial function. Case law has long 
established that a private body, such as a sports club, may also be subject to the 
rules of natural justice, when making a decision affecting a member based on 
·FS It is roughly the equivalent to 'due process' in US parlance. 
-179 G Flick Natural Justice Principles and Practical Application (2nd ed Butterworths Sydney 1984) 26-27 
480 SH Bailey, JPL Ching, MJ Gunn, DC Ormerod Smith. Bailey and Gunl1: 011 the Modern Legal 5.vstem 
(4th ed Sweet & Maxwell London 2002) 1315. G Flick fn 479 26 
481 N b' d . h' o-one e a JU ge In IS own cause 
48~ 
- Hear the other party 
~S~ European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) of-t. 
NC)\'ember 1950, signed at Rome TS 71 (1953) Cmd 8969; ETS NoS 1950 
~S.j See 8-2.5 
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contract.
485 This paved the way for applying the same principles to other private 
adjudicatory systems.486 Hence it is clear that, in the UK, the common law rules of 
natural justice do not only apply to public bodies or bodies exercising a public 
function, but also to arbitration.487 
2.5 Human rights standards 
This section is about the right to a fair trial contained in the ECHR and the due 
process standards enshrined in the US Constitution. The human rights contained in 
the ECHR and the US Constitution are primarily addressed to states, not private 
actors. Hence the main issue discussed in this section is the question of whether 
these human rights standards apply to arbitration as a private dispute resolution 
process. It is argued that, in principle, the due process standards should apply 
indirectly for the reason that states lend their hand in supporting and enforcing 
arbitration awards. 
2.5.1 ECHRI European Convention of Human Rights 
For English law, in addition to the traditional principles of natural justice, another 
source of due process principles has been the ECHR, now incorporated into English 
law by the Human Rights Act 1998488 . This section of the dissertation also takes 
into account the interpretation of the ECHR by the Strasbourg institutions489, which 
the English courts must pay heed to.490 If English law applies, the English courts 
have to read, interpret and apply English legislation (including the Arbitration Act 
485 Wood,' Woad (1874) LR 9 Ex 190; Calvin l' Carr [1980] AC 574 (PC) 596; R (In'inc) " The Royal 
BlIIgcss Go(fing Soden' of Edinburgh [2004] LLR 334 (Court of Session) para 25: G Flick fn 47932-33 
.J~(, cg R l' Gough [1993] 97 Cr App R 188 (HL) 199; AT&T" Saudi Cable Co [2000] 2 L1oyd's Rep 127 
(Comm) 138 (Ll Potter) 
487 See 6-3.2,6-4.2 
488 S.l and Sch.1 Human Rights Act 1998 
.JS<I ie the European Commission of Human Rights (EComHR) and European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) before the 1998 reforms. and now the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) 
.J<}(\ • S.2 (1) Human Rights Act 1998 
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1996) in accordance with the ECHR under section 3 (l) of the Human Rights Act 
1998. 
Article 6 (1) of the ECHR reads: 
'In the determination of his civil rights and obligations (oo .), everyone is entitled 
to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and 
impartial tribunal established by law. ( ... )' 
Since the incorporation of the ECHR it is clear that it forms part of English law. 
However this does not answer the question whether the standards of due process 
established in the ECHR do apply to a (private) arbitration tribunal. First it should 
be noted that, prima facie human rights instruments govern a state' s relationship 
with its citizens (vertical effect) as opposed to the relationships between citizens 
(horizontal effect).491 Hence it is far from obvious that the ECHR should apply in 
the private relationship between the arbitration tribunal and the parties. 
In the context of English law, under section 6 (l) of the Human Rights Act 1998, 
any act of a public authority must be compatible with the ECHR and a public 
authority includes a court or tribunal.492 Hence, clearly, Article 6 (l) applies to the 
courts in proceedings related to arbitration493 , albeit that occasionally the courts 
have even here found a waiver of rights in respect of the court proceedings (eg 
regarding confidentiality494). The consequence of this is that if an English court is 
acting under its supervisory jurisdiction (where England is the seat of arbitration) or 
its enforcement jurisdiction (where England is the place of enforcement), the courts 
have an obligation to act in accordance with the ECHR. However the issue here is 
491 A Jaksic Arbitration and Human Rights (Peter Lang Frankfurt aiM 2002) 60; see Art. 1 ECHR-a detailed 
examination of indirect effects of human rights is beyond the scope of this dissertation. 
49~ S.6 (2): an arbitration tribunal is unlikely to the a 'tribunal' within the meaning of the Human Rights Act 
1998. which defines a tribunal as one 'in which legal proceedings can be brought' (s.21) 
493 North Range Shipping Ltd l' Sean'ans Shipping Corporation [2002] 1 \VLR 2397 (CA) para 27, 
confirmed in CGL' IlltcrnationalInslirance Pic l' Astra~cl1eca Insurance Co Ltd [2006] EWCA Ci\ 1340 
(CA) para.59 Judgment of 16. October 2006 
4')4 Ci~1' o/Moscoll' l' Bankers Trust [2005] QB 207 (CA) para 39 
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whether the ECHR also applies to the arbitration tribunal itself- it not being a public 
tribunal or a tribunal established by law. 
(a) The due process rule of the ECHR and its application to arbitration 
The potential for arbitration conflicting with the right to a fair hearing in a court of 
law arises, since a valid arbitration agreement blocks either party's way to obtain 
resolution of the dispute by the ordinary, 'proper' courts established bv law. The 
reason for this is that arbitration agreements are binding (in the sense that the courts 
order a stay of legal proceedings 495) and the ultimate award is also binding and 
enforceable 496. Hence, in theory, an arbitration agreement may deprive a person of 
their right to a fair trial in a court and hence to their entitlement under Article 6 (1 ) 
of the ECHR. 
Because of the binding nature and finality of arbitration, the central question here is 
whether the due process rights enshrined in Article 6 (1) apply to arbitration. 
Since the human rights standards espoused in the ECHR are primarily applicable to 
state actors, it is questionable whether these human rights standards can also be 
invoked in relationships between private parties 497. The doctrine of the horizontal 
applicability of human rights may be one argument for the applicability of Article 6 
to arbitration, especially since it is doubtful whether arbitration is a purely private 
process. 
Unsurprisingly there is no agreement on this complex question. Essentially three 
theories can be distinguished.498 The first theory holds that the guarantee of a fair 
49~ ., 
s.9 (-+) ArbitratIOn Act 1996 
496S .66 (l) Arbitration Act 1996 
49~ C Jarrosson 'L 'Arbitrage et la Convention europeenne des droits de l'Homme' [1989] RCl'lIe de 
/ ·a,.bifra~{' 573-607. 578-580 
4q~ Aha,.~n Barak in his chapter on the horizontal effect of constitutional human rights even distinguishes 
four theoretical approaches. Apart from the non-applicability. direct and indirect applicability he also 
mentions a judiciary modeL where human rights are not applied to private actors as such, but must be 
applied by the judiciary as an organ of the state. In my nomenclature. this would be subsumed under 
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trial in Article 6 (1) applies directly to arbitration, the second theory that it applies 
indirectly and the third theory that it does not apply at all. 
Why is it important whether Article 6 (1) applies directly or indirectly? If Article 6 
(1) applies directly, the guarantees contained in that article apply fully. just as they 
apply to a court of law and parties can invoke Article 6 (1) against each other. If 
Article 6 (1) only has indirect applicability then a party cannot rely directly on 
Article 6 (1) when challenging an award. Instead the award has to be challenged on 
some other basis, such as a national arbitration law and the courts then have an 
obligation to interpret this law in accordance with Article 6 (1), as far as possible. 
This indirect application clearly leaves scope for interpretation, so that not all 
guarantees apply or if they do apply indirectly, only in modified form. 
(b) Delegation theory 
Some authors have argued that Article 6 (1) of the ECHR is directly applicable to 
an arbitration tribunal for the reason that the arbitration tribunal in fact carries out a 
quasi-judicial function, a function traditionally exclusively exercised by the courts 
and hence delegated to the arbitration tribunal by law. Because of this delegation of 
the judicial function, the arbitration tribunal would be subject to obligations of due 
process. Authors subscribing to this delegation theory, such as Jaksic, argue that499 : 
'Arbitration is adjudication of the dispute ending in a final and binding arbitral 
award, which is provided with res judicata effect. Although there are individuals 
who confer upon the arbitrators the power to resolve their dispute, arbitration is 
neither an isolated nor abstracted institution which should evade the applicability of 
human rights norms. ' 
indirect applicability. See A Barak 'Constitutional Human Rights and Private Law' in Human Rights in 
Private L(/\1' (Hart Oxford 2001) 13-42 
~qq A .Taksic fn 491 203: S Schiavetta fn 352 -+.1 
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Whether one finds the delegation theory persuasive depends on one's view of the 
nature of arbitration and one's view on whether dispute resolution is essentially a 
public or private function. If one regards arbitration as being driven by the 
preference of the parties, one could argue that the delegation theory ignores the 
significance of the contractual basis of arbitration. In this view. the delegation 
theory is unconvincing, as the state has not delegated its judicial function to the 
tribunal, but the parties have simply chosen to go to a private tribunal instead of the 
courts by concluding the arbitration agreement (opting out). 
One the other hand if one regards arbitration as being driven by the lack of efficient 
public dispute resolution processes, so that the only option is arbitration, then one 
could argue that states have failed to provide this public function and have instead 
chosen to delegate this function to a private tribunal. The argument here is that 
states have not enacted arbitration-friendly laws primarily for the reason that they 
respect individual freedom and party autonomy in contract law, but that states have 
been motivated by the recognition that if the cost of some dispute resolution is 
shifted to the private sector, the burden on the publicly financed courts is 
reduced. 500 
(c) Indirect applicability 
The second theory is that the ECHR is indirectly applicable. This theory recognises 
that the courts do not in fact or in law delegate their functions to an arbitration 
tribunal. and that arbitration is based on the parties' contractual choice. 
Nevertheless this theory also accepts that arbitration is not entirely private: the 
courts are still involved in arbitration. The courts of the seat of arbitration or the 
courts at the place of enforcement have (albeit limited) jurisdiction to set aside or 
enforce an award, as the case may be. This (actual or potential) involvement of the 
courts- as organs of the state- means that the ECHR is (at least) indirectly 
500 T Carbonneau 'Arbitral Justice: the Demise of Due Process in American Law' (1996) 70 Tlilane Lall' 
RC)'ic\l' 1945. 1958-1959 
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applicable. 501 Georgios Petrochilos points out that national law must be interpreted 
in accordance with the ECHR.502 
(d) Direct or indirectly applicable 
It is submitted that the second theory, ie that Article 6 (l) of the ECHR is indirectly 
applicable, is the most convincing theory for voluntary arbitration. The first theory 
is not entirely convincing, where the parties had a choice to go to the courts and 
could have included a jurisdiction clause in their agreement, but instead agreed to 
use arbitration. On the other hand direct applicability of the ECHR is appropriate in 
cases of compulsory arbitration (discussed below), as here the authority of the 
arbitration tribunal is not based on the parties' choice but on law. 503 Therefore it is 
necessary to make a distinction between voluntary and compulsory arbitration. 
(e) Distinction between voluntary and compulsory arbitration 
However, at times it might be difficult to decide whether or not a party has 
submitted to arbitration out of their own free will. In Deweer v Belgium a butcher 
was prosecuted for having sold pork and beef at too high a profit margin and he was 
given the invidious choice between paying a fine in full settlement or having his 
shop closed awaiting criminal prosecution. Unsurprisingly he opted (under protest) 
for the former. The Court found that he had not voluntarily waived his right to go to 
court and hence had been deprived of his due process rightS. 504 In Le Compte, Van 
501 F Matscher 'Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit und EMRK' in HabscheidiSchwab Beitriige ~lI1l1 internationalen 
rClfahrensrecht und Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit (Festschrift fUr Heinrich Nagel Munster 1987) 237, see also A 
Redfern, M Hunter fn 270 77,493: 'an arbitration agreement may constitute a waiver of the right of access 
to the courts, but it is surely not intended to be a blanket waiver of the guarantees to a "fair hearing" 
contained in Art.6' and also G Kaufmann-Kohler, T Schultz fn 224 198, also W Robinson, B Kasolowsky 
'Will the United Kingdom's Human Rights Act Further Protect Parties to Arbitration Proceedings?' (2002) 
18 (4) Arbitration International 453-466 (460), A Samuel' Arbitration, Alternative Dispute Resolution 
Generally and the European Convention on Human Rights' (2004) 21(5) Journal of International 
Arhitrorion 413-438, 416: G Petrochilos Procedllral Law in International Arbitration (Oxford University 
Press 2004) 130, 152-153 
50~ G Petrochilos fn 501 156 
~03 C Liebscher The Healthy AmII'd (Kluwer Law International The Hague 2003) 74 
)04 Dem'('/" \' Belgium (1979-80) 2 EHRR 439 (ECt HR) 462-463 
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Leuven and de Meyere the ECtHR found that the applicants had not waived their 
right to a public hearing in disciplinary proceedings through their (compulsory) 
membership of a medical professional body.505 In Thompson l' UK506 the defendant 
of an absence without leave charge agreed to summary trial (as opposed to trial by 
court martial) by the commanding officer in circumstances where he was in the 
presence of the superior officer and not infonned about his rights and the ECtHR 
held that this was not a valid waiver. 
By contrast in Axelsson v Sweden four taxi owners were members of a trade 
association, the Malmo Taxi Economic Association, which they had to be a 
member of, if they wished to obtain business from the local taxi despatch. The 
membership agreement provided for arbitration of all disputes. The Commission 
found that this was a voluntary and valid waiver of their right to have their dispute 
heard by an ordinary court and hence found the complaint inadmissible.507 
Essentially, arbitration is voluntary and not compulsory if it is based on an 
agreement between the parties which was free from duress, undue influence or 
mistake, even if the arbitration was imposed by a private, monopolistic organisation 
and all persons wishing to undertake a certain activity (such as acting as football 
players' agent or driving a taxi) had to agree to it. Arbitration is only compulsory, if 
it is required by law (such as a statutory requirement).508 
If participation in the arbitration is not voluntary but compulsory, eg under a statute, 
the arbitral proceedings must comply in full with the due process rights set out in 
Article 6 (1) or be subject to review by a body (such as a court) that does. 509 As 
Adam Samuel has pointed out, there are many tribunals (whether pennanent or ad 
hoc) carrying out proceedings called 'arbitration' which are part of the state's 
505 (198:2) 4 EHRR 1 (ECtHR) 22 
506 Thompson)' United Kingdom (2005) 40 EHRR 11 (ECtHR) Para 45 
507 Axc/son l' Sweden EcomHR Admissibility Decision of 13. July 1990 No 11960/86 available from the 
HUDOC database. Stretford l' Football Association [:2007] AllER (D) 346 (Mar) (CA) Para. 49, Judgment 
of :21. March 2007 
508 Stretford l' Football Association [2007] fn 507 ParasAg- 49 and 5:2 
509 A/h(:rt and Le Compte l' Be/gium (1983) 5 EHRR 533 (ECtHR) 545 
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510 
machinery to solve disputes so that it is sometimes difficult to draw a clear line 
between public and private dispute resolution. 5 10 
The case of Bramelid and Malmstrom v Sweden concerned mandatory arbitration to 
determine the price of shares which were compulsorily sold to the majority 
shareholder under Swedish company legislation. Here the EComHR said that 
mandatory arbitration is permissible provided that there is recourse to a court. 
which has the power to review the case both as to facts 511 and law. in order to 
guarantee the due process rights granted by Article 6 (1).512 This case has 
interesting consequences for court-mandated forms of ADR- here the due process 
rights would have to be guaranteed in full and Article 6 (1) is directly applicable513 . 
Having discussed the first two theories on the applicability of the ECHR, it remains 
to examine the theory that it does not apply at all. 
(t) Absolute waiver theory 
The third theory is that the due process standards in the ECHR do not apply to 
arbitration at alL since the arbitration tribunal is not a tribunal established by law 
and the arbitration agreement is a waiver of the right to go to court and the due 
process rights applicable to the courtS.514 The logic of the absolute waiver theory is 
that the arbitral tribunal derives its authority and mandate from the private 
agreement of the parties and hence. not from the state, and that therefore, the ECHR 
is not applicable to this private, horizontal relationship. 515 This theory is 
unconvincing and should be rejected. 
A Samuel fn 501 413; see also 8-2.2 
511 See also Le Compte, Van Leuven and de Meyere \' Belgium (1982) 4 EHRR 1 (ECtHR) 22 
51~ (1983) 5 EHRR 249 (EComHR) 258-259 
~13 W Robinson. B Kasolowsky fn 501 -l55 
)l~ Supporters of this absolute waiver theory do not necessarily argue that the absolute \\aiwr does not 
imply that no due process rights apply to arbitration. it merely means that such rights are not based on Art.6 
(1) ECHR 
515 A yiew taken by C Jarrosson 'L'Arbitraoe et la Convention europeenne des droits de I'Homme' [1989] 
_ b 
Rc1'/lc de "arbitrage 573-607. 588-589; he concedes, though that the ECHR may have some indirect 
influence on arbitrators 
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Firstly, as has been discussed above in the context of the indirect applicability of the 
ECHR, states support arbitration and enforce arbitration awards, hence endorsing 
the process. Thus states' responsibility under Article 6 (l) is indeed engaged if they 
condone flagrant breaches of the ECHR by giving effect to arbitral awards which 
infringe fundamental principles of due process. 516 
Secondly, while it is clear that the arbitration agreement does in fact waive the 
parties' right to go to court, it does not logically follow that the parties have also 
waived all due process enshrined in Article 6 (1). Authors in favour of the absolute 
waiver theory quote the case of Nordstrom-Janzen and Nordstrom-Lehtinen, where 
the EComHR emphasized that the parties had waived their due process rights: 
'there was a renunciation by the parties of a procedure before the ordinary courts, 
satisfying all the guarantees of Article 6 of the Convention'. 517 However the 
EComHR did not say that therefore the partiesdid not enjoy any of these 
guarantees. 518 
In fact, in the Nordstrom-Janzen and Nordstrom-Lehtinen case, the Commission 
examined to what extent the national legislative framework for arbitration allowed 
some control over the due process of arbitration and found that this control existed 
and had been properly exercised. 519 Hence, in this case the question was not 
whether the arbitration itself complied with Article 6 (l), but instead whether the 
national courts are ensuring that in case of breach of due process, the award can be 
challenged. However the Commission also stressed that the Contracting States may 
decide themselves 'on which grounds an arbitral decision should be quashed', 
giving the state concerned a wide margin of discretion in applying the due process 
516 See for example in Bramelid and Malstrom 1'Sweden (1983) 5 EHRR 249 (EComHR). a case in which 
one party had had an opportunity to appoint an arbitrator. whereas the other had not. The EComHR found 
the case admissible. 
W /'y'ordstrol1l-Jall:;clI and Nordstrom-Lehtinen " the /v'etherlands EComHR Admissibility Decision of 27. 
November 1996 No 28101195 available from the HUDOC database 
518 W Robinson, B Kasolowsky fn 501 462 
519 ibid 
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5~O ibid 
. . I 520 h' pnnclp es. T IS case goes probably too far in leaving due process standards 
wholly to the national courts521 and has been contradicted by later decisions, such as 
S . ·522 uovanzeml . 
The absolute waiver theory has not been confirmed by the jurisprudence of the 
Strasbourg institutions. For example in the case of Jakob Boss v Germany the 
EComHR found that the fact that the parties have entered into an arbitration 
agreement 
'does not mean, however, that the respondent State's responsibility is completely 
excluded as the arbitration award had to be recognised by the German courts and be 
given executory effect by them. The courts thereby exercised a certain control and 
guarantee as to the fairness and correctness of the arbitration proceedings which 
they considered to have been carried out in conformity with fundamental rights and 
in particular with the right of the applicant company to be heard. ,523 
In the Suovaniemi case524 the European Court of Human Rights expressly said that 
the fact that the parties have entered into an arbitration agreement and thereby 
validly waived their right to go to a public court, does not mean that they have 
forsaken all due process rights (such as the right to an impartial arbiter).525 The 
Court said that the very core of Article 6 (1) rights apply to arbitration.526 In 
conclusion, the absolute waiver theory does not withstand scrutiny and should 
therefore be rejected. 
-, I )- S Schiavetta fn 352 Fn 56 
522 See below 
52.' Admissibility Decision of 2. December 1991 No 18479 '91 available from the HUDOe database 
524 Sliomniemi ~nd others \' Finland ECtHR Admissibility Decision of 23. February 1999 No 3173 7.96 
a\'ailable from the HUDOe database 
52) ibid 5 
526 ibid 5 
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(g) Significance of waivers 
To recap, above, it is hoped that the absolute waiver theory has been refuted. Article 
6 (l) applies to arbitration, either directly, as in the case of compulsory arbitration 
or indirectly, as in the case of voluntary arbitration. In other words, the arbitration 
agreement is considered to constitute a general waiver of the right to go to court, 
but not of all due process rights enshrined in Article 6 (1).527 The distinction 
between a waiver of the right to go to court and a specific waiver of due process 
rights is critical and this distinction is not always clearly drawn in the discussion. 
The fact that an arbitration agreement is no general waiver of all due process rights 
does not necessarily mean that the parties cannot, in addition, renounce a specific 
right. To put it another way, in arbitration proceedings two different types of 
waivers should logically be distinguished.528 One is the parties generally waiving 
their right to go to the ordinary courts to seek resolution of their dispute, ie the 
arbitration agreement. 529 The other form of waiver would be one or both parties 
specifically relinquishing a specific right in particular circumstances, such as a 
party reaffirming or not opposing the nomination of a particular arbitrator in full 
awareness of a conflict of interest, which the arbitrator has previously disclosed to 
the parties. 
As has been seen above, this distinction has never consistently and clearly been 
made in the jurisprudence of the ECtHR or the English courtS.530 The jurisprudence 
can be criticised because of this failure to distinguish between a general waiver not 
to go to court and a waiver of a specific right. Hence, a general waiver of the 
5~7 Stretford l' Football Association [2007] AllER (D) 346 (Mar) (CA) Para. 65, Judgment of 21. March 
2007 
5~8 M Kurkela DlIe Process in International Commercial Arbitration (Oceana New York 2005) 30-31 
5~9 ibid 
5,0 l\/ords!n·)III-.1an::,cn and Nordstr(jm-Lehtinen l' the Netherlands EComHR Admissibility Decision of 27. 
Nmember 1996 No 28101/95 available from the HUDOC database: see also the case of BLCT Ltd l' J 
Sainsbllry PIc [2004] 2 P&CR 3 (CA) ..f..f 
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parties' right to go to court has, at times been misused as justification for limiting 
due process rights in arbitration.531 
(h) Requirements for waivers 
However, because of the importance of due process, the Strasbourg institutions 
have established, as a safeguard, certain requirements which a general or specific 
waiver must fulfil. A waiver must be 'must be supported by minimum procedural 
guarantees commensurate to the importance of the rights waived' .532 Therefore for a 
waiver to be valid, it must be clear and unambiguous533 , as well as express534 and 
informed535 and must not run counter to an important public interest536. This latter 
requirement suggests that not all rights can be completely waived (eg such as the 
rule against partiality), but this is a question on which there is no authority and 
which, ultimately is not clear. 537 For a waiver to qualify as informed, it must be 
undertaken in full awareness of the legal implications. Agreement to this can be 
evinced, eg by the party entering into an arbitration agreement being legally 
advised. 538 
531 ibid 
53: Suovaniemi and others v Finland ECtHR Page 5 Admissibility Decision of 23. February 1999 No 
31737/96 available from the HUDOC database; see also for a recent criminal case Thompson \' United 
Kingdom (2005) 40 EHRR 11 (ECtHR) Para 43 
533 'unequivocal', see LeCompte, De Meyere, Van Leul'en l' Belgium (1982) 4 EHRR 1 (ECtHR) Para 59; 
Hakansson and Sturesson v Sweden (1991) 13 EHRR 1 (ECtHR) 16; Suovaniemi and others v Finland 
ECtHR Page 5 Admissibility Decision of 23. February 1999 No 31737/96 available from the HUDOC 
database, Thompson v United Kingdom (2005) 40 EHRR 11 (ECtHR) Para 43 
5.\4 McGonne111' UK (2000) 30 EHHR 289 (Court) para 44; Paul Stretford l' (1) Football Association Ltd 
(]) Barry Bright [2006] EWHC 479 (Ch), para. 42 
535 Sllovaniemi and others l' Finland ECtHR Page 6 Admissibility Decision of 23. February 1999 No 
31737/96 available from the HUDOC database, Thompson l' United Kingdom (2005) 40 EHRR 11 
(ECtHR) Para 44; Paul Stre(ford l' (1) Football Association Ltd (2) Barry Bright [2006] EWHC 479 (Ch). 
para. 42 
5.\6 LeCompte, De Meycrc, r'an Leu1'en l' Belgium (1982) 4 EHRR 1 (ECtHR) Para 59; Hakansson and 
Sturessoll 1'Sweden (1991) 13 EHRR 1 (ECtHR) 16: Suovaniemi and others v Finland ECtHR Page 5 
Admissibility Decision of 23. February 1999 No 31737/96 available from the HUDOC database, Thompson 
l' hliled Kingdom CW05) 40 EHRR 11 (ECtHR) Para 43; Stre(ford \' Football Association [2007] AllER 
(D) 346 (Mar) (CA) Para. 56. Judgment of21. March 2007 
m Suol'([lliemi and others \' Finland ECtHR Page 5 Admissibility Decision of 23. February 1999 No 
31737/96 available from the HUDOC database 
m Suol'([llicmi and others l' Finland ECtHR Page 6 Admissibility Decision of 23. February 1999 No 
3173 7/96 available from the HUDOC database: cf Pfeifer and Plankll' Austria (1992) 14 EHRR 692 
(FCtHR) para 78 (no legal assistance hence waiver invalid) 
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Similar jurisprudence can be found in England. The English courts also have 
consistently held that a waiver of an aspect of the right to a fair trial must be 
voluntary and fully informed.539 In the Court of Appeal case of Smith l' Kvaerner 
Lord Phillips, CJ observed: 
'the party waiving should be aware of all the material facts, of the consequences of 
the choice open to him, and given a fair opportunity to reach an un-pressured 
decision' .540 
In that case, the Court of Appeal found that a waiver was not valid, as it had not 
been fully informed and voluntary. Although the party later alleging bias had been 
informed of the judge's conflict of interest, he had not been fully informed of the 
consequences of objecting to the judge and in particular he had not been told how 
quickly the case could be tried, if it had to be listed again. 541 The Court of Appeal 
also found that the waiver was not voluntary as his Counsel in effect advised him to 
waive this right. 542 
(i) Conclusion 
In summary, a minimum of procedural protections is guaranteed through the 
direct543 or indirect544 application of Article 6 (1). The absolute waiver theory is not 
supported by the jurisprudence of the Strasbourg institutions. It is also to be rejected 
on the grounds of principle in that it ignores the court's involvement in arbitration 
and it illogically confuses the parties' waiver not to go to court with a waiver of all 
due process rights. Hence the fundamental principles of due process such as 
539 In the context of procedural rights in litigation: R l' Bmt' Street Magistrate ex parte Pinochet (No:!) 
[2000] 1 AC 119 (HL) 137 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson), Millar l'Dickson [2001] 1 WLR 1615 (HL) 1629 
(Lord Bingham), Peter Smith l' Kvaerner [2006] EWCA Civ 242 (CA) para 29 
5-10 Pc/er Smith l' Al'ocmer [2006] EWCA Civ 242 (CA) para 29 
5-1\ ibid 31 
5-1: ibid 32,37 
~-I' In the case of compulsory arbitration 
,-1-1 I h b" " 
. n t e case of voluntary ar ItratlOn 
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equality of anns between the parties in the hearing, giving every party a reasonable 
opportunity to present their case under conditions which do not place that party at a 
significant disadvantage towards its opponent545 and the impartiality and 
independence of the arbitrator546 must be guaranteed despite the existence of a 
general agreement to arbitrate. By contrast other due process rights, such as 
publicity547 or the right to appeal may be modified under the ECHR in voluntary. 
private dispute resolution processes, simply because of the inherent nature of the 
particular private dispute resolution process548 . Albeit that an agreement to arbitrate 
is not a general waiver of due process, the impact of the ECHR on due process has 
been extremely limited for this reason549 and only very few of the cases in this area 
have been successful. An additional reason for this is that the indirect application of 
Article 6 (1) to arbitration gives only minimal protection, as the Contracting States 
are allowed a wide margin of discretion and usually the applicable arbitration law or 
ordre public already provides for such a minimum of rights (as does the Arbitration 
Act 1996)550. Another reason is that the parties can waive particular rights by a 
specific waiver. The consistent tenor of the Strasbourg cases is that so long as the 
parties have validly waived their rights, the courts have no duty to intervene.551 
Hence on the whole. the ECHR has historically not had a substantial practical 
impact in progressing due process rights in arbitration generally. The argument can 
be made in the future, that with the increasing use of arbitration in non-commercial 
disputes, there is a need to re-examine the waiver doctrine. 552 
5-15 Dombo Beheer BT' l' Netherlands (1994) 18 EHRR 213 (ECtHR) 230-contrast this with Jakob Boss l' 
GCr/1/(fIl) , (EComHR) Admissibility Decision of 2, December 1991 No 18479/91 available from the 
HUDOC database 
).j(, Suovaniemi and others v Finland ECtHR Admissibility Decision of 23. February 1999 No 31737/96 
available from the HUDOC database; ECtHR considered the impartiality question, but found specific and 
unequivocal waiver. 
5-1- Nordstrom-Joll::;cll and Nordstrom-Lehtinen l' the Netherlands EComHR Admissibility Decision of 27, 
November 1996 No 28101195 available from the HUDOC database 
548 See also the case of BLCT Ltd l' J Sainsbury PIc [2004] 2 P&CR 3 (CA) 44 
5-1'1 W Robinson. B Kasolowskv fn 501 466; A Samuel fn 501 426; C Jarrosson 'L 'Arbitrage et la 
Convention europeenne des dr~its de I'Homme' [1989] Revile de I'arbitrage 573-607, 593-594 
55P A Samuel fn 501 419 
551 A Samuel fn 501 416 
55~ See 7-4.4 
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2.5.2 US constitutional due process standards 
The notion of procedural due process as enshrined in the US Constitution fulfils an 
equivalent function to the notion of natural justice under the English common 
I 553 Th Sth554 d 14th555 A d h . d' 'd I aw. e an men ment guarantee t at In IVI ua s may not be 
deprived of their life, liberty nor property without due process of law. The essential 
tenets of due process have been stated by the US Supreme Court in the seminal case 
of Goldberg v Kelly556. They are: the right to an impartial judge557. notice of the 
case and the opportunity to be heard558, the right to present evidence559, the right to 
retain counsel56o and the right to obtain a written statement of the decision with 
reasons 561 . 
The due process clauses in the US Constitution are a restriction on government 
power and hence only apply to private actors if they can be brought within the 
confines of the state action doctrine. A private actor performs a state action if he or 
she carries out a public function and there is a close nexus to government 
administration. 562 The dominant view is that the extra-judicial resolution of disputes 
is not an exclusive governmental function and hence arbitration is not 'state 
action,.563 In numerous cases, US State564 and Federal565 courts have held that 
arbitration is not state action even if awards are ultimately enforced by the courts. 
For example in Davis v Prudential Sec Inc the Court said 'that the mere 
553 HJ Friendly fn 33 1269, 1277 Judge Friendly points out, however that in the US constitutional due 
process only applies to agencies of the state 
554 Applying to federal government, its courts and agencies 
555 I' . d App ymg to state governments, agencIes an courts 
556 397 US 254,260-267 (1970) 
55" ibid 271 
558 ibid 267-268 
559 ibid 268 
560 ibid 270 
561 ibid 271 
56' 
- R Reuben fn 128 990 
563 R Reuben fn 128997: HJ Friendly fn 33 1269, 1277 
564 McdValUSA Health Programs Inc l' Melllberworks Inc 273 Conn 634, 641-654 
565 Dm';s l' Prudential Sec Inc 59 F3d 1186, 1190-1192 (11 th Cir 1995): Federal Deposit Ins Corp l' Air 
Florida S,'s Illc 822 F2d 833. 842 n9 (9th Cir 1987): Elmore l' Chicago & Illinois Midland Ry Co 782 F2d 
94,96 (7th Cir 1986): Austern l' Chicago Bd Options Exch.Inc 716 FSupp 121. 125 (SDNY 1989) affirmed 
898 F2d 8R2 (2nd Cir) cert denied 498 US 850 (1990) 
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confinnation of a private arbitration award by a district court is insufficient state 
action to trigger the application of the Due Process Clause,566. Hence the idea of 
indirect applicability of due process has not held sway with the US courts and the 
traditional and dominant approach of US law has been bipolar, in other words a 
black and white distinction is made between trial in the public courts, which is 
subject to constitutional due process and arbitration, which is a private process and 
hence not subject to constitutional process.567 Furthennore, the arbitration 
agreement has traditionally been regarded as an absolute waiver of the right to a fair 
trial. 568 For example in Bowen v Amoco Pipeline Company the US Court of Appeals 
for the 10th Circuit held that the defendant had voluntarily entered and participated 
in arbitration569 and was hence barred from arguing a due process violation.570 
Because of the waiver, the Court found it unnecessary to decide whether or not 
arbitration is state action. 571 
The reason for the bipolar approach of the US doctrine and the courts is that the 
fonnality of constitutional due process and the infonnality of arbitration are 
regarded as antithetical. 572 The upshot of this is that the due process clauses in the 
Constitution do not apply to arbitration. Of course this does not mean that due 
process is inapplicable to arbitration-it only means that the US Constitution is not a 
source of law for due process requirements. 
2.6 International conventions 
The most important international convention in this area is the 1958 New York 
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards573 . 
566 59 F3d 1186, 1192 (11 th Cir 1995) 
567 R Reuben fn 128953. HJ Friendly fn 33 1269, 1277 
568 See eg cases where the arbitration agreement has been held to be a waiver of the 7th Amendment (right 
to trial by jury): Dillard 1· Merrill Lynch 961 F2d 1148, 1155 (5th Circuit 1992); Kimbrough l' Holiday Inn 
478 F Supp 566, 577 (ED Pa 1979) 
569 In fact it had compelled arbitration 
570 254 F3d 925, 940 
571 ibid 
57~ R Reuben fn 128 1046 
m 330 UNTS 3 (NYC), adopted New York 10. June 1958, entered into force on 7. June 1959. 
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This provides for the recognition and enforcement of international arbitration 
agreements574 and the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards575 . 
The New York Convention provides an exhaustive list of the grounds on which the 
Contracting States can refuse to recognise and enforce a foreign award in their 
jurisdiction. Thereby it limits the Contracting States' ability to refuse such 
enforcement. However, the New York Convention does contain the 'catch all' 
exception to enforcement- public policy, in order to allow States a margin of 
discretion where enforcement would be contrary to fundamental values of the state 
in which enforcement is being sought. Nevertheless States have accepted that the 
New York Convention has laid down a clear policy in favour of enforcement. 
Because of the recognition of the importance of arbitration for international trade 
Contracting States have exercised self-restraint and limited the (potentially wide) 
public policy restriction normally applied to the enforcement of foreign judgments. 
As a result, the enforcement of arbitration awards is now governed by the more 
restricted notion of international public policy. 576 Hence interference by states with 
arbitration awards is limited to upholding the 'most basic notions of morality and 
justice,577 and consequently refusal of enforcement is relatively rare. 578 It is 
precisely because of the limited interpretation of public policy that the New York 
Convention has facilitated the recognition and enforcement of awards. In this way. 
arbitration has overcome the limitations of Private International Law and hence has 
proven to be more effective in the resolution of cross-border disputes than litigation. 
It should also be pointed out that, in any case, the enforcing court need not slavishly 
refuse enforcement if one of the grounds listed in Article V applies, as is clear from 
the wording of subparagraphs (1) and (2): 'recognition and enforcement ma.1' be 
refused' and the burden of proof that the award should not be enforced sits with the 
party resisting enforcement. This further strengthens the New York Convention' s 
leaning in favour of enforcement. Hence. the New York Convention has had the 
574 Art.II 
5'5 Art.III 
5~b JDM Lew et al fn 270 7'21 Fn 173, 726-728 
5'7 Parsons & WhittclIlore O\'crs(:'as Co fnc \' Societe Generale de 1 'fndllstrie dll Papier (RAKTA) 508 F2d 
969 (2nd Cir 1974) 974 
578 JDM Lew et al fn 270 724, 726 
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579 
dual effect of harmonising the standards for the enforcement of awards and making 
such enforcement easier. 579 
The question here is to what extent the New York Convention is a source of law for 
due process. From one perspective one could say that the Convention limits due 
process in international commercial arbitration in that it potentially restricts the 
courts of the Contracting States to refuse enforcement on the basis that due process 
has not been complied with by the foreign arbitral tribunal. However, looking at the 
grounds listed in Article V and in particular Article V (1) (a)580, (b)581, (d)582 and 
Article V (2) (b )583, they are sufficiently wide to include various aspects of due 
process considerations. Article V (1) (b) is the main provision in this respect, as it 
allows refusal of recognition and enforcement where 'the party against whom the 
award is invoked was not given proper notice of the appointment of the arbitrator or 
of the arbitration proceedings or was otherwise unable to present his case'. Hence 
for most cases on due process it will not be necessary to invoke public policy. For 
example, in the case of Generica Ltd v Pharmaceuticals Basics Inc the US Federal 
Appeal Court of the 7th Circuit held that the ground for refusal in Article V (1) (b) 
corresponds to the general due process requirements under US law, consisting of 
. adequate notice, a hearing on the evidence and an impartial decision by the 
arbitrator,.584 This acknowledgment of the significance of due process in the New 
York Convention, and the subsequent interpretation of this Article by national court 
decisions is an important source for the international law aspects of arbitration. 
JDM Lew et al fn 270 693 
580 I I'd b' , nva I ar ItratIOn agreement 
581 P' 'bl ' arty not gIven proper notIce or una e to present Its case 
582 Arbitral authority or procedure not in accordance with the agreement of the parties or the law of the seat 
583 Public policy of the enforcing state 
584 XXIII YBCA 1076 (1998) 1078-9, 125 F3d 1123, 1129-1130 (7 th Cir 1997). also in Parsons & 
Whittemore Overseas Co Inc "Societe Generale de I 'Indllstric dll Papier (RAKTA,) 508 F2d 969. 97'5-6 Ond 
Cir 1974), where the Second Circuit said that 'this provision essentially sanctions the application of the 
forum state's standards of due process' 975, This is not in contradiction to the earlier finding that the due 
process requirements in the US Constitution do not apply to arbitration, as here the courts are dealing with 
the interpretation of the NYC and only using constitutional due process by way of analogy. ie the argument 
is not about whether arbitration is state action but what the concept of due process means, 
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2.7 Conclusion 
This section has discussed the following sources of law for due process: contractual 
provisions and rules of arbitral institutions, national arbitration laws, the common 
law, human rights law and the New York Convention and international public 
policy. These sources of law are both of a public and private origin and have a 
national and international dimension. As we have seen, human rights law has not 
had much influence in forming due process in arbitration and most impulses for due 
process stem from national arbitration laws, the arbitral rules and the interpretation 
of the provisions of the New York Convention by the courts. The following sections 
contain a comparison of due process in litigation with due process in arbitration. 
3. Impartiality and Independence in Adjudication 
As explained at the outset, the purpose of this Chapter is to draw up the 
requirements of due process and discuss how they are applied to arbitration 
proceedings. This involves a discussion of constituent elements of due process, such 
as the impartiality and independence of the adjudicator(s), fair hearing, the duty to 
give reasons, transparency and the right of appeal. 
3.1 Impartiality and independence of judges 
The first principle of common law due process, that no person shall be a judge in 
his or her own cause, means that an adjudicator in judicial or quasi-judicial 
proceedings should be impartial and independent. 585 This distinction between 
impartiality on the one hand and objective independence has also been maintained 
by the Strasbourg institutions in their rulings on Article 6 (1) ECHR.586 
585 SH Bailey et al fn 480 280, 13 15 
586 Sec cg Pl-dlar l' VJ.: (1996) 22 EHRR 391 (ECtHR) 402 ...... W3 
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This section discusses the traditional approaches to allegations of a judge's bias 
under the English common law, and the next section will discuss how these 
principles have been applied to arbitrators, both under the common law and 
arbitration specific legislation and rules. 
3.1.1 Defining impartiality and independence 
Impartiality in the context of judicial decision-making has been given the meaning 
(subjective) 'absence of actual bias', whereas independence has been taken to mean 
(objective) 'absence of appearance of bias', or in more modem terminology, 
'absence of a relevant conflict of interest' under the English common law. 
(a) Impartiality (no actual bias) 
Partiality or actual bias relates to the adjudicator's internal prejudices, prejudgment 
or predisposition towards one of the parties or the subject-matter of the dispute. 
Thus, partiality or actual bias is an abstract, subjective requirement referring to the 
judge's state of mind. 
Partiality or bias means having an inclination for or against a party taking into 
account irrelevant considerations and acting either out of self-interest or prejudice. 
Galligan emphasizes the element of prejudging by a biased judge: 
'The idea of prejudice as pre-judgment brings out well the core idea that to be 
biased is in some way to have judged the issue beforehand or to have judged it for 
h· h h' h ,587 reasons w IC are not t eng treasons. 
An allegation of partiality or actual bias would involve an examination of the 
subjective state of mind of the judge, which causes obvious problems of evidence. 
and would be a serious allegation against the judge. Hence, in practice. partiality or 
58~ OJ Galligan fn 52 .. D8 
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actual bias is notoriously difficult to prove and therefore a challenge of a ruling on 
these grounds has never been successful under English law. 
(b) Independence (no appearance of bias) 
Because of this evidentiary concern, the courts have added the second requirement 
that judges must also be independent, and this second criterion of independence 
goes some way towards effectuating an absence of actual bias. Hence in practice. 
the requirement that judges are independent is more important. 
Independence is a factual concept, in that it means absence of an objectively 
ascertainable conflict of interest. 588 In the context of judicial decision-making in 
the English courts, the requirement is usually expressed as an absence of the 
appearance of bias or in more recent decisions, an absence of conflicts of interest. 
This requirement is infringed where the adjudicator has a relevant conflict of 
interest. 
However the question of what amounts to a relevant conflict of interest clearly is a 
question of degree- if the slightest possibility of bias were to be sufficient for a 
finding of non-independence, it would be difficult to find any adjudicator for many 
cases. 589. To answer this question it is necessary to assess the risk of possible 
prejudice. 
3.1.2 Independence and the relevant risk assessment 
Looking at the risk assessment from a more abstract point of view. the risk of bias 
depends on how directly the interest (or other predisposition) relates to the parties 
or subject-matter of the decision to be made and how important the outcome is for 
588 DJ Galligan fn 51438; G Kaufmann-Kohler. T Schultz fn 224 112; A Jaksic fn 491 253-254: A 
Redfern. M Hunter fn 270238-239; JDM Lew et al fn 270 158. 260 
589 MH Redish. LC Marshall fn 50 492 et sequi 
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the judge. 590 The test for this risk assessment has been succinctly expressed in the 
US Supreme Court case of Tumey where a relevant conflict of interest has been 
described as a 'possible temptation to the average man as ajudge,591. 
Under the English common law the courts have made a distinction between 
conflicts of interest, which result in automatic disqualification of the judge (without 
further risk assessment) and conflicts of interest, which are subject to a risk 
assessment (under the 'appearance of bias' argument). 
(a) Automatic disqualification: more serious conflicts 
It has long been recognised by the English courts that a conflict of interest 
stemming from a financial interest in the subject matter of the dispute, such as 
shares in a company, may lead to automatic disqualification of the judge. 592 
However, this has now been widened to include other personal (non-financial) 
interests: the seminal case in this area is ex parte Pinochet Ugarte case593 , 
concerning extradition proceedings, in the course of which the House of Lords had 
to decide on the question of state immunity granted to the former Chilean head of 
state. Amnesty International had been granted leave to act as an intervener in the 
proceedings. It transpired after the ruling that one of the Law Lords, Lord 
Hoffmann, was a director of the charity arm of Amnesty International, and the 
defendant petitioned the House of Lords to set aside the decision. The House of 
Lords unanimously granted the petition on the basis that Lord Hoffmann' s link with 
Amnesty International was such that he should have automatically been disqualified 
to sit in the case. In the ex parte Pinochet Ugarte case all five Law Lords held that 
, 
there can be automatic disqualification of a judge, without having to show a real 
danger of bias, if the judge has a relevant interest in the outcome of the case.594 
590 John R Allison J Allison fn 52 514-517 
.591 See Tumey)' Ohio 273 US 510 (1927) 522 
59~ Dimes)' Grand Junction Canal (1853) 3 HL Cas 759 (HL) 793. R l' Rand (1866) LR 1 (QB) 230.232 
5'1.' [2000J 1 AC 61 
594 133 (Lord Br01\'I1C- Wilkinson):'once it is shown that the judge is himself a party to the cause. or has a 
relevant interest in its subject matter. he is disqualified without any investigation into whether there was a 
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Automatic disqualification obviates the need to show that the interest was such as to 
be liable to influence the judge ~ s decision. 595 Thus, the House of Lords extended 
automatic disqualification of a judge with a relevant interest to non-pecuniary 
interests. This immediately raises the question of what kind of non-pecuniary 
interest would lead to disqualification. 
On this matter, Lord Hutton stated that 
'I am of the opinion that there could be cases where the interest of the judge in the 
subject matter of the proceedings arising from his strong commitment to some 
cause or belief or his association with a person or body involved in the proceedings 
could shake public confidence in the administration of justice as much as the 
shareholding (which might be small) in a public company involved in litigation' .596 
In a similar vein Lord Browne- Wilkinson regarded the promotion of a cause of a 
party as a relevant interest. 597 Thus it seems that post the ex parte Pinochet Ugarte 
case, the promotion of and strong commitment to a particular cause or an 
association with one of the parties of the proceedings are non-pecuniary grounds 
leading to automatic disqualification without any further inquiry into the likelihood 
of bias. 
(b) Lesser conflicts: appearance of bias 
Lesser conflicts of interest are subjected to a risk assessment. Generally speaking, 
conflicts of interest may stem from a relationship with a party (eg through friend-or 
kinship) or from the adjudicator's promotion of a particular cause. 598 Hence, 
likelihood or suspicion of bias'; 139 (Lord Goff): 'the relevant interest need not be a financial interest'; 
145 (Lord Hutton) 
595 135 
596 ibid 
59" 135 
598 SH Bailey et al fn 480 280.1 315 
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usually for a finding of lack of independence, an objectively ascertainable conflict 
of interest or predisposition (' apparent bias') is necessary. 
The leading case for the requirement of absence of apparent bias is the famous 1924 
case of R v Sussex Justices, ex p McCarthy. In this case, Lord Hewart made the 
famous dictum that it is 'of fundamental importance that justice should not only be 
done, but should be manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done'. 599 
In that case, a solicitor was acting as a magistrates' clerk in a criminal case relating 
to a dangerous driving charge and as solicitor for the plaintiff in the ensuing civil 
trial for damages against the same defendant. On the facts it was clear that he had 
not advised the magistrates and, hence, had not influenced the magistrates' decision 
to convict the defendant.6oo Nevertheless the defendant's conviction was quashed 
for the appearance of bias. The logic underlying this decision is the difficulty of 
proving or disproving actual bias and that therefore. as a matter of policy, it is 
undesirable and unhelpful to even pose the question whether a person was in fact 
biased.601 Even if one accepted that an appearance of bias was sufficient for 
challenging a decision, this still leaves open the question as to how much apparent 
bias is required before a decision is quashed. The case law after Sussex Justices was 
conflicting as to the likelihood of bias required, in particular some courts seemed to 
599 R l' Sussc.y Justices fn 55 259 
600 ' fl d h ' h' . Although one could argue that his mere presence could have In uence t e magIstrates, t IS IS not a 
point that was argued by the Court 
601 ibid, see the explanation for the appearance of bias rule in R l' Gough fn 486 (HL) 191 (Lord GoJJ): 202 
(Lord Woolf), In more recent decisions the courts refer to unconscious bias rather than appearance of bias. 
see Lord Justice Simon Browne in the case R 1'Inner West London Council, e_yparte Dallaglio [1994] ..f 
AllER 139 (CA) 152 said that the courts are 'no longer concerned strictly with the appearance of bias but 
rather with establishing the possibility there was actual although unconscious bias'; see also AT&T 
Corporation l' Salldi Cable Co [2000] 2 Lloyd's Rep 127 (CA) 136 (Lord Woolf) 
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state that a mere suspicion of bias was sufficient to create an appearance ofbias602 , 
whereas others held that there must be a real likelihood ofbias603 . 
This conflict was eventually resolved in favour of the latter concept by the leading 
House of Lords decision in R l' Gough 604. In that case one of the jurors in a criminal 
trial was the neighbour of the defendant's brother- albeit that she was not aware of 
this connection during the trial. Lord Goff stated that a mere suspicion of bias is not 
sufficient- there has to be a real danger of bias in the sense of a real possibility of 
bias. 60S The only exception to this was where the judge had a financial interest in 
the outcome-in such cases bias is automatically presumed.606 Hence the courts now 
will look at the likelihood of bias rather than a mere theoretical appearance of bias. 
In a similar vain, the ECtHR has held in a case where one of the jurors in a criminal 
trial was an employee of one of the main prosecution witnesses, that the applicant's 
doubts about the juror's impartiality must be objectively justified. The ECtHR said 
that in each individual case it had to be examined whether there was a real risk that 
the familiarity would taint the impartiality of the tribunal member. The ECtHR by a 
majority of five votes to four found that there had been no breach of Article 6 (l), 
since the juror had been employed in a junior position, had had no involvement in 
the proj ect concerned and in fact had been made redundant before the trial. 607 
60~ Lord Goffin R l' Gough fn 486 (HL) 194 pointed out that 'following the Sussex Justices case, there 
developed a tendency for courts to invoke a test requiring no more than a suspicion of bias', eg 
Metropolitan Properties Co (FGC) Ltd v Lannon [1969] 1 QB 577 (CA) 599, referring to the 'impression 
which would be given to other people' (Lord Denning). Danckwerts U and Edmund Davies U endorsed a 
reasonable suspicion of bias standard 601-602 and 606 
603 R l' Camborne Justices ex p Pearce [1955] 1 QB 41 (Divisional Court) 51-52; R l' Barnsle1' COUn(1' 
Borough Licensing Justices. ex p Barnsley and District Licensed Victuallers Association [1960] 2 QB 167, 
186-187 (De1-1in U) 
604 194 
605 ibid 198 
606 ibid 195, Dimes l' Grand Junction Canal (1853) 3 HL Cas 759 (HL) 793, R l' Rand (1866) LR 1 (QB) 
no, 232; see also the US Supreme Court case of Tumey v Ohio 273 US 510, 522 (1927); J Allison fn 52 
515-516 argues that this harsher treatment of financial bias can be explained by the fact that it is easier to 
prove than prejudice and because of the public's expectations- he argues that financial interests may in fact 
have less influence on a decision-maker than other interests. Of course in the UK the ex parte Pinochct 
L:~(/rrc case has made clear that interests of a non-financial nature may also lead to automatic 
disqualification. 
607 Pullar l' UK (1996) 22 EHRR 391 (ECtHR) .+05 
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By way of summary, if the judge has a significant financial or other direct and 
personal interest in the outcome, he or she will automatically be disqualified-
however such extreme cases, exemplified by the ex parte Pinochet Ugarte case, 
will be rare. In most cases the interest will be more indirect and less substantiaL so 
that a risk assessment in relation to the conflict of interest must be undertaken and a 
judge's independence must be assessed by objective criteria. This is in conformity 
with the jurisprudence under the ECHR. 
3.2 Impartiality and independence of arbitrators 
Unsurprisingly, national arbitration laws608 and the rules of some of the most 
important arbitrational institutions609 expressly provide that arbitrators must be 
independent and/or impartial. In addition, the rules of conduct governing the legal 
professions state that members of that profession must be impartial and independent 
and not advising any party when acting as arbitrators. 61o Furthermore, it is a 
recognised fundamental principle of international arbitration law that arbitrators 
should be both impartial and independent. 611 
Nonetheless, the application of this general principle causes problems when applied 
to the manifold situations of alleged bias in which arbitrators may find themselves. 
608 Eg ss 24 (1) (a), 33 (1) (a) and 68 (2) (a) English Arbitration Act 1996; ss 1035. 1036 German 
Arbitration Act 1998: s.1 0 (a) (2) US Federal Arbitration Act 1925 ('evident partiality or corruption '): s.42 
New South Wales Commercial Arbitration Act 1984; Arts 34,58 (6) Arbitration Law of the People's 
Republic of China 1994; Art.18 (l) (ii) Japanese Arbitration Law 2003 
609 ICC Rules Arts 7 (1) and 11 (l). AAA ICDR Art.7 (l). AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules Rules 17 (a) 
(i) and 16. LCIA Rules Art.5 (2). UNCITRAL Rules Art.9, WIPO Rules Art.22 (a) 
610 Rule 22.02 Law Society's Guide to the Professional Conduct of Solicitors. 8th edition 1999 
611 A Redfern, M Hunter f~ 270236: JDM Le\\ et al fn 270 255-256: Part 1.1 IBA Guidelines of Conflicts 
of Interest in International Arbitration of 22. May 2004. available from 
http:/\\ ww.ibanet.onupublication" IBA Guide" Practical Checklist-. Precedents and Frt't'_~Jaterial\.dm 
[ 14. September 2007] 
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3.2.1 The English Arbitration Act 1996 and the common law 
Looking at English law and in particular, the English Arbitration Act 1996 in more 
detail, it provides, first of all, in section 1 (a) that 'the object of arbitration is to 
obtain the fair resolution of disputes by an impartial tribunal without unnecessary 
delay and expense'. Most importantly, section 24 (1) (a) entitles a party to apply to 
the court to remove an arbitrator, where circumstances exist that give rise to 
justifiable doubts as to his (or her) impartiality.612 Furthermore, section 33 provides 
that the tribunal shall act fairly and impartially as between the parties and non-
compliance with this duty leaves any ensuing award open to challenge.613 Although 
the English Arbitration Act 1996 does not refer to independence, but only to 
impartiality, the right to challenge an arbitrator under the 1996 Act includes 
circumstances, where the arbitrator cannot be considered to be independent, since 
an award can be challenged if there are objective circumstances that give rise to 
justifiable doubts as to the arbitrator's impartiality. This wording includes 
objectively ascertainable conflicts of interest and the real danger of bias test 
established in R l' Gough. 
It has been long established that a private body, such as a sports club, may also be 
subject to the rules of natural justice, when making a decision affecting a member 
based on contract.614 This paved the way for applying the same principles to private 
adjudicatory systems. Lord Goff in Gough stated that the same standard of real 
danger of bias applied to all persons acting in a judicial capacity whatsoever, 
whether they are adjudicating on the facts or on the law, ie judges, jurors, justices, 
tribunal members and arbitrators. Lord Goffhas said obiter that the standard as to 
the likelihood of bias stemming from a conflict of interest is the same in arbitration 
and in court proceedings, ie whether there was a real danger of bias or a real 
61~ Norbrook Laboratories l' A Tank and Moulson 2006 Wl 1333300 (Comm)- arbitrator was removed 
because of bias after contacting witnesses direct. see para 156 
61, 
. Under s.68 (l) , . _ 
61-1,-1 T&Tl' Saudi Cable Co [:2000] :2 Lloyd's Rep 1:27 (Comm) 138 (ll Potter): \\ ood 1" iT oad (18 i.-+) lR 9 
Ex 190; Call'ill l' Carr [1980] AC 574 (PC) 596: R (Irvine) " The Royal Burgess Go((rng Soclcty of 
Edinhllrgh [2004] LLR ~~4 (Court of Session) para :25: G Flick fn 479 ~:2-~~ 
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possibility ofbias.615 Lord Goffapproved of the test established in flle Elissar616 
and Bremer617 whether 
'the circumstances were such that a reasonable man would think that there was a 
real likelihood that the arbitrator would not fairly determine the issue on the basis of 
the evidence and arguments adduced before him'. 618 
Furthermore, in the more recent case of Laker Airways Inc v FLS Aerospace Ltd Mr 
Justice Rix specifically held that the test in section 24 of the English Arbitration Act 
1996 is congruent with the test of real danger of bias established in Gough. 619 
Likewise, in the case of AT&Tv Saudi Cable Corporation620 the Court of Appeal 
reiterated the dictum in Gough that the test for bias applied to courts and arbitration 
tribunals in the same manner, ie the relevant test is whether there was a real danger 
that the arbitrator would be unconsciously biased.621 
In the AT&T case the chairman of an arbitration panel was a non-executive director 
of Norte I, a competitor to one of the parties in the dispute, AT&T. The dispute 
arose from a bid for a Saudi telecommunications project, which had been won by 
AT &T. whereas Nortel had been an unsuccessful bidder. The main issue in this case 
was that the chairman was connected to a competitor of a party. AT&T was 
concerned about the risk of disclosure of confidential information to Nortel, in 
particular in view of future bids for Saudi projects. The Court of Appeal found that 
the fact that the arbitrator was a non-executive director of a competitor did not 
I d f . b' 622 affect his independence and that there was no rea anger 0 unconscIOUS las. 
615 R l' Gough fn 486 199- before the passing of the 1996 Act 
616 Ardahalian l' Unifert International SA (The Elissar) [1984] 2 Lloyd's Rep 84 (CA) 89 establishing an 
objective test to ass~ss whether an arbitrator should be disqualified because of misconduct. 
61
7
" Bremer Handels!!:cscllscha(r mbH l' Ets Soules et Cie [1985] 2 Lloyd's Rep 199 (CA) 201 
618 <. 
R l' GOl/gh fn 486 199 
619 [1999] 2 Lloyd's Rep 45 (Comm) 49 
620 [2000] 2 Lloyd's Rep 127 (CA) 
621 ibid 134-135 (Lord Woolf) and 138 (Lord Justice Potter) 
622 ibid 136 (Lord Woolf), 139 (Lord Justice Potter) 
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Although the arbitrator~s failure to disclose this interest to the parties at the outset 
did amount to a mishap in the procedure, the Court of Appeal denied that this \vas 
sufficient to set aside the award (particularly at this late stage after millions of 
pounds had been spent in the proceedings). 623 The Court of Appeal agreed with the 
first instance judge~s assessment that the arbitrator~s position as non-executive 
director would not have involved him in operational decisions by Nortel and that it 
was therefore extremely unlikely that he would have disclosed any information~ 
especially since such disclosure would have amounted to a serious breach of the 
arbitrator~ s duty of confidentiality. The chairman, given his experience and 
standing, would have been well aware of this duty. 624 
In summary, the courts have firmly established that the standards of impartiality and 
independence applied to arbitrators are equivalent to those applied to judges in the 
ordinary courts. As a matter of principle, the courts ~ insistence on equivalence is 
manifest. 
3.2.2 Important differences between arbitrators and judges 
Nevertheless~ by insisting on this principle, the English courts have turned a blind 
eye to the fact that there are important differences between the role played by 
arbitrators and that by judges. It is argued below in this Chapter625 that there are 
important differences between judges and arbitrators and that the courts should 
acknowledge these differences by admitting that they apply626 a lower standard to 
arbitrators than to judges. 
By contrast to the English position, in the leading US case on the issue of arbitrator 
impartiality the US Supreme Court has albeit obiter expressly recognised the 
difference between arbitrators and judges. In the US. section 10 of the Federal 
6~:; ibid 138 (Lord Woolf). 140 (Lord Justice Potter). 141 (Lord Justice May) 
6~4 Ibid 138 
6~5 See the next section 
6~6 See the discussion of the Rusted and Bremer cases below 
173 
Chapter 6: Arbitration and Due Process 
Arbitration Act allows vacation of the award only on the limited grounds of 
corruption, fraud, undue means or where there was evident partiality or corruption 
in the arbitrators and the legislation does not expressly mention appearance of bias 
or lack of independence. Hence it may seem at first sight that under federal 
arbitration law the test as to arbitrator bias is more restrictive and less protective 
than under the English common law. 
However, the US Supreme Court, in the seminal Commonwealth Coatings case627 
held that any tribunal whether it is a court of law or an arbitration tribunal must not 
only be unbiased but must also appear to be unbiased.628 The case concerned a 
claim for payment allegedly due for work carried out by a subcontractor against the 
prime contractor. The presiding arbitrator was an engineering consultant with a 
large business in Puerto Rico and he had had sporadic, but repeated business 
contacts with the prime contractor, generating fees of about US $ 12,000 over a 
period of four to five years, albeit no dealings in the year preceding the arbitration. 
The Supreme Court decided that this business relationship between the arbitrator 
and one of the parties was sufficiently significant to raise an appearance of bias 
(even though no actual bias was alleged) and that, as a consequence, the award 
should be vacated. 
Mr Justice Black who delivered the leading Opinion of the Court said629 that in 
principle the same, if not higher standard should apply to an arbitration tribunal 
compared to a court of law: 
'It is true that arbitrators cannot sever all their ties with the business world, since 
they are not expected to get all their income from their work deciding cases, but we 
should, if anything, be even more scrupulous to safeguard the impartiality of 
arbitrators than judges, since the former have completely free rein to decide the law 
as well as the facts and are not subject to appellate review: 
6~~ Commonw('(llfh Coatings C01P l' Continental Casualty Co 393 US 1-+5,89 S Ct 337 
628 ibid 150 
6~9 Ibid 1-+8-149 
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By contrast the other two concurring judges, Mr Justice White and Mr Justice 
Marshall, found that arbitrators should not be held to the same standards as judges 
for the reason that 
'it is often because they are men of affairs, not apart from, but of the marketplace, 
that they are effective in their adjudicatory function ( ... ) but it is enough for present 
purposes to hold, as the Court does, that where the arbitrator has a substantial 
interest in a firm which has done more than trivial business with a party, that fact 
must be disclosed' .630 
The dicta concerning the question whether the same, higher or less stringent 
standards should be applied to arbitrators than to judges were ultimately obiter, as 
the Court decided that in this case there was an appearance of bias. It is interesting 
that the Court was badly divided over the question, with Mr Justice Black 
considering that the same, if not higher standards should apply, whereas Justices 
White and Marshall held that the standards for arbitrators should be less stringent. 
This disagreement shows the difficulty of applying the same standards of 
impartiality and independence to arbitrators as those that apply to judges. 
3.2.3 Arbitrators as men or women of business 
Even though the courts in England have held arbitrators to the same standards as 
judges as a matter of law, the question arises to what extent is this possible in 
practice. It is argued here that, generally speaking, independence is more difficult to 
achieve in practice for arbitrators, as arbitrators are not civil servants or full-time 
adjudicators, unlike (most) judges, and earn their living through some kind of 
631 h b" h' h flo commercial activity. Hence, they ave USlness mterests, w IC may con ICt 
630 Ibid 150, 152-153 
631 AS Rau fn 126494-495 
175 
Chapter 6: Arbitration and Due Process 
with their adjudicatory role in some circumstances.632 Arbitrators are frequently 
professionals or business people (such as lawyers, engineers, architects, surveyors, 
medical experts) and are chosen for the very reason of their knowledge and 
expertise in a given field. 633 
Conflicts may arise, in particular where specialist knowledge of a field is required, 
simply for the reason that the number of 'insiders', such as leading members of a 
particular trade association, or experts in the field, is limited. As a consequence. the 
arbitrators, the parties' representatives, the parties' expert witnesses and the parties 
themselves may have pre-existing relationships or connections. Furthermore, for an 
arbitrator working for a large professional practice, such as a law, accountancy or 
construction firm, it is likely that one of his or her partners or associates may have 
had a business relationship with or may even be acting for one of the parties to the 
dispute in an unrelated matter. With professional practices merging and increasing 
consolidation in professional sectors, it becomes increasingly difficult to avoid such 
conflicts of interests. 
Two cases illustrate this point. In the first case, Rustal Trading Ltd v Gill & Duffus 
SA 634, the arbitrator, a director of a sugar trading company, had previously been a 
party to a protracted and acrimonious dispute involving allegations of fraud with a 
consultant of the claimant, Rustal Trading Ltd. The consultant acted as an important 
witness for Rustal in the arbitration in question. However the Court found that this 
was insufficient to establish a real danger of bias, saying that there was no reason to 
suspect that the arbitrator would in fact be predisposed against the witness' 
evidence.635 The Court pointed out that 
'if the arbitrators are themselves to be active traders there is every likelihood that at 
least one member of the tribunal will at some time have had commercial dealings 
61' 
. - JDM Lt'\\ d al fn '"270 258 
m AS Rau fn 1 '"26494-495 
(,,-I [') • ) 
. _000] 1 Lloyd s Rep 14 (Comm 
b,5 ibid 19 
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with one or both parties to the dispute. ( ... ) The fact that those dealings had on 
occasions given rise to disputes would likewise not of itself provide grounds for 
doubting an arbitrator's impartiality. Disputes are part and parcel of commercial life 
in general and commodity trading is no exception'. 636 
In a situation where a judge in an ordinary court had a pre-existing dispute with an 
important witness, this constellation would give rise to an appearance of bias, 
disqualifying the judge from sitting in the case. Because such a constellation is 
more likely to arise in the arbitration world, where arbitrators and expert witnesses 
share a common trading background, the courts seem to accept a lower standard 
regarding the question of appearance of bias. 
In the second case used to illustrate the point, Bremer, the claimant sought to 
challenge the appointment of one arbitrator to an appeal panel. Bremer was a seller 
in one of the over 1000 GAFTA arbitrations arising from a US soya beans embargo. 
It argued that the arbitrator being a director of a company, whose parent company 
was a party involved in the soya beans embargo arbitrations. but allegedly as a 
buyer, there was a risk that the arbitrator may not be able to review the case without 
any bias. Bremer alleged that a precedent in favour of the buyers would be useful to 
the arbitrator's company, hence there was a conflict of interest giving rise to an 
appearance of bias. The Commercial Court and the Court of Appeal dismissed the 
complaint. 637 The complaint failed on factual grounds, as the complainant was not 
able to show that the parent of the company, on whose board the arbitrator sat, was 
in fact buyer-oriented.638 But the Court of Appeal also said obiter that it found 
nothing objectionable about the fact that traders sit in arbitrations, as 'members of 
the Grain and Feed Trade Association are particularly concerned to have their 
disputes decided by arbitrators who were experienced both as arbitrators and above 
61(, ibid 18 
61- Bremer Handelsf?;escllschaft mbH l' EfS So Illes ef Cie [1985] 1 Lloyd's Rep 160 (QB): 2 Lloyd's Rep 
~ . 
199 ~CA) 
638 ibid 203 
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all as traders in that particular trade' .639 Curiously, though, the Court of Appeal 
obiter approved the judge's finding that even if the parent company had been buyer 
oriented, there would have been no risk of bias, as there was no evidence of any 
significant pattern in the outcome of the previous soya bean arbitrations on which 
that particular arbitrator sat. This reasoning behind this is not entirely logical. as the 
question of patterns of previous arbitrations relates to a showing of actual bias, 
whereas the claimants tried to show merely an appearance of bias. If the courts had 
found that the arbitrator's interest was too remote and indirect in any case to give 
rise to a real risk of bias, then it would have followed the same standard as that 
applied to judges. Instead the Court of Appeal chose to emphasize that the arbitrator 
in the case was a trader and that this was not objectionable, thereby implicitly 
applying a different standard than that applied to 'ordinary' judges. Hence certain 
predispositions do not disqualify arbitrators unless they reach a high intensity and 
actually blind the arbitrator as to the factual findings and applicable law.64o 
The conclusion from these cases is that a lower standard of impartiality is applied in 
arbitration than in litigation. 
3.2.4 Payment and the repeat player syndrome 
First of all, arbitrators differ from judges in that they are paid by the parties, and not 
by the state, so that the arbitrator may, at least theoretically, be interested in 
repeated appointments. This is problematic, if the parties are involved in the 
appointment of the arbitrator and the arbitrator expects repeat 'business' from one 
of the parties but not from the other. 641 Lisa Bingham in her empirical study of 1998 
comparing the statistics of non-repeat and repeat appointments of arbitrators by 
639 ibid 204 
640 W Park fn 40 132 
641 C Partasides 'International Commercial Arbitrations' in J Tackaberry, A Marriott Bernstein's Handbook 
of . .J.,-bitration and Dispute Resolution Practice (4th ed Sweet & Maxwell London 2003) 6S 1-706,687; AS 
Rau fn 126 524; E Thornburg 'Going Private: Technology. Due Process and Internet Dispute Resolution' 
34 UC Dayis Law Review (Fall 2000) 151-220.208: LJ Gibbons 'PriYate Law, Public "Justice": Another 
Look at Pli\'ac)" Arbitration and Global E-commerce' (2000) 15 Ohio State Journal on Dispute Resolution 
769-793, 780 
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employers has clearly shown that employers are at an advantage over employees 
where they make repeat appointments. 642 
3.2.5 Appointment by the parties 
Secondly, another, related issue in relation to independence is that in most cases, 
the parties appoint the arbitrator (s). If a panel of three arbitrators is appointed it is 
common practice that each party appoints one arbitrator and the third arbitrator is 
then appointed in some other manner (such as being appointed by agreement of the 
party-appointed arbitrators) as neutral chairman. 
The function of each party-appointed arbitrator in international commercial 
arbitration is to ensure that the cultural, linguistic and legal background of that party 
is properly understood by the tribunal. Hence in the context of an arbitral tribunal 
with several arbitrators, it is necessary to distinguish between neutrality and 
impartiality. A party-appointed arbitrator is not neutral, but should act fairly and 
impartially as between both parties.643 This can cause problems where one party 
fails to appoint an arbitrator and the other party's appointed arbitrator acts as single 
arbitrator. 644 
By contrast, in domestic US arbitration the practice has been the reverse, in that a 
party-appointed arbitrator has been regarded as not independent from the appointing 
party and is acting more like a representative645. However US practice is being 
influenced by international practice to the contrary.646 The Code of Ethics jointly 
64' 
- L Bingham fn 62 236-239; see also AS Rau fn 126524 
643 IDM Lew et al fn 270 258-259 
644 See BGH III ZR 332/99 of 1. February 2001, albeit in that case the German courts nevertheless enforced 
the English award, as the opposing party should have challenged the award earlier before the courts at the 
seat. 
64:i AS Rau fn 126497-498; A Redfern. M Hunter fn 270 237; IDM Lew et al fn 270 256 Subject to a duty 
not to mislead, harass the other party or engage in delaying tactics, the non-neutral arbitrator may be 
predisposed towards the appointing party. see Canon X A (1) ABA! AAA The Code of Ethics for 
Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes, Effective March 1. 2004 available from <http://www·.adr.org·Guide .. > 
[ l.f. September 2007] 
h4h \\. Park fn 40 9 
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promulgated by the American Arbitration Association and the American Bar 
Association states that, as a general rule, party-appointed arbitrators should be 
impartial and independent, unless the parties or the governing rules state 
otherwise.647 
There seems to be a consensus, at least in international arbitration, that party-
appointed arbitrators should be impartial, even though the party-appointed arbitrator 
cannot be said to be entirely neutral. However as long as each party appoints an 
arbitrator and there is a neutral chairman, this should not be seen as lowering 
standards of due process. 
3.2.6 Systemic bias 
While bias is prohibited, doctrinal predisposition is a legal factor which an 
appointing party may take into account. 648 Such predisposition may have an impact 
on fairness. Systemic bias may arise from an arbitrator belonging to a particular 
interest or stakeholder group or from repeat appointments by such a group 649 or from 
the fact that one party appoints the arbitrator and pays for the procedure65o . 
Issues of systemic bias are extremely difficult to assess.651 As Lisa Bingham has 
argued mere statistical win-lose analyses of an arbitrator's record are no indication 
of an individual arbitrator's bias.652 However she posits that' statistical analysis 
may be useful to explore questions of structural bias stemming from the nature of 
the rules governing arbitration' .653 She also points out that a substantive scanning of 
arbitration awards for systematic bias is difficult, as factual and legal accuracy are 
. I h d 654 notonous y ar to measure. 
6~' . Under 'Note on Neutrality' and Canon X, The ABNAAA Code of EthIcS fn 645 
t,~~ W Park fn 40 9 
(lo.lq 
E Thornburg fn 641 209 
650 I 93 see a so T Schultz fn 440 92-
651 E Thornburg fn 641 209 
65~ L Bingham fn 62 245-246 
6'" L B" h f 
- mg am n 62 253 
()5~ ibid 257-258 
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Systemic bias additionally refers to those leanings and propensities which e1'el)' 
individual has, not because of a personal conflict of interest or a consciously 
adopted viewpoint, but as a result of belonging to a particular group or organisation 
or as a result of a particular attitude or predisposition. Hence systemic bias is caused 
by our outlook on life as influenced by our social background and milieu and this, 
of course, includes our work environment, professional training and membership of 
professional organisations.655 Lon Fuller tells the story of a three-judge court who 
had to adjudicate on the question whether the criminal offence of threatening 
serious bodily harm to another person had been committed. The accused was a 
sailor in the navy and the unrefuted witness statements showed that the accused had 
said to a fellow sailor: 'I'll stick a knife in your guts and tum it round three times'. 
Lon Fuller wrily remarks 'Two of the judges, who had spent their lives in genteel 
surroundings far from the waterfront, were with great difficulty persuaded by the 
third to acquit. ,656 
The arbitrator's professional or business background may mean that he or she 
belongs to a particular interest or stakeholder group influencing his or her view of a 
dispute, which favours one or the other party.657 This is clearly not a problem if the 
parties both belong to the same interest group (eg both are members of the same 
trade association) and possibly less so, if the interest group is not relevant to the 
dispute. Issues of systemic bias only arise, if there is a substantial power imbalance 
between the parties and the parties belong to two opposing interest groups, whose 
interests clash in the particular dispute under arbitration. In order to illustrate this 
argument, one could imagine an arbitrator who is a leading member of a consumer 
association adjudicating a consumer law dispute between a business and a consumer 
as sole arbitrator. Another example would be a member of an employers' federation 
655 OJ Galligan fn 52 438; AS Rau fn 126488- he argues that this is unavoidable: see also J Sternlight 
'Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme Court's Preference for Binding Arbitration' (Fall 
1996) 74 Washington Unil'('rsity Lml' Qliarter~l' 637-712. 684-685 
656 L Fuller fn 38 391 
05" This type of conflict of interest is also possible for judges in extreme cases, see the ex parte Pinochet 
['gonc case, However, because of arbitrators' involvement in commercial affairs, it is more likely that they 
belong to relevant interest groups 
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sitting as sole arbitrator in an employment dispute. Similar constellations can be 
made out, eg IP rights holder-user ofIP, doctor-patient dispute or accident 
insurance company-claimants' association in personal injury cases, where the 
arbitrator belongs to one of the interest groups (eg to the association of IP rights 
holders, the medical profession or an association of personal injury claimants). In 
such cases, where a dispute involves opposing interest groups, the potential for 
systemic bias should be reduced by ensuring a balanced composition of the tribunal, 
including representation of both stakeholder groups on the tribunal, with a neutral 
chairman. 
Independence standards for arbitrators attempt to draw the minute line between 
allowing for the general expertise and knowledge of arbitrators but prohibiting 
specific conflicts of interest and providing for a balanced composition of arbitration 
tribunals. For example the AAAlABA Code of Ethics expressly recognises that 
arbitrators may have a business/professional background and states: "Arbitrators do 
not contravene this [Code] if, by virtue of such experience or expertise, they have 
views on certain general issues likely to arise in the arbitration, but an arbitrator 
may not have prejudged any of the specific factual or legal determinations to be 
addressed during the arbitration. ,658 
In commercial arbitration and other situations where there is no significant power 
imbalance between the parties and the parties have made a fully informed and 
voluntary decision to go to arbitration, this slight taint on arbitrators' independence 
is ofless significance than in arbitrations where there is a power imbalance and/or 
one party had to agree to the arbitration clause in a non-negotiated contract. 
However even in the context of commercial arbitration, Alan Redfern and Martin 
Hunter have pointed out that "in the past there was probably too great an acceptance 
651 AAAlABA The Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes, Effective 1. March 2004, Under 
'Comment 10 Canon /' fn 647 available from w,,"w.adr.org [ 14. September 2007] 
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by the parties of manifestly dependent or biased arbitrators nominated by their 
opponents ~ .659 
3.2.7 Disclosure 
Some may say that the issue of conflicts of interest is dealt with in practice by 
disclosure. 66o The arbitrator should disclose all matters which affect his 
independence from the parties or which could cause a conflict ofinterest. 661 
In England, if the parties either expressly agree that the disclosed matters do not 
disqualify the arbitrator or omit to challenge the arbitrator after a disclosure, the 
prejudiced party has waived his or her right to challenge the appointment of the 
arbitrator. As a consequence, a party may challenge the award after it has been 
rendered only on the basis of lack of independence of the arbitrator, if this challenge 
is based on facts which the party did not know at the outset of or during the 
arbitration.662 
This waiver doctrine would be in accordance with Article 6 (1) ECHR. In 
Suovaniemi the ECtHR held that 'the Contracting States enjoy considerable 
discretion in regulating the question on which grounds an arbitral award should be 
quashed, since the quashing of an already rendered award will often mean that a 
long and costly arbitral procedure will become useless and that considerable work 
and expense must be invested in new proceedings. ,663 
659 A Redfern, M Hunter fn 270 245; similar A Jaksic fn 491 256-257, A Samuel fn 501 414; Khawar 
Qureshi also points out that conflicts of interests have threatened the confidence in the arbitral process, K 
Qureshi 'Conflict ofinteresf (2004) 154 New Law Journal 1400-140l: RReuben fn 128984 
660 R Reuben fn 128 1067, see also UNCITRAL Rules Art.9: ICC Rules Art.7 (2); LCIA Rules Art.5 (3) 
661 A Redfern. M Hunter fn 270 242; JDM Lew et al fn 270 265; see also Commonwealth Coatings 
Commonwealth Coatings COlP v Continental Casual~l' Co 393 US 145. 89 S Ct 337 149 (Mr Justice Black) 
and 151 (Mr Justice White); see also UNCITRAL Model Law Art.12: see also the Guidelines American 
Bar Association, Principle VI A (1 )-(3) (a) and (b) 
66~ S, n (l) Arbitration Act 1996 
66.' Sliomniemi and others r Finland ECtHR Page 6 Admissibility Decision of 23. February 1999 No 
31737/96 available from the BUDOC database: see also Nordstrom-Janzen and Nordstrom-Lehtincn r thc 
Scrhcr/ands EComHR Admissibility Decision of 27. November 1996 No 28101195 available from the 
HUDOC database 
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By contrast, if the arbitration proceeds under the US Federal Arbitration Act. the 
award can only be challenged ex post, although the challenging party should 
express his or her objection to the appointment of the arbitrator, to make sure that 
that party has not waived his or her right to do SO.664 
However it is important to point out that the arbitrator's obligation to disclose does 
not solve the question of under what circumstances should an arbitrator step down 
because of a relevant conflict of interest. If the arbitrator does not consider the 
disclosed conflict to warrant resignation and only one of the parties challenges the 
independence of the arbitrator, the question of whether or not the arbitrator is 
disqualified must be decided by the institution administering the arbitration or, 
ultimately the courts665 . The arbitrator's duty to disclose relevant conflicts of 
interest at the outset, while notably sensible, only has the effect that the issue of 
independence must be decided at an earlier stage in the arbitration, to avoid wasted 
costs and delay. It does not circumvent the question of standards of independence. 
3.3 Conclusion 
The conclusion here is that although in theory the English courts have pronounced 
that the same standards of impartiality and independence apply to arbitrators as to 
judges, the fact that arbitrators are part of a certain business community may in fact 
lead to the application of lower standards in respect of impartiality and 
independence.666 Hence the English courts' rhetoric betrays the fact that lower 
standards are applied. The fact that the courts do not expressly recognise the 
differences between arbitrators and judges means that they never had a chance to 
address the issues arising from these differences. 
btl .. This is a gap in the US Federal Arbitration Act, see further A Redfern. M Hunter fn 270 249 
665 Eg s.24 (1) (a) Arbitration Act 1996 
66(1 This is similar to the findings in W Park fn 40 137 
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4. Fair Hearing 
The second principle of natural justice provides for a fair hearing. At a minimum, it 
requires prior notice of a claim given to a defendant and the giving of a fair 
opportunity to each party to present his or her case to the decision-maker and rebut 
that of the opponent. 667 These minimum requirements apply, in principle at least, to 
both litigation and arbitration668 . The purpose of the fair hearing principle is to 
ascertain what happened between the parties (fact-finding) and to evaluate these 
facts according to the applicable law. 669 As has been discussed in Chapter Two, the 
two main elements of fairness are equal treatment and rationality and this is 
reflected in the fair hearing principle.67o 
4.1 Prior notice 
Notice in good time671 before the proceedings gives the defendant knowledge in 
advance of the considerations, which, unless challenged, may lead to an adverse 
decision.672 Therefore an explicit disclosure of the' substance of the matters on 
which the decision-maker intends to proceed' is central to the maxim.673 Hence a 
party must be given adequate notice of any hearings in arbitration.674 In addition, a 
party should properly be informed of the appointment of the arbitral tribunal. 675 
In the recent case of Bernuth Lines Ltd l' High Seas Shipping Ltd the Commercial 
Court found that a notice of arbitration (and other arbitration documents) sent to the 
667 R (irvillc) l' The Royal Burgess Gaffing SOde(1' of Edinburgh [2004] LLR 334 (Court of Session) para 
.13: Calvin v Carr [1980] AC 574 (PC) 597; see also the US Supreme Court case Joint Anti-Fadst Refugee 
Committee l' McGrath 341 US 123 1950 171-172:'notice of the case and an opportunity to meet if 
668 S.33 (l) (a) English Arbitration Act 1996, see also for example Recommendation 98'257/EC 
669 W Park fn 40 45 also see the discussion in Chapter 2 
670 2_2 and 2-3.2 and 2-4 
671 R l' Thames Magistrates' COllrt cx p. Polemis [1974] 2 Lloyd's Rep 16, 19 
67~ G Flick fn 479 :'1, HJ Friendly fn 33 1280: Art.\' (l) (b) NYC 
m Lord Mustill in R l' SCCrCfalT of State (or the Home Department ex parte Doody [1994] 1 AC :'31 (HL) 
."60 
n J Tackaberl'\, A Marriott 'General Principles' in J Tackaberry. A Marriott fn 641 160-161 
o"~ • 
. A Redfern, M Hunter fn 270 491 
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email ill{o@,hernuth.com had been validly served on the respondents.676 The 
respondents had not in fact realised that arbitration proceedings were being held 
until they received a copy of the award in the post. The respondents used this email 
address for marketing and clerical purposes and stated that they received a large 
amount of spam emails for this email address and hence had overlooked the emails 
pertaining to the arbitration. The Commercial Court refused to set aside the award, 
since this email appeared on the respondents' website and since the respondents had 
entered this email in the Lloyd's Maritime Directory as their email address.677 This 
argument is dubious, as it seems entirely reasonable that the respondents did not 
expect to receive important legal documents in an email account, which by its very 
name seems to suggest that it was for inquiry purposes only. For litigation, CPR 6.2 
(1) (e) and Practice Direction CPR 6 make clear that electronic service is only valid 
where a party has agreed to such service in writing beforehand and has specified an 
email address for this purpose.678 In relation to arbitration the Commercial Court 
expressly stated that these provisions are not the applicable benchmark, as here the 
parties are businessmen and/or legally represented, so that any recognised means 
for effective business communication could be used for service.679 This case is 
interesting as it makes clear that a lower standard of notice applies to arbitration 
than to litigation. 
4.2 Opportunity to present one's case and rebut that of the other party-
fair hearing in a narrower sense 
4.2.1 Fair hearing -the principle 
The notion of a fair hearing under the common law has been shaped by the 
adversarial procedure. The basic principle of a fair hearing under the common law 
can be formulated summarily as follows: each party must be given a fair and equal 
676 [~0051 EWHC 30~O (Comm) Para 34 
677 P ~ 1 ara _ -t 
678 Para 3.1 
679 Para ~g: S.76 (1) Arbitration Act 1996 stipulates that the parties are free to agree the method of seryi ce 
and s.76 ()) that any effectiye means of service will do 
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opportunity to argue his or her case, both as to matters of fact and law and each 
party should also have a right to react to and rebut the submissions of the other 
party.680 
In theory, under an adversarial procedure, each party should be able to gather as 
much evidence as possible, have access to all the documents through disclosure and 
adduce pertinent evidence. Furthermore, in theory, each party has a right to call 
witnesses, including relevant experts and to cross-examine the witnesses of the 
opponent. 681 
Clearly in other jurisdictions, the inquisitorial approach with the tribunal taking a 
more active approach in calling evidence (and deciding which evidence is to be 
called) may epitomize the concept of a fair hearing.682 However in civil law systems 
the maxims of droit de fa defense and the principe du contradictoire are imposing 
similar requirements as the English maxim of fair hearing, ie the parties must have 
an opportunity to comment on and challenge each piece of evidence and each 
argument. 683 
For example in Paklito v Kfockner East Asia Ltd it was alleged by the claimant 
attempting to enforce a CIET AC award in Hong Kong that under an inquisitorial 
system there is no need to allow any cross-examination of an expert, since the 
expert is appointed by the tribunal. The Supreme Court of Hong-Kong disagreed 
and concluded, after hearing expert evidence on the questions of Chinese 
procedural law and the practice of CIET AC that even under an inquisitorial 
680 G Flick fn 479 69 
681 H.T Friendly fn 33 1282-1286 
682 Although it seems that there might be a general perception by the parties taking part in the dispute 
resolution that the adversarial procedure is fairer. as it allows the parties more control. This is the outcome 
of a 1978 study. which showed the same perception among common law (England. US) and civil law 
countries (Ge~any. France): E A Lind. BE Erickson. N Friedland. M Dickenberger 'Reactions to 
Procedural Models for Adjudicati\'e Conflict Resolution: A Cross-National Study' (1978) 22 (2) Journal of 
Conflict Resolution 318-3-l1. 335 
6S.1 . 
A Redfern, M Hunter fn 270491 
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procedure the parties have a right to comment on the reports of the tribunal 
appointed experts.684 
4.2.2 Amorphous nature of the requirements of fair hearing 
A multitude of different procedural rights can be squeezed under the notion of a fair 
hearing- basically every aspect of a party presenting or adducing evidence or law 
before a tribunal can be enshrined in the principle. 
However, it is important to emphasize that not every restriction of a party in the 
conduct of his or her case necessarily amounts to a breach of that person' s right to a 
fair hearing. The detailed requirements vary according to the nature of the tribunal 
and the courts' appraisal of what is appropriate in the circumstances.685 So there is 
clearly a correlation between the nature of the tribunal and the issues at stake on the 
one hand and the fair hearing requirements on the other hand. To give a blatant 
contrast, a small claims court or consumer arbitration tribunal will use different 
standards than a criminal court in a murder trial. 
In R v Commission for Racial Equality ex parte Cottrell & Rohon686 , Lord Lane CJ 
said that there are degrees of justice depending on the nature of the hearing and the 
seriousness of the penalties, which can be imposed.687 He compared the rules of 
natural justice to an . an unruly horse' and said that 'there is no doubt that what may 
be the rules of natural justice in one case may very well not be the rules of natural 
justice in another'. 688 In this case, the Court found that the defendant in an 
investigation by the Commission for Racial Equality had no right to cross-examine 
t)~~ XIX YBCA 664, 666 (1994) 
Ox) DJ Galligan fn 52 198; G Flick fn 479 47; SH Bailey et al fn 69 1315; R l' Commission/or Racial 
Eqllali~1' ex parte Cottrell & Rohan [1980] 3 AllER 265 (QB) 271-273: R l' Secretary a/State/or the Home 
Depart111C11t ex parte Doody [1994] 1 AC 531 (HL) 560; R (In'ine) l' The Royal Burgess Go(fing Socie~l' 0/ 
Edinburgh [2004] LLR 33.:1- (Court of Session) para 29 
68b R l' Commission (or Racial Equality ex parte Cottrell & Rohan [1980] 3 AllER 265 (QB) 271-273 
hS· ibid 271-273 " 
68R "b"d ')7') 1 1 __ 
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the witnesses on whom the Commission was relying for its findings. 689 Lord Lane 
CJ cited690 a passage in the judgment of Diplock LJ in R l' Deputy Industrial 
Injuries Comr, ex parte Moore who had said that 
'technical rules of evidence form no part of the rules of natural justice. The 
requirement that a person exercising quasi -judicial functions must base his decision 
on evidence means no more than that it must be based on material which tends 
logically to show the existence or non-existence of facts relevant to the issue to be 
determined ( .... ) It means that he must not spin a coin or consult an astrologer: but 
he may take into account any material which, as a matter of reason, has some 
probative value in the sense mentioned above. ,691 
Due process is a flexible principle whose precise meaning frequently can only be 
ascertained on a case-by-case basis.692 
For example the right to a fair hearing does not necessarily mean that it involves a 
right to make representations in person during an oral hearing and, hence, the 
parties may be limited to written submissions.693 Under the jurisprudence of the 
ECtHR, the right to a public hearing in Article 6 of the ECHR normally requires an 
oral hearing in proceedings of a court or tribunal of first and only instance.694 
However, in appeal proceedings there may be less need for an oral hearing, if the 
appellant has had an oral hearing at first instance and if the appeal only raises legal 
issues.695 The right to an oral hearing has also recently been considered by the Court 
689 See also HJ Friendly's comment fn 33 about administrative tribunals: 'in many such cases the main 
effect of cross-examination is delay 1285 
690 R l' Commissionfor Racial Equali(l' ex parte Cottrell & Rohon [1980] 3 AllER 265 (QB) 272 
691 [1965] 1 AllER 81 (CA) 94; This is the rationality element of fairness. discussed in Chapter '2 
69~ W Park fn 40 51 
693 R (bTinc) l' The Roval Burgess Go(fing Society of Edinburgh [2004] LLR 334 (Court of Session) para 
_~3; G Flick fn 479 14-15' HJ Friendl\' fn 33 1270 
6Q4 Ekbatani l' S11'cdcn (1991) 13 EHRR 504 (ECtHR) 511; Helmers ,'Swcdcn (1993) 15 EHRR 285 
(ECtHR) 293-294; Fischer l' Austria (1995) 20 EHRR 349 (ECtHR) 364: Regina (Hammond) \' Secretary 
o.fSrafe li)!- the Home Department [2005] 3 WLR 1229 (HL) 1237-1238 
695 ibid· 
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of Appeal in the case of BLCT Ltd l' J Sainsbury Plc6iJ6• In this case LJ Arden said 
that there is no general presumption under English law and Article 6 of the ECHR 
that there should always be an oral hearing before a court. He found that whether or 
not an oral hearing is required depends on the nature of the application and in 
particular whether factual issues or such issues as the credibility of witnesses are at 
stake.697 
Furthermore, in some proceedings it is indeed appropriate to curtail the quantity and 
quality of evidence, by imposing restrictions on expert evidence and cross-
examination to reduce the cost and delay of proceedings. 
Therefore, the full gamut·ofprocedural protections adopted in adversarial criminal 
and civil trials is not always required in quasi-judicial and more informal 
proceedings. In summary. for any court or tribunal. the procedure adopted depends 
on the importance of the issues at stake, the value of the claims and the complexity 
of the issues involved.698 
4.2.3 Fair hearing in arbitration 
Returning to the more specific question of fair hearing in arbitration. as has been 
pointed out above, the principle that each party must be given a reasonable 
opportunity of putting his or her case and dealing with that of her opponent is well 
established.699 For example, Article 34 (2) of the UNCITRAL Model Law an action 
for setting aside the award may be brought where 'the aggrieved party was not 
given proper notice of the appointment of the arbitral tribunal or the arbitral 
696 [2004] 2 P&CR 3 (CA) 
697 P "7 ara _, 
698 OJ Galligan fn 52 20-+_ R,' CommissionJiJr Racial Equality ('x parte Cottrell & Rohan [1980] 3 AllER 
265 (QB) 271-273: R l' Secretary of Statefor the Home Department ex parte Doody [1994] 1 AC 531 (HL) 
560: R (Irvine) l' The Royal Burgess Go(fing Socie(1' o.f Edinburgh [2004] LLR 334 (Court of Session) para 
29 
()99 S.33 Arbitration Act 1996; A Redfern, M Hunter fn 270490 
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proceedings or was otherwise unable to present its case or where the award is in 
conflict with the public policy of the state where the arbitration takes place' .700 
A good example of how the principle of fair hearing has been applied in 
international arbitration is the US case of Iran Aircraft Industries l' Avco. In that 
case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit refused to enforce 
an award by the Iran-US Claims Tribunal on the basis that the US company had 
been denied an opportunity to present its case. The Tribunal had agreed at a pre-
hearing conference that the US company would be allowed to present a summary of 
'kilos and kilos of invoices' produced by an independent audit. Later the Tribunal 
dismissed the US company's claim for the reason that the evidence was insufficient. 
The US courts refused to enforce the award on the basis that the claimant had been 
denied an opportunity to present its claim, as the Tribunal had unwittingly misled 
the claimant as to the evidence to be presented. 701 
However, it is also apparent that the courts are slower to interfere with awards 
rendered by private bodies. In Calvin v Carr Lord Wilberforce expressly stated that 
'While flagrant cases of injustice, including corruption or bias, must always be 
firmly dealt with by the courts, the tendency ( ... ) should be to leave these to be 
settled by the agreed methods without requiring the formalities of judicial processes 
to be introduced. ,702 
In arbitration it is possible for the parties to cut the cost and delay of adversarial 
processes in various ways and limit the admissibility to the most relevant 
materia1.703 The parties (or the institutional rules, by default) can. for example, 
restrict the length of the written party submissions by a word limit, limit or forego 
disclosure, restrict the evidence adduced, renounce an oral hearing or cross-
700 Set' also Art.\' (l) (b) NYC 
701 980 F2d 141 (2nd Cir 1992), XVIII YBCA 596. 601-602 (1993) 
702 [1980] AC 574 (PC) 593 
m M Kurkela fn 528 185 
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examination, proceeding exclusively by written submissions 704. or conversely. limit 
themselves to an oral procedure. They can limit the time allowed to prepare the 
case. Furthennore it is possible to restrict the number of witnesses and in particular 
. 705 d'd 11 . expert wItnesses ,or eCI e not to ca wItnesses at all. Frequently arbitrators 
appoint experts according to a secret, non-transparent procedure. Furthermore, they 
can adopt a more inquisitorial approach, where the witnesses are not examined by 
the parties, but where the tribunal takes greater control of the procedure, decides 
which witnesses to hear (and not to hear), and puts the questions to the witnesses, if 
any. 
Likewise in the US, the courts have stated that although the arbitration hearing must 
be fair and comply with the basic notions of due process, the parties should not 
expect the same procedures as they would find in a court.706 For example in 
Generica Ltd l' Pharmaceutical Basics case the US Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit found that where the arbitrator had been given a discretion in the 
terms of reference what evidence to admit, a refusal to allow a cross-examination 
on a point, which the tribunal considered to be irrelevant, was not an infringement 
of due process. 707 
The US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that an award was enforceable 
and that due process under Article V (I) (b) of the New York Convention had been 
complied with, even though one of the plaintiff s main witnesses had been unable to 
attend the arbitration hearing. The Court found that the 'inability to produce one's 
witness before an arbitral tribunal' was a risk 'inherent' in arbitration. By agreeing 
704 Under s.34 (1) and (2) (h) English Arbitration Act 1996, there is no right to an oral hearing. neither 
party can insist on an oral hearing. If the parties cannot agree, the tribunal has a discretion to decide 
whether an oral hearing should be held. Contrast this position with Art.24 (1) UNCITRAL Model Law on 
International Commercial Arbitration 'unless the parties have agreed that no hearings shall be held the 
arbitral tribunal shall hold such hearings at an appropriate stage of the proceedings. if so requested by a 
party'. US Federal Courts have also held that the failure to conduct an oral hearing, violates a party's due 
process rights: Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co Inc 1'Societe Gem!rale de l'Illdltstrie dll Papier 
(RAKT..J) 508 F2d 969 (2nd Cir 1974) 
705 Eg Egmatra AG l'Marco Trading C01poration [1999] 1 Lloyds Report 862, 866 th 
706 Gellerica Ltd l' Pharmaceutical Basics Inc XXIII YBCA 1076 (1998) 1078-9. 125 F3d 1123.1 DO (7 
Cir 1997) 
707 ibid 1129-11~0 
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to arbitration the party had relinquished its right to have a subpoena against a 
witness to secure attendance. It had not been unreasonable of the tribunal to refuse 
to reschedule the hearing since the witness could not attend, considering that 
parties, counsel and arbitrators are frequently 'scattered about the globe' in such 
arbitrations.708 It was sufficient for due process that the witness had supplied an 
affidavit with his evidence in chief.709 
Hence in arbitration restrictions of the traditional, adversarial notion of a fair 
hearing is common. Arbitrators should merely provide each party with a fair 
opportunity to present his or her case and answer that of the opponent. Unlike the 
procedural rules in court, the procedure followed in arbitration need not be 
proportionate to the risks involved, so that even a factually complex case can 
proceed without disclosure, without expert witnesses or even without a hearing. 
(a) Party autonomy, flexibility and fair hearing 
When contrasting the procedural requirements for a fair hearing in litigation and 
arbitration, one fundamental difference becomes immediately apparent: proceedings 
before an ordinary court are governed by rules on civil procedure with little or no 
influence by the parties. These rules must comply with certain minimum standards. 
By contrast, arbitration procedure, is largely determined by the parties710, the 
institution (unless it is an ad hoc arbitration) and/or the tribunal. This principle of 
party autonomy is fundamentally important in arbitration and allows the parties to 
decide, if they can agree, how to conduct the arbitration process. 
Since there are, in the case of ad hoc arbitration none, and in the case of 
institutional arbitration, only some, predetermined rules and processes, it is difficult 
to define a set of minimum standards for a fair hearing in arbitration. As all depends 
708 Parsolls & Whittemore 01'crseas CO 111C l' Sociere Ge,/(!rale de 1'lndustrie dll Papier (RAKTA) 508 F2d 
969,975 (2nd Cir 1974) 
70Q ibid 976 
"10 A Redfern. M Hunter fn 270 315 
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on the parties' agreement, and, in the absence of that agreement, on the tribunal's 
d· . 711 h . IscretlOn as to ow to proceed, the partIes have effectively waived many of the 
procedural protections. The principle of party autonomy means that, if both parties 
agree, they can renounce procedural protections, such as the ability to adduce expert 
evidence, even where the case is complex and such evidence would have normally 
been adduced in equivalent civil proceedings. 
Furthermore in international arbitration, the proceedings may be linked to more 
than one jurisdiction, which makes the definition of what amounts to a fair hearing 
in international arbitration even more nebulous, as the concept is subject to 
variations in different legal systems and subject to cultural expectations712 (eg in 
relation to such questions as to whether the parties contact the witnesses prior to the 
trial and the question of whether the parties can appear as witnesses to name but a 
few examples). Plenty of procedural questions arise, to which a clear answer is 
frequently lacking.713 In international arbitration, procedural practices that are 
entirely regular in one legal culture may be regarded as unethical or illegal in 
another. If such conflicts have to solved in a concrete arbitration case, it is more 
likely that the arbitrator's choice of procedure is regarded as illegitimate. Hence to 
safeguard procedural integrity a formulation of baseline procedural rules may be 
. d 714 reqUIre . 
(b) Equal treatment and rationality as the outer boundaries 
The only limitation on the principle of party autonomy is the principle of equal and 
rational treatment of the parties. 715 Hence as a bare minimum an arbitration 
"II S.34 Arbitration Act 1996 
71~ A Jaksic fn 491 230. 235; \V Park fn 40 51 
713 W Park fn 40 45 
714 \\. Park fn 40 60-61 
"I' 1 
. A Redfern. M Hunter fn 270317-_) 18 
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procedure must treat the parties equally and must use a rational method for fact-
finding and applying the law716. 
If the tribunal or the institution instigated a procedure which seriously limited one 
parti s opportunities to present his or her case, then the courts would be likely to set 
aside the award or refuse enforcement for infringement of the equal treatment 
principle. Therefore it is important for the tribunal to ensure that procedural rules do 
not unfairly discriminate against one party. Furthermore if a tribunal chose a 
procedure which was irrational, for example relying on pure chance (such as 
throwing a dice or drawing a straw) then it could also be said that the procedure is 
unfair. 
However, the parties themselves could in principle agree procedural rules, even if 
they were discriminatory or irrational, but only if they were not doing so 
inadvertently. In other words, the parties could waive their right to equal treatment 
or rationality, provided that this waiver is given voluntarily, without undue 
influence and provided each party is fully aware about the consequences.717 
Since arbitration tribunals have rarely, if ever applied irrational procedures, the 
more important question in practice is equal treatment. 
By way of example, the equal treatment principle means that any hearing dates 
should be fixed at a date and place which is roughly equally convenient for either 
party.718 Likewise deadlines or word-limits719 which are too tight for one party only, 
or the use oftechnology720, which is inaccessible for one party, may be a breach of 
the principle of equal and fair treatment. 721 
716 Most writings on this issue emphasize the equal treatment aspect, probably for the reason that rationality 
is taken for granted. 
-I,S t..")C 7") ee \'-_ .. J, -_ 
m J Tackaberry, A Marriott fn 674 161 
"19 ibid 
"~(l J Homle 'Online Dispute Resolution' fn 641 794 
721 A Jaksic fn 491 244 
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Equal treatment here refers to an equal opportunity to present a party's case. It does 
not necessarily mean that each party should be treated exactly the same722. for 
example being able to call exactly the same number of witnesses. The ability to call 
witnesses should depend on the relevance of the evidence to that party's case. 
However the principle of equal treatment would be infringed, if eg only one party 
was allowed to call witnesses, or if one p~rty was allowed to cross-examine the 
other party's witnesses, but not the other or, if only one party was able to benefit 
from disclosure of the other party's documents. 
This is exemplified by the ECtHR case of Dombo Beheer723 (although this case 
concerned judicial proceedings before the Dutch courts). A Dutch company brought 
civil proceedings for breach of an oral contract for an extension of a loan, 
concluded by the manager of the company and the branch manager of a banle 
Because of a rule in Dutch civil procedure, which disallows the parties from 
appearing as witness on their own behalf, the manager of the company was not 
allowed to testify as to the content of the contract, whereas the branch manager 
could as witness for the bank. The ECtHR found that there had been a breach of the 
right to a fair hearing, since the equality of arms principle had been infringed. The 
Court held that each party had to be given a reasonable opportunity to present its 
case, including evidence under conditions that do not put it at a significant 
disadvantage vis-a-vis its opponent.724 While the right to a fair hearing has never 
been defined by the Strasbourg organs and the contents of the right are open to be 
determined according to the circumstances of each individual case, this formulation 
of the equality of arms principle is the closest the Court (and formerly the 
Commission) has ever come to describing the right to a fair hearing in abstracto.725 
The principle of equal treatment also means that both parties must have equal 
access to all documents and other evidence. Consequently some opportunity should 
722 G Petrochilns fn 501 145 
m Dombo Beheer Br,· ,\/crherlands (1994) 18 EHRR 213 (ECtHR) 
'24 ibid ~~q-230 
725 AT k' t' 491 '''7 . a SIC n __ 
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be given to each party to acquaint itself with and comment on the observations as to 
law and fact made by any other party.726 
This also means that the arbitrator should not engage in ex parte communications. 
The arbitrator should never discuss the case with only one of the parties or a witness 
in the absence of the other party. This rule against ex parte communications also 
means that any written communications should always be copied to the other party, 
even where they concern trivial administrative matters.727 
Because of the principle of fair and equal opportunity to argue one' s case, the 
adjudicator's decision should only be based on the evidence presented.728 
Arbitrators are frequently chosen for their expertise in a particular field and hence 
this requirement raises the issue of to what extent the arbitrator is entitled to rely on 
his or her own specific knowledge and experience. For example the arbitrator may 
have great experience as to the cost of repairs and may not believe the expert 
evidence presented to him or her on this particular issue. In a similar vein the 
arbitrator may wish to rely on evidence gathered through the arbitrator's own 
inspection or tests. Although the prevailing opinion seems to be that arbitrators 
should be able to rely on their own knowledge and expertise. they should disclose 
the specific matters to the parties, in good time before an award is made so as to 
enable the parties to challenge the specific matters relied on.729 
7'26 Brandstetter l' Austria (1993) 15 EHRR 378 (ECtHR) 413 (in the context of criminal proceedings): 
Briemont l' Belgium (1990) 12 EHRR 217 (ECtHR) 240-241 . 
72; Eg Norhrook Lahoratories l' A Tank and Moulson 2006 WL 1333300 (Comm)- ~rbIt~ator was ~en:oved 
because of bias after contacting witnesses direct; see also Canon III B American Arblt.ratlOn ASSOCIatIon 
Code olEthies for Arhitrators in Commercial Disputes fn 645: J Tackaberry. A Mamott fn 674 160 
7'8' . 
- G Petrochilos fn 501 146 
m Fux l' 1J'c!(lair [1981] 2 Lloyd's Report 214 (CA) 522 and 528-530: Checkpoint _Lt~ 1~ Str!!thc(rde .., 
Pension Fund (2003) 14 EG 124 (CA) para 41: Zermalt l' ,Yll-L~lc [ipholstery (198)) _7-:. EG 1134.1 L,8: J 
Tackaberry. A Marriott fn 674 162-167 
197 
Chapter 6: Arbitration and Due Process 
730 
4.2.4 Conclusion 
The principle of fair hearing in adjudication at its core requires that each party is 
allowed to present his or her case as to evidence and law and to react to the case of 
the other on an equal footing. However, there is no 'checklist' of fair hearing 
requirements each procedure has to comply with, but rather the detailed 
requirements depend on the nature of the dispute and the issues at stake. While the 
civil (or even more so, the criminal) procedure rules describe the procedural 
protections before the courts, in arbitration, the procedure is chosen by the parties 
(by reference to institutional rules or by agreement). Hence it is difficult to define a 
minimum of procedural protections to which each party is entitled to, save for the 
principle that the arbitrator (and the arbitration institution) must treat the parties 
equally and rationally. This means that parties may be less well protected in 
exchange for a (possibly) speedier and more cost effective procedure. This is not an 
issue if the parties are aware of the consequences of renouncing procedural 
protections and if they have made a well-informed and voluntary waiver of their 
rights. If arbitration is mandatory or if the parties are subject to a power imbalance 
this may be more problematic. 
5. Duty to Give Reasons 
The duty to give reasons is an important procedural protection in addition to the fair 
hearing considerations outlined in the preceding section. 
Due process requires that the decision-maker does not discriminate against either 
party (equal treatment) and does not take into account irrelevant considerations 
(rationality). It is argued here that the giving of reasons aids both these aims.73o 
L Fuller fn 38 388 
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By giving reasons the decision-maker explains the basis for the decision and 
justifies it according to authoritative standards.731 This leads to better and rational 
decisions, as the decision-maker will have to explain and defend the decision both 
in relation to the facts found and the decision he or she comes to 732 which will , 
result in the parties being treated according to authoritative standards and hence, 
equally and rationally. 
The rationalisation of a decision helps to prevent arbitrariness and discrimination in 
decision-making. Frequently the instinctive decision of what is right and what is 
wrong, does not accord with the decision reached by proper reasoning according to 
legal standards. In addition, the reasons form a basis for the review of a decision 
enabling others to critically understand and appraise the decision, which is of 
crucial importance if a party wishes to appeal a decision.733 Galligan notes as a third 
argument for the significance of the giving of reasons that this is a way of providing 
satisfaction to the parties, as it makes them feel that they have been treated 
according to authoritative standards and not arbitrarily.734 
Clearly the detail and nature of reasons depends on the issues to be decided. If they 
consist merely of statements of facts, they can be brief. As Redfern & Hunter point 
out where an arbitrator or other adjudicator merely has to decide whether goods 
d 1 h b . , . ,735 correspon to a samp e or not t e answer can e a yes or no . 
"\ I ' 
, DJ Galligan fn 52430 
73~ AS Rau fn 126 530-531; see also Henn' LJ in Flannery" Halifax Estate Agencies Ltd [2000] 1 WLR 
~77 (CA) p 381: 'a requirement to give ;easons concentra~es the mind: i~i~ is ful~lIed, the resulting 
decision is much more likely to be soundly based on the eVIdence than If It IS not. 
":n DJ Galligan fn 52 432 , ,'_ 
",,4 DJ Galligan fn 51 433. M Rutherford 'Documents-Only Arbitrations in Consumer DIsputes In tn 641 
646 
735 Albeit that the 'no' probably requires a brief explanation of in what way the goods differ from the 
sample. A Redfern. M Hunter fn 270453 
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It seems that under the common law there was traditionally no absolute or general 
d . 736 uty to gIve reasons. However the trend of the law seems to recognise a duty to 
give reasons for both administrative and judicial bodies where this is required as a 
matter of fairness and openness.737 In particular, fairness requires the giving of 
reasons where the decision has important implications for the individual· s rights 
and obligations and the decision-maker is acting in a judicial function. 738 
Furthennore, under the ECHR739, which now is incorporated into UK law under the 
Human Rights Act 1998, the giving of reasons is required as implicit in the fair 
hearing principle.74o 
In the English case of Flannery l' Halifax Estate Agencies Ltd741 the Court of 
Appeal stated clearly that the modern judge has a professional obligation to give 
reasons for a decision. 742 In Flannery the Court of Appeal ordered a retriaL as the 
first instance judge had preferred the defendants' expert evidence without giving an 
explanation as to why. In the later Court of Appeal case of English v Emery 
Reimbold743 Lord Phillips MR approved of Flannery and referred to the cases of the 
European Court of Human Rights but also discussed the problem of applying the 
principle in practice due to its elusive nature. In practice, it is difficult to ascertain 
how detailed the reasons should be. He stated as a minimum principle that it should 
be possible to deduce from a judgment the reasons for the decision.744 He said that 
736 DJ Galligan fn 52 435; G Flick fn 479 127; Doody 1" Secretary o/State/or the Home Department [1994] 
1 AC 531,564; R (Irvine) l' The Royal Burgess Golfing Society 0/ Edinburgh [2004] LLR 334 (Court of 
Session) para 46; 
m Flannery l' Halifax Estate Agencies Ltd [2000] 1 WLR 377 (CA) 381; Peter Andrew English 1" Emery 
Reimbold & Strick Limited [2002] 1 WLR 2409 (CA) para 15-16; Doody [1994] 1 AC 53L 564-656: Stefan 
]' General Medical Council [2000] 1 WLR 1293, 1300; Brabazon-Drenning [2001] HRLR 6 para 24-29: 
see also DJ Galligan fn 52 435 
73R ibid 
m Von de HlIrk]' Hetllerlands [1994] 18 EHRR 481 para 61: Hiro Balalli]' Spain [1995] 90 EHRR 566 
para 27; Helle "Finland [1998] 26 EHRR 159 para 59-60: Garcia Rui:: 1'Spain [2001] 31 EHRR 589 para 
2J; Hirl'isaari "Finland [2004] 38 EHHR 7 para 30 
740 North Range Shipping Ltd l' SCafrollS Shipping COlporation [2002] 1 WLR 2397 (CA): Flannery" 
HalU11\ Estate Agcncics Ltd [2000] 1 WLR 377 (CA): Peter Andre)I' English "Emery Reimhold & Strick 
Limited [2002] 1 \\'LR 2409 (CA) 
-~I [2000] 1 WLR 377 (CA) 
74~ ibid 381 
"4,\ Perc,. Antin'll' English "Emery Reimhold & Strick Limited [2002] 1 WLR 2409 (CA) 
"44 'b'd I I para 2 
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'justice will not be done if it is not apparent to the parties why one has won and the 
other has lost'. 745 
In Hirvisaari l' Finland746 the claimant appealed a ruling by a Finnish pension board 
who had decided in a brief ruling that the claimant was able to work part-time and 
hence reduced his pension and this ruling was simply confirmed on appeal by the 
Finnish Insurance Court. The European Court of Human Rights reiterated that 
Article 6 (1) of the ECHR required that all courts and tribunals should adequately 
state the reasons on which their judgments are based. The extent of this duty may 
vary according to the nature of the decision and all the circumstances of the case.747 
However courts or tribunals are not obliged to give a detailed answer to every 
argument raised before them. The reasons must be in sufficient detail to allow the 
parties to make effective use of any available right of appeal, but can otherwise be 
brief. 748 It is in principle, admissible for an appeal court simply to affirm the 
reasoning in the court below. 749 However in this case there was an inconsistency in 
the reasoning of the first instance body, the pension board, as the claimant had 
previously received a full pension and it was ultimately unclear why the pension 
board reassessed the degree of his disability. Hence it was not sufficient for the 
appeal court to merely reaffirm that ruling without any further explanation.750 
By contrast in Van de Hurk l' Netherlands the European Court of Human Rights 
held that the court must merely demonstrate that it has addressed the contentions 
advanced by the parties 751 and in Helle v Finland it found that the court is under a 
duty to address the essential issues which were submitted to it.752 Lord Phillips MR 
in English l' Emery Reimbold interprets the standard established by the European 
7-15 ibid para 16 
7-1b Hirl'isaari l' Finland [2004] 38 EHHR 7: see also Rlli:: Tarija l'Spain [1994] 19 EHHR 553, para 29 and 
Garcia Rui= 1'Spain [2001] 31 EHHR 22 para 26 
7.1- ibid para 30 
-.j~ ibid 
-.j<l ibid 
"50 ibid para 31 
-51 [llll) .. q 18 EHRR .+81 para:,9 
',"' 
... [1997] 20 EHRR 1:'9 para 60 
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Court of Human Rights as meaning that the reasons must demonstrate that the 
essential issues raised by the parties have been taken into consideration by the court 
and how these issues have been resolved. 
The implementation of the ECHR in the Human Rights Act 1998 has had the effect 
in England that for certain types of decisions where under the common law no 
reasons needed be given, now the court is under a duty to give at least minimum 
reasons. One example for this is a court's refusal to give leave to appeal against an 
arbitration award under section 69 of the Arbitration Act 1996. The Court of Appeal 
has recently held that in order to comply with Article 6 of the ECHR, the Court has 
to give at least minimal reasons. 753 
Opinions vary as to whether the giving of reasons should be mandatory in the 
substantial arbitration award. 754 One view is that reasons should be given as a due 
process requirement: a person making a binding decision defining the rights and 
obligations of others should state the reasons for his or her ruling. 755 Another view 
is that the giving of reasons makes the award vulnerable to being appealed, which 
conflicts with the principle of finality of arbitration awards. 
Some laws 756 and arbitration rules 757 require that awards should always be 
accompanied by reasons. Other laws, including the English Arbitration Act 1996 
and the UNCITRAL Model Law758 and many arbitration rules759 mandate reasons, 
unless the parties have agreed to have an award without reasons or the award is an 
agreed award. The English Arbitration Act 1996 provides that if the parties have 
753 North Range Shipping Ltd l' Seatrans Shipping C01poration [2002] 1 WLR 2397 (CA) para 27 
754 JDM Lew et al fn 270 647 
755 J Tackaberry, A Marriott fn 674 11-391, 345 
756 Belgian Judicial Code Art.1701 (5), Art.1704 (1) (i) states that an award may be set aside if the reasons 
are not stated; French Nouveau Code de Procedure Civile Art.1471 
757 ICC Rules Art.25 (2): ICAC Rules Para 41 (1); ICSID Rule 47 (l) (i) 
758 UNCITRAL Model Law Art.31 (2), English Arbitration Act 1996 s.52 (4). Arbitration Law of the 
People's Republic of China 1994 Art.54, German Arbitration Act 1998 in the Ci\'il Procedure Code s.l 054 
(2) 
'5') UNCITRAL Rules Art.32 (3); CIETAC Rules Art.55; AAA ICDR Art.27 (2): LCIA Rules Art.26 (l); 
WIPO Art.62 (c) which also dispense with the reasons if the applicable law states that no reasons need be 
gl\cn. 
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agreed to an award without reasons, they are deemed to have excluded the right to 
appeal to the court on a point of law. 760 The parties sometimes agree to have a 
'bare' award accompanied by a statement of reasons for the award, which is 
confidential, ie cannot be used in an appeal before a court. This practice has been 
customary in some kinds of arbitration, such as London maritime arbitrations. 761 
However, in exceptional circumstances, even where the parties have agreed to 
maintain the reasons confidential, they may be disclosed to the court if public 
interest considerations override the parties' intentions. In such cases the 
'confidential award' may be used before the court to correct a logical or clerical 
error (such as a miscalculation), or to set aside the award for serious irregularity762 
or bar enforcement for other public policy reasons. However it may not be used to 
appeal the award on a point of law. 763 
Finally, some arbitration laws are silent on the point, implying that there is no duty 
to give reasons. 764 The US domestic practice is that no reasons need be given and 
the US Supreme Court has expressly held that arbitrators have no obligation to 
'd fi h' d 765 prOVl e reasons or t elf awar . 
Hence it seems that many arbitration laws and rules requires the giving of reasons, 
at least unless the parties have agreed otherwise. This is important to ensure the 
rationality and quality of the award. As has been argued above the giving of reasons 
is important for fairness and this is reflected by those arbitration laws and rules 
which require the giving of reasons. 
760 S.69 (1) 
761 The Montan [1985] Lloyd's Report 189 (CA); LMAA Rule 22 (b). (c), (d) 
76~ S.68 Arbitration Act 1996 
76.1 J Tackaherry. A Marriott fn 67.+ 11-391. 348: The Montan [1985] Lloyd's Report 189 (CA) 192-193: 
The Easr Rider [2004] 2 Lloyd's Report 626 (Comm) 25-28 
7b4 For example the US Federal Arbitration Act 
"05 [,',1ited Stcc!lmrkcrs of America l' Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp 363 US 593. 598 (1960): for the 
federal jurisdiction sec aiso Michael M Pfeif7e l' Chemoil C01poration n Fed Appx 720. 722 (2003) 
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6. Transparency versus Confidentiality 
In this section it is argued that the traditional notion that arbitration proceedings are 
confidential to the parties is problematic from the due process perspective. This 
traditional notion of arbitration means that the award, any documents and even the 
fact that arbitration has taken place is classified as confidential. 
There is anecdotal evidence that parties frequently choose (private) arbitration over 
(public) litigation for the very reason of confidentiality. 766 In other words, 
arbitration would lose some of its attractiveness as a dispute resolution process, if 
the principle of confidentiality was undermined. For this reason, arbitration 
practitioners frequently argue that, as a matter of sound commercial practice, the 
principle of confidentiality should not be compromised. However, what is good for 
the business of arbitration practitioners should not necessarily be determining 
policy. 
The extent of confidentiality and the permissibility of disclosure in certain 
circumstances are highly controversial topics, but there is a developing body of law 
on the question of when awards can be disclosed. For the Model proposed in this 
thesis more transparency in arbitration is desirable. While first movements in this 
direction have been made by the courts in several jurisdictions, this is an issue 
which needs much further refinement, particularly in evaluating the public interests 
at stake. This is all the more relevant where the parties are subject to a power 
imbalance. Interestingly, by way of example, one tentative step in this direction has 
been made by the Californian Code of Civil Procedure. It requires the publication of 
statistics about consumer awards, including the name of the business party, type of 
dispute, the amount of the claim and the amount of the award made.767 
766 JOM Lt'\\ et al fn 270660; A Redfern, M Hunter fn 270 32 
Y Californian Code of Civi I Procedure, s.1281.96 
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To this end, it should first be explained why transparency is desirable. Then the law 
on confidentiality is reviewed to show that at present the balance between 
confidentiality and transparency is inadequate. 
6.1 The case for transparency 
The case for transparency in adjudication generally can easily be made out, to quote 
Bentham, 'publicity is the very soul of justice' 768. Needless to say, in relation to the 
courts, the principle of transparency has been well-established. It is usually based 
on the case of Scott v Scott, where Viscount Haldane said that 'courts must, as 
between parties, administer justice in public' .769 The principle is also reflected in 
CPR 39.2 (1) and the ECHR Article 6770. The Law Commission of New Zealand 
has also made a clarion call for transparency in arbitration, for example. It has 
expressly acknowledged that 'public policy concerns about transparency (achieved 
through disclosure of information) with regard to business enterprises operated in 
both the public and private sector must be recognised' .771 
It is possible to distinguish three due process 772 arguments why it can be in the 
public interest to disclose arbitration awards. The first argument is informational 
equality of the parties. The second argument presented here is that of scrutiny and 
quality assurance, which improves rationality, and hence due process. The third 
argument is that the law can only develop rationally and consistently if decisions 
published. 
76R Works of Jeremy Bentham. quoted by Lord Shalt' in Scott l' Scott [1913] AC 417 (HL) 477 
"(,<) [19U] AC 417 (HL) 423, 442 
::0 Eg Werner l' Austria (1998) 26 EHRR 310 349 
I Law Commission of New Zealand Rep01183 Improving the Arbitration Act 1996 February 2003 
~l_\ailable from Illli):_\\:_~\~\\.lawcom.go\'t.nz [14. September 2007] 
- Due process consists of equality and rationality see 2-2 
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6.1.1 Informational equality 
The first and foremost reason why transparency is of utmost importance in 
adjudication generally is informational equality between the parties. Transparency 
directly counterbalances the inequalities of knowledge between the 'repeat player' 
and the 'single shot player,773 in adjudication.774 
Clearly businesses and institutions using a procedure regularly have an advantage 
over a person using it only once to solve a dispute. Repeat players will have gained 
superior information about the rulings which have been made on points of law and 
evidence, about individual adjudicators' propensities and about the procedural 
tactics to be employed.775 This differential in information would be compensated if 
the decisions ( awards) and the names of adjudicators were published. 
Two US Circuit Courts, in, Cole v Burns Internationaz776 and more recently, in Ting 
v AT&T777 , have explicitly acknowledged that confidentiality provisions for 
arbitration in adhesion contracts 778 favour companies over individuals, if companies 
continually arbitrate the same claims.779 However in Cole, in the context of 
employment arbitration, the Court denied that there was any harm to the employees 
from this repeat player effect in favour of the employer for the reason that the 
employees were legally represented and awards were looked at by the appointing 
institution.78o By contrast, in Ting concerning a state court, consumer class action 
against the telecommunications carrier, the Court held that a gagging order would 
reinforce the disadvantage suffered by the consumer plaintiffs, as they were 
claiming against a very large and powerful institution: 
m Terminology- M Galanter fn 123 97; AS Rau fn 126525-526; L Bingham fn 62 228; discussed further 
in 3-5.2 
774 J Sternlight fn 655 686; R Reuben fn 128 1085 
775 LJ Gibbons fn 641 772. 784. 789; M Galanter fn 123 98-99- for an explicit recognition before the US 
~ourt of Appeals for the 9th Circuit Ting l' AT&T 319 F3d 1126. 1151-1152 (9th Cir Cal 2003) 
76 105 F3d 1465 (DC Circuit 1997) 
m 319 F3d 1126 (9th Circuit 2003) 
"8 ic contracts using non-negotiated standard form terms. such as employment and consumer contracts 
;1Q Colc 105 F3d 1465 (DC Circuit 1997) 1.+76; Ting 319 F3d 1126 (9 th Circuit 2003) 1151 
'~(l Cole 105 F3d 1.+65 (DC Circuit 1997) 1.+86 
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, AT&T has placed itself in a far superior legal posture by ensuring that none of its 
potential opponents have access to precedent, while, at the same time. AT&T 
accumulates a wealth of knowledge on how to negotiate the terms of its own 
unilaterally crafted contract' .781 
It was stated that the confidentiality provisions would hinder potential future 
claimants from arguing their case against the telecoms giant. For this reason, the 
Court refused to reverse the District Court's decision that the confidentiality clause 
was unconscionable. 782 
Hence, in summary, the first argument concerns mainly those cases where there is a 
power imbalance between the parties (eg consumer cases 783) and hence the problem 
of repeat player advantage arises. In cases where one party uses arbitration 
repeatedly whereas the other party only uses arbitration once, there should be a 
mechanism for publishing award as otherwise the 'one-shot' player will suffer 
considerable disadvantage. 
6.1.2 Scrutiny as quality assurance 
The second reason for transparency in decision-making generally is that it is 
important as a form of quality assurance of the decision to ensure decisions are 
rational. 784 This is important for due process. It serves to ensure that the decision-
maker makes rational findings of fact, properly applies legal standards and does not 
venture beyond his or her power of authority, since the adjudicator's decision is put 
to public scrutiny.785 
:8: ring 319 F3d 1126 (9th Circuit 2003) 1152 
x_ ibid 
m MS Abdel Wahab "Does Technology Emasculate Trust? Confidentiality and Security Concerns in 
Online Arbitration' [September 2004] Special Supplement: Using Technology to Resolve Business 
Disputes ICC International Court olArbitration Bul1etin 43-51. 48 
"S.j \\' Park fn 40 42 . 
785 S 6-
,cc -) 
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Transparency is an essential safeguard against bias and incompetence - to quote 
Bentham again ' [publicity] is the keenest spur to exertion, and the surest of all 
guards against improbity. It keeps the judge himself. while trying. under trial. .786 In 
addition, transparency has an indirect effect in combating power imbalances by 
exposing potential structural or systemic bias and allowing criticism of possible 
deficiencies in a process. 
This symptom of the repeat player syndrome can only be exposed if awards are 
published787 . The publication of rulings under the UDRP has led to some criticism 
of the UDRP on the basis that the institutions offering dispute resolution under the 
UDRP have to appear friendly to the trade mark holders' interests, as the claimant 
trade mark holder chooses the institution. These criticisms have been bolstered by 
statistics relating to the outcomes of decisions, which would not have been possible 
without the publication of those decisions 788. This will be further discussed in the 
next Chapter. 
6.1.3 Development of the law 
The third argument for transparency in adjudication is the importance of developing 
the law through the persuasive force Or authority ofprecedent.789 This is an 
important aspect of due process and the rule of law. Under both the common law 
and the civil law (albeit to a greater extent under the former) important legal 
standards are established through the interpretation and re-interpretation of existing 
law.79o 
786 See fn 768 
7R" LJ Gibbons fn 641 783.787; L Bingham fn 62 246. 258. The link between appointment and biased 
awards is clearly more tenuous in the case of institutions appointing arbitrators than in the case of claimants 
directly appointing the arbitrators. 
78R See cg M Geist 'FaiLcom?' (2002) 27 Brook(1'J1 Journal of International Lmj' 903-937, M Mueller 
'Rough Justice: A Statistical Assessment oflCANN Unifoml Dispute Resolution Policy' (2001) 17 (3) The 
Information Socien' 151-163. 
'Sl) MS Abdel Wahab fn 783 -+8: J Stemlight fn 655 686: W Park fn 40 11 fn 51 
790 In relation to consumer cases. see R Bamford 'Shopping around: dealing with cross-border complaints' 
[2004] 1-+ Consumer Policr Revic1t' 108-112. 110 
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The development of the law argument has been raised by Colman J to explain that 
arbitration is not completely confidential: 
'If one obliterated from the law reports all those cases where a substantial part of an 
arbitration award had been published for all to read one would be deprived of a 
massive part of the development of English commerciallaw.,791 
However, to the extent that arbitration is not the mainstream form of dispute 
resolution, it is hard to see how an individual unpublished award would matter. 
Clearly it would be nonsensical to argue that it deprives the law of a precedent. The 
function of some awards is merely to solve the dispute in question. Hence in 
relation to commercial arbitration the argument of law development may have 
limited application. This argument is limited to those cases where an appeal lies on 
a point of law and to sectors where arbitration (as opposed to litigation) is the 
dominant form of dispute resolution. 
Hence, in sectors where points of law are dealt with by arbitration and where 
arbitration constitutes the main form of dispute resolution, publication of awards 
should be considered. 
A related point is that not all contractual relationships are private in the sense that 
they only materially affect the parties to the contract. Standard form contracts and 
their interpretation might affect third parties on a large scale. Big players in a given 
market (whether a large business in their relationships towards consumers, or a 
large multinational corporation in their business dealings) might impose de facto 
legal standards by the terms and conditions they trade on, so that the interpretation 
of these standard terms is a matter of interest to the wider public. While the 
interpretation of the tenD in an arbitration award has no precedent value, it may 
have some persuasive force, if future cases would come before the same arbitrator 
or if there has been selective publication. Hence, the second category of cases 
'<)1 Hassneh insurance Co of Israel\' Me1l' [1993] 2 Lloyd's Report 243 (Comm) 2..+7 
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where awards should be systematically published are those where the ruling affects 
other, third parties 792, such as the interpretation of a standard contract term used in a 
series of transactions by a large corporation. 
Having presented three arguments in favour of increased transparency in arbitration, 
the following section sets out the law on confidentiality in arbitration. 
6.2 Presumption of confidentiality in arbitration 
There has been a general assumption in the arbitration community that 
confidentiality should be an inherent, fundamental principle in arbitration as a 
private dispute resolution process.793 In the English case of BLCT Ltd v J Sainsbw), 
Pic the Court of Appeal held that in arbitration the parties have waived their right to 
a public hearing by opting for arbitration as a method of dispute resolution.794 
Unfortunately, this has also been the unquestioned position of the Strasbourg 
institutions in interpreting the ECHR.795 The EComHR has endorsed the notion that 
arbitration proceedings a priori are not public: 'In some respects- in particular as 
regards publicity- it is clear that arbitral proceedings are often not even intended to 
be in conformity with Article 6.,796 
6.3 What should be kept confidential? 
Confidentiality in arbitration proceedings means that no documents, evidence nor 
the contents of the award should be disclosed to the outside world and that all 
hearings and meetings are conducted in private.797 In addition, confidentiality may 
792 A Tweedale 'Confidentiality in Arbitration and the Public Interest Exception' (2005) 21 (1) Arbitration 
International 59-70, 69 
793 J Tackaberry, A Marriott fn 674 11-391,306: G Petrochilos fn 501 150 
794 r~()04] 2 P&CR 3 (CA) Para. 36 
795 JVordstr(jm-.l(/I/~cl/ and Nordstrom-Lehtinen l' the I\Tctherlands EComHR Admissibility Decision of 27. 
November 1996 No 28101195 available from the HUDOC database 
796 ibid 
79" J Tackaben·y. A Marriott fn 674 11-391. 310 
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encompass the mere fact that there are or have been arbitration proceedings 
between the parties. 
6.4 Who is under a duty of confidentiality? 
Another question is who is under a duty of confidentiality, since the obligation of 
the arbitrators, the administering institution (if any), the parties and any third parties 
who might have an interest in disclosure should all be assessed differently. First of 
all the arbitrators and any employees of the arbitral institution may well be bound 
by a duty of confidentiality either through professional rules 798 or the rules of the 
arbi tral institution 799. 
Tackaberry and Marriott point out that the obligation of confidentiality inherent in 
arbitration does not only apply to all parties, but to all persons involved in the 
arbitration, including witnesses. 8oo This would mean that if a witness was shown 
statements by other witnesses or any other documents prepared in the context of the 
arbitration he or she would be under a duty of confidentiality in respect of those 
documents.801 
What about the parties themselves or any third persons who claim to be affected by 
the award? 
798 See ('~ Canon VI ICDR Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes of 1. March 2004: 
American Arbitration Association Standards of Ethics and Business Conduct available from 
<http:i\\'\\,w.adr.org/EthicsAndStandards > [14. September 2007] or Part:2 Rule:2 (correspondence) and 
Rule -+ (relationship of confidentiality) of the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators Code of Professional and 
Ethical Conduct of September 2004 available from the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators and on file with 
the author: see also the declaration arbitrators have to sign under the ICSID Rules, Rule 6 (2) a\'ailable 
from http: W\\'w.\\orldbank.or!! icsicl basicdociQartF-chapOl.htm#r06 [14. September 2007] 
799 See cg 2003 ICDR Rules of Procedure Art.3·t LCIA Rules Art.30, ICC Rules Art.6, UNCITRAL Rules 
Art.32. DIS Arbitration Rules 1998 SA3 on Confidentiality, WIPO Arbitration Rules Art.76 
800 Cf Mason CJ in Esso Allstralio who remarked obiter that witnesses were not subject to a general 
obligation of confidence, see fn 854 para 31 
801 J Tackaberry. A Marriott fn 674 11-391. 311 
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6.5 Contract and institutional rules 
Confidentiality obligations between the parties to the arbitration can arise from 
contract law, ie where the arbitration agreement or the institutional rules (the latter 
are a form of implied agreement between the parties) contain an express 
confidentiality clause. Confidentiality clauses in arbitration agreements are difficult 
to draft, as the parties might not want absolute confidentiality, so that the agreement 
has to provide for appropriate contingencies and exceptions.802 First of all an 
arbitration award may need to be enforced by a court, which of course is a forum 
with public access. 803 Furthermore, a party may be under an obligation to make 
disclosures regarding the arbitration, eg where it is a listed company, or where a 
party is selling its business and disclosure is required for the purposes of due 
diligence, or where one party has to make disclosures to an insurance or parent 
company. Another difficulty in drafting a confidentiality clause may be the question 
of its validity under the applicable law. Because of these difficulties with 
confidentiality clauses in arbitration agreements (and the associated costs with 
specialist legal advice), there has been a call for uniform, general rules for 
confidentiality. Such uniform rules (including exceptions) could be formulated by 
the institutional rules. However, institutional rules face the same formidable task of 
having to define the scope of the duty of confidentiality. 
The 2003 ICDR Rules provide a presumption that hearings are private, unless the 
parties agree, or the law requires, to hold them in public.804 The Rules furthermore 
establish that any matters relating to the arbitration or the award should not be 
disclosed by the arbitrator or the administrator unless otherwise agreed by the 
parties or required by law. 80S The Rules also provide that an award may only be 
made public with the consent of all the parties or as required by law. 806 However, 
interestingly the Rules also say that parts of an award may be made available. if 
80' 
- A Tweedale fn 797.. 59 
803 City of Mosco1\' l' Bankers Tmst discussed below fn 843 
804 Art.20 (4) 
80S ArU4 
806 Art.27 (4) 
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edited to conceal the identity of the parties, unless all parties agree not to disclose 
any part of the award.807 
The 1998 LCIA Rules provide that all the meetings and hearings should be 
conducted in private unless the parties agree otherwise.808 The parties are under a 
duty to keep the award, any documents used in the proceedings and any material 
prepared for the arbitration confidential, unless disclosure is necessary to comply 
with a legal duty, to pursue a legal right or to enforce or challenge an award before 
a court.809 
Under the 1998 ICC Rules, the arbitral tribunal has the power to take measures to 
protect trade secrets and confidential information.810 Furthermore Article 21 (3) 
provides that hearings cannot be attended by third parties unless the tribunal and the 
parties consent to this. The rules do not expressly oblige the parties to keep the 
award or any associated material confidential, but in practice the arbitrators 
recommend that a confidentiality clause is included in the terms of reference agreed 
by the parties. 811 
The 1976 UNCITRAL arbitration rules likewise stipulate that hearings are 
private812 and in addition that the award may only be made public with the consent 
of both parties813 . As to maintaining confidentiality of other documents such as 
pieces of evidence, written and oral arguments, the identity of the arbitrators and the 
fact that arbitration is taking place, UNCITRAL recommends that the party deal 
with these matters in an agreement on confidentiality.814 
~ll- Art.27 (8); reflecting international practice see JDM Lew et al fn 270 661 
808 Art.l 9 (-+) 
809 Art.30 (1) 
810 Art.20 (7) 
811 With all the associated difficulties of drafting such a clause; H Bagner 'Confidentiality-A Fundamental 
Principle in International Commercial Arbitration':' (2001) 18 (2) Journal of International.Arbitratioll 243-
~49,~4-+ 
RI~ III camera, Art.25 (4) 
811 A ", S) 
. rL1_ (_ 
81~ UNCITRAL Notes on Organizing Arbitral Proceedings of 1996, paras 31, 32 
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The WIPO Arbitration Rules contain the strictest provision on confidentiality. This 
includes a duty of the parties and any third party to keep the existence of arbitration 
a secret.815 The duty of confidentiality expressly refers to documents and evidence 
and expressly includes witnesses, ie it is the obligation of each party to ensure that 
the witnesses called on their behalf maintain confidentiality.816 Furthermore there is 
an express requirement that the award is kept confidential subject to an exception 
where disclosure is necessary to comply with the law or for a party to protect their 
rights vis-a-vis another party.817 Article 76 of the WIPO Arbitration Rules expands 
these duties of confidentiality to the arbitrator and the Center. 
From this brief qualitative review it seems that some of the most important sets of 
arbitral rules provide that the hearing must be private. With the exception of the 
ICC Rules it seems that the arbitration rules establish a presumption that the award 
is maintained confidential by the parties, ie it can only be published with the 
consent of all parties (subject to exceptions). However, only the LCIA Rules and 
the WIPO Rules impose an express duty on the parties to keep other arbitral 
documents secret. With the exception of the WIPO Rules, the rules seem to put the 
parties under no obligation not to disclose the fact that arbitration proceedings are 
or have been taking place. 
6.6 Arbitration laws 
Where there is no contractual arrangement as to confidentiality (whether in the 
arbitration agreement or in the institutional rules) the question arises whether there 
is a duty of non-disclosure under the general arbitration law. 
There are large variations between different legal systems as to the non-contractual 
duties of confidentiality in arbitration. Arbitration laws, with the notable exception 
815 Art.73 
816 Art.74 
m Art.75 
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of New Zealand818, do not expressly provide for arbitral confidentiality.819 In the 
UK, in the case of the Arbitration Act 1996, this omission was a conscious 
decision-it was felt that the principle of confidentiality was best developed by the 
courts and that a general definition was inappropriate. 820 
The English courts have consistently held that there is an implied duty to maintain 
confidentiality in arbitration, being a principle intrinsic to arbitration, albeit that this 
duty may be subject to exceptions. 
The first authority on this is the Court of Appeal case of Dolling-Baker v Merrett821 
concerning litigation under a contract for reinsurance. The defendants were the 
reinsurer and broker of the reinsurance policy. The plaintiff sought to obtain 
disclosure of arbitral documents (the award, pleadings, evidence, including 
transcripts) of an earlier arbitration involving the same defendants, under a very 
similar policy of reinsurance, but with a different claimant. Parker LJ found that 
there was an implied obligation on both defendants not to disclose or use for any 
other purpose any document prepared for and used in the arbitration. He based this 
obligation on the 'essentially private nature of arbitration coupled with the implied 
obligation of a party who obtains documents on discovery not to use them for any 
other purpose than the dispute in which they were obtained'. 822 Hence documents 
used in arbitration proceedings could not be disclosed in later litigation except with 
consent of both parties or pursuant to a court order. A court order allowing 
disclosure would only be made if disclosure or inspection of the documents was 
necessary for the fair disposal of the litigation. LJ Parker set out as the relevant 
criteria for making this assessment, being whether the information contained in the 
arbitral documents to be disclosed was relevant for the litigation before the court, 
whether there were no other practical means of obtaining this information elsewhere 
818 S.14:'An arbitral agreement unless otherwise agreed by the parties, is deemed to provide that the parties 
shall not publish, disclose or communicate any information relating to arbitral proceedings under the 
agreement or to an award made in those proceedings'. 
81u JDM lew et al fn 270 660 
8~(l J Tackaberry, A Marriott 'General Principles' fn 67411-391. 31.5 
B-1 [1990] 1 WLR L~05 (CA) 0" 
"-- ibid 1214 
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and most importantly, whether the information would be necessary for disposing 
fairly of the proceedings.823 The Court of Appeal in Dolling-Baker while finding an 
implied obligation of confidentiality, did not give a comprehensive definition of its 
extent or exceptions to it. 
In another reinsurance case, Hassneh 824 , the reinsured was conducting arbitration 
against the reinsurer and litigation against the broker of the reinsurance. In order to 
aid settlement with the broker the reinsured wished to disclose to the broker not 
only an interim award obtained in his arbitration against the reinsurer, but also other 
arbitral documents such as pleadings, evidence and the transcript. Colman J 
confirmed that there was an implied duty of confidentiality in arbitration 
proceedings, which was implied in the arbitration agreement by business efficacy or 
custom.825 He pointed out that arbitration hearings have been held in private for 
hundreds of years and that the informality and candour of such private hearings 
were an essential ingredient to arbitration. 826 He argued further that the private 
nature of the hearing must in principle extend to arbitral documents, as the 
disclosure of such documents would in fact open the doors of the arbitration room 
to the public.827 While thus underlining the importance of confidentiality in 
arbitration he also found that a distinction should be made between the reasoned 
award and other arbitral documents (such as pleadings, evidential documents and 
transcripts). Since the reasoned award identifies the parties' rights and duties and 
since it can be brought into public courts under their supervisory jurisdiction or for 
the purposes of enforcement, Colman J found that the duty of confidentiality is 
lower with regard to the award. 828 He pointed out that the award or parts of it may 
sometimes be published in the context of the court's supervisory and enforcement 
jurisdiction and that this is important for the development of English commercial 
m ibid 1214-1215 
824 Hassnch insurance Co otlsraell' Mew [1993] 2 Lloyd's Report 243 (Comm) 
825 ibid 246 . 
826 ibid 246-247 
827 ibid 247 
828 ibid 247 
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law.829 Conversely, stricter standards of confidentiality apply in respect of other 
arbitral documents. 
Hence Colman J found that the award may be disclosed without leave of the court 
if this was necessary for the establishment or protection of an arbitrating party's 
legal rights vis-it-vis a third party.830 By contrast, other arbitral documents could 
only be disclosed where all parties consented or with leave or by order of the court. 
The court should only allow disclosure of other arbitral documents where this is 
necessary for disposing fairly of the matter or for saving costS.83l 
The Court of Appeal in Ali Shipping Corp v Shipyard Trogirl53~ firmly repeated that 
there was an implied term of confidentiality in arbitration. It also held that this term 
was not only implied where business efficacy so demanded, but as a matter of law 
in each and every arbitration, without the need to examine the precise circumstances 
of the agreement in each case. 833 As to the exceptions, however. the Court of Appeal 
was not quite as clear about the distinction between the disclosure of awards on the 
one hand and that of other arbitral documents on the other hand. Potter LJ stated 
four exceptions to the implied duty of confidentiality: consent, order of the court, 
leave of the court and disclosure necessary for the protection of legitimate interests 
of an arbitrating party. As to the latter exception he said: 'although to date this 
exception has been held applicable only to disclosure of an award, it is clear ( ... ) 
that the principle covers also pleadings, written submissions and the proofs of 
witnesses as well as transcripts and notes of evidence given in the arbitration'. 834 
Hence it seems that the Court of Appeal found that the overarching principle for 
exceptions to the implied term of confidentiality was the necessity of disclosure for 
protecting an arbitrating party's interest. 
8~q ibid 
H30 ibid 24R-249 
S31 ibid 250-251 
R3~ [1998] 1 L1oyd's Report 643 (CA) 
R.<.1 ibid 651 
R1.j ibid 651 
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Interestingly the Court Appeal said albeit obiter that courts must approach the 
question of disclosure with a flexible mind, so that in certain cases disclosure could 
be ordered where this was sought by a third party unconnected to the arbitration, if 
such disclosure was 'in the interests of justice'. 835 Here Potter LJ referred to the 
case of London and Leeds Estates Ltd l' Paribas Ltd (No2)836 where Mance J had 
held that a litigating party was entitled to disclosure of a proof made by an expert 
witness in an earlier arbitration and which seemed to be inconsistent with the views 
expressed by that expert in the court proceedings.837 
In yet another reinsurance case, Association Electric838 in a reference to the Privy 
Council from Bennuda, it was found that the award of an earlier arbitration could 
be used in a subsequent arbitration involving exactly the same parties despite an 
express confidentiality clause in the agreement. The respondents in that case sought 
to use the award, which had decided an important issue in relation to both 
arbitrations to support a plea of issue estoppel. Lord Hobhouse treated this use of 
the earlier award as a question of enforcing the rights conferred by the earlier 
award- the decision in the earlier award bound the parties and they hence were 
estopped them from thereafter disputing that decision.839 
He criticised the approach of Potter LJ in Ali Shipping, expressing reservations 
about the desirability or merit of a blanket implied duty of confidentiality in 
arbitration. A general implied obligation of confidentiality 'runs the risk of failing 
to distinguish between different types of confidentiality which attach to different 
types of document ( ... ) and elides privacy and confidentiality ( ... ). Generalisations 
and the fonnulation of detailed implied tenns are not appropriate. ,840 Hence the 
Privy Council was reluctant to support a broad duty of confidentiality arising from 
implied tenns. Although these statements where, strictly speaking, obiter, as the 
835 ibid 651-652 
836 [1995] 1 EGLR 102 (QB) 
m ibid 109 
~.1~ Associated Electric and Gas Insurance Sen'ices Ltd l' European Reinsurance Company of Zurich [2003] 
I WLR 1041 (PC) 
81lJ. . 
. IbId 1049-1050 
R4(l ibid 1051 
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case concerned an express confidentiality clause, it led some authors to conclude 
that the concept of confidentiality advanced in Ali Shipping is now open to 
doubts.841 Furthermore, Lord Hobhouse reiterated the distinction first made by 
Colman J in Hassneh between disclosure of the award itself and other arbitral 
materials. 842 
The most recent case on this issue, City of Moscow l' Bankers Trust Compan/N3 
concerned a challenge to an award on the grounds of serious irregularity under 
section 68 of the Arbitration Act 1996. This is the first case on the issue of whether 
a judgment resulting from the courts' supervisory jurisdiction over arbitration 
should be published. In particular, the Court of Appeal interpreted the new Civil 
Procedure Rules. Rule 62.10 (1) states that arbitration claims can be heard either in 
private or in public. Subject to the court ordering otherwise, Rule 62.10 (3) 
effectively states that a determination of a point of law844 under the courts 
supervisory jurisdiction should be heard in public, whereas all other arbitration 
matters should be heard in private. Mance LJ said that this distinction should only 
be the starting point for the analysis. 845 The court should consider hearing the 
matter in open court or any party may apply for a public hearing, even where the 
Rules provide that,primafacie, the hearing should be private.846 Furthermore the 
fact that the hearing was held in private did not necessarily lead to the conclusion 
that the resulting judgment in the arbitration matter should not be published, as the 
judgment might incorporate less confidential information that that which would be 
disclosed during the hearing. 847 He came to the conclusion that the courts should 
carefully balance considerations of confidentiality in arbitration proceedings with 
the requirement that all judgments of a public court should be public under Article 6 
X41 S Kouris 'Confidentiality: Is International Arbitration Losing One of Its Major Benefits?' (2005) 22 (2) 
Journal of International Arbitration 127-140 131; A Tweedale fn 792 60-61 
84~ Associated Electric and Gas Insurance Services Ltd l' European Reinsurance Company of Zurich [2003] 
1 WLR 1041 (PC) 1051 
84.1 [2005] QB 207 (CA) 
844 Referring to sections 45 (preliminary point of law) and 69 (appeal on a point of law) Arbitration Act 
1996 
S45 [2005] QB 207 (CA) 209 
S41' ibid 231 
X4- ibid 
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ECHR and the common law. The court should in particular weigh up how much 
politically or commercially sensitive infonnation would emanate to the public and 
whether this infonnation can be protected by anonymising law reports. 848 
Mance U clearly stated that there should be a presumption in favour of publicity: 
'the desirability of public scrutiny as a means by which confidence in the courts can 
be maintained and the administration of justice made transparent applies here as in 
other areas of court activiti .849 He rejected any suggestion that this would upset the 
confidence of the business community in English arbitration.85o However in the 
case subject to this appeal, he held that only a summary of judgment could be 
published, because of the politically and commercially sensitive information 
contained therein. 
Hence while the English courts recognise an implied principle of confidentiality in 
arbitration this principle may be limited where the legitimate interests of the parties 
so demand and, possibly where it is in the interests of justice (where disclosure is 
demanded by a third party). 
The English approach contrasts with that taken in US, Australia and Sweden where 
there is no implied duty of confidentiality. Confidentiality requires an express 
agreement of the parties. There are dicta in these jurisdictions which found that 
confidentiality does not attach to arbitration proceedings notwithstanding their 
private nature. Similarly there have been cases in international arbitration where the 
disclosure of the award was made in the public interest. 
In the US, a federal court has refused to recognise a duty of confidentiality in 
international arbitration. In United States v Panhandle Eastern COlp8'Sl the US 
Government moved to obtain disclosure of documents relating to an ICC arbitration b 
H48 ibid 231-232 
849 ibid 231 
850 °bod ')3') I I __
851 118 FRD 346 (DDeI 1988) 
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between Panhandle's subsidiary and an Algerian company to protect its security 
interests as guarantor of ship financing bonds. Senior District Judge Latchum in the 
District Court found that there was no general obligation of confidentiality in 
international arbitration and granted the US govemmenf s request for production of 
the documents. It seems that the US courts have not recognised a duty of 
confidentiality applying to arbitration as such852 and have even been prepared to 
overrule an express confidentiality clause in the case of Ting discussed above.853 
In the infamous case of Esso Australia854, the High Court of Australia on appeal 
from the Supreme Court of Victoria categorically denied that there was an implied 
duty of confidentiality in arbitration, in a majority decision of four to five judges855 . 
All judges agreed that there was a public interest exception wider than the exception 
under the English authorities viz merely allowing an arbitrating party to disclose 
arbitral documents if necessary to protect that party's legitimate interests.856 
Mason CJ pointed out that arbitration proceedings had never been completely 
confidential, inter alia since the supervisory and enforcement jurisdiction of the 
courts was of a public nature. 857 He expressly rejected the English rulings finding 
an implied term of confidentiality (such as Dolling-Baker and Hassneh). Mason CJ 
held that there was no implied term of confidentiality and confidentiality could only 
85~ ibid; Industrotech Constructors Inc 1'Duke University (1984) 314 SE 2d 272 274; Giacobazzi Grandi 
Vini SpA v Renfield Corp (1987) US Dist Lexis 1783: contrast this with the position in mediation, where 
confidentiality was held to prohibit disclosure of all statements, documents and discussions: In re 
Anonymous 283 F3d 627 (CA 4th , 2002) 
853 See 6-6.1.1, fn 777 
854 Esso Australia Resources Ltd l' The Right Honourable Sidne:v James Plowman (1995) 128 ALR 391 
(High Court of Australia) 
855 Mason CJ, Brennan J, McHugh J and Dawson J agreeing and Toohey J dissenting 
856 Mason CJ para 38, Brennan J para 8, Toohey J para 26.The Australian High Court referred to the 
English decisions of Dolling-Baker and Hassneh, however compare the English case of London and Leeds 
Estates Ltd, where the court allowed disclosure of arbitral documents (an expert proof) on the application 
of a third party, unconnected to the arbitration. since this was in the interests of justice. See also the dicta 
?x Potter LJ in Ali Shipping discussed above. 
H, Para 31: But compare the English approach as exemplified by the decision in City of Mosco'w l' Bankers 
Trust, discussed above where the court decided that the full judgment of a challenge to an award could not 
be pUblished, precisely because of confidentiality reasons. 
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be based on an express term in the arbitration agreement (and such a term would not 
bind third parties in any case). 858 
6.7 Conclusion: an inadequate balance under English law 
The English cases (Dolling-Baker, Hassneh and Ali Shipping) described above do 
not make clear whether the implied obligation of confidentiality in arbitration is 
based on the long-established equitable principles relating to confidentiality. 
The common law (or, more accurately, equitable) principles relating to breach of 
confidence allow a claimant to obtain an injunction to prevent disclosure of 
confidential or private information and, where such information has already been 
disclosed, damages and other remedies, such as delivery up. The requirements for 
an action for breach of confidence are that the information must be of a confidential 
or private nature and it must have been imparted in a situation of confidence and 
there must have been an unauthorised disclosure (or threat of such disclosure) to the 
disadvantage of the person who communicated it. 859 A situation of confidence can 
arise even absent express contractual provisions to this effect, where it should have 
been clear to the recipient of the information from all the circumstances that the 
information was to be kept confidential, taking into account the harmfulness of the 
disclosure (which must not necessarily lead to financial detriment), the relationship 
of the parties and the parties' expectation of privacy. 860 
However the equitable principles relating to confidence provide for a public interest 
exception and if the duty of confidence in arbitration is based on these principles, a 
public interest exception would clearly be available. 861 In Ali Shipping Potter U 
858 'b'd I I paras 35-37 
859 Malone l' Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis (No 2) [1979] Ch 344 (ChD) 375; 
Coco l' AN Clark (Engineers) Ltd [1969] RPC 41 (ChD) 47; Faccenda Chicken Ltd,' Fa "wier [1987] Ch 
117(CA)1~1 
860 Attomcr GCI/era! l' Guardian Newspapers (N02) [1990] 1 AC 109 (HL) 281 Lord Goff, Campbell" 
MGN Ltd t~004] ~ AC 457 (HL) Paras 13-14. ~1 Lord Nicholls; 47-48 Lord Hoffmann: 85 Lord Hope; 
U4-U5 Ladv Hale 
861 " A Tweedale fn 792 61 
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gave a clear indication to the business community that there was no wide, general 
public interest defence lurking under English law.862 He expressly referred to the 
Esso Australia case discussed above, where the public interest exception had been 
expressed in the widest terms. This indication notwithstanding, he left the door ajar, 
by saying that there might be further exceptions to the general rule of 
confidentiality: 'while it may well fall to the English court at a future time to 
consider some further exception to the general rule of confidentiality based on 
wider considerations of public interest, it is not necessary to do so in this case'. 863 
At this time it seems that the English courts have had no opportunity to rule on the 
question of whether disclosure of an arbitration award could be in the public interest 
under certain circumstances. Hence it is open to some speculation under what 
circumstances such disclosure would be in the public interest. It is, however 
unlikely that such a public interest exception would go as widely as the point made 
at the beginning of this section, ie that publication is necessary for the interests of 
justice and transparency. 
As has been discussed above, it seems that the English courts have assumed that 
there is a duty of confidentiality in arbitration. English courts have defined the 
exceptions narrowly, limiting them to the legitimate interests of the parties or the 
interests of justice, rather than the wider public interest. The courts have refused to 
acknowledge the wider implications of confidentiality and hence no adequate 
balance between confidentiality and transparency has been established under 
English law. This can also be contrasted with the position in other jurisdictions, 
where the courts have found in favour of transparency in arbitration by even 
rejecting an implied duty of confidentiality. A clearer definition of the public 
interest in line with the four arguments presented in section 0 is required here. This 
will be discussed in relation to the Model for internet disputes in Chapter Eight. 
86~ [1998] 1 Lloyd's Report 643 (CA) 652 
Sb~ ibid 
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7. Right of Appeal/Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards 
The relevance of a right to appeal in the due process discussion is that, in addition 
to the duty to give reasons and transparency discussed above, an appeal helps to 
eliminate bad judgments and mistakes occurring at first instance and thereby 
contributes to a fair outcome (in terms of finding the true facts and applying the law 
to the facts correctly).864 It thus contributes to equal treatment and rationality. 865 
This function of appeals has two implications, one in the private interest and one in 
the general public interest. Firstly a right of appeal increases justice to the particular 
party appealing. But secondly and more importantly, there is also a public interest 
element. The availability of an appeal ensures that there is a body of decisions 
interpreting the law in a more authoritative manner, leading to greater consistency 
of the law overall. In courts, a hierarchical appeal system, providing for appeals on 
points of law, has the important function of ensuring an intelligent and authoritative 
interpretation of the law, thus contributing to the quality and predictability of the 
law. This function of an appeal system is probably more important than the function 
of providing justice in an individual case.866 For an individual it is equally tragic 
whether he or she loses on the facts or on the law. However the law usually restricts 
appeals to points of law, which shows that the public interest is more important than 
the private interest. 
Thirdly, appeals are also necessary to guarantee the application of mandatory public 
norms, such as consumer protection. If there is no review of awards on the merits, if 
the parties cannot appeal on the basis that the arbitrator has not applied the law, this 
means that the strict law may well not be applied. 867 For this reason Ware argues 
864 J Stemlight fn 655 686 
86-) Elements of due process 2-2 
866 In the context of arbitration see for example the grounds which must be fulfilled before an English court 
hears a judicial review of an arbitration award on a point of law. The ground in s.69 (3) (c) (i) applies if the 
questio~ is not one of general public importance, in which case the decision of the tribunal has to be. 
ohviollsfv 1\.,.ong, whereas the ground in s.69 (3) (c) (ii) applies if the question is one of general publIc 
importance, in this case the decision only has to be at least open to seriolls doubt. 
867 \\' Park fn 40 1 L fn 51 
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that arbitration does not only lead to privatisation of procedure, but also of 
b . I 868 su stanhve aw. An appeal should therefore be considered as part of the 
procedure for fair adjudication. 869 
On the other hand, appeals increase costs and add further, significant delay. If the 
right to an appeal was not restricted in any way, the dissatisfied party losing a case 
would always seek to reverse the result. Hence the right to appeal has to be limited 
to the most deserving cases for any system of justice not to collapse. The question 
arises to what extent these considerations should apply to the review of arbitration 
awards by the courts. 
First of all there is agreement that courts cannot review matters of fact, unless there 
are obvious and objectively ascertainable mistakes (such as a calculation error) to 
be corrected. Provided the parties have selected the arbitrator according to the 
agreed procedure and the award has been issued by an impartial arbitrator after 
having allowed each party a fair opportunity to argue their case, the parties should 
be bound by the arbitrator's evaluation of all factual matters. Another question is 
whether the parties should also be bound by the arbitrator's interpretation of the 
law. 
Different considerations apply here for domestic and international arbitration. In 
international arbitration, a distinction has to be made between the courts of the seat 
of the arbitration, which the parties select to reflect their preference about which 
law should govern the arbitration procedure, and the enforcement courts. The 
enforcement courts are the courts called upon to recognise or enforce an award. 
First review by the courts at the seat is considered. Under English Arbitration law, 
both for domestic arbitrations and in arbitrations where England is the seat there are 
868 S Ware fn 316719-720 and 7~5 
S~l) S Ware fn 316 argues that without an appeal mandatory laws are not applied to arbitration, however he 
prefers the non-arbitrability of certain disputes to the creation of an appeal system, 751. 754- this would not 
be an option for internet disputes, hence an appeal system is necessary, M Philippe fn 413 188; T Schultz fn 
440 100 
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three distinct grounds for challenging an award before the courts: lack of 
b . . . d' . 870 " . 871 87") su stantIve Juns IctlOn ,senous uregulanty and appeal on a point of law ~. 
These grounds for review are subject to a requirement of exhausting the arbitral 
tribunal's own powers to correct any clerical errors or accidental slips or 
oversights873 and it is also subject to any arbitral appeal or review processes 
provided in the arbitration procedure itself. Furthermore there is a time limit of 28 
days for bringing any appeals. 874 Neither of these requirements is particularly 
problematic from a due process perspective. 
Hence a party has a right to challenge an award for lack of substantive jurisdiction 
on the basis that it did not agree to arbitration or on the basis that it objects to the 
appointment or constitution of the arbitral tribunal. Furthermore, if the tribunal has 
infringed on its obligations to act impartially and to give each party a fair hearing 
the award can be challenged under the grounds of serious irregularity.875 This right 
of appeal also applies to the other eight forms of irregularity or misconduct listed in 
section 68 (such as the tribunal exceeding its powers876 or failure by the tribunal to 
conduct the arbitration according to the procedure agreed by the parties877), which 
are wide enough to encompass all forms of serious irregularity of procedure. 
However irregularity again, is interpreted narrowly and is only available in extreme 
cases where the tribunal has gone so wrong as to cause substantial injustice. 878 A 
party may have lost the right to challenge the award on the grounds of lack of 
870 S.67 Arbitration Act 1996 
871 S.68 Arbitration Act 1996 
872 S.69 Arbitration Act 1996 
n Sections 57 and 70 (1) Arbitration Act 1996 
874 S.70 (3) Arbitration Act 1996 
8~5 S.68 (1) (a) 
876 S.68 (2) (b) 
8"" S.68 (2) (c) 
878 Egmatra AG,' Marco Trading Corporation [1999] 1 Lloyd's Rep 862 (Comm) 865: Cameroon Airlines 
,. Transl/cf Limited [2004] EWHC 1829 (Comm) para. 102. eg where a party is not given a fair opportunity 
to address a kcl' issue 
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substantive jurisdiction or serious irregularity, if they knew (or could have known) 
about the grounds for challenge but failed to raise objections in a timely manner. 879 
If England is the seat or if the arbitration is a domestic English proceedings, a party 
can also appeal on a point of (English)88o law881 , but only if the parties have not 
agreed to exclude this ground of appeal882 and there is a presumption that if the 
parties have agreed to dispense with reasons for the award that they have also 
excluded the right to an appeal on a point of law. An exclusion of the right to appeal 
on a point of law may be incorporated into the arbitration agreement by way of 
reference to arbitration rules and need not be set out explicitly in the arbitration 
clause883, such as the rules of institutions such as the ICC, which incorporate an 
automatic exclusion of appeal. 884 
In any case, under section 69 an appeal under this ground can only be brought with 
leave of the court885 . The Court must give reasons for the decision on whether to 
allow an appeal886, but will usually consider an application for leave to appeal 
without an oral hearing.887 An oral hearing would only be required in exceptional 
circumstances where this is necessary to ensure the fairness of the hearing, such as 
that the judge lacked the necessary material to make a decision.888 
Section 69 (3) essentially severely limits appeals on a point of law to the most 
deserving cases, taking into account the perspective of the parties' rights and the 
879 S.73: ASM Shipping Ltd of India l' TTMI Ltd of England [2006]EWCA Civ 1341 paras. 9, 11 and 13 
Judgment of 16. October 2006 
880 Other laws are facts 
881 Limited rights of appeal are also possible under some other laws, eg Australia·s Commercial Arbitration 
Act 1984, s. 38 
882 Cf s. 87 (1 ) (b) Arbitration Act 1996 
883 SlIkllman Ltd l' Commonwealth Secretariat [2006] EWHC 304 (Comm) para. 21 
884 Art.28 ICC Arbitration Rules 
885 S.69 (2) 
886 /"v·orth Range Shipping Ltd l' Seatrans Shipping C01poration [2002] 1 WLR 2397 (CA) para 27 
887 S.69 (5): BLCT Ltd \' J Sainshury Plc[2004] 2 P. & C.R 3 (CA) para. 36 
8SS P ~8 ara. _ 
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importance of the point of law for the public interest. 889 If the legal point which is 
appealed is not of general public importance then the test is that the arbitrators must 
have been obviously wrong on a question of law. This test imposes a high standard: 
'it is not enough to say maybe they were wrong or even that there is only a 
possibility that they were right. The Court has to be satisfied that the arbitrators 
were obviously wrong on a question oflaw,.89o 
In BLCT Ltd v J Sainsbury PIc the Court of Appeal said expressly that the 
limitations on the right of appeal in section 69 of the Arbitration Act 1996 are in 
accordance with Article 6 of the ECHR.891 
While English law still allows for some vestiges of review on the merits, there is a 
clear tendency to interpret the parameters for review narrowly, as the cases 
discussed above demonstrate. 
In other common law jurisdictions there are also relics of a right to have a review 
on the merits. Under US Federal law an award can be challenged in certain 
instances of fraud or corruption, arbitrator misconduct or where the arbitrators 
exceeded their power.892 As to the merits there is a ground for review created by the 
case law, ie an award can only be set aside on the merits if it is in manifest 
889 S.69 (3) provides that (a) the detennination must affect the rights of at least one party, (b) that it was a 
question which the tribunal was asked to detennine, (c) the decision of the tribunal is either obviously 
wrong or it concerns a question of general public importance and the decision is at least open to serious 
doubt and (d) that it is just and proper for the court to detennine the question: the English Courts have also 
made clear that an error of law cannot be disguised as a serious irregularity, such as the tribunal exceeding 
its powers. This is important as the courts power to review cases on points of law can be excluded, whereas 
the latter cannot. So a mistake as to the currency was not a serious irregularity, see the Lesotho Highlands )' 
Imprcg/io Sp.-1. case, [2005] UKHL 43 (HL) 
890 Mr Justice Tuckey in Egmatra AG 1'Marco Trading Corporation [1999] 1 Lloyd's Rep 862 (Comm) 
864 
891 [2004] 2 P. & C.R .) (CA) para. 33, SlIkllman Ltd l' Commonwealth Secretariat [2006] EWHC 304 
(Comm), para 26 
Hl)" 
- Federal Arbitration Act 9 USC * 1 0 
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disregard of the law.893 This is a much stricter standard than merely applying the 
law erroneously, it must amount to the arbitrators wilfully disregarding the law. 894 
In other common law jurisdictions, appeals on the merits are even more restricted. 
Under the New Zealand Arbitration Act 1996 appeals on points of law are only 
allowed in international arbitrations, if both parties agree.895 
By contrast in many civil law countries courts have no control of the merits of the 
award, where the appeal is on a question of law (as opposed to due process).896 
Likewise the UNCITRAL Model Law provides for recourse to a court for setting 
aside the award on due process grounds, but does not provide for any appeal on a 
point oflaw.897 However some civillaw898 jurisdictions and the UNCITRAL Model 
Law899 contain a public policy gloss on this- they include public policy as a ground 
for judicial review. The public policy ground (even if interpreted as the more 
limited notion of public international policy) may well contain substantive aspects. 
As Park points out: 
'Public policy ( ... ) implicates a cluster of chameleon-like notions whose unifying 
essence lies in overriding societal interests that constrain how arbitrators decide 
cases' .900 
This public policy gloss notwithstanding, Park claims that this laissez-faire model 
of judicial review represents the predominant trend for international commercial 
arbitration for review at the seat of arbitration. 901 He states that international , 
arbitration has been driven in recent years by a tendency to give arbitration tribunals 
893 For example BOH'ell l' Amoco Pipeline Co (2001) 254 F3d 925 (Tenth Circuit) 932 
894 ibid 
895 S.6 
896 JDM Lew et al fn 270 677-678: W Park fn 40 11 
897 Art.34. essentiallv the same list as that in Art.V 1958 NYC 
898 -See for example French NCPC Art.1502 (c) 
899 Art.34 (2) (b) (ii) 
900 W Park fn 40 15 
901 W Park fn 40 12 
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greater autonomy from supervision by national courts at the seat of the 
b ' , 902 ar ItratlOn. Some commentators even argue for the complete abolition of review 
by the courts at the seat of arbitration, foreclosing any review there on procedural or 
substantive grounds. 903 
The reason for this growing tendency to restrict control of awards at the seat is that 
for international arbitration a multitude of different national courts may, in certain 
scenarios be competent to review an award and this causes obvious conflicts and 
inefficiencies, for example the court at the seat may set aside the award and a party 
may nevertheless attempt to enforce the award in a different country. 904 
Up until this point, the discussion has been limited to the position at the seat of the 
arbitration or domestic arbitration. Looking at the position of the enforcing courts, 
this is govermed by the 1958 New York Convention905 for signatory states. Their 
courts can only refuse to recognise and enforce an award in the limited 
circumstances set out in Article V of that Convention and these are reflected in 
section 103 of the Arbitration Act 1996 (for New York Convention awards), While 
these grounds have been briefly discussed above906, it suffices to say here that these 
grounds do not directly include a review on substantive points of law, They do 
include907 public policy as a ground, the malleability of which has been pointed out 
b . h' . 908 H h b d' d b 909 rt' I a ove III t IS sectIOn. ow ever, as as een Iscusse a ove ,cou s In genera 
have been slow to refuse enforce foreign awards on public policy grounds in order 
902 Ibid 
903 P Fouchard 'La Portee Internationale de I'AnnuIation de Ia Sentence Arbitrale dans son Pays d'Origine' 
(1997) 3 ReVile de I 'Arbitrage 327-352, 349: 'On Ie voit, Ia primaute reconnue au juge du siege de 
I 'arbitrage aux fins de coordination du controle de Ia sentence presente bien des dangers. II n'est donc pas 
illegitime de limiter ses inconvenients.' and 352 he concludes: 'Le seul controle judiciare don't elles 
seraient I 'objet aurait lieu lors d'une demande de reconnaissance ou d'execution dans un pays determine. 
( ... ) sa justification ultime est d'ordre logique: pourquoi annuller une sentence si e1le n'a pas a etre execute 
dans ce pays?'. 
904 A detailed discussion of this conflict is outside the scope of this discussion, but see P Fouchard fn 903 
905 330 UNTS 3 (NYC). adopted New York 10. June 1958. entered into force on 7. June 1959 
906 6_2.6 
907 S.1 03 (3) ., . 
908 The delineation between procedural and substantin:, issues and the concept of publIc polIcy are outside 
the scope of this dissertation. 
909 6_2.6 
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910 
to encourage arbitration as a dispute resolution mechanism in international trade. 
For example in the case of OTV SA v Hilmarton Ltd9J () the English courts enforced 
an award, even though the contract underlying the claim was illegal in the place 
where the contract was to be performed. The case concerned the payment of a fee to 
an intermediary and the Court pointed out that there had been no bribery and the 
contract had not been illegal under Swiss law which was the law applying to the 
contract. 
Therefore, for English courts, there are wider grounds for the courts to annul an 
award, when acting under the supervisory jurisdiction of the seat than there are if 
the English courts are enforcing a foreign New York Convention award. 
If the system was changed to disallow any setting aside of awards at the seat this 
would mean that for most international arbitrations the grounds would be limited to 
those contained in the New York Convention, disallowing all reviews on the merits 
on points of law. 
In conclusion, there is an observable trend to restrict the review of arbitration 
awards on the substantive merits. This is particularly true for international 
arbitration to avoid conflicts between courts and forum shopping. This restriction of 
the review of the merits is an expression of a preference for efficiency and speed 
even at the cost of allowing the occasional false interpretation of law. This means 
that the public, general interest of appeals, ie the development of the law through 
precedent is definitively and increasingly taking a backseat. 
As the above brief discussion has hopefully demonstrated, while the right of appeal 
is an important aspect of due process, it has been severally curtailed in arbitration 
for the sake of finality and to prevent delay and to reduce costs and because it is in 
line with commercial expectations 911. It makes sense for traditional commercial 
[1999] ~ Lloyd's Rep 222 (Comm) 
911 As pointed out by W Park fn 40 11 
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arbitration, if the parties are aware that by choosing arbitration they may limit the 
availability of an appeal, so that it can be said that they have waived recourse to the 
courts and appeal. 
However the limitations on appeals may be more problematic in cases where the 
parties have not made a voluntary choice in bringing their case to arbitration. The 
limitation on appeals is also problematic if arbitration is becoming the predominant 
model of dispute resolution as it hinders the development of the law through the 
creation of precedent. This will be discussed further in the next Chapter. 
8. Conclusion 
Despite the rhetoric of due process rights, arbitrators effectively apply lower 
standards of due process than those applied by judges in litigation, due to the party 
autonomy and the waiver principles. On the one hand, lawyers express a concern 
for due process in arbitration as a general principle, on the other hand there is a 
need for procedural efficiency and flexibility which is expressed in the twin tenets 
of party autonomy and waiver of due process rightS.912 This Chapter has attempted 
to expose this conflict between the twin principles of party autonomy and waiver on 
the one hand and due process on the other. 
This Chapter has identified the main due process principles and examined to what 
extent they apply to arbitration and how they are implemented in the arbitration 
process. For this purpose the two classic elements of due process have been 
discussed, independence and impartiality of the arbitrators, and the fair hearing 
principle. The overall conclusion is that lesser standards in arbitration proceedings 
than in litigation are observed with respect to these two principles. 
91~ Similar findings by W Park fn 40 57: 'The emphasis on flexibility likely represents a ?an\inian survival 
Illt'chanism, helping institutions market themselves globally by sidestepping tough questIons about what 
faimess means when legal cultures diverge.' 
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In relation to the first of the two core principles of due process, ie independence and 
impartiality the courts have frequently asserted that the same standards as in 
litigation apply. As shown in this discussion, this is only rhetoric. as arbitration is in 
its very nature different from litigation before the courts. It has been explained that 
arbitrators in commercial arbitration cannot be independent in the same way as 
judges. This is a factor which is rarely (if ever) acknowledged by the (English) 
courts. 
In relation to the second of the two core principles of due process. ie fair hearing it 
has been difficult to define any minimum standards which arbitration is required to 
meet. It should be acknowledged more openly that there exists a trade-off between 
fairness of procedure, and costs and delay. Since one of the declared goals of 
arbitration is to cut costs and delay, a curtailment of fairness in hearings standards is 
inevitable. 
In addition, three aspects of what may be loosely called principles of accountability 
and transparency in political terminology have been examined: the duty to give 
reasons, privacy and confidentiality, and the right to an appeal. These latter three 
requirements are also important for due process, as they provide the checks and 
balances to ensure due process is complied with. 
In relation to these three aspects of accountability and transparency, the courts not 
only openly acknowledge that there is a lesser duty in arbitration. On the contrary. it 
is frequently stated by the courts that it is in the very nature of arbitration that it is 
confidential or that there is only a limited right to judicial review and since these 
restrictions are immanent to arbitration it is assumed that the parties have waived 
their rights by agreeing to arbitration as a form of dispute resolution. The courts 
rarely discuss the procedural values, but tend to make an assumption that in 
arbitration there is no need for either accountability or transparency. 
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<)1.1 7-2 
To the extent that the courts admit that lesser due process rights apply~ this is 
usually justified by the parties' choice of arbitration (waiver doctrine) and their 
control over the procedure (party autonomy). Hence an important justification for 
the application of fewer and lesser due process rights is the fact that the parties have 
chosen arbitration. As has been explained, under the jurisprudence relating to the 
ECHR, such a waiver is only effective if it was given voluntarily and well-
informed. This will indeed be the case for most cases of commercial arbitration 
between business parties. However as arbitration expands as a form of dispute 
resolution into other sectors, waivers may not always be effective. In particular, 
where there is no recourse to the courts (because of lack of enforcement or because 
of costs) or in the case of non-negotiated, standard consumer contracts, the waiver 
doctrine should not apply. This will be discussed in Chapter Seven.913 The intention 
of this Chapter is not to criticize traditional, commercial arbitration but to explore 
how arbitration as a process needs to be adapted to comply with the higher 
standards of due process for the Model of dispute resolution for internet disputes. 
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Generally, nobody behaves decently when they have power. 
(Kingsley Amis (1922-1995)) 
1. Introduction 
As has been seen in Chapter Three914, the internet as a communications medium 
harbours a great potential for an increase in cross-border disputes. These disputes 
may involve individuals, consumers and sole traders who, before the arrival of the 
internet, were unlikely to be involved in cross-border disputes. It has been 
suggested in Chapter Four915 that online arbitration could provide a suitable 
(binding) method of dispute resolution for many internet disputes. This raises the 
question under what circumstances such arbitration is fair. 
The origins of arbitration are a method of dispute resolution for members of the 
same industry or trade. Traditionally, the parties were all business members of the 
same trading community, with shared sets ofvalues.916 The origins of arbitration 
can be contrasted with the nature of many internet disputants, who may not share a 
common background and may well be very diverse indeed.917 
In traditional commercial arbitration, parties have been allowed to value factors 
such as efficiency and speed over due process. The preceding Chapter has shown 
that less stringent due process standards have been applied in commercial 
916 M Budnitz . Arbitration of Disputes between Consumers and Financial Institutions: A Serious Threat to 
Consumer Protection' (1995) 10 Ohio State Journal on Dispute Resolution 267-342. 318-319 
917 ~ ') 
-'--
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arbitration (compared to litigation) because of the twin tenets of party autonomy 
and the waiver doctrine. 
It is argued in this Chapter that, if internet disputants have no other realistic option 
but to choose online arbitration, it cannot be said that they freely choose arbitration 
or that they have opted out of the state court system and hence, the waiver doctrine 
should not apply in the Model espoused here. Furthermore, if there is a power 
imbalance between the parties, and the' stronger' party imposes its terms on the 
'weaker' party, it is also difficult to argue that both parties have voluntarily chosen 
arbitration and opted out of litigation. In these cases, although arbitration is based 
on contract, it is not fully consensual (no voluntary, informed consent). 918 Finally, 
in such a situation of power imbalance, the doctrine of party autonomy is also 
deprived of its meaning, as only the 'stronger' party is truly autonomous. 
To support this argument this Chapter examines two examples of arbitration in 
constellations where it cannot be said that both parties have freely chosen 
arbitration, where the procedure is mandatory (UDRP) and where they are of 
unequal bargaining power with one party imposing terms on the other (B2C 
arbitration). Although the relevant internet disputes in this thesis have been defined 
more widely than the B2C paradigm and although the consumer arbitration cases 
examined here do not exclusively arise from internet transactions, they serve as a 
useful example for arbitration between unequal parties. 
The argument of this Chapter is that the principles of party autonomy and the 
waiver doctrine should have limited application to the relevant internet disputes. 
For the Model of dispute resolution espoused here traditional arbitration must be 
adapated. 
QIS 0 Be\'leveld and R Brownsword: 'it is implicit in the idea of consent that it should be given on a free 
and info~med basis', Consent in the Law (Hart Oxford and Portland 2007) 130 
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This Chapter also examines the restrictions placed on B2C arbitration by law to 
compensate for the fewer due process protections found in arbitration. It argues that 
a new paradigm has to be found. The traditional paradigm which applies lesser due 
process rights and at the same time restricts arbitration for certain relationships 
(such as B2C cases) has to be changed. The solution is not to restrict access to 
arbitration for such internet disputes, as access to binding dispute resolution is 
required, but to ensure that due process applies. Therefore, this section advances the 
argument that stricter due process standards should be applied to online arbitration 
of internet disputes (as defined in Chapter Three919) than have hitherto been applied 
to offline, commercial arbitration between businesses. 
The first example to support this contention is the use of arbitration clauses in 
consumer contracts. 
2. Legal Controls on the Use of Arbitration Clauses in 
Consumer Contracts 
An arbitration contract or clause involves a waiver of the right to go to court920 
(which, as a waiver of a right, requires consent) and an agreement, by which the 
parties undertake an obligation to take part in the arbitration procedure (which also 
requires consent). This consent should be voluntary and fully informed.921 However 
it is questionable whether in the B2C context, consent to arbitration complies with 
these requirements, as there may be a lack of choice of options 922 due to market 
failures caused by the imposition of standard contract terms by the more powerful 
(business) party. 
919 Parties subject to a power imbalance, as crystallized in the corporate entity-individual paradigm, see 3-
6.3 
9'0 
- See Chapter 6-2.5 
911 See fn 918 
922 The question here is whether the lack of choice is of such a nature as to mean that there is such pressure 
on the person that they feel forced to accept an option they would otherwise not ha\e chosen, see D 
Bcyle\dd and R Brownsword fn 918 l .. B 
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In B2C e-commerce, where the supplier includes an arbitration clause in the 
standard form contract, the consumer is in a far inferior bargaining position. In fact 
it can be said that the consumer is in no bargaining position at all, as the contract is 
offered on a 'take it, or leave it' basis. It is also likely that the consumer has not 
read the standard terms and conditions (even if there was a clear link from the 
ordering webpage) and thus that the consumer is not even aware that there is an 
arbitration clause in the contract. 923 Another reason consumers are likely to be 
unaware of the arbitration clause in the contract is that they do not make their 
choices according to whether or not there is an arbitration clause in the contract, 
since at the stage of contract conclusion consumers are unlikely to give any thought 
to the issue of later disputes. Finally, even if the consumer has seen the clause, he or 
she may not appreciate its significance. 
Consumers frequently have no real choice about the terms on which they contract, 
as different businesses use similar terms or a particular supplier may have a very 
strong market position. Consumer choice and market competition hence will not 
solve the problem of the consumer's inferior bargaining position. For these reasons, 
it is a fallacy to say that the consumer has chosen arbitration. 924 
A second imbalance in the relationship between consumer and supplier arises 
because the supplier chooses the arbitrator or, at least, the arbitration institution. 
Most likely the business is a 'repeat player', conducting numerous arbitrations each 
year and being familiar with the arbitration institution and the procedure. By 
contrast the consumer is the 'single shot' player who, in most cases, arbitrates only 
one case against this e-commerce supplier. This disadvantages the consumer 
substantially.925 In extreme cases, the arbitration institution might even (consciously 
9~.1 See also Case C-168/05 Mostaza Claro,' Centro MOl'il [2007] 1 CMLR 22 (ECl) para 25 
9~4 J Stemlight fn 655 688, M Budnitz fn 916 321 
9~5 This has been recognized explicitly in the recent US Court of Appeals decision Ting \'.~ T&T 319 F3d 
1126.1151-1152 (9th Cir Cal 2003). Because of this disadvantage to the consumer, the court found an 
arbitration clause in an adhesion contract unenforceable. See also the discussion of repeat players in 3-5.2 
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or not) regard the supplier as a repeat customer for referral and hence this might 
mean that there is some degree of (unconscious) systemic bias. 926 
Because of this lack of free choice and the repeat player effect, the law in some 
jurisdictions restricts the enforceability of pre-dispute arbitration clauses. 
Furthermore consumer groups have long argued that consumers should not be 
bound by pre-dispute arbitration clauses.927 
The law makes an important distinction between pre-and post-dispute arbitration 
agreements. A B2C arbitration agreement entered into before the dispute has arisen 
is potentially unfair, as at that point the consumer is likely to be unaware of its 
significance. The consumer is not likely to think of a possible dispute at this stage, 
nor to envisage that he or she may need an avenue of redress later on. By contrast, 
after a dispute has arisen, the consumer is likely to think about different dispute 
resolution options and if, at that point, he or she chooses not to go to court, but to 
try arbitration instead, then there is no reason why the law should not accept such a 
choice. Hence, generally speaking most laws restrict (in some way) the 
enforceability of pre-dispute arbitration clauses against a consumer, but only very 
few jurisdictions do not allow a B2C arbitration agreement after the dispute has 
. 928 
ansen. 
The question of whether a pre-dispute B2C arbitration agreement is enforceable 
against a consumer can arise in different contexts and this raises the question of 
which law will apply to the question of whether the arbitration agreement is 
926 Further 3-5.2, discussion of independence 6-3 
9'-
- M Doyle et al fn 424 78; see also Consumers International fn 43229-30 (Recommendations) and see 
also Principle VI, 2nd Sentence of EC Recommendation 98/2571EC; see also the AAA Consumer- Related 
Disputes Supplementary Procedures of 15. September 2005. available from 
http: \\'ww.adr.orgisp.asp?id=22014 [14. September 2007]and the AAA Due Process Protocol for 
Consumers Plinciple 5: BEUC Position Paper' Alternative Dispute Resolution' of 21. November 1001 
BEUC X /04S '2001. pp.5-6: TACD (Transatlantic Consumer Dialogue) 'Alternative Dispute Resolution in 
the Context of E-commerce' Position Statement of February 2000, E-comm 12-00, Resolution No 4 
available from http:w\\\\.tacd.on2. c£i-bin db.c!!i'.\)'H~t'=\ie\\ &config=admilvdocs.cfg&id=41 [14. 
September 2007]; Bamford fn 790 110; OECD Report fn 43020 
q~~ G Kaufmann-Kohler. T Schultz fn 224 173: French Civil Code, Art.2061 states that domestic pre-dispute 
arbitration agreements with consumers are invalid, see below for the position in the UK and the llS. 
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enforceable or not.929 It may arise when the consumer starts litigation before his or 
her national court and the defendant business claims that the court has no 
jurisdiction because of the arbitration agreement. In this situation the court may 
apply the law of the forum (ie its national law) on the basis of mandatory consumer 
protection law overriding the law of the arbitration agreement.930 The question may 
also arise before the courts at the seat of the arbitration, if the consumer challenges 
the jurisdiction of the arbitration tribunal, under the law chosen by the parties or the 
law of the seat. 931 Finally once an award (or a judgment) has been rendered, the 
issue may again arise in enforcement proceedings at the place where the defendant 
has assets. The enforcement court is likely to apply the law chosen by the parties 932 
and/or the provisions of the New York Convention933 . 
2.1 Subject-matter arbitrability 
Arbitrability refers to the question of whether a particular type of dispute may be 
submitted to arbitration. States may reserve certain types of disputes to the 
exclusive domain of the courts, for reasons of public policy or the public interest.934 
If a particular category of disputes is not arbitrable, then a dispute falling into that 
category can never be submitted to arbitration, regardless of the consent of the 
parties. It seems that consumer disputes can be submitted to arbitration in principle, 
subject to conditions. In other words the laws of most jurisdictions impose 
conditions on the giving of consent, but do not exclude consumer arbitration 
agreements from arbitration altogether. 935 In jurisdictions allowing the enforcement 
9~9 Applicable law is discussed in 4-4 
930 Richard Zellner l' Phillip Alexander Securities and Futures Ltd [1997] ILPr 716,724; see also s.89 (3) 
of the Arbitration Act 1996: 'whatever the law applicable to the arbitration agreement' 
9.~1 A Redfern, M Hunter fn ~70 148-151, G Kaufmann-Kohler, T Schultz fn ~~4 174 
9)~ Ibid and Richard Zellner l' Phillip Alexander Securities and Futures Ltd [1997] ILPr 730 (QB) 736-738 
9.1.' Art.\' (1) (a), Art.V (~) (a) or Art.V (2) (b). This will depend on the legal categorisation of consumer 
disputes in the jurisdiction of recognition and enforcement. This Chapter considers the UK and US 
position. 
I);~ 
. A Redfern, M Hunter fn 270 163: G Kaufmann-Kohler, T Schultz fn ~~4 170 
9.15 G Kaufmann-Kohler, T Schultz fn 224 170-17~: for example the German civil procedure code (ZPO) 
imposes specific form requirements on consumer arbitration agreements in para 1031 (5) (contained in a 
separate signed document or ha\'e certification by a notary public), as to the position in England and the 
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of post-dispute arbitration agreements it can also not be said that consumer disputes 
are not arbitrable. 936 It has been pointed out that limitations on arbitrabilitv have 
" 
been pushed back successively for the reason that judges perceive arbitration as a 
method to relieve the case overload of the ordinary courtS.937 
2.2 Control of consumer arbitration under English law 
2.2.1 Small claims disputes 
In England and Wales an arbitration agreement concluded with a consumer 
(whether pre- or post-dispute)938 is considered to be unfair and hence 
unenforceable939, if the claim does not exceed £5,000.940 Hence. under English law, 
if the amount in dispute is no more than £ 5,000941 a pre-dispute arbitration clause is 
automatically not binding on consumers, without the need for applying any of the 
tests set out in Directive 93/13/EEC on unfair terms in consumer contract, 
implemented in the UK by the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 
1999. 
US, see next section. T' Heiskanen puts forward the view that consumer disputes are not arbitrable (quoting 
Finland as an example), V Heiskanen fn 10731 
936 For example in France the law distinguishes between a pre-dispute arbitration clause ('clause 
compromissoire') and a post-dispute arbitration agreement ('compromis'). The pre-dispute arbitration 
clause is only valid between merchants and professionals, Code Civile Art.2061, Code Commercial Art.631 
9.r W Park fn 40 25-26 
9.1~ S.89 (1) Arbitration Act 1996 'present or future disputes or differences (whether or not contractual), 
939 Such a clause would not be binding on the consumer. but binding on the business supplier, Regulation 8 
(1) Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999 
940 Arbitration Act 1996, s. 91 (1) and Unfair Arbitration Agreements (Specified Amounts) Order 
1999/2167, Art.3. S.l (1) Consumer Arbitration Agreements Act 1988 used to contain a complete 
prohibition of all domestic pre-dispute arbitration clauses in consumer contracts. but this has been repealed 
hy the 1996 Act 
941 This amount can be changed by statutory instrument. It seems that this amount tallies with the upper-
limit for the small claims procedure. The policy behind this is that up to this amount it may be better for the 
consumer to choose the statutory small claims procedure, whereas for larger amounts in dispute. arbitration 
may, under certain circumstances actually be in the consumer's interest. 
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2.2.2 Regulation of unfair contract terms 
If the amount in dispute exceeds that sum, the tests in the Directive and the 
Regulations apply to assess whether the arbitration clause is binding on the 
consumer. 942 If the arbitration clause is considered unfair it is not binding on the 
consumer, but may still be binding on the business.943 
(a) Example in the Annex to the Directive 
The example (q) in the Annex to the Directive and the Regulations is the most 
relevant example of an unfair term: 
'excluding or hindering the consumer's right to take legal action or exercise any 
other legal remedy, particularly by requiring the consumer to take disputes 
exclusively to arbitration not covered by legal provisions' . 
The meaning of the phrase' arbitration not covered by legal provisions' is not 
entirely clear and several interpretations are possible. One interpretation could be 
that this phrase distinguishes private arbitration from public forms of 'arbitration' , 
such as the small claims procedure or a statutory Ombudsman scheme. On the other 
hand, it could refer to a distinction between arbitration based on the applicable law 
and arbitration where the arbitrator does not base his or her decision on strict law. It 
seems that the courts have interpreted the clause to mean the former. 944 
In a recent case the Eel held that if a pre-dispute arbitration clause is held to be 
unfair by the national court the award has to be annulled, even if the consumer has 
failed to raise the unfair nature of the term during the arbitration proceedings. the 
reason for which may be that the consumer is unaware of his or her rights or that the 
Q4~ Christopher Drahozal and Raymond Friel' A Comparative View of Consumer Arbitration' (2005) 71 
Arhitratiol1 131-139, 134' OFT 'Unfair Contract Terms Guidance' (February 2001), paras 17.2, 17.3 
Q.j1 ' 
. Art.6 (l) Directive, Regulation 8 (1) 
').)4 By implication: Landgericht Krefeld Case 6 0186'95. Judgment of29. April 1996 [1997] ILPr 716: 
Picardi " Cuniberti [2002] EWHC 2923 (QB) para 102 
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consumer is deterred from enforcing then on account of the costs which judicial 
proceedings would involve.945 
It is also interesting to note that Recommendation 98/257 lEe also provides in 
Article 4 that consumers should not be bound by a pre-dispute arbitration clause.946 
(b) The fairness test 
In any case, Article 3 (3) of the Directive makes it clear that the examples in the 
Annex are only indicative and hence a case-by-case assessment has to be made in 
order to see whether (1) the arbitration clause has been individually negotiated, (2) 
is contrary to the requirement of good faith and (3) causes an imbalance in the 
parties' rights and obligations to the detriment of the consumer. 947 The courts must 
also take into account the nature of the goods and services for which the contract 
was concluded, the other terms of the contract and also all circumstances occurring 
at the point the contract was concluded.948 
A mere explanation or the pointing out of an onerous clause in the consumer 
contract may be necessary to ensure incorporation under the common law, but will 
not be sufficient to render the clause fair or, for that matter, 'individually 
negotiated'. Pre-formulated terms, which the consumer has not been able to 
influence are never 'individually negotiated' .949 
The two core elements of the assessment to see whether a term is fair or unfair are 
the imbalance and the contrary to good faith requirements. These elements have 
been interpreted by the House of Lords in the case Director-General afFair 
Trading v First National Bank plc950 • Lord Bingham described the imbalance test by 
945 Case C-168/05 Mostaza Claro l' Centro Movil [2007] 1 CMLR 22 (ECl) paras 29-30 
946 Recommendations have no binding force 
<147 A.rU (l) Directive and Regulation 5 (1) Unfair Tenns in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999 
<l4~ Art.4 (1) Directive and Regulation 6 (1) 
Q4Q Art.3 (2) Directi\e and Regulation 5 (2) 
')50 [2002] 1 AC 481 (HL) ~ 
') 1 '"' 
_--tj 
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the question: is the term weighted in favour of the supplier so as to tilt the parties' 
rights and obligations under the contract?951 Lord Millett, in the same case, 
approached the assessment from a practical standpoint by asking whether, the 
parties would have accepted the term, if their attention had been drawn to the 
term.
952 The assessment has both a procedural and substantive element and is not 
limited to an inquiry of whether the term has been brought to the consumer's 
attention, but in addition whether it is substantially fair. 953 What does this mean in 
the context of pre-dispute consumer arbitration clauses? 
(c) Substantial fairness in the context of pre-dispute arbitration clauses 
In the context of construction adjudication, pre-dispute adjudication clauses have 
been upheld where the consumer had received competent and independent 
professional advice for example from the surveyor. 954 In these cases the courts seem 
to have equated the requirement of good faith with the requirement that the 
consumer is fully informed about the consequences of adjudication.955 
By contrast in Picardi l' Cuniberti the Court has held that an arbitration clause in a 
contract between an architect and a consumer is an onerous term which must be 
drawn to the specific attention of the consumer and that the term had therefore not 
been validly incorporated.956 The Court also held (obiter) that the arbitration clause 
was an unfair term and that it is an example of a significant imbalance to the 
detriment of the consumer957, as it may hinder the consumer's right to take legal 
action958. In that case the consumers had not been professionally advised. 
951 para 17 
95' 
- para 54 
(5) [2002] 1 AC 481 (HL) paras 17 (Lord Bingham). 36-37 (Lord Steyn) 
954 Allen Wi/son Shopjitters and Builders l' Buckingham [2005] EWHC 1165 (TCC) para 43: Westminster 
Blii/dinf!; Companl' Limited l' Beckingham [2004] BLR 163 (TCC) para 31 
955 ibid L • 
956 [2002] EWHC 2923 (QB) para 127 
957 [2002] EWHC 2923 (QB) para 128 
958 ibid 
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The litigation in the case of Richard Zellner v Phillip Alexander Securities and 
Futures Ltd before the Gennan Landgericht (District Court) Krefeld and the English 
High Court is another example where an arbitration clause in an agreement with a 
consumer has been held an unfair, and hence, unenforceable tenn. The claimant. a 
Gennan consumer had been solicited by cold-calling into entering a futures and 
options agreement, under which he lost a substantial sum of money. One of the 
clauses in the agreement provided for arbitration in London before the LClA under 
English law. The Gennan court applied Gennan mandatory consumer protection 
law and held that the tenn was unfair as it deprived the consumer of access to his 
local court and since the tenn was hidden in small print extending over several 
pages, it had the effect of 'duping' the consumer.959 The claimant won the case and 
moved to enforce the judgment in England by registering it with the English High 
Court. The defendant appealed against the Master's Order for registration, again 
arguing that the Gennan Court had no jurisdiction because of the arbitration 
agreement. On appeal, the English High Court had to assess the validity of the 
arbitration agreement, this time under English law. It also came to the conclusion 
that the arbitration agreement was invalid.96o 
2.2.3 Conclusion: English law 
It is clear from this discussion that an arbitration clause can be an unfair tenn, 
depending on the circumstances, as it may deprive the consumer of access to 
national courts and application of mandatory consumer protection nonns. 
95CJ Landgericht Krefeld Case 60 186/95, Judgment of29. April 1996 [1997] ILPr 716,724; the Court 
applied the German law and referred to Directive 93/13 on unfair terms in consumer contracts. which at 
that point only had indirect application, as it had not yet been implemented into German law. 
960 [1997] ILPr 730 (QB) 736-738; the English Court did not refer to Directive 1993113 on unfair contract 
tenns which at that point had not been implemented in the UK. Instead it based its findings that the 
arbitration agreement was invalid on s. 1 (1) Consumer Arbitration Agreements Act 1988. which provided 
that pre-dispute consumer arbitration agreements were unenforceable. S.2 (a) of the Act limited this to 
domestic agreements- however the Court found that s.2 (a) was discriminatory against EU citizens and 
hence should not be applied. The Consumer Arbitration Agreements Act 1988 and its blanket prohibition 
on pre-dispute consumer arbitration agreements has been repealed by the Arbitration Act 1996. 
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Some of the English cases have made a distinction between a professionally advised 
consumer who would be bound by the arbitration clause, and a consumer who is not 
advised and hence would not be bound. The validity of this distinction is doubtful, 
since the purpose of the regulation of unfair contract terms is not merely to ensure 
that the consumer is properly informed. The concern of the legislation is also to 
counterbalance the power imbalance between consumers and businesses and the 
one-sided imposition of standard terms. To focus merely on information ignores the 
requirement of fair dealing set out in Director-General of Fair Trading l' First 
National Bank pIc. 
However it is important not to make too much of the case law based on construction 
cases, as the interpretation of what amounts to an unfair term depends on the 
context961 and the answer may well be different for internet and, in particular e-
commerce disputes. 962 For claims above the £5000 threshold, it is ultimately not 
clear whether a pre-dispute arbitration clause, for example contained in standard 
terms on a website, would be binding on the consumer or not. It is argued here that 
the courts will interpret the Regulations to see whether the consumer has not only 
understood the arbitration clause, but also whether the clause deprives the consumer 
of mandatory consumer protection law 963 or due process on a case-by-case analysis. 
Therefore English law restricts the use of pre-dispute arbitration clauses 
considerably, thus acknowledging that consumers must be 'protected' from the 
lesser due process standards of arbitration and be given the choice to go to court. 
961 ArtA (1) Directin:' and Regulation 6 (l) 
962 The argument advanced here is that arbitration clauses should not be regarded as unfair, if and only if 
arbitration respects due process. This could be achieved by interpreting the unfair contract term pw\isions 
accordin~lv. 
'161 ~ -
. See 4-4.5 
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In a similar vein, it is likely that an English court would for public policy reasons 
refuse enforcement of an arbitration award which had been based on an unfair 
arbitration agreement in a standard term contract. 964 
2.3 Control of adhesion contracts under US State law 
By contrast to England/the EU, in the US arbitration clauses in a written contract 
with a consumer are usually enforceable.965 There is a strong presumption in favour 
of arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act966 . This has been shown in cases 
concerning specific State consumer protection legislation967 providing for 
mandatory, non-waivable consumer rights, where the courts have validated the 
arbitration clause, even ifit had the effect of depriving the consumer of these 
rights. 968 
However, an arbitration clause in a consumer contract must have been brought to 
the consumer's attention. In Specht 11 Netscape Communications COlpn 969 the courts 
have made a distinction between 'browse wrap contracts' and 'click wrap 
contracts'. The Court found that the arbitration clause was not incorporated in a 
browse wrap contract, as the consumer may have not followed the link to the terms 
and conditions.97o 
964 Richard Zellner l' Phillip Alexander Securities and Futures Ltd [1997] ILPr 730 (QB) 736-738; 
discussed above, although this case was about the enforcement of a German court judgment, it discussed 
the validity of the arbitration agreement and found it unenforceable. 
965 T Carbonneau fn 471 19; Allied-Bruce Termini.Y Cos 1'Dobson 513 US 265, 115 S Ct 834 (1995) 281-
2R2 
966 9 USC ~ 2: an arbitration agreement 'shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable. save upon such 
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract'. However Jean Sternlight has found 
that this preference for arbitration was not part of the original intent of Congress, but a myth developed by 
later courts out of a misguided policy to deal with overburdened courts, J Sternlight fn 655 644-656. 660-
674, similar M Budnitz fn 916289-290 
96" 
, Because of the supremacy of federal law see also T Carbonneau fn 471 27 
l/(>~ Commerce Park at DFTV Freeport 1'Mardian Constr Co 729 F.2d 334.338-339: 39 Fed.R.SerY.2d 134 
(5 th Cir 1984): Marler l' Drexel Burnham Lambert Inc 566 F Supp 333. 335 (1983 ND Texas). Ting l' 
..1T&T319 F3d 1126: 1147-1148 (9 th Cir Cal 2003) (arbitration clause held unenforceable for other reason) 
Q6() 306 F3d 17. 4R UCC Rep Sen 2d 761 (:~nd Cir 2002) 
97030-33.35 
2.+7 
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Furthermore under general State contract law, a term in a consumer contract can be 
unenforceable if it is procedurally and substantially unconscionable and this 
doctrine of unconscionability equally applies to arbitration agreements, 
notwithstanding the Federal Arbitration Act's pro-arbitration stance. 971 A term is 
procedurally unconscionable if it is in a contract of adhesion, which is a standard 
term contract drafted by a party with a superior bargaining position.972 However. 
the mere fact that an arbitration clause is contained in a standard contract does not 
make the arbitration agreement unenforceable against the consumer. An additional 
factor is required in that the term must also be substantively unconscionable.973 
Substantive unconscionability is concerned with the one-sided nature of the contract 
and its oppressiveness, looking at the actual effects of the challenged provision.974 
Such one-sidedness can stem from the fact that the consumer has to bear an 
excessive filing-fee, the fact that the consumers cannot resort to class-action or that 
the process is confidential, hence enhancing the repeat-player effect975 . A clause 
restricting the consumer's avenue of redress to arbitration, while allowing the 
company the choice to litigate would also be invalid for the same reason. 976 
The courts have held in several decisions 977 that an arbitration agreement in a 
consumer contract that forces the consumer to incur excessive arbitration fees is 
unconscionable. For example, in the much-cited case of Brower l' Gatevt'aJ' Inc978 
971 Court decisions finding arbitration agreements unconscionable and unenforceable have been relatively 
common in the state and federal courts in California, see T Carbonneau fn 471 27 
97~ Eg Ting,'AT&T319 F3d 1126, 1148 (9th CirCaI2003), 
973 Iberia Credit Bureau l' CingulaI' Wireless LLC, Sprint Spectrum Company,Centennial Wireless 379 F3d 
159,167-168 (5 th Cir 2004) 
974 Ting l' AT&T 319 F3d 1126, 1149 (9 th Cir Cal 2003) 
975 Ting 1'AT&T319 F3d 1126, 1151-1152 (9th Cir Cal 2003) but different in Iberia Credit Bllrea~ 1'. 
CingulaI' Wireless LLC, Sprint Spectrum Company,Centennial Wireless 379 F3d 159, 175-176 (5 Or 
2004) 
976 Iberia Credit Bureau l' CingulaI' Wireless LLC, Sprint Spectrum Company, Centennial Wireless 379 F3d 
159,168-169 (5th Cir 2004) 
977 Brower,' GafCH'01']OOO Inc 676 N.Y.S. 2d 569, 572 (1998): Green Tree Financiall' Randolph, 531 US 
79, 81; 121 S.Ct. 513. 517 (2000) (in this case the US Supreme Court accepted that prohibiti ve costs may 
invalidate an arbitration agreement against a consumer, but the Court was not convinced that the petitioner 
would in fact incur such costs); Knepp l' Credit Acceptancc CO/po 229 B.R. 821, 838 (1999), Patterson l' 
ITT Consumer Fin. CO/po 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 563, 565-567 (1993), Gutierre= l' AlitOll'CSf Inc 114 Cal.AppAth 
77,86 (Cal App 2003), Ting 1'AT&T319 F3d 1126, 1151 (9th Cir Cal 2003) 
Q7R Bn)H'cr " Gatcwal'20()() Inc 676 N.Y.S. 2d 569. 57';, (1998) 
248 
Chapter 7: Internet Disputes and Fair Arbitration 
involving the purchase of a personal computer and related software products 979, the 
arbitration agreement stipulated arbitration before the ICC Court of Arbitration. The 
ICC advance fee for the claim was the amount ofUS$ 4,000, of which USS 2,000 
were non-refundable. The New York Appellate Court held that the arbitration 
agreement was unenforceable and remanded the case back to a lower court to 
encourage the parties to find an appropriate arbitration procedure for their small 
claims dispute. In the US, the American Arbitration Association has introduced 
specific fee schedules for consumer disputes. 98o 
In another line of cases the courts have held an arbitration clause to be 
unenforceable against a consumer, if it prevented consumers to resort to class 
action, which existed as a right under State law. 981 
In summary it can be said that if the arbitration agreement provides for an 
accessible and affordable forum, it will be enforced against a consumer. 982 The 
underlying approach in the US is that arbitration is as effective as court proceedings 
in adjudicating disputes and that arbitration may be in the parties' and society's 
interest. 983 
979Yalue of the claim was on average about US$ 1,000 
980 Arbitration Rules for the Resolution of Consumer Related Disputes of 15. March 2001, the consumer 
must pay a fee of US $ 125 (for small claims under US $ 10,000). 
981 ling l'AT&T319 F3d 1126, 1150 (9th Cir Cal 2003); Ingle)' Circuit Ci(1' Stores 328 F3d 1165, 1175-
1176 (9 th Cir 2003); Szetela l' Discover Bank 118 Cal Rptr 2d 862, 867-868 (Ct App 2002): Discover Bank 
\' Superior COllrt 36 Cal4th 148, 162 (2005); Dana Klussman v Cross Country Bank 134 Cal App 4th 1283, 
1291,36 Cal Rptr 3d 728, 733-734 (Cal App 2005): Aralv Earthlink 134 Cal App4th 544, 564, 36 
CaiRptr3d 229 (Cal App 2 Dist 2005) but different: Charles Provencher l' Dell Inc 409 F Supp 2d 1196 
(US District Court CD California 2006). In the Discover Bank case the Court said that an arbitration clause 
is unenforceable if found 'in a setting in which disputes between the contracting parties predictably involve 
small amounts of damages. and when it is alleged that the party with the superior bargaining power has 
carried out a scheme to deliberately cheat large numbers of consumers'. The judge in the Provencher case 
distinguished this case on its facts, by finding that there was no blanket policy in California against class 
action waivers in the consumer context 1201. The Court in the Provencher case found on the facts that the 
arbitration clause and class action waiver did not deprive the consumer of effective redress and did not 
exempt Dell from the consequences of any alleged wrongdoing 1202-1203.The Court upheld the validity of 
the clause. 1203-1204; similarlv, in Iberia Credit Bureau)' Cingular Wireless LLC Sprint Spect11l11l 
Compalll'.CclI/('I/llial Wireless 379 F3d 159. 174-175 (5 th Cir 2004) the Court also found that the bar on 
class actions is also insufficient to render an arbitration clause automatically unconscionable. 
982 Charlcs Provcllcher l' Dell Inc 409 F Supp 2d 1196 (US District Court CD California 2006) 1202-1203 
98-
o T Carbonneau fn -+71 19 
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Nevertheless, where an arbitration agreement in an adhesion contract deprives the 
consumer of access to a forum to vindicate his or her rights. an arbitration clause 
may be struck out. Hence some restrictions against consumer arbitration agreements 
exist also under the US approach. However these restrictions are insufficient to 
guard consumers from unfaimess984, as will be explained in the next section. 
2.4 A critique of consumer arbitration 
As explained in the preceding section, although there are some restrictions on 
arbitration clauses in adhesion contracts, on the whole there has been a presumption 
that arbitration agreements in such contracts are valid. This approach has been 
heavily criticised in legal literature. 985 
For example Jean Sternlight writes986 : 
'In case after case since C ... ) 1983, the Supreme Court has reiterated that arbitration 
should be preferred over litigation. However, when the parties have not knowingly 
and voluntarily agreed to arbitration, this preference has no justification as a matter 
of legislative history, nor can it be defended as a matter of policy. Instead, such an 
arbitral preference simply allows stronger parties to take advantage of weaker 
parties. ' 
William Park has stated987 : 
'The value of even-handed adjudication, which commends arbitration among 
sophisticated business managers, sometimes gets lost when form contracts are 
imposed on ill-informed individuals by manufacturers or employers with grossly 
984 W Park fn 40 22-23 
985 R Alderman 'Pre-Dispute Mandatory Arbitration in Consumer Contracts: A Call for Reform' (Winter 
~OOI) ~8 HOlistoll LGlI' Rel'i£»\' 1237-1268,1240-1242: P Carrington 'Regulating Dispute Resolution 
Provisions in Adhesion Contracts' (Winter 1998) 35 Harl'ard Journal on Legislation 225-2~ 1.225-226; ] 
StemIight fn 655 704-705; M Budnitz fn 916 287: R Reuben fn 128 1032 
QK0 . _ ] Sternhght fn 65) 711 
987 \\' P f 
. ark n 40 21 
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disproportionate bargaining power. The result may be a distant forum of uncertain 
integrity. ' 
Therefore, calls have been made that pre-dispute arbitration agreements should be 
unenforceable unless there is a voluntary and fully informed waiver.988 The main 
problem with consumer arbitration agreements is that consumers have no real 
choice, as the arbitration clause is usually imposed on them. 989 
There are six factors which may potentially render arbitration as a process unfair to 
consumers. This does not mean that arbitration is always unfair to consumers, how 
these factors weigh against the efficiency gains described in Chapter Five 990 
depends on the circumstances of each case. Most of these factors have already been 
discussed in the general discussion of due process in Chapter Six. However, they 
will briefly be listed again here in the specific context of consumer arbitration as an 
example of a power imbalance situation and explain how they disadvantage 
consumers more than businesses.991 
2.4.1 The risk of systemic bias against consumer complainants 
This has been discussed in great detail in Chapter Six and the reader is referred to 
that discussion.992 The root causes for such systemic bias in the consumer context 
are the repeat player effect993 explained in Chapter Three994 . 
988 R Aldennan fn 985 1264-1265; P Carrington fn 985 230-231: J Stemlight fn 655705; M Budnitz fn 916 
333-335; R Reuben fn 128 1032 
989 R Aldennan fn 985 1240, 1246 et sequi; P Carrington fn 985226; J Stemlight fn 655 676-677 
990 5_5.2 
991 In this discussion I rely mainly on US sources and literature, as in the UK mandatory pre-dispute 
arbitration clauses are frequently not binding (see the last section). In the US consumers are also 
disadvantaged as arbitration deprives them of the benefits of class action. and in some areas, also of the 
benefit of punitive damages, see for a discussion of this M Budnitz fn 916285-286. Since these are features 
specific to the US litigation systems, they wi1I not be further discussed here. 
9¢~ 6-3 
99, J Stemlight fn 655 678-679, 684-685: M Budnitz fn 916 294 
9901 ~ __ ? 
- ).-
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995 6-4 
It has been explained in Chapter Six that the concept of a fair hearing is a flexible 
one and that in arbitration particularly it is common practice to take short-cuts in the 
quantity and quality of evidence adduced.995 This sets the consumer in a B2C e-
commerce dispute at a particular disadvantage, as usually the consumer has to pre-
pay for any goods or services, so that if a dispute arises the consumer will be the 
claimant, who has to prove the facts to substantiate the claim.996 
2.4.2 Transaction costs 
Arbitration mayor may not be cheaper than litigation. For consumer disputes it may 
well be that small claims proceedings are cheaper. The point is here that court 
judges need not be paid, whereas arbitrators must be paid (unless the business bears 
all the cost). If the arbitration agreement applies a law foreign to the consumer, he 
or she may incur additional cost in obtaining foreign legal advice. 997 
2.4.3 Confidentiality 
In Chapter Six I have also discussed the implications of confidentiality for due 
process.998 The first main point is that confidentiality exacerbates the informational 
inequality between the parties.999 Secondly confidentiality deprives the law of a 
precedent. If there is no precedent the law cannot develop in a coherent fashion. 1000 
If there are no cases interpreting consumer protection legislation it can be argued 
that this disadvantages consumers generally, as it makes consumer protection 
legislation less effective. 1001 Thirdly the non-publication of arbitration awards 
996 J Stemlight fn 655 678-679, 683-684; M Budnitz fn 916 31 L 314; E Thornburg fn 641 206-207 
997 R Aldennan fn 985 1241-1242, 1249 et sequi; J Sternlight fn 655 678-679. 682-683 
998 6-6 
999 M Budnitz fn 916 285, 287 
1000 6_6.1.3 
1001 R Aldennan fn 985 1242. 1258, 1262 et sequi: P Carrington 985 229 
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means that there is not the same scrutiny and criticism of awards as there is with 
public judgments. 1002 
2.4.4 No reasons and no appeal 
The arbitration agreement a business imposes on a consumer may well provide that 
no reasons should be given and that the award is final. The implications of this have 
been discussed in Chapter Six 1003. This is problematic, since this renunciation of 
rights has been imposed by one side, and may disadvantage the consumer as 
claimant disproportionately because of the repeat player effect 1004 .1005 
2.4.5 Applicable law 
The business may state in an arbitration agreement which law is to apply to the 
dispute, thereby defeating or curtailing mandatory consumer protection provisions, 
which may otherwise apply. 1006 Secondly since the judicial review of arbitration 
awards on the merits is limited, arbitrators may not properly apply the law 1007 and in 
particular they may not apply (foreign) mandatory consumer protection laws. 1008 
These two factors mean that consumer protection law is less effective than it 
otherwise would be. 1009 
2.4.6 One-sided procedure 
Finally since the business acts as experienced repeat player and selects the 
arbitration institution and shapes the procedure to its own advantage, this further 
100~ Mentioned by J Sternlight fn 655678-679,686: M Budnitz fn 916 327-328; E Thornburg fn 641 210-
211; H Perritt fll 432 681 
1003 6_5: 6-7 
1004 6-6.1.1 
1005 J Sternlight fn 655 678-679, 686 
1006 4_4.5 
1007 S Ware fll 316 719-720 
1008 E Thornburg fn 0-+ 1 216 
1009 J Sternlight fn 655 678-679, 685: cf M Budnitz fn 916285 doubts whether the fact that arbitrators do 
not have to apply strict law necessarily disadvantages consumers 
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disadvantages the one-shot player consumer. 1010 This puts the principle of party 
autonomy on its head, as in fact only one of the parties is autonomous. More 
generally it can be said that the principle of procedural party autonomy is 
problematic, if there is a great power imbalance between the parties. 
2.5 Conclusion 
As the example of consumer disputes has shown, traditional, commercial 
arbitration may not be the suitable paradigm for solving all disputes arising on the 
internet. In a situation of considerable power imbalance, such as consumer e-
commerce disputes, there is no voluntary and informed waiver of due process. For 
internet disputes it is no solution to provide that pre-dispute arbitration clauses 
should not be binding, as this would deprive the weaker party of all access to 
redress, as the courts are not a viable or affordable option. This is even more the 
case where the parties are located at a distance or even in two different jurisdictions. 
Hence this is a Catch 22 situation for internet disputes: on the one hand traditional 
arbitration is not working to provide fair dispute resolution in a situation where 
there is a considerable power imbalance between the parties, such as consumer e-
commerce disputes. On the other hand it is no good to simply limit the availability 
of arbitration in the online environment, as it is the only viable form of binding 
dispute resolution. Hence, the controls on arbitration clauses provided by the law on 
unfair contract terms (in the UK and the EU) or adhesion contracts (in the US) are 
not effective to ensure the fairness of arbitration and not sufficient to protect 
consumers. The outcome of this is that arbitration has to change for internet 
disputes- it has to reinvent itself to cater for a wider range of internet disputes and 
disputants. Arbitration has to comply with stricter due process standards, when 
employed for the solution of internet disputes, at least where there is a power 
imbalance between the parties. If online arbitration is the only viable binding 
dispute resolution procedure in many cases (and not only an alternative to 
1010 R Alderman fn 985 1 ~42, 1 ~53 et sequi; P Carrington fn 985 226; J Stemlight fn 655 685; M Budnitz 
fn916293 
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litigation), it is crucial that due process standards are incorporated into online 
arbitration of internet disputes, as waivers are not in fact voluntary or possible. 
The second example for due process and arbitration of internet disputes is the 
UDRP. 
3. UDRP as a Model for Online Dispute Resolution 
This section describes the UDRP, analyses its procedural fairness and discusses to 
what extent this procedure could serve as a model for the resolution of internet 
disputes. 
3.1 Brief description of the UDRP 
ICANN, the body tasked with governing the internet domain name system by the 
US government, adopted the UDRP on 26. August 1999. The UDRP is designed to 
solve disputes between a trade mark owner and a domain name registrant 1011 , where 
the registrant has registered a domain name identical or confusingly similar to the 
trade mark, the registrant has no rights or legitimate interests in the name and the 
registrant has registered and used the domain name in bad faith. 1012 The UDRP 
cannot be used to deal with conflicts between two trade mark holders or between a 
trade mark holder and a registrant who has rights or legitimate interests. In 
particular, the UDRP does not apply if the registrant has been known by the name 
or used it in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services or for a 
I " . 1 1013 egItlmate non-commerCIa purpose. 
The UDRP has been drafted narrowly to combat the internet phenomenon of 
cybersquatting, ie the registration of a domain name similar to a trade mark for an 
1011 F· . h d b· or generIC top-level domams suc as .com an . 1Z 
101' 
- Paragraph 4 (a) UDRP as approved by ICANN on 24. October 1999, 
~\w".icann.org/dndr/udrp!polic\.htm [ 14. September 2007] 
101 ~ 
. Paragraph 4 (c) UDRP as approved by ICANN on 24. October 1999. 
!.lttp:, \\'ww.icann.orgidndr.'udrp'policy.htm [14. September 2007] 
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illegitimate purpose, such as selling the domain name to the trade mark owner or to 
a competitor of the trade mark owner, preventing the trade mark owner from 
reflecting the name in the corresponding domain, vexing the trade mark owner or in 
order to deflect traffic from the (famous) trade mark owner onto the registrant's 
own site, who may, by this last tactic increase traffic and advertising revenue. 1014 
A further discussion of the substantive issues of the UDRP is outside the scope of 
this thesis. Suffice to say here that the UDRP (and its associated rules) do not 
merely lay down the procedure for the dispute resolution, but also forms the 
applicable substantive law for the resolution of disputes within its scope. The main 
consideration in the design of the UDRP was to create a convenient, cost-effective 
and fast procedure to combat cybersquatting. 1015 
The UDRP as a procedure lO16 is similar to arbitration in that a private adjudicator (a 
one or three member panel) produces a decision binding on the parties. However 
the procedure is not strictly speaking arbitration, as the decisions are not fmal and 
do not have res judicata effect between the parties10l7 . Either party can start 
proceedings before a competent court after the panel has produced a decision. IOI8 
Like arbitration, the UDRP is based on a contractual regime. The UDRP has been 
described as a . contractually-mandated private system for the benefit of non-
1014 b Paragraph 4 (b) UDRP as approved by ICANN on 24. Octo er 1999, 
http:' w\\'w.icann.org/dndr/udrp!policv.htm [14. September 2007]; WIPOCase No D2006-0882 Geoffrey 
Inc \' NOT THE USUAL 
1015 Para 38 WIPO Report New Generic Top Level Domains: Intellectual Property Considerations 
1016 Th d d'" P d ' e UDRP calls the procedure 'Man atory A mmlstratlve roce ure 
101~For the relationship between court proceedings and the UDRP see below. For arbitration the award 
disposes of the dispute between the parties, A Redfern, M Hunter fn 270459; cf for the position under the 
UDRP, S(c17::c11'. Pifer WL 1419016 (District Court W.D.Wash 2006) Decision of 22. May 2006: Storey l' 
Cello Holdings LLC 347 3Fd 370, 373-4,381 (2nd Cir NY 2003); Parisi l' Netlearning Inc 139 F Supp 2d 
745,752 (District Court ED Va 2001); Sal/en 1'. Corinthians Licenciamentos LTDA 273 F3d 14,26-27 (lSI 
Circuit 2001): see also N ChatteIjee 'Arbitration Proceedings under ICANN's Unifonn Domain Name 
Dispute Resolution Policy- Myth or Reality' (.2006) 10 Vindobona Journal of International Commercial 
Law & Arbitration 67-90, 86-87: C Emerson, 'Wasting Time in Cyberspace: The UDRP's Inefficient 
Approach Toward Arbitrating Internet Domain Name Disputes' (2004) 34 University of Baltimore Lm\' 
RC1'iclI' 161-197, 177 1018 Paragraph 4 (k) UDRP 
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. . '}019 Th' 
contractmg partIes . IS works as follows. The domain name registrant has 
agreed to submit disputes to the UDRP regime under the terms of the contract 
between the domain name registrar and the domain name registrant. However this 
agreement is in no sense voluntary. ICANN, as the ultimate regulator of the domain 
name system, has imposed a requirement on each domain name registrar to 
incorporate the UDRP into their contracts with their customers. The UDRP is a 
regulatory dispute resolution scheme implemented by a chain of contracts. 1020 
Furthermore, the decisions are also binding, since they are enforced by action of the 
registrar if neither party commences litigation before the courts. 1021 The registrars 
are contractually obliged (as part of their licence from ICANN) to comply with an 
order by a panel to cancel or transfer a domain name. Since the only remedy a panel 
can award is to cancel or transfer a domain name 1022 (panels cannot order any other 
remedy such as damages), the order of a panel can directly be implemented by the 
registrar, who has the de facto power to cancel or transfer domain names. This 
means that the UDRP is self-enforcing 1 023 . While this is effective it creates the risk 
that the process is not seen as legitimate, if it does not comply with due process. 1024 
To the extent that the UDRP lowers the hurdle for complainants by cutting the cost, 
time and effort to seek redress, it can be said that it shifts the burden to litigate 
before the courts from the trade mark holder to the domain name registrant, who has 
to go to court to prevent or remedy a transfer or cancellation of the name. However. 
the mere fact that the UDRP shifts the burden to litigate from the trade mark holder 
1019 f h D' R I' P , E Thornburg 'Fast, Cheap and Out of Control: Lessons rom t e ICANN Ispute eso utlOn rocess 
(Spring 2002) 6 Journal of Small and Emerging Business Lav.' 191-233,197 
1020 Parisi l' Netlearning jnc 139 FSupp2d 745, 751 (District Court ED Va 2001): Storey v Cello Holdings 
LLC ~47 3Fd 370,381 (2nd Cir NY 2003) 
10'1 b ~ . I . d' . ~ I 
- The UDRP states that the registrar waits ten days elore Imp ementmg a eCIslOn to transler or cance 
the domain name in order to see whether the registrant commences court proceedings Para 4 (k). See also 
below 7-3.'2.7 
IO~~ P h 4 (.) UDRP aragrap I 
I02.~ In fact some courts have held that a UDRP decision cannot be enforced as an arbitration aw·ard. see for 
example in relation to para. 10 FAA Parisi "/'/ctlearning Inc 139 F Supp 2d 745. 752 (District Court ED 
\'a 2001): Dluhos ". Strasberg, 321 F.3d 365, ~72-73 (3 rd Circuit 2003) 
1024 L Helfer 'Whither the UDRP: Autonomous. Americanized or Cosmopolitan?' (2004) 12 Cardo::o 
Journal of International and Comparatin' Lmt' 493-.:"0.:".496 
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to the domain name registrant within its (narrow) scope does not render the UDRP 
automatically unfair. 1025 
F· 1026 d' l' . 'd lve lspute reso uhon servIce provi ers have received ICANN approval. At 
present, only thee are deciding cases under the UDRP: the Arbitration and 
Mediation Center ofWIPO lO27, the National Arbitration Forum (NAF)1028 and the 
Asian Domain Name Dispute Resolution Centre (ADNDRC)1029. The complainant 
trade mark owner selects which of the dispute resolution service providers should 
hear the case. 1030 
For .eu domain names, the European Commission has set up, in conjunction with 
the .eu registry (EURID) a dispute resolution procedure clearly modelled on and 
almost identical to the UDRP. 1031 The first (and to date only) dispute resolution 
provider accredited to resolve disputes under this .eu ADR policyl032 is the Czech 
Court of Arbitration 1033. In the text procedural variations will be pointed out, as they 
are relevant and significant for the due process discussion. 
10'5 . 
- Suggested In E Thornburg fn 641 193 and the same author fn 1019215-216 
1026 ICANN has approved a total of five dispute resolution service providers, however two of these have 
ceased to accept cases. E-Resolution has ceased operations on 30. November 2001. Recently (1. January 
2007) CPR has also ceased to accept UDRP cases. This ssection refers to the CPR Rules, where they 
contained interesting points, but it should be noted that the scheme is not operative. CPR had registered 141 
cases (including pending cases) until 11. July 2006. CPR has ceased to accept new UDRP cases since 
January 2007 
1027 WIPO has 8925 cases on its files (including pending cases) until 11. July 2006, see 
http://arbiter.wipo.intldomains!statistics/cumulativecountries.html [11. July 2006] 
1028 NAF has registered 6694 cases (including pending cases) until 11. July 2006 see 
l~t~f 'doll1<l.i.l:s.adrforum.com/decision.aspx [1.1. Jul~ 2006] . . 
- The BeIJIng office has had about 88 cases (IncludIng pendIng cases) untIl July 2006, the Hong-Kong 
office about 84 (including pending cases), see http://www.adndrc.orgadndrciindex.html[ 11. July 2006] 
1000 -Paragraph 4 (d) UDRP 
10JI See Articles 11-23 of Commission Regulation 874/2004 of 28. April 2004 laying down public policy 
rules concerning the implementation and functions of the .eu Top Level Domain. see OJ L162 of 30. April 
1004 pAO 
1032 Like the UDRP this does not compromise any mediation (unlike the Nominet procedure- Nominet 
claims to settle 60°'0 of all its cases by mediation, see http:"ww.nominet.org.uk,disputes/drs ) [ 14. 
September 2007] 
111;\ Appointed by EURID on 12. April 2005 
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This sub-section has given a brief outline of the purpose and structure of the UDRP. 
The task of the next section is to provide a critique of the procedure from the 
viewpoint of due process. 
3.2 A critique of the UDRP 
This section analyses the due process issues arising from the UDRP. 
3.2.1 Independence and impartiality 
(a) Complainant win rates 
Various studies have examined the statistical outcomes ofUDRP decisions. Milton 
Mueller has found in his early study conducted in 2000 that trade mark owners 
succeed in obtaining the disputed domain name in about 80 per cent of the time on 
average across all dispute resolution service providers. 1034 Some six years later, this 
figure of the average percentage of complainant winning across all dispute 
resolution providers has increased to around 84 per cent. 1035 While these figures in 
themselves seem high, they do not, by themselves, evidence any unfairness in the 
procedure, as it is impossible to know what percentage of cases are 'true' 
cybersquatting cases. 1036 
IO'~ M Mueller 'Rough Justice- an Analysis ofICANN's Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy" Research 
Report published by the Convergence Center, Syracuse University School of Information Studies dated 
November 2000, p.1 0 Table 3 (this does not take into account the cases settled or withdrawn) and published 
as 'Rough justice: A Statistical assessment ofICANN's Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy' (2001) 17(3) 
The Information Societr 153-163 
IO~:i The group of UDRP dispute resolution providers has changed since then, as ADNDRC has started to 
operate only in April 2002 and e-Resolution has gone out of business. However the lion share of the meat 
of cases is still heard by WIPO and NAF, see fn 1038. The author has examined the statistics of each 
provider as shown on the respective websites on 12. July 2006. This figure ignores not only pending cases 
but also any withdrawn cases or split decisions and is therefore higher than the figures detailed below fn 
1040. This method has resulted in 10680 claimant win cases out of a total of 12675 cases (not counting 
withdrawn cases), equaling 84.3%. 
103b It is impossible to judge the fairness of a procedure merely by the win-lose rate of a particular pany. sec' 
also the discussion of fairness in 2-4 
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More interesting is to compare the 'complainant win' rate of each dispute resolution 
provider with that provider's market share. Milton Mueller found in 20001037 that 
the complainant success rate between the different providers varies considerably 
and that the two providers with the overwhelming market share have each much 
higher complainant success rates 1038 than the provider with the lowest market 
h 1039 1040 H th . h h h fi . . . s are. e poses e questIOn w et er t ese Igures are an IndIcatIOn for 
systemic bias, as the complainant selects the dispute resolution provider. who, as a 
consequence, has an incentive to appear to be 'complainant-friendly', in order to 
increase its market share. 1041 In order to avoid such systemic problems, he 
recommends that, the registrar of the domain name concerned rather than the 
complainant should choose which dispute resolution provider hears the case. 1042 
1037 MMuellerfn 103414-16 
1038 WIPO- 67.5% and NAF- 71.5% complainant win rate (these figures include the withdrawn/settled 
cases), p.11 Table 4; WIPO- 61 % and NAF 31 % market share, p.14 Chart 4 
1039 e-Resolution complainants won in 44.2% of cases (this includes the withdrawn/settled cases) p.11 
Table 4; e-Resolution market share 7%, p.14 Chart 4 
1040 Ignoring any pending cases, I have counted the number of decisions in which the domain name(s) was 
(were all) transferred or cancelled (claimant win) and the cases where the claim was denied (respondent 
win), as well as those cases, which were withdrawn or where the panel returned a split verdict, ie where 
there are several domain names and only some are transferred (neither claimant nor respondent wins). My 
analysis of the website data of 12. July 2006 (see fn 1035) has produced the following figures: 
WIPO NAF CPR ADNDRC 
Complainant win 66.3% 74.5% 54.2% 54.1% 
Market share 55.9% 42.5% 0.9% 0.7% 
ThiS would tally with Milton Mueller's figures- however I have not exammed other factors such as pnce or 
country of origin of complainants. 
1041 See fn 1034 18: 'it proves that forum-shopping exists to some degree'. He also examined other factors 
such as price, which he concludes is not a strong explanatory factor (p. 15) and the complainant's country 
of origin, which he found significant (NAF for US complainants; WIPO for complainants outside the US, 
p.l7) and speed of decision (p.18). He nevertheless concludes that decision outcome is the strongest factor 
(p.18). See also M Halpern, A Mehrotra, 'Exploring Legal Boundaries Within Cyberspace: What Law 
Controls in a Global Marketplace?' (2000) 21 Unh'ersi(r of Pennsylvania Journal of International 
Economic Lml' 523-561, 558 and M Geist 'Fair.com? An Examination of the Allegations of Systemic 
Unfairness in the ICANN UDRP' (2002) 27 Brookfvn Journal of International Lm!' 903-937,906 and M 
Froomkin, D Post Froomkin and Post Send Letter to IC-il'v7\' Board. Letter of 26. January 2000 a\ailable 
from http:'lw\\\\,icannwatch.org archiH' pOSl fwomkin udrp letter.htm [14. September 2007] and M 
Froomkin 'ICANN's Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy- Causes and (Partial) Cures' (2002) 67 Brookfrll 
Lcm Review 608-718, 672-673 
Ill~~ See fn 1034 19-20: M Froomkin fn 1041 673: this. however may lead to the reverse problem that 
sen'ice providers have to appear to the registrant friendly. 
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The claim, that forum shopping according to outcome leads to bias, while striking, 
should at least be questioned. It is difficult to demonstrate a clear and persuasive 
causal link between the forum s~opping and the actual decision-making. This does 
not mean that such a link does not exist. Providers have an incentive to create the 
right perception about dispute outcomes in the minds of the complainants' advisors. 
1043 Th' . ~'d I . . e IncentIve lor provi ers to appear comp ainant-fnendly mayfurthermore 
indirectly impact on the independence and impartiality of the panellists themselves. 
but this is extremely difficult to show. 1044 The provider's role is limited to providing 
administrative support. 1045 The following discussion will therefore mainly focus on 
the impartiality and independence of the panellists. 
(b) Impartiality and independence of the panellists 
First of all, it should be pointed out that the individual panellists are subject to an 
express obligation of independence and impartiality and have to declare any 
conflicts of interest. 1046 
The panels have held that a panel must only recuse itself if there are grounds on the 
basis of which a reasonable, objective person would doubt the panellisfs 
impartiality. This would be the case if the panellist had a conflict of interest, such as 
a financial interest or had represented a party or a third party in a dispute against 
one of the parties or where the panellist had demonstrated personal bias. The 
evidence relating to bias must establish more than just a hint or insinuation, it must 
establish serious doubt. 1047 This is roughly in line with the traditional jurisprudence 
on independence and impartiality outlined in Chapter Six. 1048 
10·B. '0 
. M Froomkm fn 1041 690; E Thornburg fn 1 019 ~.;. 
1044 In the case WIPO Case No D2001-0558 AFMA Inc l' Globemedia the panel pointed out that the 
provider's role is limited to the administration of cases and refused to accept that the provider can be 
biased. 
1045 See also the discussion of bias and the difficulty of proving actual bias in 6-3.1.1 
(Iql' Rule 7 Rules for the UDRP; Supplemental Rules: Art.9 ADNDRC. Art.7 CPR. Art.IO NAF and Art.8 
WIPO 
IO·P WIPO Case No D200 1-0505 Britannia Building Society 1'. Britannia Fralld Prevention 
1048 ()_) 
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However the UDRP rules do not expressly provide for a challenge of the panel by 
one of the parties before an independent third party on the grounds of lack of 
independence or partiality. 1049 Clearly a provision allowing either party to challenge 
the appointment of a panellist before an independent third party body, even after a 
decision has been made, is necessary to render these provisions effective in 
preventing the appointment of biased panellists. 105o This independent body could be 
an appeals bodyl051 or a court. 
Secondly, the providers can influence the outcome of decisions through the 
selection and allocation of panellists 1 052. For this reason it is necessary to examine 
in more detail who are the panellists and how are panellists allocated to a particular 
case. 
(c) Selection of panellists 
In connection with the question who the panellists are, it is important to address 
questions of systemic bias. 1053 For example, if all panellists were practising trade 
mark lawyers representing trade mark owners' interests in their professional 
capacity carrying out their 'day' job, it could be concluded that such panel 
composition is indicative for systemic bias, even if the individual panellist cannot 
be shown to be biased. Unsurprisingly, the panels themselves have not accepted any 
Ilqq Only the .eu ADR Rules and the NAF Rules expressly provide for a challenge of a panellist on the 
basis of lack of impartiality, independence or integrity, but then only before the institution itself and not an 
independent third party, see .eu ADR Rules, Rule 5 (c) -(e) and Rule 10 (c) - (e) NAF Rules available 
from 
http://domains.adrforum.convmain.aspx?itemID=6~ 1 &hideBar= F alse&navID="3 7 &ne\\s=.2h [ 14. 
September 2007] 
1050 M Froomkin fn 1041 689; see the discussion about appeals, below 7-3.2.6 
1051 S h d' . b I 
c cc t e IScuSSlon e ow 
105:! As Milton Mucller points out himself. fn 1034 11 
105\ S d' . f . b' . 6 3 ") 6 
. ,cc ISCUSSlon 0 systemic las 111 - ._. 
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arguments that trade mark lawyers should not sit on panels on the grounds of bias, 
since there was no sign of the individual panellist' s bias.1054 
While in commercial arbitration it has been widely accepted that arbitrators are 
appointed who are active in the relevant sectorl055 the same should not be 
automatically assumed for the UDRP procedure, which is mandatory and public. M 
Scott Donahey also suggests that the requirements for appearance of impartiality 
have to be more stringent under the UDRP than in commercial arbitration, as 
'the parties interested in the UDRP process are often private individuals with little 
experience with the litigation process or with trade mark law. The audience of the 
UDRP process is far more likely to find an appearance of impropriety in a given 
. . ( ),1056 sItuatIon .... 
He argues, while asserting the actual integrity and impartiality of the panels, that it 
would be better if no panellists were representing clients in (other) UDRP 
procedures to avoid allegations of systemic bias. However he also argues that this is 
unrealistic, as it would effectively bar practitioners from serving as panellists. 1057 
By way of example looking at the CV s of the panellists on the WIPO panel, it 
appears that the majority of them are indeed trade mark lawyers, but a significant 
proportion of panellists have a different background. For example, 48 panellists out 
of391 are academics. This figure amounts to 12.3%.1058 The bulk ofpanellists are 
trade mark lawyers. The high proportion of trade mark attorneys among UDRP 
1054 WIPO Case No D200I-0505 Britannia Building Socie~1' \'. Britannia Fraud Preventiol1: WIPO Case No 
D2004-0535 United S('lTices Automobile Association \' Ang Wa Assoc 
1055 6_3.2.3 
105(1 M Scott Donahey 'The Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Process and the Appearance of 
Pal1iality- Panelists Impaled on the Horns of a Dilemma' (2002) 19 (1) Journal of International Arbitration 
D-38,35 
1057 M Scott Donahey fn 1056 38 
I(I)X Looking at the list ofWIPO panellists on the relevant website on 15. July 2006 and counting the 
pannelists on the lists whose C" indicated that their main occupation is academic. It is fair to say that there 
is a lower likelihood of systemic pro-trade mark holder bias among academics than there is among trade 
mark lawyers (this is an assumption made). 
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panellists should be criticised. A more balanced composition of the panel lists 
would be desirable. 1059 
(d) Allocation of panellists 
As to the question of how panellists are allocated to individual cases, Michael Geist 
found that this is an important and troubling aspect of the UDRP in this context. 1060 
This raises the question whether, if appointment is left to the provider, providers are 
apt to appoint panellists who have shown pro-complainant leanings. This problem is 
mitigated if the parties influence the appointment of panellists. 
At a minimum, the parties can decide whether the case should be heard by a one-
member or three member panel. 1061 However, the parties do not choose who 'sits' 
on the single member panel- panellists are appointed by the dispute resolution 
service provider. 1062 If the complainant or the respondent decides that the case 
should be heard by a three member panel, each party should provide a list 
nominating three candidates for appointment and the provider selects one member 
from each list. The third member of the panel is determined from a list of five 
possible candidates drawn up by the provider, usually by each party deleting two 
names from that list. 1063 So for three member panels, the parties cannot appoint the 
panellists, but at least they have some degree of influence over panel composition. 
Therefore, non-transparent or even biased panel allocation is more of an issue for 
single member panels, as for cases coming before three- member- panels, the 
1059 M Froomkin fn 1041 693; S Ware fn 316 163: looking at the CVs of the panelists used for the .eu 
domain name ADR it also seems the case that the majority of panelists are IP attorneys, see 
http://w\\'w.adr.euiadr/panelists/index.php [14. September 2007] 
1060 M Geist fn 1041 911: 'The study finds that influence over panel composition is likely the most 
important controlling factor in determining case outcomes.' 
1061 UDRP Rules 3 (b) (iv) and 5 (b) (iv) available from http://www.icann.ol"!:?:idndr/udrp/uniform-
rule:--.htm#3bxiii [ 14. September 2007] 
1061 UDRP Rule 6 (b) provides that a single panellist is appointed by the dispute resolution service provider. 
This is the same under the .eu domain name procedure, Rule 4 (b) .eu ADR Rules. 
106~ UDRP Rule 6 (e) 
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parties have some influence over the panel appointment. 1064 Michael Geist 
examined the difference in the complainant-win rates for single member panels, 
with panel allocation being solely controlled by the provider, and for three-member 
panels, where the parties have some degree of control over who is appointed. This 
produced an astonishing result: for cases decided by sole panellists, complainants 
win in 83%) of cases, whereas for three-member panels that rate drops considerably 
to 58%.1065 
He posits that the reason for this remarkable difference is that respondents have an 
input on who sits on the panel and that deliberation between the panellists results in 
more balanced decision-making. 1066 For this reason he recommends that all UDRP 
cases should be heard by three-member panels. 1067 
The process for the appointment of single panellists is indeed not transparent. The 
UDRP Rules merely provide that, if no three member panel is requested, the dispute 
resolution provider selects the single panellist to decide the case. 1068 The WIPO 
Rules 1069 and the NAF Rules 1070 do not contain any supplemental provisions on the 
criteria to shed any light on the question of how single panel members are selected. 
The .eu ADR procedure also does not explain how panellists are appointed. 1071 
I()(l~ At least where the respondent takes part in the procedure 
1065 M Geist fn 1041 912.922 
1066 He excluded other factors, such as the possibility that in three-member panel cases the respondent has a 
better case and hence elects a three member panel. He found that a significant number of three-member 
panels are requested by complainants and that in some cases where a three-member panel is requested by 
the complainant, the respondent defaults (which might indicate on the contrary that the respondent has a 
'bad' case): M Geist fn 1041 923-926 
1067 M Geist fn 1041 930-931 
1068 UDRP Rule 6 (b) 
1069 WIPO Rules available from http:/.arbiter.wipo.int domainsirules'suppkmentalinde\..htm Ii:''::' [ 14. 
September 2007] 
1070N · '1 bl f AF Rules (VersIon 1. January 2006) aVaI a e rom 
http: (h)l11ains.adrforum.com/main.aspx'.>itemID=631 &hideBar= False&nadD=23 7&news=26 [14. 
September 2007] 
10'1 Rule 4 (a) merely states that 'the panelists shall be selected in accordance to the internal procedures of 
the Providers', .eu ADR Rules 
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Interestingly, the ADNDRC Rules make an exception in stating that panellists shall 
be appointed according to the following benchmarks 1072: 
(i) the nature of the dispute, 
(ii) the availability of the panellist, 
(iii) the identity of the parties, 
(iv) the independence and impartiality of the panellist, 
(v) any stipulation in the registration agreement and 
(vi) any suggestions made by the parties themselves. 
While it is laudable that the ADNDRC has attempted to fonnulate criteria for the 
selection of panellists in order to make the process more transparent, looking at the 
criteria more closely, it is questionable how useful they are, as they are vague. It is 
unclear how criterion (i), the nature of the dispute, should influence the selection. 
Furthennore the question must be asked how the identity of the parties should be 
relevant for choosing a panellist. It would be sensible to choose a panellist of the 
same nationality as the parties, if the parties are both nationals of the same 
country1073 or to choose a panellist of a nationality different from each party, where 
the parties are nationals of different countries 1074.1075 Furthennore language 
capability1076 and availability of the panellist are other important, practical criteria. 
These factors apart lO77, a completely random selection ofpanellists would be fairer. 
107~ Art.8 (1) ADNDRC Rules available from 
http:/\\'w\\.adndrc.org/adndrc'bj supplemental rules.html [14. September 2007] 
10".1 WIPO Case No D2005-0597 Tvist Givim Sanavi Pazarlama Vc Tiearet A.S \' Maehka Company 
1074 WIPO Case No D2000-0827 William' Hill Organization Limited \' Lisa Jane Statton 
1075 This may be a problem where the panelist needs to speak the language of one of the parties, see the 
discussion on language 7-3.2.4. Also WIPO Case No D 2004-0643 Tatra banka \' US ff'ARE INC where the 
appointment of the panelist was challenged on the basis that he was Czech and one of the parties was 
Slo\ak, this challenge rightly failed, as it would have been impossible to find a panelist who speaks the 
re!e\ant language, as there are few. if any, eg Korean panelists who speak Czech, 
1076 f h ' ' UDRP Rule 11 (a): the language of the proceedings should generally be the language 0 t e regIstratIOn 
agreement- this pro\'ision of course has an impact on panellist selection 
lOT' In an inter\'it'w with Christian Wichard at the WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center on 11. 
December 2003, he confirmed that these are the criteria they are applying when selecting panelists. 
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It is even more significant that the ADNDRC Rules allow the parties some 
influence over the selection, even where only a single panellist is appointed. This 
occurs in two ways. Firstly, one of the selection benchmarks is a stipulation in the 
registration agreement, which gives the registrant some influence. 1078 Secondly the 
Rules provide that, if the parties do not elect a three member panel for the dispute 
and if the respondent files a defence, the ADNDRC sends the parties a list of five 
panellists and the panellist ranking highest with both parties is appointed. 1079 
Michael Geist concludes from his analysis of the relevant data that 'case-allocation 
appears to be heavily biased toward ensuring that a majority of cases are steered 
towards complainant-friendly panellists' .1080 Such a statement is difficult to prove 
empirically (as opposed to anecdotally108l), as there may be a multitude of factors 
which determine which panellist is appointed to a case. My aim in this thesis is not 
to prove whether or not panellist allocation under the UDRP is in fact biased or 
not l082 , but merely to point out that non-transparent allocation of arbitrators to a 
case is problematic. 
There are two possible solutions to avoid any appearance of bias: one solution 
would be to allow the parties some control over the choice of arbitrator 1083 or a 
random selection, after practical criteria such as availability, nationality and 
1078 If only by choosing the registrar in the first place 
1079 If the case is a default case, then the ADNDRC appoints the single panellist without reference to a list, 
Art.8 (4) and (5) ADNDRC Rules available from 
http://www.adndrc.org/adndrc/bLsupplemental.rules.html[14.September2007].This footnote refers to 
the rules of the Beijing Office, but Art.8 is the same in the supplemental rules for the Hong-Kong and the 
Seoul Offices. 
1080 M Geist fn 1041 912,928. For example, he discovered from his analysis of the data that 53% of all 
NAF single panel cases (512 of 966) were decided by only six people, ibid. 
1081 One such anecdote is that Professor Milton Mueller has never been appointed single panelist by WIPO. 
which of course raises the question whether the reason for this is that he has criticized the UDRP as being 
complainant-biased. 
108' . ' h h hid 
- Merely working out how many cases each panelIst has heard and III how many cases e or seas ru e 
in fa\our of the complainant is probably not sufficient. as this would not take account of other factors. 
However, it would be interesting to compile these figures. as Michael Geist's study is now 5 years old and 
there are many more decided cases. This could be an interesting research project. but is outside the scope of 
this PhD. 
1083 For example by gi\'ing the parties a list of nine arbitrators from which they can each delete four. 
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language capability have been satisfied. 1084 In the context of the UDRP it may 
indeed be advisable to have all cases decided by a three-member paneL as this 
would be likely to improve the quality of the decision-making. 1085 
(e) Conclusion 
Discussing the independence and impartiality of the UDRP a distinction has to be 
made between the role of the dispute resolution service provider and the panellists. 
The independence and impartiality of the provider can only be guaranteed if 
providers are allocated randomly to cases. However the independence and 
impartiality of the panellists is more important for the outcome and should hence be 
the focus of this discussion. It is recommended here that there should be an 
independent third party ruling on any challenge brought by a party alleging a 
conflict of interest or bias of a panellist. In addition, the composition of the panels 
should be more balanced with fewer trade mark attorneys and more non-trade mark 
interests, such as academics, on the lists. Thirdly the parties should have more 
control over the allocation of the panellists to a case or such allocation should be 
random. Furthennore the introduction of three member panels for all UDRP cases 
should be considered in order to improve the quality of decision-making. 
3.2.2 Notice and service to the respondent 
Tracing a Respondent and effecting actual notice can be difficult to achieve for any 
Complainant in an international dispute. In order to overcome this issue, the Rules 
state that the Complainant need not necessarily achieve actual notice, and service is 
effected by the dispute resolution provider sending the notification and complaint to 
the contact points listed in the UDRP Rules. These are (i) all contacts in the 
\084 M Froomkin fn 1041 691-discussing all options and stateing that registrar selection would be best. 
However the problem there is that registrars themselves have an incentive to be 'registrant-friendly'- hence 
such a system might create systemic bias poled the reverse way. 
IOS5 And would still be cheaper than court proceedings: the current fees are $4000 (WIPO for 1-5 domain 
names), $$2600-2900 (NAF for 1-5 domain names). $$4,500-6000 (CPR for 1-5 domain names). $$ 2.500-
3.000 (ADNDRC for 1-5 domain names) 
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Registrar's Whois and billing database (by post, fax, email), (ii) an email to 
'postmaster@' at the disputed domain name, (iii) an email address on the website to 
which the domain name resolves and (iv) any contact details provided by the 
Respondent or the Complainant. The provider must send the Notification and the 
Complaint to all these various contact points. 1086 Since it is in the Respondenfs 
sphere of control to keep his contact details with the Registrar up-to-date, these 
provisions on notice and service are fair. 
3.2.3 Fair bearing: minimum standards and equality 
As has been shown in Chapter Six of this thesis the principle of fair hearing means 
that the parties should have a fair and equal opportunity to argue their case as to law 
and fact. 1087 The principle raises two distinct, but frequently confounded issues, 
namely minimum standards of quality and rationality, and equality. 1088 
In commercial arbitration, it is difficult to draw a bottom line of minimum 
requirements as to procedural fairness, because of the principle of party autonomy, 
with the consequence that a discussion of 'fair hearing' is usually limited to the 
issue of equality. However, the UDRP is fundamentally different from commercial 
arbitration in that it is not a voluntary, but a mandatory procedure and hence, 
fairness should have a separate meaning in addition to equality. 1089 While parties 
may freely choose to renounce procedural protections and, for example agree to 
'throw a dice' instead, they should not be forced to do so by a mandatory dispute 
1086 UDRP Rule 2 (a) 
1087 6-4.2 
1088 S ') 2 1 d 2 '1 ') ee _- . an -_._ 
1089 E Thornburg 'Fast, Cheap and Out of Control: Lessons from the ICANN Dispute Resolution Process' 
(Spring 2002) 6 Journal of Small and Emerging Business Lml' 191-233,215; M Scott Donahey 'The 
Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Process and the Appearance of Partiality- Panelists Impaled on 
the Horns of a Dilemma' (2002) 19 (1) Journal of International Arbitration 33-38. 34-35: see also Parisi \' 
!Vcl/earning Inc 139 FSupp2d 745, 751 (District Court ED Va 2001): 'the UDRP's unique contractual 
arrangements renders the FAA's pro\'isions for judicial review of arbitration awards inapplicable'. This is a 
similar argument as the one advanced in relation to consumer arbitration above. 7-2: S Ware 'Domain 
Name Arbitration in the Arbitration-Law Context: Consent to, and Fairness in the UDRP' (2002) 6 Journal 
of Small and Emerging Business Law 129-165.150. He argues that fairness is secondary to consent and 
since domain name registrants consent to participate in the UDRP when registering a domain name, this 
provides sufficient legitimacy. see pp. 153-154 
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resolution procedure. 1090 The reason for this is that the UDRP is not an entirely 
private procedure, but has public law elements. 1091 
An examination of whether the UDRP provides for a fair hearing therefore raises 
the two questions whether the UDRP complies with minimum standards offaimess 
and whether the UDRP treats both parties equally. With these two questions in 
mind the procedural rules are examined. 
These two principles are contained in Rule 10 (b) of the UDRP Rules, which 
provides that 'in all cases, the Panel shall ensure that the Parties are treated with 
equality and that each Party is given a fair opportunity to present its case'. 
This statement of principle notwithstanding, each party's opportunity to present its 
respective case is severely and stringently curtailed in five ways. 
(a) No (online) hearings 
First, both parties are affected by the rule that there are no hearings absent any 
exceptional circumstances. 1092 The UDRP Rules make clear that this includes any 
form oftele-, web- or video-conferencing. 1093 In practice this means that any form 
of hearing will be extremely rare. 1094 
1090 I am, of course, not asserting here that the decision-making process under the UDRP is the equivalent 
to throwing a dice. 
1091 This has been recognized by the US Courts. For example in Eurotech Inc l' Cosmos European Travels 
AG 189 FSupp 2d 385,392 (District Court ED Va 2002) the Court held that 'arbitration' under WIPO 
auspices was not an entirely private matter. as WIPO was a quasi-public organization. 
109~ UDRP Rule 13 
109" ibid 
1094 69 liT' d WIPO Case No. D2001-0830 AT&T C01p. 1'. Randy Thompson, WIPO Case No. D2001-13 lVrnten 0 
o(America Inc l' Enic. Net, WIPO Case No. D2004-1 042 Jenna Massoli p/kla Jenna Jameson \' Linq 
Entertainment Inc and in NAF Case No 95752 Millennium Broadcasting C01poration " Publication France 
,Honde the Panels refused to follow a request for an oral hearing by stating that no such hearing is 
necessary, On inquiry by the author, case administrators at WIPO, CPR and ADNDRC (Hong Kong 
Office) have stated that they have never personally come across a case, where an in-person hearing had 
been held (Da\'id Roache-Turner. telephone conversation of 5. September 2006. Helena Tavares Erickson. 
email 15, August 2006 and Dennis Cai, email of ~ 1. August 2006) 
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1095 
The same applies for the .eu domain name procedure. 1095 Interestingly the only 
dispute resolution provider accredited to date, the Czech Arbitration Court does 
envisage the use of ICT and online hearings. In its Supplemental ADR Rules it 
provides 1096: 
"In case the Panel determines, in its sole discretion, that an in-person hearing is 
necessary, the hearing will be carried out by teleconference, video conference, or 
web conference at the CHAT address of the Provider if both Parties agree with the 
use of such technology." 
In the ordinary procedure, the parties' submissions are limited to two documents, a 
Complaint and a Response in the vast majority of cases. 1097 The issue here is the 
credibility and accuracy of these documents, there being no opportunity to probe 
this information in the examination of witnesses and the UDRP not providing any 
penalties for making false statements in the Complaint or the Response. 1098 
(b) Further submissions 
Secondly, considering this limitation of the material on which the decision is based, 
the question arises whether the Panel has the power to probe further if there are any 
gaps in the evidence. To what extents can Panels ask for further submissions or ask 
for clarification of specific points? 
The UDRP Rules provide indeed that a Panel may request further statements or 
documents. 1099 However, this power is rarely exercised. According to the Legal 
Index of all WIPO UDRP decisions, Panels have availed themselves of this power 
See .eu ADR Rule 9 
1096 Rule 7 
1097 See the UDRP Rules :3 and 5 and see the discussion on further submissions in the next section 
109X 
1099 E Thornburg fn 1019217-218 . . . .. 
UDRP Rule 12; likewise the .eu ADR Rule 8: the Panel may request or admIt. In Its sole dIscretIOn, 
further statements or documents from either of the Parties. 
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1100 
only in 0.42% of all cases. 1lOO Panels may well find it difficult to find the time to 
request and consider additional evidence, as the Panel has only 14 days from its 
. k d .. 1101 H . . 
appoIntment to rna e a eCIslOn . owever, In exceptIonal circumstances, the 
Panel can extend the time for reaching its decisions and in some of the few cases, 
where the Panels have asked for further evidence, this has been done. 1102 
(c) Complainant has no right of reply 
The third point to make here is that the Complainant has no regular right to a reply. 
The UDRP Rules do not expressly allow the parties to submit further statements or 
documents on their own initiative. 1103 The Rules merely provide that the Panel 
decides the admissibility of evidence and this includes any supplemental filings. 1 104 
The WIPO and ADNDRC Rules do not add anything to the UDRP Rules on this 
point. By contrast, the NAP Rules allow either party to file additional written 
statements or documents 1105 within five days after the deadline for the Response for 
the payment of the additional substantial sum of $400. 1106 If one party files such an 
additional statement or document, the other party is entitled to respond to it within 
five days. I 107 The CPR Rules allowed parties to submit further statements and 
documents, but left it to the discretion of each individual panel whether or not it 
admitted such further statements and documents. I 108 
While the Respondent is able to react to and answer to the allegations made by the 
Complainant, the Complainant cannot, as a matter of course, respond to the points 
raised in the Response and therefore has to anticipate and second-guess the 
38 cases out of 9008 as of 31. July 2006 
1101 Rule 15 (b) 
1102 WIPO Case No 2000-0017 Drmv-Tite Inc \' Plattsburgh Spring Inc; WIPO Case No 2003-0043 Fiji 
Rugby Union \' Webmasters Limited 
110.1 Pointed out by the Panel in WIPO Case No D2002-0635 Classmates Online Inc \' John Zliccarini 
IliI~ Rule 10 (d), WIPO Case No D2005-1246 Admerex Limited l' Metyor Inc 
1105 but no amendments to the original 'pleadings' 
1106 Rule 7 (a), (b) 
1107 Rule 7 (c) 
1108 CPR Rule 10 
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Respondent's case. This disadvantages the Complainant and is contrary to the 
principle that each party should have an opportunity to respond to the submissions 
of the other. For this reason, some WIPO panels have allowed Complainants to 
submit an additional statement to deal with unanticipated defences. 1109 On the other 
hand, in most cases the Panels have disallowed a Reply in the interest of 
expedition. I I 10 
(d) Narrow word- or page limit 
Fourthly, most dispute resolution providers provide a narrow word- or page-limit 
for the Complaint and the Response. IIII Considering that the Complaint and the 
Response contain all legal arguments as the basis for the decision. this is restrictive 
and the word- and page limits have in fact been insisted upon by providers in some 
cases. 1112 However, in other cases panels generally have taken into account the full 
submissions, even though they exceeded the word-or page limit. 1113 Furthermore, 
1109 The WIPO Legal Index of Decisions indicates that there have been 99 decisions in which a 
supplemental filing was requested and 40 of these have been granted. see http://arbiter.wipo.int/cl..!i-
bin/domains/searchllegalindex'?lang=eng#l ')300 [13. August 2006]. For example WIPO Case No. D2000-
0853 Investissement Marius Saradar S.A.L. 1'. John Naffah, WIPO Case No. D2004-0023 Custom Bilt 
Metals 1'. Conquest Consulting, WIPO Case No. D2005-0410 Southwest Airlines Co. v Cattitude a/Ida LJ 
Gehman, WIPO Case No. D2005-0508 Microsoft Corporation 1'. Source One Management Services Inc. In 
WIPO Case No. D2000-1648 Benzer v. FutureSoft Consulting Inc and Sunil Bhatia the Panel even went so 
far in saying that the Complainant had a right to reply. 
1110 In 59 out of 99 decisions, the Panels have refused to consider supplemental filings, see 
http: "arbiter.wipo.int/cgi-bin/domainsisearch/Jegalindex?lang=eng#12300 [13. August 2006]. For 
example, WIPO Case No. D2000-0166 Plaza Operating Partners Ltd l' Pop Data Technologies Inc, WIPO 
Case No. D2000-0938 Parfums Christian Dior SA l' Jadore, WIPO Case No. D2003-0447 The EW Scripps 
Company)' Sinologic Industries, WIPO Case No. D2003-0780 DK Bellevue Inc d/b/a Digital Kitchen l' 
Sam Landers 
1111 WIPO provides a word limit of 5000 words for each the Complaint and the Response, but no word limit 
for the Panel Decision, WIPO Rule 10; NAF provides that the Complaint and the Response must not 
exceed 10 pages, NAF Rules 4(a) and 5(a); CPR Rules provided the same as NAF, see CPR Rules 4 and 5 
and ADNDRC Rules provide for an even tighter word limit of only 3000 words for the Complaint and the 
Response, but no word limit for the panel decision, see Rule 13: the Czech Arbitration Court provides a 
word limit of 5000 words for the complaint, response and panel decision see .eu ADR Rule 11 
III~ See WIPO Case No D2005-0976 Giga Fty Limited 1'. Elena Sadkovaya, where the Complainant was 
asked to submit a shorter Complaint complying with the word-limit. 
11\.1 see WIPO Case No D2001-0581 T 'alera Energy C01poration l' American Distribution S)'stems; NAF 
Case No 97031 Dvkema Gossett PLLC)' DefallltData.com; in NAF Case No 122224 The Trustees o/the 
Trust Number SR~I1'. Turnberrr, Scotland Golf and Leisure the Panel found that the Respondent complied 
with the ten page limit, even th~ugh the Response was 11,000 words (which in Font Size 12 Times Roman 
would be about 22-25 pages). By contrast in NAF Case No 318079 Advanced Research & Technology. 
Institute, Inc. 1'. Eric LeT 'in the Panel refused to consider the Respondents 102-page (SIC) Response. which 
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the word- or page- limits only apply to the legal argument, not to the evidence 
adduced in any Annexes. 1114 Hence in practice this limit does not unduly restrict 
the parties' opportunity to present their respective cases. 
(e) Short time limit for filing the Response 
Fifthly, the main restriction is the short time limit for the filing of the Response. 
This is a significant restriction, which affects Respondents only. 
The Respondent has 20 days from the day on which the dispute resolution provider 
has forwarded the Complaint ll15 to file a Response- this time period is less than 
three weeks. 1116 This is a short time period in itself, if the Respondent has to find a 
lawyer, prepare his or her case and gather evidence, for example in respect of 
showing a legitimate use of the domain name 1117. Moreover, the period for 
preparing the Response is even shorter, if the Respondent cannot be reached by 
(more or less) instantaneous forms of communication such as fax and email and the 
communication is delayed in the post, or where the Respondent is an individual 
who is temporarily absent, for example on holiday. In addition, this extremely short 
time-limit for serving a Response is determinative for the outcome in a case, as 
there are usually no other opportunities to submit legal argument or evidence. 
Therefore this time-limit is likely to hamper the Respondent's defence significantly. 
mainly consisted of diatribe irrelevant to the case at issue and the Panel rightly pointed out that it was not 
its function to 'search through Respondent's venomous attacks on others to find substance somewhere 
within the many pages of offensive, boorish, racist and anti-Semitic statements'. 
1114 The word-limit only applies to the description of the grounds set out in the Policy. but does not cover 
evidence, which may be submitted in the Annexes, see WIPO Case No D2001-0558 AFMA Inc l' 
Globemedia 
1115 UDRP Rules 5 (a), 4 (c) 
1116 Under the .eu domain name procedure the respondent has 30 working days. this is about six weeks. see 
EC Regulation 874;'2994, Art.22 (8). It seems that a lesson has been learnt from the tightness of the 
deadline under the UDRP. 
1117 such as showing demonstrable preparations to use the domain name in connection \\'ith a bona fide 
offering of goods or services Para 4 (c) (i), or a showing that he or she was known under that name, Para 4 
(c) (ii) or demonstrating legitimate non-commercial fair use, Para 4 (c) (iii) UDRP Policy. 
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The UDRP Rules provide that in exceptional circumstances the dispute resolution 
provider may extend the deadline for filing the Response. 1118 This wording suggests 
that an extension is not to be granted as a matter of course and that the dispute 
resolution provider or the Panel have discretion whether or not to grant such an 
extension. 
The WIPO Rules and the ADNDRC Rules do not elaborate further on the question 
of under what precise circumstances and how the deadline for filing a Response can 
be extended. 
The NAF Rules stipulate 1 119 a procedure which must be complied with. The 
Respondent must ask the Complainant whether he or she agrees to the extension, 
must submit the request in writing before the deadline for filing the Response 
stating the exceptional circumstances for the Request and how much additional time 
is needed. The maximum extension granted is an additional 20 days and the 
Respondent must accompany the request with a filing fee of $1 00 1120. 
This raises the question whether and in what circumstances extra-time has in fact 
been allowed to Respondent and how restrictive is the criterion of 'exceptional 
circumstances' . 1121 
Looking at some of the relevant WIPO decisions 1 122, it seems that the WIPO Center 
obtains the Complainant's comments before deciding whether or not to grant an 
1118 UDRP Rule 5 (d) 
1119 NAF Rule 6 (a) (i) 
1120 Presumably this fee is to cover additional administrative costs, but also to deter Respondents. 
1121 Based on an examination of WIPO and NAF Panel decisions, as these two cover the lion-share of all 
cases. 
II~~ No quantitative research has been undertaken, analyzing all the decisions in which the issue of an 
extension of time for filing the Response or the issue of a late filing of a Response arose- a key word search 
of all WIPO domain nam; decisions for 'extension of time' in the same phrase as 'Response' indicates that 
there are 6767 decisions (as of 31. July 2006). see the search engine provided on the WIPO Center website 
~\'\'\\,-'-ill}l)_.intl~earch/elvad\'anc~d.html [31. July 2006]. A random sample of 20 WIPO cases have 
been examined in closer detail. 
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. f' ~ fil' 1123 extensIOn 0 tIme lor lIng the Response. In some cases short extensions of time 
of 2-12 days have been allowed. I 124 However the WIPO Center has been reluctant 
to grant an extension of 14 days or more in cases, where the Complainant did not 
consent to such an extension. I 125 
In reviewing the question of an extension of time Panels emphasize the duty of the 
panel to ensure that proceedings are conducted in an expeditious manner. I 126 Most 
Panels have interpreted the 'exceptional circumstances' for extension narrowly and 
likewise, several Panels have held that late responses should be disregarded absent 
real exceptional circumstances. I 127 
In sharp contrast, the NAF more readily allows extensions of time, provided a 
formal request for extension accompanied by the fee of $1 00 is filed in a timely 
11~3 UDRP Rule 5 (d) also provides that the parties may extend the time by written agreement with the 
approval of the dispute resolution provider. If the Complainant agrees to the extension of time, the WIPO 
Center will usually grant such an extension, see for example WIPO Case No. D2002-1129 Puerto Rico 
Tourism Co v Virtual Countries Inc, where the due date for the Response fell on 2. January 2003 and the 
Complainant agreed that the deadline should be extended by 20 days because of the Christmas holiday 
period. 
1124 WIPO Case No. D2004-1 030 Allee Willis v. NetHol(vwood: the Respondent asked for an extension of 
60 days, the WIPO Center permitted 7 days; WIPO Case No. D2000-1648 Benzer 1'. FutureSoJt Consulting 
Inc and Sunil Bhatia: the Panel allowed 12 days because one of the Respondents was out of his country of 
residence. 
11~5WIPO Case No. D2003-0091 International Health Insurance Danmark Forsikringsaktieselskab v 
Cortes}r. Fernando; WIPO Case No. D2004-1 030 Allee Willis 1'. NetHol(vwood; WIPO Case No. D2002-
0241 The Leading Hotels of the World Ltd. v. Online Travel Group 
1126 UDRP Rule 10 (c); wiPO Case No. D2004-1030 Allee FT'illis 1'. NetHol(vwood; WIPO Case No D2004-
0614 Museum o/Science l' Jason Date: 'otherwise parties will feel free to disregard deadlines and 
respondents will regularly submit late responses' 
11'7 h .. f h 
- In WIPO Case No. D2003-0033 l099Pro Inc v Convey Compliance Systems Inc t e maJonty 0 t e 
Panel refused to accept a Response fi I ed 10 days late, even though the Respondent was not I egall y 
represented or advised. The reason that the period concerned was the 'busiest time of our season' was not 
regarded as sufficient cause for an extension. In WIPO Case D2005-1304 Mobile Communication Service 
Inc l' WchReg the Panel refused to accept a Response 8 days late. It considered that the Respondent's 
clerical error in entering the wrong date in its calendar was not a valid ground to accept a late submission. 
nor that the Respondent's legal representative was busy on another case. In WIPO Case D2005-0994 
Fashiont1'.C0111 GmbH l' Chris Olic a Response filed two days late was disregarded. the reason being gi\'en 
was that the respondents had difficulties in obtaining evidence. Again this was not regarded as exceptional 
circumstances. Finally the mislaying of files in the respondenfs archi\'e also \\as not considered a 
sufficient ground for an extension of time in WIPO Case DR02005-0005 OMT' A G l' SC Mondokommer= 
SRL 
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manner and the procedure set out in Rule 6 (a) (i) has been complied with. 1128 The 
requirement to pay a fee has been criticised in the literature. 1129 However, the fact 
that NAF has introduced a procedure to deal with extensions and readily grants such 
extensions is usually overlooked by these authors, who claim that NAF is harsh on 
this issue. 1130 
Most NAF panel decisions do not state whether or not the Complainant has agreed 
to the extension, but the Respondent must have conferred with the Complainant as 
part of the procedure. In the few cases where the Panel did not allow an extension 
of time, the Respondent had not complied with the procedure for the Request under 
NAF Rule 6 (a) (i).1131 Where the Response was simply late, most panels have 
refused to take it into account l132, whereas a few other panels have still considered 
't l133 1 . 
The conclusion from the foregoing is that, although there is a possibility to extend 
the extremely short time-limit for serving the response in exceptional 
circumstances, this does not alleviate the problem that this time-limit is too short, as 
1128 A search for the phrase 'extension of time' in the search engine for the NAF decisions at 
http://domains.adrforum.com/decision.asp:\ [26. July 2006]: flushed out 55 records. Out of these, the NAF 
did not accept a request for an extension of time in two cases and in another four cases it did not allow a 
late Response. Many decisions simply state that the Respondent applied for an extension of time in 
accordance with the procedure and that it was granted, without detailing the exceptional circumstances 
relied on. In some cases the reasons are stated, for example, NAF has allowed an extension of time of 15 
days, where the respondent had problems in finding an available lawyer: NAF Case No. 94243 YOIJt1' Inc l' 
Erkan Alemdar or NAF Case No. 692150 Charles Letts & Co Ltd v Citipublications, where the Respondent 
was given an additional 20 days with the agreement of the Complainant, as he was out of his country of 
residence. 
11'9 
- E Thornburg fn 1019 215 
1130 . M Froomkm fn 1041 703 
1111 NAF Case No 545232 Tata Sons Ltd l' US Citizen aka Sojan Pulickal; NAF Case No 96694 Victoria's 
Secrcr ef aI1·. Shern' Hardin 
Il.l~ NAF Case No 1'14758 Foley & Lardner l' Brian G Wick: the Panelist refused to accept the Response. 
e\en though the electronic copy was filed on time, but the hardcopy form and Annexes were 4 days late: 
NAF Case No 545232 Tata Sons Ltd l' US Citizen aka Sojan Pulickal where the Response was a couple of 
days late: see also NAF Case No 95823 Wombat Enterprises Inc d/b/a Domain-It,' l' Admnced ,Vct1t'ork 
Technologies and NAF Case No 94941 Gorstel1' Limited l' Shop A-Z.com Inc 
I m For example in NAF Case No 94346 Tall Oaks Publishing Inc l' l'v'ational Trade Puhlications Inc the 
Panel took into consideration a Response which was 11 days overdue. without having been given any 
reason for the late filing: see also NAF Case No. 112469 Gaiam Inc l' /\'iclsen. where the Panel accepted a 
Response 22 days after the deadline. as the Respondent asserted that he had not received the Complaint 
until after the deadline had expired. 
"')-7 
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an extension will only be granted in really exceptional circumstances (WIPO) or is 
restricted to an additional 20 days (NAF). Furthennore the panel decisions on 
whether a late response is pennissible are inconsistent. 
The mere fact that the keyword search used to find WIPO cases 1134, in which there 
was an issue about the extension of time for filing a Response, flushed up 6767 
cases (out of a total of 9008 1135) shows that the tightness of the 20 day deadline 
causes problems for many respondents preparing their case. Milton Mueller 
explains the high default rate partly by the fact that the UDRP procedure moves so 
fast that ordinary domain name registrants may be prevented from defending 
themselves. 1 136 
It can also be argued that there is an imbalance between the Complainant and the 
Respondent: the Complainant has no time-limit for preparing the Complaint, which 
contrasts with the extremely tight deadline for Respondents. 1 137 Admittedly, this is a 
prejudice inherent in all fonns of adjudication. The party commencing the 
proceedings is always at a tactical advantage, as they may choose the right moment 
to do so. Albeit, that under the UDRP the trade mark owner always starts the 
proceedings, and the registrant is always in the position of respondent, as the UDRP 
does not allow the registrant to ask for a declaration that it had legitimate rights and 
that the registration was not abusive. In that sense it could be argued that the UDRP 
is severely discriminating against the domain name registrant, who is handicapped 
in the preparation of a defence. 
1134 A similar search was not possible for the NAF cases, as the search engine on the NAF decision site 
does not allow the use of the Boolean connector 'within', which makes it impossible to search for a phrase, 
not knowing the exact words which may be used. 
II, -
,) As of 31. July 2006 
111(, -
. M Mueller fn 1034 12 
1137 Fn 1019216 
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(f) Conclusion 
This section has discussed the procedural restrictions which the UDRP and the 
supplemental rules impose on the parties in proving their case. The question which 
has to be answered is whether these strictures make the procedure unfair. For this, it 
is important to decide which yardstick the procedure should be measured against. 
As I have said at the outset of this section, the procedural standards of traditional. 
commercial arbitration should not be applied, the UDRP being a mandatory 
procedure. If the purpose of a procedure is to establish the facts and to apply the 
law, sufficient legal argument and evidence must be allowed to make the procedure 
rational and fair. 1138 Decision outcomes, based on partial argument and facts, 
become irrational. On the other hand, too much procedure will lead to delay and 
expense, making the procedure inaccessible and slow. Hence the amount of 
procedural protections has to be proportionate to the issues at stake. 
A domain name can be extremely valuable to the parties and the application of the 
UDRP involves many fact-intensive issues, on which evidence must be led. 1139 
Such fact-intensive issues include, for example, proving the existence of an 
unregistered trade mark, the respondent's legitimate interest in the domain name or 
the question of bad faith. As discussed above the parties' opportunity to present 
their case has been severely curtailed. Many authors have stated that the UDRP is 
not suitable to decide such complex and important issues. This cannot be 
formulated more concisely than in Froomkin's words1140: 
. Without cross-examination, expert testimony and a greater inquiry into the facts 
than the current system allows, arbitrators have little choice but to shoot from the 
hip, and this increases the odds that they will miss. ' 
II." See Chapter 2 for a discussion of the relationship between rationality and fairness 
11,'1 
. E Thornburg fn 1019 198-199 
114l) . M Froomkm fn 1041 698 
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The main procedural defects identified are the rule that there are no (online) 
hearings, there is no right to a reply, the restrictions on further submissions of 
material and most significantly the short-time limit for filing the Response. These 
defects mean that the UDRP has too stringently curtailed legal argument and factual 
evidence and this restricts the amount of material the panels can consider, leading to 
irrational and inconsistent decisions. In addition there is also a violation of the 
principle of equality. The procedure does not treat the parties equally. as 
complainants have the unequal burden of anticipating the respondents' case and 
respondents are crippled by the short timeframe set for the response. It is therefore 
submitted that the procedure is unfair. 
A longer time period for filing the Response, such as eight rather than three weeks 
would not prejudice the Complainant disproportionately. Likewise, the use of ICT 
to allow for distance hearings (by web-conference, teleconferencing or video-
conferencing) may make the procedure fairer, by allowing more argument and 
evidence to be admitted, by allowing further questions be put to the parties to 
clarify issues and some limited cross-examination, without adding too much in 
terms of cost and delay. The rules governing further submissions should be relaxed 
and a right of reply introduced. These procedural issues will be taken into account 
for the due process standards established in the Model in Chapter Eight. 1141 
3.2.4 Language 
In many UDRP proceedings the Complainant trade mark holder and the Respondent 
domain name registrant will be located in different countries and will be speaking 
different languages. Hence it is not surprising that language issues have arisen in 
many proceedings. The language issue is a tricky one. Proceedings conducted in a 
language foreign to one pat1y may well deprive that party from having meaningful 
1141 8-3 
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access to the proceedings or a fair and equal opportunity to present his or her case. 
On the other hand translation may add significant COSt. 1142 
In this context it should be pointed out that an official version of the UDRP only 
exists in English. 
Rule II(a) of the UDRP Rules states that the proceedings shall be held in the 
language of the Registration Agreement. 1143 The Panel may direct that documents 
be translated into that language. 1144 The purpose of this rule is to protect the 
Respondent, who, of course, chooses the Registrar and hence has some influence on 
the language of the registration agreement and, indirectly the proceedings. 
However Rule 11 (a) also states that the Panel has discretion to direct that the 
proceedings may be conducted in another language. Clearly a rigid rule that 
proceedings should always be conducted in the language of the Registration 
Agreement does not make sense, for example where both parties are proficient and 
comfortable to communicate in the same language and the Registration Agreement 
is in a language different from that or where the Respondent 1 145, despite being 
notified in the language of the Registration Agreement, does not file a Response 1146. 
WIPO panels have made clear that the notification of the Complaint to the 
Respondent should always be in the language of the Registration Agreement to give 
114' G dD Ie' . 
- Discussed in WIPO Case No D2000-1759 Beiersdoif AG l' 00 ea ommUnlCatlOns 
II·n Same applies to the .eu ADR proceedings, see EC Regulation 874/200-+. Art.22 (4)-most panel 
proceedings are conducted in English, see http://www.adr.euiadrldecisionsiindex.php [ 1-+. September 
2007] 
1144 Rule 11 (b) 
1145 See for example WIPO Case No D2003-0679 Deutsche Messe AG l' Kim Hyungho: WIPO Case No 
02003-0989 Dassault A1'iation 1'Mr Minwoo Park in both cases the Panel determined that the Korean 
respondent was able to communicate in English without difficulty 
1146 See for example WIPO Case No D2003-0774 Amazon.com Inc l' Kim foon-Jo or \\"IPO Case No 
D2005-0407 Auchal11' Ousi1ang Chaoshi 
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the Respondent an opportunity to appreciate the true nature of the proceedings and a 
chance to object to the proceedings being held in English. I 147 
One issue may arise from the fact that for some domain name registrants there may 
be no registration agreement available in their vernacular. Presumably, most 
Registrars offer their registration agreements in their national language. For 
example for the .com generic top-level domain, most Registrars are based in the 
US/Canada, Western Europe, some in Asian countries (Korea, China, Japan, India, 
Singapore, Malaysia) and Australia & New Zealand. I 148 A domain name registrant 
in, for example Poland or Thailand would have to sign a registration agreement in a 
foreign language I 149 and thus conduct the proceedings in a foreign language and 
bear the cost of translating all documents. 
A second issue may arise from the way Panels have exercised their discretion under 
Rule 11 (a) of the UDRP. In particular, here the question arises whether panels are 
able to assess the Respondent's language proficiency merely on the basis of a one-
off communication such as a letter written to the dispute resolution provider or to 
the Complainant. In many cases panels have allowed proceedings in English on a 
vague assessment that the Respondent would be proficient in that language. I 150 
For example, in one case II5I the domain name was registered with Neptia, a Korean 
registrar and the Respondent requested in a letter, written in English, that the 
proceedings be held in Korean, pointing out that the Registration Agreement was in 
Korean and that he did not speak English well. The Panel simply took this letter 
1147 Expressly stated in the WIPO Rules, Rule 4 (a), also WIPO Case No D2000-17S9 Beiersdoif AG l' 
Good Deal Communications; WIPO Case No D200S-0407 Auchan l' Oushang Chaoshi 
1148 There are also registrars in Russia, Turkey, Jordan, Kuwait and Israel. The only Eastern European state 
was Latvia and the only South-American state was Brazil. See the list on the Verisign website at 
http:' \\\\'w.verisign.cominformation services/namin~-services com-llet-re~istr\"page OO"'lh6.html as of 
5. August 2006 
i14Q • 
Probably EnglIsh 
1150 Eg WIPO Case No D2000-1759 Beiersd01fAG l' Good Deal Communications; WIPO Case No D2003-
0679 Deutsche Messe AG ,. Kim Hnmgho; WIPO Case No D2003-0989 Dassault A1'iation,· All' AIi/nt'oo 
Park; WIPO Case No D200S-0407 Auchan l' Oushang Chaoshi, NF A Case No 110843 BE..J. Systems l' 
Park Slino Jo 
1151 ~ 
NFA Case No 110843 BEA 5.vstems l' Park Sung.To 
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itself as proof that the registrant is able to communicate in English and for this 
reason declined to conduct the proceedings in Korean and reached a default 
decision, when the Complainant did not file a Response. 
In conclusion it should be pointed out that to comply with Rules 10 (b) and 11 (a) of 
the UDRP at least the notification should be translated into the language of the 
registration agreement, Panels should be slow to infer that Respondents are 
proficient in English and Respondents should be allowed to file documents in the 
language of the registration agreement. 
3.2.5 Use of online technology 
As has been discussed in Chapter Five, the use of online technology is important as 
it renders dispute resolution more efficient and hence fairer. I 152 
The use of online technology in the UDRP procedure varies slightly between the 
different dispute resolution service providers. WIPO, NAF and ADNDRC allow the 
parties to submit the complaint and the response as an attachment to an email and to 
communicate by email. Alternatively, WIPO, NAF, ADNDRC and the Czech Court 
of Arbitration have set up an online case filing system, which enables both parties 
to file their submissions by uploading documents through the internet. In addition, 
the WIPO, NAF and ADNDRC have made available model form documents in 
d I . C' C' '1' fil' 1153 wor or e ectronlc lormat to lacl Itate 1 mg. 
As has been discussed above, the UDRP does not envisage the use of innovative 
communications for online hearings. 1154 The imaginative use of technology for real-
1151 5-5 
115.1 WIPO Rule 3 (a) (ii) and (iii), see http: W\\'w.wipo.im/amc/en/domains/filin£!/udrp!index.html. NAF 
website at http> . dOlllains.adrforum.com/main.asp\'?item ID= 27()&:hideBar= F al sl'&nadD=202&news= 21> 
and ADNDRC Rule 3 (l) and website http://w\\.\\.adndrc.orgiadndrc.bjdownload.html[ 14. September 
2007] 
1154 Contrast this with the provisions in the Czech Court of Arbitration's Supplemental .eu ADR Rules. 
discussed above 
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time interaction, such as video and web-conferencing and chat, should be 
I d l155 t . " d h d .. exp ore 0 Improve commurucatlOn an t e eCIslOn process. 
3.2.6 Lack of appeal and inconsistency of decisions 
The significance of the right to appeal for due process has been explored in Chapter 
SiX1156 . One defect of the UDRP procedure in this respect is that it does not provide 
for an appeal process whatsoever. This is the case for both challenges to procedural 
matters and appeal of substantive matters. I 157 
(a) Challenge on procedural matters 
Important in this discussion of due process is whether a party can challenge aspects 
of the procedure either before or after a decision has been reached. For example. 
one party may assert a serious irregularity of procedure, preventing it from having 
an opportunity to present its case, for example, where the Panel disregards a 
Response or a Panel may on occasion breach a procedural rule, for example by 
inadvertently allowing ex parte communications, or a party may challenge the 
appointment of a panellist on the basis of a conflict of interests. In these scenarios 
the question arises whether and how the aggrieved party can challenge the 
procedure, or, if a decision has already been reached, the decision. 
While the UDRP Rules contain various procedural protections for the parties, 
including a stipulation about fair hearing I 158 and independence and impartiality of 
1155 M Froomkin fn 1041 705; E Thornburg fn 1019219 
1156 6_7 
1157 The same is true for the .eu procedure, see .eu ADR Rule 12 (a); unlike the procedure established by 
Nominet for .uk country code domain names. which provides for an appeal to a panel of three experts. see 
ht~r \\'\\\\ .nominet.org.ukidisputes drs' appeals [14. September 2007] 
II) Rule 10 (b) 
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h I 1159 . . t e pane s , there IS no procedure for the partIes to challenge a panel decision, if 
these rules have been breached 1160 and this puts their effectiveness into doubt! 161. 
Since there is no appeal body or procedure, the only institutions apt to hear such a 
challenge is the panel itself or the dispute resolution provider. 1162 There is no 
'higher' appeal body or third party considering procedural challenges, unlike 
traditional arbitration where the ordinary courts can hear procedural challenges 
under their supervisory and/or enforcement jurisdiction. 1163 
The procedural rules of the providers are mostly silent on this point. Only the CPR 
Rules explicitly empowered the panel to decide any procedural or jurisdictional 
challenges and the CPR Rules also stated that challenges to the independence, 
impartiality or integrity of the panel itself were decided by an officer of the 
CPR.! 164 The NAF Rules state expressly that a party can challenge the appointment 
of a panellist on the grounds of lack of independence or impartiality before a 
decision has been reached by filing a request with the NAF.1165 
Procedural challenges are usually considered by the panels when reaching a 
decision. 1 166 However, no procedural challenges are possible after the panel has 
reached its decision. 
Panel decisions have found that in very exceptional cases, a panel may allow a case 
to be reheard on the application of the complainant, where in the first proceedings 
1159 Rule 7 
1160 In WIPO Case No D2001-0505 Britannia Building Society 1'. Britannia Fraud Prevention the Panel 
was concerned about this issue: 'Neither the Policy nor the Rules explicitly create a procedure by which a 
party can raise concerns about the suitability of a designated Panelist. However it is critical that a 
mechanism be provided to ensure compliance with Rule 7 and Rule 10 (b)' 
1161 M Froomkin fn 1041 689: 'Current procedures rely on arbitrators to disclose potential conflicts, but this 
is clearly insufficient, since the truly biased person will tend to downplay the extent of conflicts'. 
1162 WIPO Case No D2001-0505 Britannia Building Societl' 1'. Britannia Fraud Prevention 
1163 . 
See Chapter 6-7. as to the role of the courts see below 7-3.2.7 
1164 CPR Rule 9 
1165 NAF Rules 10 {c), (d), (e) 
1166 WIPO Case No D2004-0643 Tatra Banka l' US W4RE INC: WIPO Case No D2004-0535 United 
Sen'ices Allfomobile Association l" Ang Wa Assoc: WIPO Case No. D2000-0629 COllsor~io del Prosciutto 
di Parma l' Domain Name Clearing Company: NAF Case No 139595 cr" Ranch l" Default Data.com 
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the complainant was deprived of justice because of a serious misconduct on the part 
of a panellist, witness or lawyer, because of peIjured evidence, or more generally, 
where there has been another serious breach of due process. However, these 
decisions have held that such a refiling of the complaint is only permissible if the 
breach is so serious that it amounts to a miscarriage of justice. This establishes a 
high burden of proof. 1167 
But in any case, these rulings on rehearing the same case again only benefit the 
complainant, not the respondent. 1168 This is unfair, as it infringes the principle of 
equality between the parties giving the complainant a second bite of the apple to 
rectify infringements of due process, but not the respondent. 1169 
For these reasons, it is argued here that the UDRP rules should provide for a 
procedure to allow either party to challenge a decision if there has been a breach of 
the requirement for a fair hearing or the requirement of an independent and 
impartial panel. This could be done by way of a rehearing by a different panel, by 
appeal to a 'superior' body 1170 or appeal to a court of law. Successful challenges are 
probably rare l171 , not leading to significant costs, or delay. 
(b) Substantive appeals 
As to substantive appeals, the UDRP does not provide for an appeal in matters of 
substance. There is no procedure to review the decision on the factual findings and 
1167 Ld 'T'[ C ., L" d WIPO Case No D2000-0703 Grove Broadcastinu Co t V.l e esvstems ommUntCatlOns mllte; b . 
WIPO Case No D2000-1490 Creo Products Inc l' Website In Development; WIPO Case No DWS2002-
0001 Philips l' Relson Ltd; NAF Case 721968 AOL LLC v Robert Farris; While stating the general 
principle all these cases concerned a refilling of the Complaint based on new evidence, rather than serious 
misconduct or breach of natural justice. 
1168 . d' d I . f d' A respondent cannot counterclaIm or seek a free-stan mg ec aratJOn 0 reverse omam name 
highjacking, see by way of illustration the NAF Case No 098010 Glimcher University Mall \' GNO 
1169 . M Froomkm fn 1041 699 
11:0 The establishment of an appeal body is discussed below. 
II. I On inquiry by the author. CPR stated in an email of 15. August 2006 by Helena Tavares Erickson 
(Senior Vice-President Committees. Research & Education) that to her knowledge such a procedural 
challenge had never arisen in the few CPR cases filed. Likewise. Dennis Cai. Case Administrator of the 
:\DNDRC Hong Kong office has also replied that he is not aware of any procedural challenges to date 
(email of 21. August 2006) on file with author. 
286 
Chapter 7: Internet Disputes and Fair Arbitration 
no appeal on points of law. As has been discussed in Chapter Six 1172, the lack of an 
appeal procedure for a substantive review lowers standards for individual justice. as 
the losing party has no opportunity to correct mistakes in the application of the law. 
but also leads to a lower quality of justice overall, as there are no authoritative 
rulings on points of law, streamlining reams of inconsistent decisions. 
The lack of appeal and the discrepancies ofUDRP decisions has been heavily 
criticised in the literature. 1173 The UDRP has established a novel substantive law 
combating cybersquatting on a global basis and the panels are staffed by lawyers 
from many different legal cultures and traditions. Furthermore, panellists are free to 
take into account any law that they deem applicable. 1 174 Given this diverse and 
cosmopolitan nature of panels and the murky choice of law clause 1175, it is perhaps 
not surprising that there are many inconsistent interpretations of the UDRP. 1176 
An appeal process would help to generate coherence and a greater degree of legal 
certainty. I 177 In order to achieve this, appeal ruling should have the force of legal 
precedent. Appeals could be heard by special, more senior appeal panels, composed 
of three or five special appeal panellists. These appeal paneUists should be senior 
lawyers with long-standing experience in hearing UDRP cases. 
On the other hand, obviously, an appeal procedure is apt to lead to delay and an 
increase of costS.II 78 This could be remedied by appeals being subject to a leave 
requirement and leave should only be given where the outcome of a case depends 
on the interpretation of the UDRP and the case raises new issues important for the 
1m 6-7 
1173 E Thornburg fn 1019224; M Scott Donahey 'A Proposal for an Appellate Panel for the Uniform 
Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy' (2001) 18 (1) Journal of International Arbitration 131-134. 131-
U~ 
1174 UDRP Rule 15 (a) 
1175 E Thornburg fn 1019215: this has 'resulted in eclectic and unprincipled choice of law decisions, 
creating uncertainty about applicable law'; also L Helfer fn 1024495 . 
1176 Panels tend to refer to other panel decisions, but there is a huge body of decisions and a systematIc 
search through all decisions is next to impossible 
11'-
. L Helfer fn 1024 495 
1178 For this reason, Milton Mueller argues against an appeal system for the UDRP. see M Mueller fn 103-+ 
12 
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1179 
development of a consistent UDRP law. 1179 The appeal process should also contain 
strict-time limits.1180 The leave requirement and the time-limits would ensure that 
the appeal process does not introduce excessive costs and delay. 
One way to spread the costs of appeals, would be to finance the appeal by a 
combination of a special fee paid by the party lodging the appeal with a small 
additional fee imposed either on each domain name registration or an appeal fee 
added to each UDRP case. 118l 
(c) Conclusion as to appeals 
The UDRP should provide for an appeal system, allowing an aggrieved party to 
challenge a procedural mischief or a decision based upon a procedural mishap and 
appeals on points of law. Such appeals could be heard by special appeal panels 
composed of three to five senior panellists (such panels being established across all 
service providers). 
The lack of an appeal system notwithstanding, the losing party can, however. go to 
court. 1 182 As Circuit Judge Sotomayor has stated: 'Unlike traditional arbitration 
proceedings, UDRP proceedings are structured specifically to pennit the domain-
name registrant two bites at the apple,! 183 From a superficial point of view it may 
seem that the due process concerns raised by the UDRP being a 'rough and ready' 
procedure combined with the lack of appeal are remedied by the fact that parties are 
not prevented from starting court proceedings. That this is not the case, will be 
shown in the next section. 
M Scott Donahey fn 1173 133 
1180 -M Scott Donahev fn 1173133 
1181 -M Scott Donahey fn 1173 133 
118~ P RP P j" aragraph 4 (k) UD 0 ICY 
IISI nd " Y '003) 
. Storer l' Cello Holdings LLC 347 3Fd 370,381 (2 Or N -
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3.2.7 Court proceedings as parallel proceedings 
If the complainant loses, the status quo is maintained, unless and until the 
complainant can provide the registrar with a court decision, ordering the transfer or 
cancellation of the domain name. On the other hand, if the respondent loses the 
UDRP case and the panel has ordered the cancellation or transfer of the domain 
name, the registrar will implement that decision, unless the respondent starts court 
proceedings. The respondent has 10 business days from the date when the registrar 
was notified of the decision to provide the registrar with official documentation 1184 
that the respondent has started court proceedings to obtain a declaration that he or 
she is not infringing the complainant's rights and/or has a right to use the domain 
name. If the respondent starts court proceedings in a court and furnishes the 
required evidence within the time limit, the registrar will not transfer or cancel the 
domain name, unless the respondent's court case is settled, withdrawn or decided 
against the respondent. 1185 
(a) Rectifying mistakes under the UDRP 
However, it is clear that the relationship between a panel decision and litigation 
before the courts is that of parallel proceedings. The court does not apply the UDRP 
as the substantive law to the dispute. Such court proceedings would be heard based 
on the applicable national law such as trade mark law, passing_offl186 and unfair 
competition law1187, anti-cybersquatting law l188 or tort1189. The US Anti 
IIR4 An email by the registrant that he has started court proceedings is not sufficient: America Online Latino 
l' AOL Inc 250 FSupp2d 351 358 (District Court SD New York 2003) 
1185 ' . Paragraph 4 (k) UDRP Policy 
1186 English case of BTr One in a Million [1999] 1 WLR 903 (CA) 
1187 Eurofcch Inc l' Cosmos European Travels AG 213 FSupp2d 612.614 where the registrant sued the 
trade mark owner after a WIPO panel had held that the domain name be transferred. The trade mark owner 
counterclaimed and successfully moved for summary judgment for trade mark infringement and unfair 
competition 15 USC ~ § 1114, 1125(a) and under the anti-cybersquatting provisions of the ACP A in 15 
USC § 1125 (d) and the Court ordered the transfer of the domain name. 
1188 Such as the US Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act 1999. incorporated in the Lanham Act 15 
USC § 1114 (2) (D) (v). In Jay D Sallen l' Corinthians Licenciamentos 273 3Fd 14,26 (l sl ~ircuit 2001) 
where the Court found that this section of the ACPA can be used as a sword (ie cause of actIOn): ·S.1114 
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Cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act 1999 is unique in creating a specific anti-
b . I 1190 In h' . cy ersquathng aw. t e UK, a regIstrant who was losmg a domain name as a 
result of an UDRP ruling may attempt to make an application under section 21 of 
the Trade Mark Act 1994, providing a remedy for groundless threats of 
. c.' d' 1191 . Inlnngement procee Ings. AlbeIt that a complainant under the UDRP may not 
be asserting trade mark infringement (as the UDRP claim is sui generis) so that this 
section is inapplicable. 
This also means that the ordinary courts do not entertain a challenge against a 
UDRP decision based on procedural grounds. 1192 Nor does the court directly review 
the facts alleged before the UDRP panel. Although some of the factual issues may 
cover the same ground (such as the validity of the complainant's trade mark or the 
respondent's use of the disputed domain name), the court has a greater array of 
tools available for its fact-finding process (such as in-person hearings and 
examination of witnesses) and therefore its factual findings may well differ from 
that of the panel. 1193 Court proceedings therefore do not constitute a review or 
appeal of the UDRP decision. 1194 
(2) (D) (v) provides a registrant who has lost a domain name under the UDRP with a cause of action for an 
injunction returning the domain name if the registrant can show that she is in compliance with ACP A. ' 
1189 Eurotech Inc l' Cosmos European Travels AG 189 FSupp 2d 385, 389 (District Court ED Va 2002) The 
Court found that a complainant is immunized from tort claims based on the initiation and maintaining of 
WIPO proceedings under the UDRP. 
1190 L Helfer fn 1024 497-notes that the ACPA has acted as a pull for anti-cybersquatting cases into the US 
courts- see also 7-3.2.7 
1191 See the case of Global Projects Management Ltd v Citigroup [2005] EWHC 2663 (Ch), or by analogy 
Quads4Kids l' Campbell [2006] AllER (D) 162 (Oct) where the court found that the dispute resolution 
procedure on eBay used by the owner of a design right may amount to a threat of infringement proceedings 
119' d h C . d 
- For example in Eurotech Inc v Cosmos European Travels AG 213 FSupp2 612,617 t e ourt pomte 
out that, although the WIPO 'arbitrator' allowed the defendant (Cosmos. the complainant) to amend the 
complaint, he declined the claimant (the respondent in the WIPO proceedings) to respond to the amended 
complaint (see WIPO Case No D2001-0941 Cosmos European Travels AG l' Eurotech Data Systems 
Hellos Ltd). The District Court merely noted this without any discussion of due process. as it wa~ 
reviewing the case de novo. 
1193 Mr Justice Laddie noted in Computer Futures Recruitment Consultants Ltd l' Stylemode Data Ltd 2000 
WL 3.~281329 (ChD) that 'the type of enquiry engaged in by ICANN may well not meet the rather more 
stringent requirements of applying in a court of law'. 
1194 rd C· . 200~) Expressly stated in Dluhos 1'. Strasberg, 321 F.3d 365, 373-7'+ (3 lrcult -
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By the same token it is also clear that the UDRP does not constitute arbitration in 
the sense of the FAA, so the courts are not reviewing awards under Paragraph 10 as 
to arbitrator misconduct, serious procedural flaws or manifest disregard of the 
I 1195 aw. 
Although there does not seem to exist a case on this point, the English courts would 
probably also not be restricted by the limitations of ss. 67-69 of the Arbitration Act 
19961196, but decide a case de novo. A long series of (mainly US) court decisions 
have made clear that the courts owe no deference to UDRP decisions and that the 
courts examine the dispute de novo under the (probably different) standards of the 
applicable nationallaw. 1197 
Even though a court case is not heard under the UDRP, it will cancel out or 
supersede any panel decision. 1198 If the panel decides that the domain name should 
be transferred, but a court subsequently finds that the respondent does not infringe 
the complainant's rights under the applicable national law, the registrar will not 
implement the original panel decision. Likewise, in the reverse, if the complainant 
does not secure the domain name in the UDRP panel proceedings. but subsequently 
succeeds in, for example a trade mark suit before a national court, the registrar will 
cancel or transfer the domain name to comply with the court decision, 
notwithstanding the UDRP decision to the contrary. 
1195 Parisi l' Netlearning Inc 139 FSupp2d 745, 752 (District Court ED Va 2001), nor would an English 
court apply the provisions in the Arbitration Act 1996 for the same reasons. 
1196 • I' f I 6 7 Grounds for challengmg and award and appea s on pomts 0 aw. see -
1197 See Marcel Stenzel l' Gary L Pfifer WL 2104438 (District Court WD Wash 2006). Order of 26. July 
2006; Convt:v Compliance Systems Inc )'1099 Pro Inc 443 F3d 327, 333 (4th Circuit 2006): Store.v l' Cello 
Holdings LLC 347 3Fd 370, 373-4, 382 (2nd Cir NY 2003); Barcelona.com, Incorporated 1'. Excelentisimo 
Aruntamiento De Barcelona 330 F3d 617. 626 (4 th Circuit 2003): Retail Sc)'ices Inc)' Freebies Publishing 
247 FSupp2d 822, 827-828 (District Court ED Va 2003): Eurotech Inc)' Cosmos European Travels 
Akticngesellschaft 213 F.Supp.2d 612. 618 (District Court ED Va 2002): Parisi)' Netlearning Inc 13.9 F 
Supp 2d 745, 752 (District Court ED Va 2001); see also implicitly. Swiss BGE 4C.37612004/1ma (Highest 
Swiss Civil Court), Judgement of 21. January 2005 concerning the maggi.com domain name. reversing the 
WIPO Case No D 2001-0916 Nestle )' Pro Fiducia Treuhand by applying Swiss law on name rights and 
unfair competition. 
1198 ./a1' D Salim )' Corinthians Licenciamentos 273 3Fd 14.26-27 (1 sl Circuit 2001); Storer )' Cello 
Holdi;lgs LLC 347 3Fd 370, 382 (2nd Cir NY 2003); Marcel Stenzel)' Gary L Pfifer WL 2104.+3.8 (District 
Court WD Wash 2006). order of 26. July 2006. This was recommended in the first WIPO domam name 
process, see the Final Report WIPO Internet Domain Name Process of 30. April 1999 
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One could therefore argue that the UDRP allows 'wrong~ decisions to be rectified 
by allowing the parties to go to court. However the recourse to courts will 
frequently not be available to the losing party, because of the costs and since the 
UDRP has a different scope from nationallaw. 1199 This is particularly acute where 
the parties are based in different countries. as will frequently be the case. 
(b) Jurisdiction and conflict of law issues 
In addition, recourse to the courts involves perplexing jurisdiction and conflicts of 
law issues~ which the UDRP was meant to avoid in the first place. For this reason 
also it cannot be said that the recourse to the courts can replace the availability of an 
appeal. 
Redress before courts raises the puzzling question of jurisdiction. Which court 
should the respondent commence proceedings in order to prevent the transfer of a 
domain name? The UDRP makes clear that the courts at the principal office of the 
registrar or the respondent's address as shown in the Whois register should have 
jurisdiction (so-called 'mutual jurisdiction~).12oo Essentially~ the complainant agrees 
to submit to this mutual jurisdiction in his or her complaint. 1201 The purpose of 
these rules on jurisdiction in the UDRP is to protect the respondent~ if he or she 
loses under the UDRP, as it is likely that the courts of the mutual jurisdiction are 
closer to 'home' for the respondent. 
As has been mentioned above, the UDRP has shifted the burden of litigation from 
the trade mark holder to the domain name registrant. To counterbalance this, as a 
political compromise, the UDRP, prima facie has shifted the burden of defending a 
case in a foreign jurisdiction to the complainant. 1202 While the UDRP provides that 
1199 d . Only a very small percentage ofUDRP cases en up In court 
1~1l0 Paragraph 4 (k) UDRP Policy, UDRP Rule 1 (Definition of Mutual Jurisdiction) and UDRP Rule 3 (b) 
(;iii) (Form & content of the complaint) . ., . 
1_01 This is not a contractual obligation. as the complainant has no contractual relatIOnship With the registrar 
or the respondent. 
1202 M Froomkin fn 1041 705 
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the complainant must submit to this mutual jurisdiction, it does not explicitly state 
that this jurisdiction is exclusive. This raises the question to what extent courts other 
than those mentioned in Rules 1 and 3 (b) (xiii) have found themselves competent 
to hear an action intended to reverse a panel decision under the UDRP. 
In the decision of Barcelona. com v Excelentismo Ayuntamiento de Barcelona the 4th 
Circuit of the US Court of Appeals found that it had jurisdiction not on the grounds 
of the mutual jurisdiction as defined in the UDRP, but based on US federal trade 
mark jurisdiction. 1203 
The US Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act 1999 (ACP A), incorporated 
in the Lanham Act (Trademark Act of 1946) allows an aggrieved domain name 
registrant to seek relief against an overarching trade mark owner by asking for a 
declaration that he or she did not infringe the Lanham Act and an injunction to have 
the domain name retumed. 1204 In the Barcelona. com case the Appeals Court found 
that the District Court had wrongly applied Spanish law to the question of whether 
the Complainant had trade mark rights in the domain name. The Appeals Court 
found that this question should only be decided under US trade mark law, and since 
the Lanham Act did not recognise trade marks in geographical denominations, the 
domain name was not entitled to protection and hence the domain name registrant 
had not infringed the Complainant's trade mark rights. 
This ruling is problematic, as it means in effect that domain name registrants can 
defeat a trade mark owner winning under the UDRP by bringing an action under the 
I~03 Barcelona.com, Incorporated 1'. Excelentisimo Ayuntamiento De Barcelona 330 F3d 617. 625 (4 th 
Circuit 2003): 'Jurisdiction to hear trademark matters is conferred on federal courts by 28 USC *~ 1331 
and l338 and a claim brought under the ACPA, which amended the Lanham Act, is a trademark matter 
over which federal courts have subject-matter jurisdiction'. See also the earlier case of the 1 st Circuit US 
~ourt of Appeals Jay D Sallen l' C~ril1thians Licenciamentos 273 3Fd 14.23 (l st Circuit 2001) 
1_04 The relevant s.of ACPA (15 USC ~ 1114 (2) (D) (v» provides: 
'a domain name registrant whose domain name has been suspended. disabled. or transferred under 
a policy [such as the UDRP] may upon notice to the mark owner. file a ci\il action to establish 
that the registration or use of the domain name by such registrant is not unlawful.( ... ). The court. 
may grant injunctive relief to the domain name registrant. including the react] \'atlon of the domaIn 
name or transfer of the domain name to the domain name registrant": 
See also Store)' l' Cello Holdil1!!:s LLC 347 3Fd 370, 382 (2nd Cir NY 2003) 
• < 
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ACP A before the US federal cOUl1s, so long as the complainant has no trade mark 
rights recognised under the Lanham Act ignoring any foreign trade mark rights. It 
could be argued that this effectively applies US trade mark standards to all domain 
name disputes.12o~ A foreign (non-US domiciled) registrant could sue before the US 
federal courts if the courts have personal or in rem jurisdiction oyer the defendant 
trade mark holder. Again it is likely that the courts would establish in rem 
jurisdiction (in the absence of personal jurisdiction) on the basis of the location of 
the Registry. 1206 
The COUl1 of Appeals did not discuss the nature of domain names and the ubiquity 
of their use. If the City of Barcelona had brought parallel proceedings before the 
local cOUl1s in Spain, and assuming that these courts would have found that the 
registrant had infringed the City of Barcelona's trade mark rights by the use of the 
domain name under Spanish law, so that the Spanish courts had ordered the domain 
name to be transferred or cancelled, the Registrar \\'ould have been subject to two 
conflicting cOUl1 orders concerning the same name. 1207 The ACPA essentially 
applies US federal trade mark law to all cases brought under the UDRP. 
In Storey" Cello Holdings LIC the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that the 
registrant may file a case in another cOUl1 than the COUl1s defined in the mutual 
.... -
jurisdiction, pointing to the first sentence of paragraph -+ (k), which expressly states 
that either par1y can seek independent resolution of the dispute in any court of 
competent jurisdiction. In other \Yords the Second Circuit was of the opinion that 
the definition of mutual jurisdiction in the UDRP does not limit the registrant" s 
choice of courts, and a court may find that it has jurisdiction based on some other 
law. The COUl1 in that case said that the only significance of the mutual jurisdiction 
I~05 Sec also L Helfer fn 1 O~4 4q8 
I~06 ' , '\'''' Y' F"'d '1 1 "'''' 1 (Ith C' \' \ "'00')' "when See alsl) Harrods Lrd l' Snfl' Interllet Domalll James _,(,_ ,_, - -to __ -t -t Ir :"\. - _. 
c1aiI1l~ to the propen~ itself are'the source' of the underlying C(lntro\,ersy bet\\ cc'Il the ~la,int~ff,an~. the 
defendant. it would be unusual for the Statt' where the' propeny is located not to haw Junsdlctlon ; 
hOWt'\cr the author has only found .. ·ase~ where ~l foreign trade mark owner sued registranb under the in 
rem jurisdiction under 15 l;SC ~ 112.:' (d) (2) (.-\). but no cast's \\here a fore'ign registrant attempted to 
reCo\'er a domain name from a trade mark holder. 
I' " 
,l But Se't' the Comillcllral."/irlillcs cast'. be\cm fn 1211 
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is that, if the registrant wishes to prevent or delay implementation of the UDRP 
panel decision it should bring an action in a court of mutual jurisdiction. 1208 
Furthermore, the US ACP A also contains far-reaching long arm provisions on 
jurisdiction. It allows trade mark holders to bring an in rem action against a domain 
name in the judicial district in which the domain name registry is located 1209, if the 
registrant is outside the reach of personal jurisdiction of the US courts. 1210 For 
example in Continental Airlines Inc v Continental Airlines.com1211 a South-Korean 
national, Mr Park had registered, inter alia, continentalairlines.com with Neptia, a 
South Korean registrar. On losing in the NAF decisionI2I2 , which ordered the 
transfer of the domain name to the trade mark holder, Continental Airlines, Mr Park 
started proceedings in the District Court of Incheon in South Korea, an action, 
which of course suspended the implementation of the UDRP decision. This 
prompted Continental Airlines to file a competing action in rem under the ACP A 
and the Court found trade mark infringement under the Lanham Act and ordered the 
Registry to change the registrar for the domain name to a registrar in the US, for 
subsequent transfer of the domain name to the trade mark holder. 1213 This 
possibility of in rem actions under ACP A effectively defeats the protection for 
registrants under the UDRP, which allows them to sue in the courts at the location 
of the registrar or in their own courts. The in rem action trumps the registrant's right 
to have his rights declared by a local court. 
In the case of NBC Universal Inc v NBCUniversal.com the District Court came to 
the same conclusion and allowed the in rem action to proceed in similar 
circumstances. The Court found that the trade mark holder had not waived their 
right to file proceedings in a federal court by submitting a complaint (with the 
mutual jurisdiction clause) under the UDRP. The Court also addressed the issue of 
I~D8 Storer t' Cello HoldinCTs LLC 347 3Fd 370, 380 (2 nd Cir NY 2003) 
PD9· C> • d 9 . . 1 ') f 
- At the time of writing in August 2006, there were 19 top level domam names ~n . 1. reglstnes. - 0 
which are based in the US. The .com Registry is Veri Sign Inc. based in Dulles. Vlrgmla. 
1210 15 USC ~ 1125 'd) (2) (A) 
I'll . \ 
: ,390 FSupp 2d 501 (District Court ED Va 2005) 
1.1. NAF Case No 250002 Continental Airlines Inc \' Park 
1'1, 
-. Fn 1211 509 
")9-
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comity and jurisdiction in these in rem actions and said that there was no 
requirement for abstention by the US federal court, as the Korean proceedings were 
not an in rem action. However, the Court ultimately left open the possibility that in 
different circumstances comity may warrant the US federal court to abstain from a 
ruling. In this case the Korean registrant had not provided any evidence that the 
Korean court had actually taken any steps towards solving the dispute. 1214 
(c) Conclusion 
This snapshot of court cases has hopefully shown that there is a requirement for an 
appeal under the UDRP, as the ability to bring a case before the ordinary courts is 
not sufficient to rectify mistakes at the UDRP level. Since court proceedings are 
parallel proceedings based on different procedures and different substantive law, 
they do not contribute to streamlining the vast quantity of decisions rendered under 
the UDRP and to reducing the inconsistency between these different panel 
decisions. 
Nor is individual justice well-served. Court proceedings are expensive and in 
international conflicts, involve the usual running of the gauntlet around questions of 
jurisdiction and applicable law, as just illustrated. I2l5 Parallel proceedings in 
different courts, conflict of law issues and conflicting court decisions may feature 
dominantly in domain name disputes, as these are frequently international and 
involve trade mark issues, on which national standards still vary considerably. 1216 
The court decisions discussed in this section do not contain a discussion of the 
ubiquity of domain names due to the fact that the internet can be accessed from 
1'14 . . • . 
- NBC Uninnal Inc l' NBCUniversal.com 378 FSupp2d 715. 717 (Dlstnct Court ED \ a 2005). motion 
to dismiss action for lack of jurisdiction dismissed; see also the similar case of Cable Nelt'S iYcfH'ork LP \' 
C\'NEWSco/1/ 66 USPQ 2d 1057 (4th Circuit 2003) not reported in Federal Reporter; the US Court of 
Appeals for the 4th Circuit confirmed that the US District Court had properly assumed jurisdiction against 
the Chinese domain name registrant in an in rem action ordering transfer of the domain name. 
1~15 Only a remarkably small percentage ofUDRP cases ended up in court. less than 1 0/0. see L Helfer fn 
1024 49~ 
1216 Esp~cially in relation to geographical denominations. name rights and the recognition of unregistered 
trade marks and unfair competition law. 
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anywhere and any discussion of how jurisdiction and applicable law in trade mark 
cases can be limited by concepts of targeting. 
This jurisdictional and conflicts of law quandary means that the courts will not 
provide effective redress in many situations and this lack of access to the courts 
means that the absence of an appeal under the UDRP is not healed by the fact that 
parties are not prevented from starting court proceedings. An appeal process is 
therefore necessary to further individual justice and to achieve more consistency 
and hence more authority for UDRP decisions. 
3.2.8 Transparency 
The UDRP dispute resolution providers maintain a list of their panel members with 
a link to their CV s. Furthermore, unlike arbitration awards, the reasoned UDRP 
decisions are publicly available from the dispute resolution providers' websites. 1217 
Two providers, WIPO and NAF even provide some limited keyword search 
facilities for their databases of decisions. Thus, it seems fair to say that the UDRP 
process is more transparent than commercial arbitration. The fact that decisions are 
published has undoubtedly enabled academic criticism and awareness of the 
shortcomings of the UDRP. 
3.3 Conclusion 
In conclusion, the UDRP has several serious procedural deficiencies, which 
impinge on the due process granted to the parties. The UDRP should be improved 
by ensuring that the panel list is not composed of a majority of trade mark attorneys 
and by ensuring that panellists are allocated randomly, or preferably. that all cases 
are heard by panels chosen by the parties. There should be an internal appeal system 
to a different body of panellists, allowing the parties to challenge decisions on both 
1~17 Paragraph 4 (j) UDRP Policy and UDRP Rules 15 (d) (providing for reasons) and 16 (b?,.see 
I1n.p~/~\\\\'w.wipo.inl!amc/endolllainsisearch index.html ,http: domains.<l~irforum.comdeclslon.asp:\, 
hlli~\\ .adndrc.org adndrcindex.html [14. September 2007] 
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procedural and substantive grounds. Furthermore the time-limit for filina the 
c 
response should be extended significantly and provision be made for additional 
filings and online hearings. It should be ensured that the procedure is held in a 
language which both parties can understand. Finally, the UDRP should be binding 
on corporate entities to avoid tactical litigation. 1218 
This section has shown that the UDRP is not as such a model procedure for online 
arbitration of internet disputes. The UDRP was drafted with the model of 
commercial arbitration in mind. But as has been shown, this is inappropriate for a 
procedure which is mandatory and coercive and, which therefore is more in the 
nature of an international, public dispute resolution procedure. Nor are the defects 
in the UDRP cured by the rule that the parties can go to court to rectify a bad panel 
decision, as the courts frequently are not accessible, because of the costs and the 
jurisdictional quagmire associated with international disputes, which the UDRP was 
supposed to overcome in the first place. For these reasons the UDRP should be 
reformed. 
This Chapter has found that both B2C arbitration and the procedure under the 
UDRP are unfair, because they have been modelled on traditional arbitration. 
Having examined two paradigms for internet disputes, namely consumer disputes 
and domain name disputes, this Chapter will conclude by reflecting on a different 
model, which should be termed the 'proportionate model of dispute resolution' . 
This concept of the proportionate model of dispute resolution shall serve as the 
theoretical basis for the conclusions in this thesis which will be contained in 
Chapter Eight. 
1'18 . h 8 ,., 1 '"I ) 
- See Example 3 discussed in Chapter 3-3 and In C apter -_ ... ' (c 
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4. Proportionate Model of Dispute Resolution 
This Chapter argues that due process should apply to internet disputes l219 . This 
means that such disputes should not be entirely relegated to the private dispute 
resolution field with the consequence that no due process protections apply. It is 
suggested that the dichotomous model of dispute resolution be abandoned. 
4.1 Two spheres one public-one private 
The current model of dispute resolution is dichotomous, consisting of two 
conceptually1220 separate spheres: one public (traditional court litigation), the other 
private (ADR processes, including arbitration). In traditional court litigation, high 
standards of due process are applied, whereas in arbitration, the parties are deemed 
to have waived some important due process standards, simply by agreeing to this 
form of dispute resolution, which is deemed private. As explained in Chapter Six, 
much less stringent standards of due process have in practice been applied to 
traditionaL commercial arbitration. 
This dichotomy of our current perception of dispute resolution stems from the 
fundamental distinction between private and public law in Western law systems. 
The reason for this distinction is that the law protects two potentially conflicting, 
fundamental principles, ie individual autonomy and contractual freedom on the one 
hand and, on the other hand, the supremacy and pervasiveness of fundamental 
values and human rights. 
The potential conflict between these two principles is solved by dividing the law in 
a public (pertaining to the state) and private (pertaining to the individual) sphere. I22 ! 
1219 For the definition of relevant internet disputes-Chapter 3 
1220 These spheres are linked by court-mandated forms of ADR and the involvement of courts in arbitration 
(not discussed in this thesis) but conceptually they are separate. nevertheless. 
1221 Albeit that the public-private dichotomy has recently come under attack: see for e;xampIe. fr?": an . 
administrative law point of view, J Freeman 'The Private Role in Public G.overnance (2000) 7) .. \C)\·} ork 
Unil'('/'sitr LGlI' RC1'inl' 543-675.547-548. She regards governance as a senes of negotiated relatIonshIps. 
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Human rights and due process apply in the former~ whereas they do not apply in the 
latter. 
4.2 Privatization of public functions 
The privatization of functions which have traditionally been regarded to be public, 
such as dispute resolution~ raises two related questions. 
First it has to be asked whether human rights should apply to such privatized 
functions carried out by private (non-state) actors. 1222 Otherwise~ the privatization 
of law risks obliterating human rights protections~ such as the right to a fair trial and 
due process in dispute resolution. 1223 
Secondly the question arises how it can be ensured that all stakeholders are involved 
to make privatized law democratic. Privatized law is inevitably shaped by 
contractual arrangements~ and these contractual arrangements in tum are likely to 
be determined by the party with the greater bargaining power~ as pointed out by E 
Thornburg: 'Internet disputes have been privatized in ways that provide substantial 
advantages to the already powerful' . 1224 Privatized law risks lacking in legitimacy, 
if not all interests of stakeholders are taken into account and balanced against each 
other. 1225 
57l. She admits, however that the constraint of private law on private discretion is not sufficient, 591 and 
she suggests additional checks on private actors, 593. See also the art.by RH Mnookin 'The PubliclPrivate 
Dichotomy: Political Disagreement and Academic Reputation' (1982) 130 Unil'ersity of Pennsylvania Law 
Rel'iclI' 1429-1440, 1430 et sequi who argues that the line between private and public may be impossible to 
define generally. 
I~~~ This is a concern which has been voiced by Lawrence Lessig in relation to internet regulation, see L 
Lessig Code and Other Laws ofCvberspace (Basic Books New York 1999) 217-218 
I'" . 
--.' E Thornburg fn 641 154,218 
1"4 
-- E Thornburg fn 641, 153 
1~~5 M E Price and SG Verhulst 'In Search of the Self in C Marsden Regulating the Glohal b?formation 
SoderI' (Routledge London & New York 2000) 57-78. 64. Jan'od Wiener points out that it is a liberal myth 
that private regulation is apolitical and cannot be regulated by the state. see J Wiener Glohalisatioll and the 
Harmolli:arioll of LQ1t' (Pinter London & New York 1999) 28. A general discussion of globalisation and 
self-regulation a~e outside the scope of this thesis. The purpose of this paragraph is merely to place into 
Context the much more specific quest about what due process standards ADR for internet disputes should 
adhere to. 
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The primary focus of this thesis is on the first issue, but the second issue is related 
to the first issue. If private procedures are shaped by the more powerful interest 
group they are likely to infringe on the due process rights of the weaker group. 
For example, the reasons for the procedural deficiencies in B2C arbitration are that 
the arbitration clause is contained in a non-negotiated contract. 
Furthermore, the reasons for the procedural deficiencies of the UDRP are that it was 
largely designed by WIPO with the needs of trade mark holders in mind and in 
particular with overwhelming emphasis on speed and low-cost at the expense of due 
process. This problem arises if a dispute resolution procedure is drafted by one 
stakeholder group and not the other or as Michael Froomkin has said in the UDRP 
context: 
'It remains the case that if you put a committee of foxes in charge of a chicken 
coop, you tend to get a lot of happy foxes and a lot of dead chickens.' 1226 
The concern of this Chapter is the risk of obliterating due process in online 
arbitration because of its alleged private nature. Whether or not this risk 
materializes depends on where the line for the application of due process is drawn. 
4.3 The waiver doctrine- fully informed and voluntary approach 
At present, the waiver doctrine discussed in Chapter Six 1227 is the tool for this 
demarcation in the context of traditional commercial arbitration. According to this 
doctrine, arbitration is truly private, since the parties have opted out of public 
dispute resolution and thereby have waived some or all of their rights to a fair trial. 
1:~6 M Froomkin fn 1041 716 
1"-
-- 6-') " 
301 
Chapter 7: Internet Disputes and Fair Arbitration 
Just to recap what has been explained in Chapter SiX1228 in the US~ the parties are 
indeed regarded as having absolutely waived their due process rights guaranteed 
under the Constitution. The US approach is clear-cut~ the state action doctrine does 
not apply to arbitration, as arbitration is regarded to be a private form of dispute 
resolution, outside the constitutional reach. 
By contrast, under the ECHR, the question, whether or not the right to a fair trial 
applies to arbitration, is contentious and opaque. My conclusion in Chapter Six was 
that under the ECHR, although due process is not completely inapplicable~ some 
due process rights are automatically and implicitly waived by the parties resorting 
to arbitration as a process of dispute resolution. 1229 The European doctrine is that 
some elements of due process, such as transparency~ the right to an appeal or some 
aspects of fair hearing (such as extensive disclosure under English litigation) or the 
complete independence of arbitrators are not applicable to arbitration because afthe 
very nature of arbitration. 1230 The logic is that if the parties have chosen arbitration 
as a process, then they have accepted these characteristics of arbitration and thereby 
waived these aspects of their right to a fair trial. Furthermore, other aspects of due 
process can be specifically waived, for example where the arbitrator discloses a 
relevant conflict of interest and the parties omit to challenge the appointment. 1231 
The waiver doctrine under European and US law, allows parties to opt out of the 
state court system and to choose a form of dispute resolution allowing for flexibility 
of procedure~ speed, efficiency and possibly lower costs. Therefore this doctrine 
makes sense for traditional commercial arbitration, where the parties are roughly of 
equal bargaining power and, as business parties~ are aware of the implications of 
arbitration or have, at least~ access to professional advice. Traditionally~ arbitration 
has been used for business disputes and in the commercial field the waiver doctrine 
makes eminently sense. 
1~28 6-2.5.2 
1~~9 6-2.5.1 
12J(l6_2.5.1 
1231 6_2.5.1 
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One could argue that this problem of unfairness could be solved by only holding an 
arbitration clause valid ifboth parties were fully infonned and voluntarily agreed 
the arbitration clause. 1232 This largely reflects the approach under the ECHR. As 
explained above, to comply with the right to a fair trial under Article 6 of the 
ECHR, a waiver of the right to go to court must be fully infonned and voluntary. 1233 
This approach is also espoused by some US scholars, who argue that an arbitration 
clause should only be valid if it is a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to go 
to court. 1234 For this test it is necessary to assess the visibility and clarity of the 
arbitration agreement, whether both parties understood its significance (knowledge) 
and whether there was any choice, ie whether the party could have contracted with 
I . 'd 1235 an a ternatlve prOVl er. 
4.4 Internet disputes and the waiver doctrine 
But in relation to internet disputes, if the parties are subject to a power imbalance, 
the waiver doctrine does not make sense, as here arbitration is not entered into 
voluntarily. Arbitration is not voluntarily since the more powerful party makes the 
weaker party contract on the more powerful party's tenns (as in B2C cases) or since 
arbitration is mandatory through a contractual regulatory regime (as in the UDRP). 
Arbitration is also not voluntary, as in many cases it will be the only available and 
affordable means of redress. 
Hence, this 'fully informed and voluntary approach' is no real solution to the 
problem of finding a fair dispute resolution mechanism for internet disputes. Where 
the parties are located at a distance and particularly, where there is a considerable 
power imbalance between the parties, the parties should not be deemed to have 
I ~1' . 
- Set' above 6-2.5.1 
1~.1.1 6-2.5.1 
1',4 
-. R Reuben fn 128 1022 
I" . 
-') R Reuben fn 128 1022-1034 
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waived their due process rights as there are serious doubts as whether this waiver is 
voluntary. 
The rationale for the use of arbitration for internet disputes is not to opt-out of the 
state court system, but to provide an affordable and fair means of redress. If online 
arbitration complies with due process there is no requirement for a waiver. 
4.5 The proportionate model explained 
A new paradigm is required for these kinds of disputes and this should be termed 
'the proportionate model of dispute resolution for internet disputes'. Proportionate 
due process protections should be introduced to deal with power imbalances and 
distance disputes. This model takes an all-encompassing approach to dispute 
resolution and bridges the current dichotomy between private and public dispute 
resolution. The idea here is that all dispute resolution is public to an extent, as it 
involves the carrying out of a public function and that for this reason due process 
should apply to all forms of dispute resolution, but on a proportionate basis. 
Fairness requires different standards of due process depending on the nature of the 
dispute and the parties involved. 1236 But this does not alter the thesis that a 
minimum of fairness and due process standards should apply to online arbitration of 
. d· 1237 mternet Isputes . 
Richard Reuben writing about arbitration in general, has described this approach in 
his unitary theory of dispute resolution. He uses the metaphor of a planetary system. 
The closeness of each planet to its sun determines the gravitational pull. In the same 
manner, so he argues, the closer a form of dispute resolution is to the power of the 
state, the higher the standards of due process applied to that dispute resolution. 
Therefore the gravitational pull is the highest for litigation, less so for arbitration 
1~.1b G Richardson, H Genn fn 50 122, see also 6-4.2.2 
1~37 For the discussion of the relevant disputes see Chapter 3 
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and the least for mediation. 1238 He describes this as 'minimum, but meaningful due 
process standards' for arbitration. 1239 
His theory should be adapted to the Model of dispute resolution for internet disputes 
espoused in this thesis. Since online arbitration used for internet disputes will 
encounter a great variety of disputes, a distinction should be made between different 
types of arbitration. Commercial arbitration between business parties would orbit 
further away from the due process centre than arbitration involving parties with 
power imbalances and those where arbitration is mandatory (such as the UDRP). 
Hence the Model of resolution for internet disputes outlined in Chapter Eight is an 
intermediate form of dispute resolution positioned between litigation and 
commercial arbitration, providing for a minimum of due process. This intermediate 
model would also be a solution to the conflict between due process and access 
which has been described in Chapter Two 1240. It would reduce the formality of 
disputes resolution, allowing for more flexible procedures and hence increasing 
access without waiving due process completely. 
This dilemma of providing out-of-court dispute resolution for internet disputes 
without prejudicing an individual's right to a fair trial has also been recognized by 
the European Commission in Article 17 (2) of the E-commerce Directive 
2000/31/EC (in relation to consumers): 
'Member States shall encourage bodies responsible for the out-of-court settlement 
of, in particular, consumer disputes to operate in a way which provides adequate 
procedural guarantees for the parties concerned.' 
The idea of a proportionate model of dispute resolution may offer a solution to this 
dilemma. 
I '1~ 
- R Reuben fl1 128 1047-1048 
123Q R Reuben fl1 128 1047-1048.957 
1~.jO 2-6 
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In conclusion, this means there is a requirement to design private dispute resolution 
systems which have public due process safeguards incorporated. 
5. Conclusion 
This Chapter has looked in depth at consumer arbitration and found that certain pre-
dispute arbitration clauses in business to consumer contracts are invalid in the UK, 
whereas in the US such clauses are frequently enforceable. This Chapter has also 
examined the UDRP as a dispute resolution procedure, modeled on commercial 
arbitration, which is mandatory and coercive. This Chapter has shown that neither 
the US model of consumer arbitration nor the model of the UDRP administrative 
procedure are fully respecting due process with the result that they are unfair. 
This Chapter has argued that the traditional model of commercial arbitration using 
only abbreviated due process protections is not suitable for internet disputes and it 
explained that online arbitration of internet disputes was fundamentally different 
from the traditional arbitration model, since arbitration may not be an alternative to 
court litigation, but the only process which can provide a remedy for an aggrieved 
party. Furthermore, under the traditional paradigm there is an implicit acceptance 
(despite some rhetoric to the contrary) that arbitration provides lower standards of 
due process, but that the parties have freely waived their rights and are therefore 
autonomous to fashion the procedure according to their needs. This does not make 
sense where one party imposes arbitration on the other or arbitration is mandatory 
and/or there is no other viable redress. 
Furthermore the traditional paradigm accepts that lower due process rights can be 
against public policy in certain types of disputes where there is a strong power 
imbalance, such as business to consumer disputes. However. in order to protect the 
weaker party arbitration has been restricted for these types of disputes (at least in 
the form of pre-dispute arbitration clauses) or. as in the UDRP. the dispute 
resolution mechanism is not final. 
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This paradigm needs to be changed. Online arbitration is a necessary dispute 
resolution mechanism for internet disputes and in particular for those disputes 
where there is a strong power imbalance between the parties. Therefore rather than 
excluding these disputes from arbitration or making the process not final. higher 
due process guarantees should ensure that the process is fair. Since the waiver 
doctrine does not apply (no voluntary relinquishment of rights) full due process 
should apply to online arbitration for consumer and other internet disputes (as 
defined in Chapter 3). The new model propo/sed would be to allow pre-dispute 
arbitration clauses for all disputes, but impose stricter due process standards for 
internet disputes. The final Chapter of this thesis will explore what the minimum 
due process standards should be and how they should be implemented for a fair 
model of dispute resolution. 
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Chapter 8: A Model of Dispute Resolution for the Internet 
"Reform? Reform? Are things not bad enough already? " 
(Sir John Astbury 1926) 
1. Introduction 
Given the limitations of existing court procedures and other dispute settlement 
mechanisms, Chapters Three and Five have demonstrated a need for binding online 
arbitration mechanisms to solve internet disputes. Online arbitration as a 
mechanism is likely to capture a whole range of internet disputes which cannot be 
solved by any other means. 
Chapter Six has shown that, by comparison to the safeguards adopted in common 
law and human rights doctrine, due process is a low priority in commercial 
arbitration. This has traditionally been justified by the principle that the parties 
should be able to fashion their own procedure (principle of party autonomy) and 
that the parties have waived some of their due process rights (waiver principle). The 
reason for a streamlined procedure in arbitration is that it permits the parties to 
make dispute resolution more efficient and allows for confidentiality and some 
degree of informality. 
However, if the same principles are applied to arbitration in situations where the 
parties are subject to a significant power imbalance, have no access to litigation 
and/or where arbitration is mandatory, this renders the procedure potentially unfair. 
In Chapter Seven, the discussion of consumer arbitration and the analysis of the 
UDRP have flagged unfairness problems, caused by the fact that these procedures 
are modelled on traditionaL commercial arbitration. For this reason. it has been 
argued in Chapter Seven that private. commercial arbitration without more does not 
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provide a suitable model for the resolution of the internet disputes. Chapter Seyen 
has concluded that an intermediate form of dispute resolution has to be found, 
providing for due process but without the formality and complexity of litigation. 
The conclusion from this is that online arbitration complying with minimum due 
process standards can be used to fill this void. 
Fairness has three constituent elements, which have been explained in Chapter 
Two: due process, access and the counterpoise. Hence in addition to due process, 
the Model has to ensure that dispute resolution for internet disputes is accessible 
and rebalances (to an extent) pre-existing power imbalances. 
The main task of this Chapter Eight is to outline the parameters for a workable 
Model of fair dispute resolution for internet disputes, drawing on the conclusions 
from previous chapters. This Model applies to internet disputes where one parties is 
a corporate entity and the other an individual or where both parties are 
individuals. 1241 In order to accomplish this task, themes are discussed which can be 
best circumscribed by the following four questions: (i) how to bring the parties to 
online arbitration? (ii) what are the minimum standards which should apply to the 
resolution of internet disputes? (iii) how to implement the due process standards? 
(iv) what are the costs and who should bear these? 
2. Bringing the Parties to Arbitration 
The first issue a Model for the resolution of internet disputes has to address is how 
to bring the parties before the (online) arbitrator. Traditional, commercial 
arbitration is based on an agreement between the parties to arbitrate. 1242 Such an 
a<rreement can be concluded at the outset before the dispute has arisen, and c 
provided it is in writing, this agreement is binding and enforceable. 
1~41 See 3-6 
1~4~ O. .. ,.., 
ISCUSSlon In 4-3.L 
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In Chapter Seven1243 it has been explained that an exception to this are (most) pre-
dispute consumer arbitration agreements in the EU/EEA, which may not be binding 
on or enforceable against the consumer. More generally, it is questionable whether 
it is fair if the more powerful party effectively imposes arbitration on the 'weaker' 
1244 H 'f h f d' party, owever, even I t e use 0 pre- lspute consumer arbitration clauses 
raised no fairness issues, it would be unlikely that they would be adopted by 
companies in the EU/EEA to the same extent as they are in use in the US, The 
reason for this preponderance of arbitration clauses in contracts used by US 
corporations is that specific features of US litigation, such as the availability of 
class actions, jury trial and punitive damages provide incentives for the more 
powerful party to avoid litigation in favour of arbitration, 1245 The same incentives 
do not exist in the EU, 
Hence it could be said that it is necessary that the arbitration agreement is 
concluded after the dispute has arisen, This immediately raises the question whether 
the respondent will agree to arbitration at this stage,1246 Such agreement is unlikely 
if the claimant is the 'weaker' party in an internet dispute without effective access 
to dispute resolution in the courts,1247 If the 'weaker' party (such as an individual in 
state A) has no access to the courts why would the 'stronger' party (such as a 
multinational company involved in e-commerce established in state B) agree to 
arbitration? 
This Catch-22 situation is a serious obstacle to the availability and feasibility of 
I, b' , C:' d' 1248 on me ar ItratlOn lor Internet lsputes, 
124.; 7-'2 
1~"~ Discussion in 7-2, which, by way of example, has illustrated this in the conte::t of co~sumer arbitration 
u) A detailed discussion of US civil procedure is outside scope, For further detaIls of thIS argument see 
Christopher Drahozal and Raymond Friel fn 94'2 131 
124(, G pel I' f 
- a less n 177 19 
124" Bamford fn 790 109; Paragraph 'Enforcement' Report 'The European Online Marketplace: Consumer 
Complaints 2005', published bv the EEJ-net in June 2006 
I: .. , For further details see the discussion in 5-6 on the reasons for low usage of OOR 
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The concern of this thesis is access and this includes the availability of fair and 
proportionate dispute resolution for internet disputes. The availability of online 
arbitration as a fonn of redress can only be secured by some form of encouragement 
or compulsion to take part in arbitration. 
In order to make such an obligation to arbitrate fair in a situation of power 
imbalance in respect of internet disputes, it should only be imposed on the more 
powerful party (in this thesis corporate entities) and not on the weaker party (in this 
thesis individuals, including consumers). 1249 There seems to be consensus among 
consumer organizations and policy makers that consumers, for example, should not 
be bound by a pre-dispute arbitration clause. 1250 
Such an asymmetric obligation on participation in arbitration or adjudication1251 is 
justified by the need to redress the power imbalance between the parties (the 
counterpoise), defined as the third principle of fairness and discussed in Chapter 
Two 1252. Hence the asymmetric obligation would be a procedural tool used to level 
the power imbalance between the parties. 
1"49 See eg Ombudsman schemes discussed below 8-2.2; this raises the question whether in a dispute 
between two individuals (raising no power imbalances) the parties should be bound by the online 
arbitration clause. The argument in favour of this is that second generation internet is much more 
interactive than the early internet and that hence there is a greater likelihood of individual to individual 
disputes 
1~50 M Doyle et al fn 42478; this is also a requirement of the OFT's Consumer Code Approval Scheme, 
discussed 8-2.1.3, see Condition 4d Consumer Code Approval Scheme, Core Criteria and Guidance dated 
November 2006, OFT 390; see also Consumers International fn 432 29-30 (Recommendations) and see 
also Principle VI, 2nd Sentence of EC Recommendation 98/2571EC; see also the AAA Consumer- Related 
Disputes Supplementary Procedures of 15. September 2005, available from 
http: \\'\\'w.adr.or2)sp.asp?id=2')014 [14. September 2007] and the AAA Due Process Protocol for 
Consumers Principle 5; BEUC Position Paper 'Alternative Dispute Resolution' of21. November ~OO~ 
BEUC/X/048/2002, 4-6; TACD (Transatlantic Consumer Dialogue) 'Alternative Dispute ResolutIon In the 
Context ofE-commerce' Position Statement of February 2000, E-comm 12-00, Resolution No 4 available 
from http:/'\\'wW .tacd.ol'!!/cgi-bin/db.cgi ?page=view&confi!!=admin i docs.cfg&id=41 [14, September 
2007]: Bamford fn 790110; OECD Report fn 430 20 
I~SI The term 'adjudication' in this thesis is used as a neutral term to mean a fonn of dispute resolution 
im'oh'ing a third' party making a decision binding on the parties, and is to include arbitration, ombudsmen 
and litigation. 
I~S~ See the third principle of fairness. ie the need to counterbalance pre-existing inequalities 2-~,:; 
3 1 1 
Chapter 8: A Model of Dispute Resolution for the Internet 
It means that the individual should be able to choose between online extra-judicial 
adjudication and litigation, whereas the corporate entity should have to agree to 
submit to the extra-judicial adjudication procedure once a dispute arises. However, 
after a dispute has arisen, once the individual has agreed to extra-judicial 
adjudication, both parties should be bound by the decision of the adjudicator. 
provided the adjudication is fair1253 . 
The challenge is to introduce such an asymmetric obligation into the relationship 
between the parties. This can be done through a contractual membership scheme 
and/or making online extra-judicial adjudication compulsory by law, 
2.1 Contractually mandated schemes 
The first possibility is to bind corporate entities to online arbitration through a 
contractually mandated scheme operated by a trusted party. This is essentially a 
contract between one (or each) party and a trusted party, which contains an 
arbitration agreement covering the internet disputes which may arise. On an abstract 
level, the principle behind this is that the trusted party has the power to entice the 
more powerful party (the corporate entity) to agree to arbitration of all internet 
disputes, thus obviating the need for the parties entering into a direct arbitration 
agreement between themselves. In contract law terms, there are two different 
models for contractually mandated schemes: 
2.1.1 Arbitration agreement between participants 
This model is equivalent to a club or association making rules and conditions for all 
its members, agreed to by each member as a condition of membership and 
governing the contractual relationships between the members. Although such a 
contract cannot be neatly analysed into offer and acceptance, it is ne\'ertheless a 
1~53 S h!"" d" d" 8 3 ee t e laImess standards lscusse 111 -
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b· d· 1254 m mg contract between each member. If later a dispute arises between two 
members, this will be governed by the rules agreed between the trusted party and 
each member. 
For example, the operator of an online marketplace (such as an online auction or a 
B2B trading platform) or an online discussion forum (such as a blog) could impose 
online arbitration on participants for the resolution of disputes among participants in 
the online marketplace or discussion forum. The operator would act as a trusted 
party obliging each participant to agree to solve any disputes with other participants 
b 1· b· . 1255 Th· yon me ar ItratlOn. IS agreement could be made when participants join the 
marketplace or forum, as a condition of membership. 
In order to prevent any unfairness against individuals, such a scheme could provide 
that this obligation to submit to arbitration only applies to corporate entities. 
Individuals are encouraged to take part in online arbitration, but are free to choose 
litigation instead. 
For example, eBay the online auction platform provides an internal dispute 
resolution mechanism through its 'Item Not Received or Significantly Not as 
Described', 'Unpaid Item' and 'Mutual Feedback Withdrawal d256 programmes, 
which can be instigated by buyers or sellers against the other party respectively. 
These dispute resolution programmes consist of online, assisted negotiation 
between the parties and also an insurance element l257 , but do not include online 
1~54 As in the rules for the regatta in The Satanita [1895] p.248, Clarke v Dunral'cl1 [1897] AC 59 
mentioned in G Treitel The Law of Contract (lIth Edition Sweet & Maxwell 2003) 47 
L'55 Probably containing an escalation clause, providing first for online conciliation or mediation, and if this 
fails, using online arbitration. 
1~5~ Feedback is a crucial tool for sellers on online auction platforms to enhance their reputation. Buyers are 
encouraged to leave feedback on a particular seller's performance which in tum informs future buyers 
about this seller's trustworthiness and a seller with a bad feedback rating is unlikely to be able to sell. 
Hence, there may well be arguments about the appropriateness of feedback, which this programme is 
intended to address. 
1~5' The eBay Standard Purchase Protection Programme, which proyides reimbursement of a maximum of 
£105, subiect to certain conditions, see http:'pages.ebav.co.uk/help:tpiesppp-prllcess.html [1--+. September 
2007] . 
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b· . 1258 If h d' b . ar ItratlOn. t e Ispute cannot e solved Internally, a complainant can take the 
dispute to an external dispute resolution provider, Squaretrade, providing mediation 
. 1259 F h' hid' b servIces. or Ig er va ue Isputes, uyers and sellers can use an escrow service. 
However, there is no direct referral to online arbitration and no obligation on either 
party to participate in arbitration of any kind. Arguably eBay's dispute resolution 
could be given more teeth, if corporate buyers and sellers agreed to submit to online 
arbitration as the ultimate redress mechanism, to be used as a last resort in an 
escalated procedure. The reasons for this lack of online arbitration may be that 
many items bought and sold on eBay are of small value1260 and many transactions 
are between individuals (including consumers). 
All online marketplaces, discussion fora and other interactive platforms should 
consider the incorporation of an obligation for corporate entities to agree to online 
arbitration. 
2.1.2 Arbitration agreement for the benefit of a third party claimant 
The second model incorporates online arbitration into the membership agreement 
for the benefit of a third party claimant, used where a claim arises from an online 
activity, but the claimant is not a participant in the activity or a member of the 
organisation .. 
An example of this is a trade association, whose members commit to solve any 
disputes with third party buyers by online arbitration. 1261 A second example would 
be a claimant who has been defamed on a discussion forum or other online platform 
but who is not a member of this forum. In either example, the third party will not be 
1~~8 http://p,l!.!cs.ebav.co.uk/helpitpprobkms-dispute-resolution.html [14. September 2007]. . , 
1_)\l https : \\\\\\' .:-,quaretrade.comi ent! i spiodn overview odr. i sp: jsessionid=fi vpeet8z 1 "!\'hostld=ehIQotle&:st 
~=oeb'1\&L'ntid=fivpeet8z1 [14. September 2007] . ' _ :;:~) Th~ appropriateness of online arbitration in r.elation ~o small disputes IS furt~er dls~uss~d b~lo~'. 8.-=, 
ThIS construction may raise problems regardl11g the l11dependenee of the onl111e arbItratIon l11StltutIOn 
and/or the arbitrators, see the discussion of standards 8-3 
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privy to that contractual agreement so that the question arises whether the third 
party could rely on and enforce this arbitration agreement. 
In the UK, section 1 of the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999 confers a 
right to enforce a contract term on a party not privy to the contract, if the contract 
intentionally provides a benefit for that party, provided the party is at least 
identified as a member of a class in the contract. 1262 Section 8 (2) furthermore 
provides that if the contract contains an arbitration agreement for the benefit of the 
third party and it is in writing, the third party may choose to use arbitration. 1263 
Hence the third party buyer could rely on an arbitration agreement concluded 
between a seller and a trade association if the arbitration agreement is expressed to 
be for the benefit of the buyer. Likewise the person claiming defamation damages 
could also sue the defendant, if the arbitration agreement concluded between the 
defendant defamer and the operator of the discussion forum had envisaged a class 
of claimants to which the claimant belongs. 
This raises the question of how such contractually mandated schemes could work in 
practice. 
2.1.3 Contractually mandated schemes in practice 
Two types of contractually mandated schemes could be established in practice: 
Codes of practice coupled with a trust mark incorporating online arbitration or 
online arbitration imposed by the rules and conditions of a platform. 
1~62 Section 1 (1) (b), (3) th 
126~ Treitel points out that arbitration is optional for the third party. see G Treitel The LOll' a/Camraer (11 
Edition Sweet & Maxwell 2003) 656-657. By contrast, if the third party wishes to enforce a substantl\'e 
right arising under the contract which also contains an arbitration clause. then section 8 (l ~ applies a~d the 
arbitration clause is binding on the third party: Nisshin Shipping l' Cleaves [2004] 1 Lloyd s Report _~8 
(Comm 0) paras 38, 41 and 41 
.., 1 -
-' .) 
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(a) Codes of practice and trust marks1264 
In the consumer e-commerce context, this construction requires a sponsoring 
organisation. One possibility is that a trade or consumer organisation sponsors a 
code of practice, to which e-commerce businesses subscribe and to whose 
provisions they agree to conform. 
In return for this subscription, business members are allowed to use a trade mark 
protected logo ("trust mark') indicating to consumers that the business is safe to 
transact with, thereby boosting the business' branding and the consumer confidence 
it attracts. If a business persistently offends against the terms of the Code, it may be 
expelled from the scheme, so that a sanction exists for non-compliance. However, a 
trust mark scheme financed by membership fees can only afford to lose so many 
members. 1265 One of the terms of the code of practice could be that e-businesses 
submit to online arbitration. 
An example of this is provided by the OFT's Consumer Code Approval Scheme 1266. 
The OFT has established a programme for the approval of codes of practice, and if 
a code is approved, the businesses concerned are allowed to use the OFT logo. One 
of the terms of the OFT's Consumer Code Approval Scheme is that the code must 
include the availability of an independent redress scheme, which is binding in 
respect of code members and that the code member must accept any decision made 
under the scheme. 1267 
1~64 Examples for trust mark schemes, which cannot discussed here because of lack of space are Trusted 
Shops http:i'\\'ww.trustedshops.com/merchantslindex.html and Euro Label http: www.euro-
label.com/euro-labellControllerServlet [14. September 2007] , their codes, however do not provide for 
online arbitration. The Austrian certification body for Euro Label requires, however participation in the 
Austrian Internet Consumer Ombudsmann for Austrian certified member businesses including compliance 
with a recommendation made by the Ombudsman, see the discussion in 5-3.2; BBB Online Reliability 
Code. which obliges members to agree to participate in binding arbitration under BBB Rules of Arbitration 
(Binding). if the consumer also agrees, http:/ www.bbbonline.or!! reliability dr.asp [14. September 2007] 
I ~65 G P C II' f 
- a less n 1779 
1~66 This is. strictly speaking a secondary mark, establishing standards for Codes, rather than being attached 
to a particular Code 
1~6- Condition 4d of the Consumer Code Approval Scheme, Core Criteria and Guidance dated November 
2006. OFT 390 
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However, trust marks only work if they serve to distinguish the products from one 
provider from those of another and for this to occur, consumers must be aware of a 
trust mark. Many well-known brands rely on their own branding and trust marks are 
being predominantly subscribed to by smaller businesses. 1268 Hence more thought 
should be given to the question of how consumer awareness about a trust mark can 
be raised, thereby making the trust mark more attractive for businesses. 1269 
(b) Disputes arising from a platform 
A second possibility would be that the operator of an online platform incorporates 
online arbitration in the membership terms. This second construction could be used 
where sellers and buyers engage in B2B or B2C e-commerce an online platform. 
such as an auction platform. 1270 
However it is by no means limited to e-commerce. Contractually mandated online 
arbitration could be extended to oblige participants in a whole range of online 
activities to take part in online arbitration for disputes between themselves or with 
third party complainants (provided the dispute resolution clause is for the benefit of 
third parties). Such schemes are not limited to contractual disputes related to e-
commerce, but could encompass tort disputes such as defamation or copyright 
infringement. 
An operator of an online forum, an online auction site, a site providing an 
opportunity for users to upload user generated content, such as homemade videos. 
or indeed any other internet service provider hosting users' content, could make it a 
condition of participation that users agree to online arbitration if a claim is made by 
a third party for. eg defamation or infringement of copyright. 
1~68 G PC II' J- a less fn 177 9 
1169 Albeit that the OFT's Consumer Code Approval Scheme was publicized by a million pound advertising 
campaign, see Newsletter, Issue 7 ayailable on the OFT website. 
1~70 S If" 
. ee a so G-P Calliess n 177 b 
~17 
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For example, eBay has introduced a notice and take-down complaints system, 
called eBay VeRO programme, which allows third party owners of IP rights to 
complain about infringements of their rights through sales on eBay.I271 Once such a 
notice has been filed, eBay will take-down the allegedly offending item. without 
checking the validity of the notification. 
This take-down on notice procedure has to be seen in the context of the EU rules on 
the liability of internet service providers for hosting illegal materials. An ISP is 
immune from liability only if they have no actual knowledge of infringement and 
are not aware of any facts or circumstances from which infringement would be 
apparent, and if they receive notice of such infringement they have to act 
expeditiously to remove the infringing material. 1272 This means that the burden to 
litigate is shifted from the complainant IP owner, who can achieve the removal of 
allegedly offending items by mere notice, to the provider of the content, such as the 
seller on eBay, who has to litigate to re-instate the material. 
An example of this is the recent case of Quads4Kids l' Campbell case. 1273 The 
defendant had notified eBay that the claimant was selling children's dirt bikes 
allegedly infringing the claimant's registered design right. The claimant had to 
institute proceedings and obtained an injunction reinstating his sales on eBay on the 
basis that he had an arguable defence and that the use of the notice procedure was a 
. d' . h 1274 groundless threat of proceedings for infringement of a Commumty eSlgn ng 1. 
Instead of using a mere notice and take down procedure, access to dispute 
resolution could be increased if the parties used online arbitration to solve such a 
dispute, instead of litigation. The use of online arbitration in such cases may be 
:~~: http://pa!!es.eba\.co.uk\·erO!I:arti~ipants.html[14. Septem?er 2007].,. . ... '. . 
- ArtIcle 14 (l) E-commerce DIrectIve 2000,31/EC- a more 111 depth dISCUSSIon of ISP hablht: IS outSIde 
scope 
1 ,-, 
0_' [2006] AllER (D) 162 (Oct)(ChD) of 13. October 2006 .... . 
12 4 Community Design Regulations 2005. SI 2005 2339 Regulation 2; see also the sImIlar provIsIons 111 
s.21 Trade Marks Act 1994, s. 70 Patents Act 1977 
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quicker, possibly cheaper and more convenient to use1275 especially if the seller has 
limited financial means, is located in a different jurisdiction than the ISP or in a 
jurisdiction without an efficient court system,1276 and effective dispute resolution 
can enhance the platform's commercial reputation. 
Most of the examples discussed in Chapter Three l277 neatly illustrate the benefits 
and the limitations of contractually mandated dispute resolution clauses. 
(c) The examples in Chapter Three 
In Chapter Three l278 six examples have been used to illustrate the cross-border 
nature of some internet disputes and the difficulties of redress where this is coupled 
with a power imbalance between the parties. These examples can now be used to 
illustrate the effectiveness of contractually mandated arbitration. 
In Example One l279, if the B2B e-commerce platform made online arbitration 
compulsory for all its members with the threat of expulsion for members who do 
not participate in online arbitration or who do not comply with an award, this would 
make redress more likely for the trader concerned. 
In Example Two 1280 it is likely that the consumer would obtain a credit charge back. 
However if this is not available, then if the travel company had subscribed to a trust 
mark scheme providing for independent redress, the consumer would be more likely 
1~75 See the discussion in 5-5 on the benefits of ODRJonline arbitration 
1~76 For a more detailed discussion of this topic see J H6rnle 'Internet Service Provider Liability- Let's Not 
Play Piggy in the Middle' (2002) 7(3) Communications LG1t, 85-88, arguing that there should be a 'put 
back' provision combined with online arbitration. 
1277 ~-1 
1278 3-:; 
1~79 A sole trader in Nigeria concludes a contract with a company, manufacturing locally in China and 
trading internationally, for some widgets through a B2B e-commerce trading platform. The wldgeb are 
defective and the sole trader seeks redress for breach of contract 
1280 A consumer in Chile enters into a contract with a large US travel company for a cruise holiday through 
an e-commerce website. Howe\'er the cruise is cancelled at the last minute and the deposit of US S;~OOO has 
not been refunded. The consumer seeks return of the deposit paid 
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to obtain redress, but this pre-supposes that consumers are aware of trust marks and 
only contract with subscribing businesses in the first place. 
E 1 Thr 1281· '11 . -C: •• xamp e ee IS an 1 ustratlOn lor the prOposItIon that online arbitration should 
be binding on the corporate entity in order to avoid the more powerful party 
electing to litigate in a local court before which the individual is not able to defend 
herself. The procedure of the UDRP should be made fairer and be binding on 
corporate entities. 1282 
In Example Four1283 the Egyptian individual could use online arbitration to obtain 
redress against the US news corporation if the online news platform had obliged all 
persons posting on the website to agree to online arbitration. Again this shows the 
importance of online operators binding users to online arbitration. 
However, not all internet disputes can be covered by contractually mandated online 
arbitration, especially where there is not trusted third party involved. In Example 
Five1284, the dispute is not covered by a contractually mandated online arbitration 
scheme, as the dispute does not arise from a platform, but from the content of a 
private individual's own website. There is no trusted third party in this case. 
1281 The owner of a bricks and mortar shop located in Dublin has named her shop 'Crate & Barrel' and she 
also operates a website connected to her shop under the domain www.crateandbarrel.biz . A large US 
company running an extensive chain of store present in most states of the US claims infringement of their 
US Federal trade mark in the same name and commences infringement proceedings against the 
unincorporated Irish trader before a US District Court. The owner cannot afford litigation in the US and the 
US District Court enters default judgment in favour of the US corporation. The domain name is transferred 
to the US corporation 
1282 See the discussion in 7-3 
128.1 A US-based corporation publishes an online article on an interactive online news platform. accusing a 
named Egyptian civil servant of belonging to a terrorist organisation. The Egyptian indi\'idual seeks redress 
for defamation 
I:~~ A US citizen uploads potentially defamatory comments about an internationally famous Australian film 
star on his OWI1 website. These comments are copied and downloaded widely and thus propagated on a 
global basis. The film star commences proceedings against the US citizen before his local Australian court 
for defamation 
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L'k . . E I S' 1285 . . 1 eWIse In xamp e IX SInce there IS no trusted party there is no possibility for 
redress by online arbitration. These last two examples show the limitation of the 
contractually mandated solution. 
For such disputes, something else is needed over and above contractually mandated 
online arbitration. 
2.2 Compulsory, statutory arbitration 
At first sight, the notion of compulsory online arbitration may appear to be an 
oxymoron- it has been pointed out above that arbitration is based on the agreement 
of the parties 1286, and this seems prima facie contradictory to the notion that 
arbitration is compulsory. However, it is possible to argue that the parties have 
agreed to arbitrate in a case where extra-judicial adjudication has been imposed by 
statute, for the purposes of classifying a form of dispute resolution as 
'arbitration' .1287 This argument is substantiated below. 1288 
Clearly, as has already been discussed, compulsory extra-judicial adjudication has 
to comply with the fair trial principles under Article 6 ECHR, as the waiver doctrine 
does not apply. 1289 This require compliance with the due process standards 
discussed below. 1290 
In the UK there are two statutory, compulsory and extrajudicial adjudication 
schemes which may serve as a model for a dispute resolution scheme for internet 
1'85 l' h . . d 
- A large Russian company illegally remotely hacks into the server of an Eng IS Inventor In or er to 
obtain confidential, sensitive information. The English inventor seeks redress for damages arising from this 
unlawful action. 
1~86 4-3.~ 
1~87 A Redfern, M Hunter fn 270 9 Fn 34: 'There are circumstances in which arbitration may be a 
compulsory method of resolving disputes, eg in domestic law, arbitrations may take place compulsorily 
under legislation aovernina aaricultural disputes or labour relations:. J Tackaberry. A Marriott fn 674 ~-
010, 15 the autho;s point ;ut in the legal definition of arbitration that 'sometimes the submission instead of 
being voluntary is imposed by statute.' 
12SS 8-2.2.3 
1 '1s t ) 
_. See the discussion in 6-::!.5 
1~90 8-3 
321 
Chapter 8: A Model of Dispute Resolution for the Internet 
disputes: the ombudsman 1291 schemes for communication disputes and for financial 
servIces. 
2.2.1 Ombudsman schemes for communication disputes 
Sections 52-54 of the Communications Act 2003 1292 impose a duty on 
communications companies to subscribe to a dispute resolution scheme, providing 
redress and remedies to residential and small business customers 1293 complaining 
about the provision of electronic communications services such as complaints about 
billing, customer service, loss of service, equipment faults, misselling, privacy 
infringement or disconnection 1294. Two ombudsman! adjudication schemes have 
been approved to provide dispute resolution services: Otelo1295 and CISAS 1296. 
Otelo and CISAS provide conciliation and adjudication services to complainants. 
Communications companies can choose which of these two schemes to subscribe to 
in order to fulfil their obligations under the conditions set under section 52 (2) (b) of 
the Communications Act. Once a communications company has become a member 
of either scheme, it has to participate in the dispute resolution, whereas customers 
are not obliged to use these schemes and are (at least in theory) free to go to court 
instead. 
1291 Ombudsman schemes in the UK traditionally were set up to investigate maladministration, ie disputes 
between the state administration and individual citizens, and many ombudsman schemes still perform this 
function, such as the Local Government Ombudsman or the Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman 
or the Prisons and Probation Ombudsman, such schemes are outside the scope of the thesis. which only 
looks at the resolution of disputes between private parties, see R Nobles 'Keeping Ombudsmen in their 
Place' [2001] Public Law 308-328,309-310; In recent, modem ombudsman schemes, emphasis has moved 
away from investigation and report writing to dispute resolution, so that this new generation of ombudsman 
schemes are making binding decisions on the merits, P Morris, R James 'The Financial Ombudsman 
Service' [2002] Public Law 640-648,640 
1292 As required by Article 8 (4) (b) of the Framework Directive 2002'211EC of7. March 2002 and Article 
~4 (1) of the Universal Service Directive 2002 /221EC of7. March 2002 
1293 Section 52 (2) (b)- a small business customer is defined as having less than ten employees. see s. 25 (6) 
(b) 
1294 See the Otelo Annual Report 2006, Figure 4 on p. 17; CISAS Annual Report 2006 on p.9 
1295 Office of the Telecommunications Ombudsman, a company limited by guarantee 
1296 Communication and Internet Services Adjudication Scheme, operated by IDRS Ltd. a di\'ision of the 
Chaltered Institute of Arbitrators 
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Furthennore, once the adjudicator has reached a final decision, the customer has a 
h · h h . 1297 f c Olce w et er or not to accept It. I the customer accepts, the decision becomes 
b· d' h 1298 'f h m Ing on t e company, 1 t e customer does not accept the decision, it will 
P99 h . lapse. - T e maXImum award under these schemes is £ 5.000.1300 However under 
the OTELO scheme awards have been small, 74% of complainants received less 
than £100. 1301 Most awards under the CISAS scheme have been in the bracket of 
£100-£500 and the average award was £174.1302 If a communications company 
persistently refused to comply with awards, this would amount to a breach of their 
membership conditions and could lead to expulsion from the dispute resolution 
scheme and could ultimately trigger the enforcement provisions 1303 in the 
Communications Act 2003. 1304 
2.2.2 Financial Ombudsman Service 
The Financial Ombudsman Service considers complaints from consumers or 
businesses with an annual turnover of less than one million pounds 1305 about 
fi . I . 1306 d' 1307 b nki d . Th' mancia servIces , consumer cre It ,a ng an msurance. e maXImum 
award the FOS can make is £100,000. 1308 Since the Consumer Credit Act 2006 has 
come into force in April 2007 its jurisdiction covers 26,000 regulated firms and up 
1297 This distinguishes these ombudsman/adjudication schemes from arbitration. However under the scheme 
rroposed under the Model in this thesis, the decision of the ombudsman would be binding on both parties 
298 Otelo Terms of Reference. 9.l2: the Otelo Annual Report 2006 states that only 47 remedies of 8500 
(0.55%) in the period 2003-2006 have not been complied with; CISAS Rule 4 (I) 
1299 Section 52 (2) (b) Communications Act 2003 and Otelo Terms of Reference 7.1, 9.9, 9.10, 9.1 L 9.l2 
and 13 (a) and (b): CISAS Rule 2 (e) 
1300 . Otelo Terms of Reference 9.3 (c): CISAS Rule 2 (I) 
1301 Otelo Annual Report 2006, p.6 
J11l' 
. - CISAS Annual Report 2006, pp. 7 and 10 
1303 S . 94 . ectlOns et seq U1 
1104 As has been confirmed by Gregory Hunt, Director of Business Development for the organisation. IDRS 
running the CISAS scheme (email of 5/9/2007 on file with author) 
1305 Financial Services Handbook, Rules 2.4.3. 2.4.4 
1306 Compulsory jurisdiction covers all regulated firms. see Financial Senices and Market:-; Act 2000. ss. 
''"1 - . 
--,'I et sequI 
110- CompUlsory jurisdiction, see Consumer Credit Act 2006 ss. 59 et sequi: only indiy~duals and 
partnerships consisting of no more than three partners can use the procedure to complaIn about consumer 
credit. 
1308 Financial Services Handbook, Rule 3.9.5 
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to 100,000 firms that have consumer credit licences issued by the OFT. 1309 A 
complaint made to the FOS does not have to be determined according to the law 
only, the ombudsman may decide a complaint by reference to what in his opinion is 
fair and reasonable in all the circumstances. 1310 The FOS initially issues an informal 
recommendation to the parties, if the parties do not accept the recommendation. an 
ombudsman will review the case and issue a Final Decision 1311. This Final Decision 
only becomes binding if the complaining consumer notifies the FOS that he or she 
has accepted the Decision. 1312 A Decision accepted in this way can be directly 
enforced by the complainant as a court order (just like an arbitration award would 
be).1313 
2.2.3 Classification of compulsory arbitration! ombudsman services as 
arbitration 
For cross-border disputes the question will also be whether a statutory ombudsman 
decision is an award, enforceable under the New York Convention. In this context it 
has to be examined whether a compulsory, statutory ombudsman scheme counts or 
should count as arbitration. 1314 
(a) The position under English law 
In England, section 94 (1) expressly provides that the substantive part (Part I) of the 
Arbitration Act applies (with modifications l315 ) to statutory arbitration. Section 95 
1309 See Annual Report 2005/2006. pp. 3, 9, 10; P Morris, R James fn 1291 641 have described this huge 
institution and resulting bureaucracy as a 'brave new world in ombudsmanry'. 
1310 See section 228 (2) FSMA 2000 and R (on the application of IFG Financial Services Ltd) l' Financial 
Ombudsman Sen'icc Ltd [2005] EWHC 1153 (Admin) para, 13 
1311 A Final Decision is only issued in about 8% of all cases, see Annual Report 2005/2006, p.36 
1,1' 
. - Section 228 (5) FSMA 2000 
1313 Sections 229 (8) and (9) and Part III Schedule 17 FSMA 2000 
1314 Under the Model proposed here, unlike the adjudication schemes discussed above in 8-2.2.1 and 8-
2.2.2. the decision would be binding on both parties. Gregory Hunt of IDRS Ltd operating the CIS AS 
adjudication scheme points out that CISAS is not arbitration for the reason that it is n.ot binding on the 
consumer or small customer (email of5'9'2007 on file with author). This would be dIfferent under the 
Model. 
I, I' 
. See Sections 95-98 
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(1) (a) creates a legal fiction by implying that the parties have concluded an 
arbitration agreement. Therefore, if the ombudsman service is based on statute. the 
Arbitration Act 1996, including its enforcement provisions applies. 
In England there is no inherent contradiction between compulsory arbitration and 
agreement. An example of this is the recent Court of Appeal case of Stre(ford l' 
Football AssociationJ316 . In this case, even though the arbitration clause was 
imposed on all players' agents by the sports regulatory body (the Football 
Association) in the compulsory licence, the court found that the dispute resolution 
was voluntary arbitration. 1317 The Court of Appeal held that the arbitration 
procedure was imbued with sufficient due process to comply with Article 6 of the 
ECHR. 1318 Even though the agent had no choice but to enter into the licence 
agreement with the (self-) regulatory body and it could therefore be described as 
compulsory (the Court of Appeal avoiding this term), the Court of Appeal said that 
this was a voluntary agreement to submit the dispute to arbitration and therefore the 
Arbitration Act applied. 1319 
In a much earlier case of 1874, the House of Lords held that a contractual obligation 
of the parties to refer a dispute to arbitration is compulsory if it was based on 
statute. 1320 In that case the parties were bound to refer the dispute to arbitration 
because of the statutory underpinning of the arbitration agreement. Hence there is 
no inherent contradiction in saying that arbitration is based on an agreement and 
statute simultaneously. 
1316 Stretford l' Football Association [2007] AllER (D) 346 (Mar) (CA). Judgment of 11. March 2007 
IW Para' 49 
1318 p t..-ara u) 
1319 Para 49 
11~(l . • 1. d rr B'R ./ .. Company (1870-1~7~) LR 2 Sc Ca/cdo11lan Rar!lm1' Company l' GreenOCK an n emyss G) ar lta., . -
~47 (HL) Judgment of 24. March 1874 
'15 .J_ 
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Under English law, an extra-judicial adjudication scheme, which is imposed by 
statute, but at the same time based on an agreement, may qualify as arbitration, 
regardless of the name given to the scheme or its statutory basis. 1321 
For example, the companies under the communications adjudication schemes are 
agreeing to the adjudication in their membership agreement and they can choose 
which scheme to become a member of. In fact, also for the financial services 
ombudsman scheme discussed above, it could be argued that the membership of the 
companies in the ombudsman scheme constitutes their agreement. In this sense the 
adjudication in these schemes could be classified as arbitration as it is based on a 
membership agreement. 1322 On the other hand, since the decisions are not binding 
on the 'weaker' party, these adjudication schemes may not constitute arbitration for 
this reason. 1323 
If the ombudsman scheme is based on statute, the Arbitration Act 1996 will apply in 
England because of section 94 (1). The position under English law can be 
summarized by the following table: 
Ombudsman scheme Arbitration imposed 
imposed by by self-regulator), 
statute/statutory body, not on statutory 
instrument basis 
Recognition and Agreement required Agreement required 
enforcement 
under the New 
York 
Convention, 
Articles II and V 
(1) (a) 
Applicability of Section 94 (1) Agreement required 
Arbitration Act Stref(ord case 
1996 
11~1 Provided it involves binding dispute resolution as described in 4-3.2 
D~~ And because of s. 94 (1) of the Arbitration Act 1996 . 
1m This is unclear. Ho\\'en:'r the issue need not be decided here, as for the Model proposed. online 
arbitration awards would be binding on both parties 
I 
I 
I 
I 
! 
, 
I 
, 
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(b) Enforcement under the New York Convention 
The question whether an award resulting from a compulsory scheme, which is also 
based on agreement, is enforceable in a foreign jurisdiction under the New York 
Convention under Article III, depends on whether the law applicable to the 
b· . 1324.. ar ItratIOn agreement recogruzes It as such. One of the factors which may make 
an award unenforceable is the lack of consent. 1325 Whether sufficient consent exists 
will be determined by the applicable law 1326 and depends on all the 
. 1327 h . 
cIrcumstances . Furt ermore, the conclUSIOn as to whether compulsory 
arbitration can be based on agreement will ultimately vary between national laws 
1328 H th d' b" h' h . 
. owever ere are prece ents III sports ar ItratIOn w IC suggests that It 
can.
1329 Furthermore, it is unclear from the drafting history of the New York 
Convention whether or not it was intended to apply to compulsory arbitration. 1330 
Therefore there is no clear cut answer and much will depend on the applicable law. 
1324 4_4.1 
1325 Articles II (1) and Article V (1) (a) NYC; A van den Berg The New rork Arbitration Convention of 
1958 (Kluwer Deventer 1981) 287-288 
1326 Article V (1) (a) NYC 
1327 An example for quasi-compulsory arbitration is the US-Iran Claims Tribunal. This has been set up by 
Treaty between the US and Iran (Algiers Accord). Individuals bringing claims before the Tribunal are, of 
course not a party to this Treaty. However, the Court of Appeal of Paris, on 28. June 2001 has held that an 
individual bringing a claim before the Tribunal agrees to arbitration at that point, (2002) XXVII Yearbook 
Commercial Arbitration 439 para 14, by contrast, the English High Court has found otherwise (under Dutch 
law) in Dallal v Bank Mellat (1986) XI Yearbook Commercial Arbitration 547, para 2 (but even though 
there was no agreement, the Court found the Tribunal to be competent and therefore found res judicata and 
struck out the English proceedings as vexatious, para 15) 
1.128 In some jurisdictions compulsory or mandatory arbitration may be regarded as unconstitutional and an 
infringement of the right to a fair triaL see, for example the Decision of the Italian Corte Constituzionale of 
8. June 2005, where it held that a statutory provision providing for mandatory arbitration for waterworks 
disputes is unconstitutional, see Kluwer Arbitration Reports available from 
hUt·· 'WIN\\, .kl uwerarbitration.comiarbitrati on/arb/home/ipn/defau It.asp?i pn=R0640 [14. September 2007] 
1.12 See for example Slaney l' lAAF. where the US Court of Appeals (7 th Circuit). 27. March 2001 has 
recognised an award made by compulsory sports arbitration as res judicata, and did not recognize the 
defence that there was no written submission agreement (2001) XXVI Yearbook Commercial Arbitration 
1091, paras 8-12 
1.1.10 A van den Berg fn 1325380: Article I (2) states that the Convention applies to arbitral awards made by 
permanent bodies to which the parties have submitted- the adverb 'voluntarily' was dropped before 
'submitted '- this seems to suggest that compulsory arbitration is covered by the Con\'ention. 
''''7 
-'-
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(c) An argument for classifying compulsory arbitration based on 
agreement as arbitration under the New York Convention 
Both, traditional arbitration and ombudsmen services constitute adjudication by a 
private party, outside the ordinary courts. 1331 They playa similar role, ie the 
resolution of a dispute between two private parties with a final decision imposed by 
a third party adjudicator outside the courts, which has res judicata effect. 1332 
Ultimately the question whether a particular1333 adjudication scheme could be 
described as arbitration depends on whether the parties have agreed to it (in which 
case it may be arbitration) or whether it has been imposed by statute or a regulator 
in such a way that it cannot be said that there is an arbitration agreement (in which 
case there is no arbitration). It is argued here that if arbitration is imposed by a 
regulator, the process should nevertheless qualify as arbitration. 1334 The argument 
here is that arbitration can be compulsory and be based on agreement at the same 
time. There is no inherent contradiction in the notion of compulsory arbitration 
based on agreement. 
Hence arbitration and the ombudsmen schemes described above share many similar 
features and the discussion of fairness standards and how to implement them is 
equally relevant to ombudsman schemes and arbitration. Therefore if an 
1331 R James Private Ombudsmen and Public Law (Ashgate Aldershot 1997) 3: 'An ombudsman is an 
independent person who can receive complaints, investigate them and direct or recommend a remedy where 
the complaint is found to be justified'. 
133~ If the rules of the ombudsman scheme provide for finality (as is the case of the schemes reviewed 
above, once the customer has agreed to it): R (on the application 0.[ Towry Law Financial Sen'ices Pic) \' 
Financial Ombudsman Sen 'ice Ltd [2002] EWHC 1603 (Admin) para. 17 and Westminster City COl/ncil \' 
Hal'l\'ood and another (N02) [2000] ICR 827 (ChD) 840 (res judicata effect of statutory ombudsman 
schemes) and R (Bradley and Others) ,. Secretary oj StateJor Work and Pensions The Times, 27. February 
2007 (finding of ombudsman binding on Minister, if it complied with due process) 
1333 There is no general blueprint for ombudsmen schemes, each has to be evaluated according to its own 
rules and terms of reference, R James fn 1331 2-3 
13:q See for example the Malmo Taxi Association case discussed in Chapter 6-2.5 (e) where in order to 
pro\'idt: a taxi service, a driver had to obtain a license from the MTA and this contained an arbitration 
clause. Even though the adjudication was imposed in this way it was still considered to be voluntary 
arbitration; the same argu~ent is made by J McLaughlin in respect of the US in . Arbitrability: Current 
Trends in the United States' 12 (2) Arbitration International 113-136, 134 
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b d h · b d 1335 . . . om u sman sc erne IS ase on an agreement , It should amount to arbItratIOn 
and the New York Convention should apply for enforcement purposes in foreign 
. . d" 1336 Juns IctIons. 
2.2.4 Compulsory adjudication/an ombudsman scheme for internet 
disputes 
The reason why statutory ombudsman schemes imposing compulsory arbitration 
have been discussed here is that they compel the 'stronger' party to submit to 
arbitration and therefore show an example of how the 'stronger' party can be 
brought before the adjudicator. 
An ombudsman scheme for internet disputes would effectively solve the Catch-22 
situation described above while still avoiding the complexity, delay and cost 
involved in litigation. An ombudsman scheme would be intermediary dispute 
resolution mechanism, where non-statutory online arbitration is not available, in 
accordance with the proportionate model advocated in Chapter Seven 1337. 
In his Preliminary Report 'Access to Justice' Lord Woolf recommended that the 
government should consider creating more ombudsmen schemes for consumer 
complaints. 1338 
An ombudsman scheme for internet disputes would be necessary in a situation 
where there is a dispute between an individual and a corporate entity and where 
there is no contractually mandated arbitration scheme applicable to the dispute. This 
. d' . I f c. . 1339) would ensure access to fair dispute resolutIOn (secon pnncIp eo laImeSS . 
1115 And if the ombudsman's decisions are binding 
1136 Howe\'er the courts in different jurisdictions may take different views on this, see fn 1328 
1m 7-4 
1338 Para 16 
1;;<1') ? 
---.3.1 
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The Model outlined here would include an internet disputes ombudsman office 
created by legislation as one piece of the jigsaw puzzle of the Model. 1340 Such an 
internet disputes ombudsman office could not be created without legislative 
backing, as there is no single discernible self-regulatory body or even industry 
sector which could take the initiative and bind the parties into arbitration 
agreements. 
The need for such an ombudsman scheme arises from the power imbalance 
described in Chapter Two, the jurisdictional issues discussed in Chapter Three and 
the inadequacy of arbitration as a form of dispute resolution for internet disputes 
discussed in Chapters Seven and Eight. It would provide for a fair dispute 
resolution mechanism, thereby enhancing trust and confidence in the internet as a 
communications medium and in e-commerce generally and it would overcome the 
difficulties of bringing both parties to the adjudicator. It would make dispute 
resolution accessible (second principle of fairness) and provide a counterpoise 
(third principle of fairness 134 1) where the parties are of unequal bargaining power. 
The scheme should be based on the agreement of both parties, so that the scheme is 
a form of online arbitration which would fall under the regime of the New York 
Convention. This would ensure that the decisions are awards which can be enforced 
in a foreign jurisdiction under the New York Convention. 1342 It has already been 
argued above that a statutory, compulsory arbitration scheme can be based on 
agreement of the parties. 1343 How this would work will be further discussed 
below. 1344 
1.1.10 The Model is fullY outlined, below 8-6 
1.141 ') _ ") 1 ') . 
... -.~ .-
I q~ See the discussion in 6-2.5 
114.1 8-2.2.3 
1144 8-6 
3~() 
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The scheme should be funded by a mixture of a fee imposed on the parties and a 
state subsidy from general taxation, which is required to make the scheme 
accessible. The issue of costs and funding is further discussed below. 1345 
The next section will outline the due process (first principle of fairness 1346) 
standards which any online arbitration and ombudsman scheme should comply 
with. 
3. Standards for Online Arbitration of Internet Disputes-
Findings from Previous Chapters 
This section compiles the due process standards which should apply to online 
arbitration and any ombudsman scheme, by extrapolating the findings made from 
the discussion of applicable law in Chapter Four, due process in arbitration in 
Chapter Six and consumer arbitration and the UDRP as examples of non-consensual 
forms of arbitration in Chapter Seven. 
3.1 Applying the 'weaker' party's mandatory laws 
In Chapter Four it has been argued that, for cross-border internet disputes, the 
mandatory laws of the 'weaker' party (such as a consumer, or an insured) should be 
applied, if the corporate entity directed its activities to that party's jurisdiction, 
unless the 'weaker' party has misled the corporate entity as to his or her 
location. 1347 If mandatory laws did not apply this would seriously undermine the 
effectiveness of laws designed to protect the weaker party in a situation of power 
imbalance. 1348 
1.145 8 -
-) 
1.1-1(, .2-4 
1J4; 4-4.5.4 
1.'4R 4 4 - d' I' . Ch t '7 '") 4 5 
- .) an In re atIOn to consumer protectIOn. ap er / -_ .. 
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3.2 Independence and impartiality of the provider and the arbitrators 
Independence and impartiality have been generally discussed in great detail in 
Ch t S 1349 dE· h 1350 In h· .. . ap ers even an Ig t . t IS context a dIstmctIOn must be made 
between independence of the institution and that of the arbitrators. 
3.2.1 Independence and impartiality of the arbitrators 
The first point here is that the arbitrator should be impartial, and have no conflicts 
of interest1351 . The arbitrator should be under a duty to disclose a CV and any 
relevant interests. 1352 A relevant interest would be an interest of the arbitrator or of a 
person closely affiliated to the arbitrator1353 such as a business, professional, 
financial or personal relationship with one of the parties (or someone affiliated to a 
party or its representative) or any interest in the subject-matter or outcome of the 
dispute. 1354 
However, this is not sufficient. In addition the procedure should allow each party to 
challenge an appointment of an arbitrator on the basis of lack of independence or 
partiality and the same standard as that observed by a court of law should apply. 
Such a challenge could take place before a specialist appeal panel. 1355 
A more difficult issue is to address systemic bias. As far as the independence of the 
arbitrators themselves are concerned, arbitrators should be chosen from a variety of 
stakeholder groups (ie not only those representing trade mark interests for IP 
disputes, or not only those representing consumer interests for consumer disputes 
IWJ 6-3 
\350 7_2.4, 7-3.2.1 
1351 With a duty to recuse himself or herself if there is a conflict of interest 
1.15~ AAA Due Process Protocol for Consumers Principle 3 (e) 
11\1 Such as a spouse, relative or business partner 
11~~ ABA Guidelines, Principle VI A (3) (a), (b) . . 
1.1)) On the unavailability of such a challenge under the UDRP, 7-3.2.6 and see also the discussion In 6-3.2 
on the lower standards ~f independence applied to commercial arbitrators: AAA Due Process Protocol for 
Consumers Principle 3 (e) 
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1356 
) 1356 F h' . etc . urt ermore It would be preferable If the arbitrators' income is not 
dependant on the number of appointments, as again there is a risk of a repeat player 
effect, if only one party refers cases for arbitration. 1357 Hence if arbitrators are paid 
a regular (part-time or full-time) salary (such as adjudicators working for an 
ombudsman scheme) they are less likely to be influenced by the prospect of repeat 
business. Furthermore the adjudicators should have sufficient independence from 
the provider. 1358 If possible, the allocation of arbitrators to a particular case should 
be random, after certain practical considerations (such as technical expertise, 
language capability, neutral nationality and availability) have been taken care of. 1359 
Ifboth parties can influence the appointment of the arbitrator(s) this would improve 
independence, albeit that the dominant repeat player is at an advantage, knowing 
the arbitrators better than the one-shot player. Hence random allocation is 
preferable for ensuring independence. 
3.2.2 Independence of the institution 
Clearly the institution should be independent of both parties. 1360 As with the 
arbitrators themselves, the institution should also be under an obligation to disclose 
any financial or institutional relationship with either party. 1361 
6-3.2.6,7-2.4.1, 7-3.2.1 (c) 
1357 3-5.2,6-3.2.4 
1358 For example where an ombudsman scheme is financed by membership fees the ombudsman will know 
which members have paid their subscription and from this an allegation of partiality may arise. By contrast 
adjudicators independent from the provider may not have this information. This was pointed out by 
Gregory Hunt in relation to the CISAS scheme (see email of 5/9/2007 on file with author). 
1359 Discussion of the UDRP. 7-3.2.1 (d) 
1360 Dispute Resolution by a trade or consumer association is not fully independent and therefore contrary 
to this principle, however cf both EC Recommendation 98/2571EC, Principle I and II and the ABA 
Guidelines Prinicple VI A, which both settle for lower standards (the arbitrator must not have been 
employed by the association in the last three years before appointment and full disclosure). For a detailed 
ex.amination of trade associations' complaints procedures and a conclusion that they are ineffecti ve, see 0 
Greenberg, H Stanton 'Business Groups, Consumer Problems: The Contradiction of Trade Association 
Complaint Handling' Chapter 5 in L Nader (ed) No Access to Lml' (Academic Press ~e~' York 19.80) 193-
231,225-227; see also the Condition 4d Consumer Code Approval Scheme, Core Cntena and GUidance 
dated November 2006, OFT 390 
1361 Such as a trader being paid a commission for referring cases to the dispute resolution pro\ider, see the 
ABA Guidelines. Principle VI A (1) and (2) 
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If one party sets up and pays for the procedure and/or sets up the arbitration 
h th O t . k f . b' 1362 sc erne, IS crea es a TIS 0 systemIC las. This risk arises, for example where a 
trade or industry association (or a consumer association for that matter) sets up a 
self-regulatory dispute resolution scheme for disputes between its members and 
consumers (business). 
This issue could be mitigated through the institutional organization of the provider. 
All competing stakeholder interests should be represented on the body designing the 
scheme and the governing or oversight body of the dispute resolution provider. 
Furthermore, the entire membership of the executive of the redress scheme should 
be independent of any trade association or other body promoting the redress 
scheme. 
The service should be funded in such a way as to prevent real or perceived bias. 1363 
Clearly, if online arbitration or an ombudsman scheme is funded by general 
taxation, no independence issue would arise. Considering that state courts are also 
subsidized, public funds should be used to subsidize online arbitration for internet 
disputes and in particular to fund some of the costs of setting up such schemes. 
The two ombudsman schemes in the financial services and communications sector 
described above 1364 have been funded by industry through an annual levy and a case 
fee. 1365 Since the respective regulators 1366 have controlled and approved the 
procedural rules, supervise the operation of the schemes, their independence has not 
been tainted by the fact that the dispute resolution is paid for by industry. Therefore, 
it should be considered whether a regulator, such as the OFT or OFCOM should set 
up an online arbitration or ombudsman scheme for internet disputes, as this would 
1362;::_ ~ ') d 7-2 4 \l _ ._ an . 
1:16.1 Consumers International fn 432 16; Condition 4d of the Consumer Code Approval Scheme. Core 
Criteria and Guidance dated November 2006, OFT 390 
1364 8_2.2.1. 8-2.2.2 
1.\65 See Otelo Terms of Reference, Article 12; Rule 6 (a) CISAS Rules: Financial Ombudsman Senice. 
Annual Report 2005/2006, p. 42 
1366 Of com and the Financial Services Authority respectively 
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avoid the conflict between funding coming from industry and independence of the 
scheme. 
However it should be pointed out here that funding cannot come from industry in 
,,/ 
the form of a regular levy, as there is no clearly identifiable, regulated sector. I367 
Ideally, the procedure should be financed by public funds. 1368 This is the case for 
the Austrian Internet Ombudsman. 1369 
Furthermore, if only one party selects the dispute resolution service provider, this 
also creates a risk of systemic bias, as has been explained in Chapter Seven. 1370 The 
problem is completely avoided if there is only one institution providing online 
arbitration for particular types of disputes, as competition between different 
institutions may taint their independence, competing to appear friendly to the party 
selecting their services. 1371 If there is more than one institution this problem could 
be avoided if cases are allocated to a provider either randomly or through a third 
party. Alternatively the problem could be alleviated1372 by ensuring that the 
procedural rules are the same for all providers, so that they only compete on cost. 
3.3 Fair hearing 
The principle of fair hearing requires that each party is given an opportunity to 
present his or her case and respond to the case of the other. Hence each party must 
be given an opportunity to advance legal argument and factual evidence and be 
shown, and given an opportunity to react to the legal argument and evidence of the 
other party. 1373 
1367 D' . ISCUSSlOn 8-5 
1368 8-5 
1369 D " - 3 '1 
, escnptlOn)-._ 
1,70 7_3.'2.1 
In UDRP discussed above in 7-3.'2.1 
I~:~ But not completely avoided, as the competition may still influence the decision-making .. 
\';.1 See 6--L 7-2.4, 7-3.2.3; see also Principle III of EC Recommendation 98/2571EC: CondItIon -+d 
Consumer Code Approval Scheme. Core Criteria and Guidance dated November 2006. OFT 390 
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Several requirements flow from this principle. Very tight and inflexible word limits 
or deadlines for filing submissions might infringe a party's right to present his or 
her case. 1374 An example of this has been discussed in Chapter Seven in relation to 
the UDRP, where the respondent has less than three weeks for filing a Response to 
h C 1 · 1375 F h . 1" h t e omp mnt. urt ermore, a stnct Ifilt on t e number of submissions by the 
parties, such as categorically disallowing a Reply to Response, may also be an 
infringement of the principle of fair hearing. 1376 Similarly. while an oral hearing is 
not always required, in some complex cases or cases requiring the evaluation of 
evidence an oral hearing (possibly conducted using online technology such as web-
conferencing) may be appropriate and this should be left to the discretion of the 
arbitrator. 1377 
In the international context, language barriers may deprive one party from obtaining 
a fair hearing. For this reason it is important that procedural rules contain sensible 
stipulations about the language of the proceedings and translation. 1378 
It is important for an arbitration or ombudsman procedure used between parties 
subject to a power imbalance that the 'powerful' party is not given more influence 
in designing the procedural rules as an effect of the repeat player situation. In other 
words the procedural questions should be decided either by the arbitrator in the case 
or, ex ante, for all disputes, by all stakeholders involved. 1379 
In situations where the individual is likely to be unrepresented, and therefore unable 
to present a case, an inquisitorial procedure, where the arbitrator takes the initiative 
in investigating and researching the evidence and law may be more suitable than the 
1374 . 7-3.2.3, Consumers InternatIOnal fn 432 19 
1375 7_3.2.3 (e) 
1376 Discussed in relation to the UDRP 7-3.2.3 (c) 
1.17' Discussion of the UDRP in 7-3: and AAA Due Process Protocol for Consumers Principle 11 (a): see 
also H Perritt fn 431 680 
1378 See the discussion of the language issue in the context of the UDRP in 7-3.1.4; Consumers 
International fn 431 18 
\1'9 See further the discussion of consumer arbitration in 8.1 
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'pure' adversarial approach in order to reduce the need for costly legal 
representation. 1380 
3.4 Reasons for decisions & transparency 
Arbitrators should hand-down reasoned decisions. 1381 This standard that decisions 
should be published would be a departure from the traditional confidentiality of 
arbitration awards and is likely to be resisted by corporate entities who wish awards 
to remain confidential. 
Like the UDRP, any online arbitration procedure should be fully transparent. This 
does not only mean that information about the procedure, the rules, its terms of 
reference, costs, the arbitrators' details and CV, the procedure for selection and 
allocation of arbitrators should be accessible online, but that the reasoned decisions 
should also be published online and the principle of confidentiality should not 
apply. 1382 
3.5 Judicial review/appeal 
In order to allow for the correction of serious irregularities in the procedure (such as 
a challenge to the arbitrator's independence) and of mistakes of law and in order to 
reduce the inconsistency of decisions, there should be a possibility of appeal to a 
1380 See 6-4 and the discussion of the Model below in 8-6.3.4: see also Principle IV of the EC 
Recommendation 98/257/EC and Condition 4d Consumer Code Approval Scheme, Core Criteria and 
Guidance dated November 2006, OFT 390; see also G Richardson, H Genn fn 50132 and R James fn 1331 
); OECD Recommendation on Consumer Dispute Resolution and Redress. July 2007. Recommendation II 
A 3 recognising the need for accessible procedures avoiding the need for legal representation 
1381 See the explanation of the importance of reasons in 6-5 and in the context of consumer arbitration in 7-
2.4.4; see also Condition 4d Consumer Code Approval Scheme, Core Criteria and Guidance dated 
NO\'ember 2006, OFT 390: AAA Due Process Protocol for Consumers Principle 15 (c) and Consumer~ 
International fn 432 19 
138~ The case for transparency has been made in Chapter 6-6 but see also the discussion in Chapter 7 in, 
relation to consumer disputes 7-2.4.3 and the UDRP 7-3.2.8: H Perritt fn 432 682: Consumers InternatIOnal 
fn 4J~ 17; BEUC Position Paper 'Alternati\e Dispute Resolution' of 21. No\'~mber 2002 , 
BElJC X/048 2002. p. 10. Cf the Austrian Internet Ombudsmann keeps its ruhngs confidentiaL ~ee 
http:1 \\\\\\ .omblidsmann.auombudsmann.phpicat'2Ititle/H(~,oF4L1fi!!e~Fragen [14, September 2(l07] 
..... 7 -~ -~ 
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. b d 1383 Th· . b d supenor 0 y. IS supenor 0 y could be a panel of three or five senior 
arbitrators. However because of the potential inherent in an appeal system to 
increase cost and delay and hence its risk of reducing access to justice~ appeals 
should be strictly limited by a leave requirement and a requirement for the appellant 
to pay (at least some of) the costs of an appeal. Appeals should only be allowed on 
important points of law or for procedural challenges. 1384 
Having discussed the fairness standards which should apply to online arbitration~ 
some thought should be given to how these standards can be implemented. 
4. Implementation of the Standards 
As has been seen in Chapter Six, traditional arbitration is based on the principle of 
party autonomy. This principle does not work well where the parties are subject to a 
considerable power imbalance, as here it is likely that the 'stronger' party will seek 
to determine the rules to the disadvantage of the 'weaker~ party, especially if the 
'stronger' party is a repeat player. Therefore it is important that the fairness 
standards outlined above are incorporated into procedural rules. This can be done in 
four ways: through the institutional rules, national framework legislation~ an 
international convention and a referral system, each of which will be discussed in 
tum. 
4.1 Institutional rules 
Arbitration organizations may find that internet disputes, or certain types of internet 
disputes, require different sets of procedural rules than those used in commercial 
arbitration and therefore formulate separate rules for particular types of disputes. 
First tentative steps in this direction have been made. 
1m 6-7 d 7-3 ') 6 an ."-. 
1384 S h d· .. Ch 6 7 ee t e ISCUSSlOn In apter-
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For example, the American Arbitration Association formulated special rules for 
consumer disputes in 2005. 1385 These Rules amended the rules for commercial 
arbitration and provided, for example that consumers could still go to a small claims 
court1386 and provided for a low cost fee schedule for consumers 1387. The AAA has 
also formulated the principles which are to govern its consumer arbitrations in its 
Consumer Due Process Protocol. The Protocol was drawn up by the AAA' s 
National Consumer Disputes Advisory Committee, whose aim was to draw up 
principles reflecting broad consensus on standards for consumer arbitration, hoping 
that this will inform consumer rules generally and ultimately legislation and judicial 
opinions. Likewise the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators also provides a dedicated 
set of rules for consumer arbitration/adjudication. 1388 
The argument of this thesis is that for the internet disputes under consideration, 
special institutional rules should be drawn up. Institutional rules are important for 
the development of arbitration law and are therefore important for the development 
of fairness standards. 
However, a general awareness that arbitration between parties subject to a power 
imbalance may need special rules to deal with fairness issues 1389 is only beginning 
to develop and these efforts are largely confined to the B2C power imbalance. 
Therefore the second option, national framework legislation. dealing specifically 
with internet disputes is required. 
1185 See Consumer- Related Disputes Supplementary Procedures of 15. September 2005. replacing the rules 
of 1. July 2003, available from http>i\\,ww.adr.org,sp.asp,?id=22014 [14. September 2007] 
1386 Rule C-1 (d) . 
II~" Rule C-8: if the claim does not exceed $ 10.000, the consumer is responsible for fees not exceedmg 
$125; if the claim is between $ 10.000 and $ 75.000 the maximum fee the consumer will be charged is 
$ns 
1388 Independent Consumer Arbitration Service (lCAS), rules a\'ailable from 
http:/ w\\w.idrs.ltd.uk/ConsumeriPDF'IC:\S Rules Applicatioin.pdf[14. September 2007-for lack of 
space not further considered 
11", And other issues such as affordabilit\' 
""9 
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4.2 National legislation 
National legislation should set a framework amending the general legislation on 
arbitration for internet dispute between a company and individuals in order to 
incorporate the minimum fairness standards discussed above. A party should be 
able to challenge an award if these standards have not been met. For example. 
tentative steps in this direction have been made by the Californian Code of Civil 
Procedure containing specific due process standards for consumer arbitration 
concerning the independence of the arbitrators and of the arbitration institution and 
disclosure requirements. 1390 The due process standards outlined above may serve as 
a blueprint to draft a model law setting out the standards which could be provided in 
national framework legislation for internet disputes. 
4.3 An international convention on enforcement of awards 
It has been mentioned in 3-9, that the jurisdictional rules and the rules on 
enforcement of court judgments pose real and substantial barriers to the resolution 
of internet disputes. By contrast, the New York Convention has facilitated the 
recognition and enforcement of foreign awards by committing Contracting States to 
recognizing and enforcing foreign arbitral awards and by limiting the grounds on 
d · . 1 bl· 1· 1391 which recognition and enforcement can be refuse to mternatIOna pu IC po ICy. 
However as has been discussed in Chapter Seven, certain types of disputes where 
the parties are subject to a power imbalance, such as consumer disputes are either 
not arbitrable, or the recognition or enforcement of the award may be against public 
policy. 1392 Furthermore some states have limited the application of the New York 
. . f h 1393 Convention to commercial relatIOnshIps, as defined under the law 0 t at state. 
l.1tlo Sections 1281.92-96: no systematic, comparative research of all US federal and state< arbitration 
legislation has been undertaken- the Californian Code is only mentioned as an example. 
I1QI 
. The reader is referred to 6-2.5 and 7.7 
1.1l): 7-2 
139.1 Article 1 (3) 2nd Sentence: 45 (out of 142) states, including the US have made such a declaration 
according to the author's count on the UNICTRAL website on 25. March 2007 
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Furthermore, for an ombudsman scheme on statutory footing. in some jurisdictions. 
a court may refuse recognition and enforcement on the basis that an ombudsman 
decision is not an award. 1394 
Hence the political incentive for negotiating a convention is that it would make 
online arbitration (including ombudsman schemes) of a variety of internet disputes 
enforceable across international borders. If this is not practical on an international 
level, an attempt should at least be made on a regional level, such as the EU. 
The notion of internet disputes as defined in this thesis is wider than consumer 
disputes 1395, and therefore it may be helpful to have a separate convention on 
internet disputes. Such a convention should stipulate that provided the minimum 
due process standards as defined above have been applied, the award is to be 
recognized and enforced in the states having ratified the convention. This would 
enable the cross-border recognition and enforcement of awards relating to internet 
disputes, thus enabling cross-border internet transactions and interactions and it 
would help to incorporate the due process standards into arbitral procedure for 
internet disputes. 
4.4 Referral systems/clearing house 
In the system developed by Lawrence Lessig four modalities of regulation govern 
. . 1396 d human behavIOur: law, non-legal norms, markets and archItecture. Law an 
norms have been discussed immediately above and the findings are that, at present, 
there are few specific norms to address the particular problems posed by internet 
dispute resolution. It has been argued in some quarters 1397 that the market will be 
1394 In this thesis the view is taken that they are arbitration awards. provided the submission to the 
ombudsman is based on the parties' agreement. see the discussion above. but see for example fn 1328 
1395 Definition of rele\'ant disputes in 3-6 
I.W6 L Lessig 'The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach' (1999) 113 Harmrd Lml' Rel'ie)\' 501-
549.507: L Lessig fn 122288-92 
139' Set' for example H Perritt fn -+32 700: and subject to proper disclosure about ODRAI?R. see L Pon~e 
'Broadening Traditional ADR Notions of Disclosure' (2002) 17 Ohio State Journal all DIspute Resolllf/oll 
~~1-337, 337 
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sufficient to regulate standards for online arbitration of internet disputes, since 
consumers or other internet users would choose to interact or transact only with 
those companies providing or subscribing to fair dispute resolution schemes. As has 
been pointed out above 1398 this expectation is likely to be disappointed l399• as 
internet users are unlikely to read and digest standard terms and conditions of 
websites or other platforms and are unlikely to have disputes in mind when using 
the internet and even if they did, they may have no meaningful choice between 
different providers. 
But it is suggested here that regulation by architecture may be more effective than 
the market. Lessig has explained computer code as functioning as the internet's 
architecture and that this architecture is not god-given, but can be used as a form of 
regulatory control. He argues that technology can create trust. 1400 
Essentially a referral or clearinghouse system would provide a gateway through 
which individuals can find a fair online arbitration scheme, which they can trust. 
This system would provide an electronic white list of all existing online arbitration 
mechanisms complying with due process. A referral system is a website indexing, 
listing and linking to all dispute resolution providers providing arbitration 
1· . h h .. d . . 1401 In h d r 1 comp Iant WIt t e mInImUm ue process cntena. ot er wor s a relerra 
system amounts to an accreditation system, which if sufficiently monitored, updated 
d .c:' d' l' 140'" Thi an promoted, channels consumers to lair Ispute reso utlOn. - s gateway 
could be hyperlinked from relevant websites and internet fora- this would be an 
example of an architecture creating trust by providing access to fair redress systems. 
The gateway would not merely provide information about different dispute 
1398 In relation to consumer arbitration clauses in 7-2 
1399 T Schultz also argues that government intervention is necessary to regulate the fairness of ODR. see T 
Schultz fn 440 89 et sequi; he essentially argues that governments are trusted by disputants to provide fair 
dispute resolution. 
1400 The point Lessig makes is that internet architecture. its Code must be designed so as to create trust. see 
L Lessig fn 1222 Chapter 4 in relation to id technologies (equally re!e\"ant to dispute resolution) . 
1401 It would also be necessary for the referral system to evaluate and monitor compliance on an ongOIng 
basis. 
140~ See also M Philippe fn 413 183-184; T Schultz fn 440 94-100 makes a distinction between mere 
accreditation and clearing houses but this distinction seems to be more a matter of degree than substance. 
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resolution providers, but in addition provide the access point for individuals seeking 
redress. Its function would be to exclude all providers who do not comply with 
minimum due process standards, thereby regulating due process. This function 
would be performed by Code rather than by legal rules as it is computer code 
(through hypertext linking and an interactive platform) which directs the disputant 
to the dispute resolution provider. 
An example of such a system is the EEl-net (European Extra-judicial Network) 1403 
set up in 2001 by the European Commission for cross-border consumer disputes. 1404 
At the heart of this system is a central consumer body (Clearing House or European 
Consumer Centre) in each Member State providing advice and assistance to 
consumers and citizens in that particular Member State. In order to help individuals 
wishing to bring a claim against a company established in another Member State, 
the national Clearing House will liaise with the equivalent Clearing House in that 
Member State in order to refer the consumer to the most relevant dispute resolution 
system in that other (foreign) Member State. 1405 This could be a court using some 
sort of small claims procedure or it could be an ADR provider. providing mediation 
or arbitration. For a dispute resolution provider offering arbitration to be included in 
the EEl-net it has to comply with Recommendation 9812571EC. 1406 
In this fashion, the EEl-net provides a referral system for ADR in all EU and EEA 
Member States, providing a one stop shop for cross-border dispute resolution 
complying with minimum fairness standards. By directing the consumer to the 
1403 See for example http://wwY\.eej-net.on!.uk ; A similar, parallel organization is the FIN-net, a network 
of dispute resolution for financial services disputes, see http: . ec.europa.eu/internal market/finseryices-
rClail/tinnet/index en.htm#network [14. September 2007] 
1404 According to the Report 'The European Online Marketplace: Consumer Complaints 2005', published 
by the EEJ-net 1,834 complaints and disputes about e-commerce were received by the network In 2005 
with non-delivery of ordered products constituting the largest area of complaints. 
1405 For more detail see R Bamford fn 790 108; Hornle, J 'The European Extra Judicial Network-
Overcoming the Obstacles' (2002) 7 Communications La1\' 143-145 
1406 And with Recommendation 2001/310/EC on the Principles for Out-of-Court Bodies lnvolyed in the 
Consensual Resolution of Consumer Disputes for mediation and other forms of consensual resolution. The 
1998 Recommendation only applies to binding arbitration procedures, whereas the 2001 RecommendatIOn 
is applicable to consensual, non-binding forms of consumer dispute resolution. 
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dispute resolution provider in the business~ Member State the EEJ-net also 
overcomes any jurisdictional and enforcement issues. 
However, it has already1407 been pointed out that this Recommendation is 
insufficient and needs to be further developed. Furthermore~ the European 
consumer organization~ BEUC reported that not all ADR bodies notified by the 
Member States which are listed on the EEJ-net referral system are in fact complying 
with the principles enunciated in the Recommendation. 1408 
Another issue with the current set up of the EEJ-net is that its coverage is far from 
being comprehensive. 1409 The EEJ-net does not oblige the Member States to create 
any new ADR schemes, but merely links up already existing provision of ADR 
schemes. 1410 
Some Member States have ADR initiatives focused on particular towns or 
regions 1411 , whereas others have very specific ADR schemes only covering a 
particular type of business or sector1412• Only very few Member States have a 
general consumer ombudsman scheme. 1413 Austria has a dedicated Internet 
Ombudsman Service which has already been discussed in Chapter Five1414 and 
which is further mentioned below1415 • Some Member States have not notified any 
compliant ADR schemes. 1416 
140- 6-2.2 
1408 Position Paper 'Alternative Dispute Resolution' of 21. November 2002 BEUC/x/048/2002. p. 3 
1409 BEUC Position Paper' Alternati ve Dispute Resolution' of 21. November 2002 BEUC/X/048/2002, p. 3 
1410 Bamford fn 790 109. Another issue is that traders may not agree to arbitration. this has already been 
discussed above in 8-2 
1411 For example in Belgium, Portugal, Germany and Spain; 
http:i;ec.europa.ell'consumersiredress'out of couli/adrdb en.htm [14. September 2007] 
141~ For example the Ireland, UK; http>it.::c.europa.ewconsumersiredressiout of courtadrdh ell.htm [14. 
September 2007] 
141.1 Norway. Sweden, Denmark, Estonia, Finland and Greece have some sort of general dispute resolution 
scheme for consumer disputes. see http>/ec.europa.euconsumers redress out of court'adrdb en.htm [14. 
September 2007] 
1414 5_3.2 
1415 8 -
-) and 8-6 
1416 Notably the Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic. Lithuania. Hungary. Slo\'enia and Malta, see 
http://C'l',l'llropa.ellconsumersredressoutofcouli'adrdben.htm [14. September 2007] 
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Hence for many types of internet disputes there will be no relevant ADR scheme in 
the respondent's home Member State. Therefore, the establishment of a specific 
internet dispute ombudsman scheme should be considered at European or Member 
State leve1 1417 . 
This is further discussed below. 
5. Proportionality, Costs and State Funding 
In Chapter Two the conflict between due process and effectiveness has been 
pointed out and it has been explained that a compromise has to be found by 
balancing due process with effectiveness. 1418 This thesis proposes four possible 
solutions to this conflict: (i) the use of technology to increase access (so that more 
due process can be 'afforded'), (ii) the use of the proportionate model of dispute 
resolution, creating a model of online arbitration/an ombudsman, which, in terms of 
due process, is positioned between litigation and commercial arbitration, (iii) 
recognizing that some disputes are de minimis, ie of such small value that they 
cannot be solved by online arbitration or other forms of binding dispute resolution 
and (iv) a state subsidy for some disputes to increase access, paid from general 
taxation. In addition, this section also briefly considers the related issue of how the 
cost of online arbitration should be distributed between the parties. 1419 
The first solution, the use of online dispute resolution to increase access and 
efficiency has already been discussed at length in Chapter Five and will not be 
further discussed here. 
1417 The only country which seems to have a dedicated internet ombudsman is Austria, which provides 
online mediation services for B2C e-commerce disputes. see http: \\\\'w.ombudsmann.at [14. September 
2007] 
1418 2-6 
1419 . d' ., d There are of course other methods, such as legal aid. However the focus of thIS Issertatlon IS on ue 
process and not on how state funds are used to finance dispute resolution. The details of what form the state 
subsidy should take are outside the scope of this dissertation. 
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The second element of a solution to this conflict is the concept of proportionate 
dispute resolution discussed in Chapter Seven, the idea that procedures should be 
appropriate to the nature of the dispute. 1420 
This concept of proportionate dispute resolution entails that for high value claims 
formal litigation may be appropriate. For small disputes, especially if the disputants 
are located in different jurisdictions, online arbitration/an ombudsman scheme may 
be the only appropriate form of dispute resolution. It has been argued that, if there is 
a power imbalance between the parties, in order to make such procedures 
meaningful, minimum due process standards as outlined above, should be followed. 
This is in accordance with the principle of proportionate dispute resolution, as these 
minimum due process requirements are less formal and allow for some abbreviation 
of procedural complexities compared to the procedure before the courts. 1421 The 
Model of online arbitration envisaged here is, in terms of due process, somewhere 
between litigation and commercial arbitration. 
However this raises the question whether there should be a de minimis, whether 
disputes below a certain value cannot be solved at all by online arbitration. For 
example if an individual pays £7 by credit card for a book from an online company, 
which is never delivered, the question arises whether such a dispute could ever be 
solved by online arbitration satisfying the procedural due process outline above- the 
answer is likely to be negative. It could be argued that for disputes below a certain 
threshold value, payment card charge-back or negotiation are the only feasible 
forms of dispute resolution. If the dispute cannot be solved by such means, the party 
affected has to write off the loss. 
Even if a claim is trivial, however, if the problem is widespread and systemic, so 
that a large number of individuals suffer (small) harm, this should be addressed, but 
I·CO S h d' .. 
, ~e t e ISCUSSlon In 7-4 
14~1 Even if they entail 'more' due process than traditional arbitration. where the parties ar~ of more equal 
bargaining power and can therefore curtail procedural protections on the basis of the pnnclple of party 
autonomy and the waiver principle. 
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b I I· 1422 hr y regu atory comp lance tough state enforcement or through criminal law in 
the case of fraud, rather than individual redress. However. since this thesis is only 
concerned with individual redress this will not be discussed here. 
The difficulty is, however to state what this de minimis threshold should be. As a 
ballpark measure one could say that this should be 20% of the monthly average 
disposable income. Arguably 20% of the monthly average disposable income is 
roughly the amount any household can afford to lose without substantially 
damaging its standard of living. It could be argued that if the average household lost 
this money on an internet transaction, this could be written off without severe 
financial consequences. In other words this could be described as an acceptable 
risk. For the UK, the yearly average disposable income in 2005 was £13.300 1423 . 
Twenty percent of the monthly average disposable income is about £200. So for 
claims below a value of £2001424 it may be argued that online arbitration is not 
appropriate in any event, and that persons transacting online need to accept that 
there is a minimum level of financial risk for which redress cannot be achieved in 
all cases. This argument may run counter to intuition at first glance, as it seems that 
currently, many internet disputes are of small value 1425 . The purpose of this thesis 
however is to construct a Model for fair dispute resolution and it has to be 
recognised that online arbitration which complies with due process standards will 
only be proportionate for certain disputes. Hence for claims of very small value 
different methods, such as negotiated assistance, online mediation or resolution 
through payment reverse mechanisms must be used. 
14~~ In the UK the Office of Fair Trading has enforcement powers under the Enterprise Act 2002 and in the 
US the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has enforcement powers under the FTC Act. an overview of their 
internet enforcement cases can be found at http: \\'\\'\\ .ftc.S!:O\ bep intemet/cases-internet.pdf [1-+, 
~wtem?er 2007]... . . . .)' ___ ., " . . 
National Statistics Onlme, see http: \\\\'w.statlstles.£o\'.uk eel llU!!!!et.asp.ld-1 ))- last \ ISlted Apnl 
2007 
1-124 This is only a rough estimate. it could be argued that a maximum of 5°0 o.r 10% of the monthly income 
IS the maximum which is affordable- this is not a point which is further exammed here 
1425 See for example the average claim of £87 for the Austrian Internet Ombudsmann in 2006. quoted abo\\:? 
in 5-3.2 
3.+7 
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But even for higher value claims the question of costs is an issue. For high value 
claims the costs of online arbitration may well be proportionate. But there is likely 
to be a middle ground, where the claim is above the de minimis (which has been 
argued to be in the region of £200) but below the threshold which makes online 
arbitration worth pursuing. It is argued that therefore a state subsidy is needed. 
In order to illustrate this argument further it is necessary to consider how much 
online arbitration costs with due process incorporated. Online arbitration involves 
paying for the time of the arbitrator, the cost of the administration of the dispute 
(assuming that the administrator of the online arbitration scheme would provide the 
technology) and legal advice and representation. Clearly the cost will vary 
enormously depending on how these tasks are carried out and by whom. 
Assuming for the sake of argument that in a straightforward case, an arbitrator can 
be found who is willing to act for a fee of £500, the administration fee is £500 and 
legal representation does not exceed £500 for each party, the total aggregate cost 
would amount to £2000 in a relatively straightforward scenario. 1426 
Looking at the AAA consumer arbitration costs 1427, a case with a claim value below 
US $ 75,000 but above US $ 10,000 attracts an administrative fee ofUS$ 950 and 
an additional US$ 300 if an in-person hearing is held, an arbitrator fee of US $ 250 
for a documents only arbitration1428 and a fee of US $750 if an in-person hearing is 
held. Hence the total for such a claim would be US $ 1200, about £600 for 
documents only arbitration and US $ 2000, about £ 1, 000 for arbitration with a 
hearing. If the value of the claim does not exceed US $ 10,000, the administrative 
fee is US $ 750 and an additional US $ 200 if a hearing is held and the arbitrator 
fees are the same. Hence, for a claim of up to US $ 10,000 the total is US $ 1000, 
about £500 for documents-only arbitration and US $ 1700 for arbitration with an in-
14~b This is of course only a vague estimate of what it would cost to conduct a~ online arbi~ration. Since 
thne is no travelling involved and administration through an online platfonn IS more effiCient, the 
procedure conducted offline would be even more expensive. 
1427 Effective 1. lulv ~003, available from http: WW\\ .adr.pr~ sp.asp·.'id=~~039 [14. September 2007 1 
14~s This may include a telephone or online hearing 
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person hearing, about £850. 1429 These figures work out between £500 and £1.000 
plus any legal costs for both parties. 1430 If the parties choose to be legally 
represented and the legal costs are about £500 for each party, the total costs for the 
procedure are between £1500 and £2000. 
Another example is the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators arbitration scheme for 
disputes involving consumers or a small business in dispute with companies, for 
which a registration fee of £500 plus VAT is payable by the company. 1431 This 
scheme is a documents-only arbitration. Again there may be additional costs for 
legal advice and/or legal representation. 
Straightforward arbitration, supported by online technology1432 is efficient, but 
nevertheless requires the time of a professional arbitrator, an administration 
institution and a legal advisor/representative and, on the figures illustrated above, 
may well involve total costs in the region of somewhere between £500 and 
£2000 1433 . 
This raises the question whether the parties can foot this bill or whether the cost of 
online arbitration means that the parties will to a large extent be deprived of online 
arbitration. If a claim is smaller than, say £10,000 the cost of online arbitration may 
simply be too expensive for the parties, no matter how the actual cost is distributed. 
Therefore this thesis argues that some kind of subsidy is needed for disputes, where 
the claim is between £200 and £10,000. 
1.j~9 The arbitrators' fees are only estimates for the purposes of the deposit, however the consumer"s 
contribution is capped at us $125 for disputes not exceeding US $ 10,000 and at US $ 375 for disputes 
between US $ 75,000 and US $ 10,000. The business has to pay the remainder. 
1.j~O The parties may use the AAA online platform. but the costs are the same. 
1.j~1 
Para. 1.3 of the Rules for the scheme 
httr:w\\\\,.idrs.ltd.uk/Consllmcr PDr Ie AS Rules Application.pdf [14. September 2007] 
I·B_ For forms of technology, see 5-4.5 
1·133 Depending on the degree of technology used, the efficiency of the administration. complexity and 
duration of the cases and whether the parties are legally represented/advised. 
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It should be recognised that fairness, due process, access to justice and ultimately 
the rule of law are important values which should be supported through public 
funding through tax. After all, the courts are financed by the public purse. so it 
seems not illogical to argue that this should also apply to online arbitration. 
An alternative could be some fonn of insurance. However insurance is only 
functional if the risk is spread widely and if an insurance levy was imposed on e-
commerce or even internet access, this would amount to a form of taxation which 
would hinder this fonn of technology and be contrary to the policy that the internet 
should not be subject to special fonns of tax. Therefore an insurance scheme is 
likely to be politically unacceptable. Finally, this funding could come through 
regulatory action, imposing a regular levy on industry to at least partially fund an 
internet ombudsman service, in a similar fashion than the communications services 
ombudsman and the financial services ombudsman. While such a scheme should be 
considered, at the present point in time it seems unlikely to be politically 
acceptable, as the internet, unlike the areas of financial services or 
telecommunications, is not heavily regulated, but only subject to light-touch 
regulation. Furthennore, the internet sector is not homogenous and thus it would be 
hard to identify who should pay. 
Therefore a regular levy is probably not practical, but companies should be made to 
pay the greater part of the fees if and when a dispute is solved by online arbitration 
(on a case-by-case basis). This is further discussed below. 
Therefore, funding should come from general taxation to ensure access to justice for 
internet disputes. A good example for a dispute resolution procedure financed by 
. d' Ch F' 1434 public funds is the Austrian Internet Ombudsmann, descnbe m apter lye. 
This leaves the final issue to be considered, ie the question of how the costs of 
online arbitration should be distributed between the parties. The distribution of 
1434 - ~ ') )-.'.-
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costs can serve as an important counterpoise to pre-existing inequality between the 
parties. 
If the loser pays the winner's costs, an individual may be barred from access to 
online arbitration if costs are high as he or she may not be able to take the risk of 
losing the case and having to pay for cost. 
Therefore, it is proposed here that under an online arbitration scheme for internet 
disputes, individuals (as the 'weaker' party) should pay a certain amount towards 
the cost of online arbitration, possibly capped at a maximum of between £20 and 
£100 depending on the value of the claim1435 , in order to deter vexatious claims. 
However it is submitted that individuals, when claiming against companies should 
not have to pay the full cost, even if they lose their case, in order to increase access 
to justice and to level the power imbalance in such cases. Companies should have to 
pay a larger share of the cost of online arbitration on a case-by- case basis. 1436 If a 
dispute is between individuals, they have to share the costs equally, hence there is 
an even greater need for a state subsidy to increase access to dispute resolution. 
In conclusion on the cost issue, it is suggested in this thesis that for claims up to a 
value of £200, online arbitration or an ombudsman scheme is not proportionate 1437. 
For claims between £200 and £10,000 it is argued that online arbitration may not be 
proportionate, but it has been argued that the parties should not be forced to 
abandon their claim and that hence some form of subsidy, coming from general 
taxation is required. Parties should pay part of the cost, with the individual's 
contribution being capped. For claims above £10,000 there is arguably no need for a 
state subsidy. 
14)) See for example also OECD Recommendation on Consumer Dispute Resolution and Redress. July 
2007, Recommendation II AI, which recognises that some costs may be imposed on the consumer. but that 
this cost must not be disproportionate to the claim 
1436 This contribution could be tapered according to the size of the corporate entity. see 3-6.1 
1437 C' f hI' . h h ompanng the \'alue 0 tee aIm WIt t e costs 
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6. The Model: Resolution of Internet Disputes 
The Model for the resolution of internet disputes proposed in this thesis is a jigsaw 
puzzle with different elements. The main elements proposed are: (i) non-binding 
forms of ODR, (ii) redress against online merchants provided by payment 
providers,(iii) online arbitration provided by private schemes,(iv) a statutory 
ombudsman and (v) litigation. While this thesis focuses on online arbitration 
(including online ombudsmen) and its benefits for internet disputes, it 
acknowledges the role of other forms of ODR and litigation as parts of this jigsaw 
puzzle. Hence, this thesis does not propose that online arbitration is the only form 
of dispute resolution. The significance of online arbitration is that it widens the 
availability of (and access to) binding dispute resolution. 1438 The following outlines 
the essential elements of the Model and how they each fit into the puzzle. 
6.1 Non-binding forms of ODR 
Non-binding forms of dispute resolution can terminate a dispute without the need 
for a binding decision. It has been discussed in Chapter Four that online mediation 
should be used as a mechanism before online arbitration to filter out the disputes 
where a compromise can be found. 1439 Non-binding forms ofODR are 
complementary to online arbitration and may, in particular solve disputes which fall 
below the de minimis threshold for online arbitration. As an example for this, 
Paypal's assisted negotiation dispute resolution programmes have been discussed 
above. 1440 
I·B8 See 5-5 
1m 4-3 
1440 See the discussion of the 'Item Not Received or Significantly Not as Described', 'Unpaid Item' and 
'Mutual Feedback Withdrawal' 1440 programmes 3-8.2 
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6.2 Payment reverse mechanisms 
Payment reverse mechanisms, such as credit charge backs have been outlined in 
Ch Thr 1441 Th·d . apter ee . ey can provl e a remedy where a party claIms that payment 
should be reversed. They are also an important mechanism for disputes which fall 
below the de minimis threshold for online arbitration. 
6.3 Online arbitration 
Online arbitration is the most important jigsaw piece for the Model proposed and 
this sections outlines, by way of summary, the main issues. 
6.3.1 De Minimis 
In recognition of the principle of proportionality, it has been argued in this 
Chapter1442 that there should be a de minimis threshold below which disputes cannot 
be solved by online arbitration. This has been set at a figure of approximately £200 
on the basis of affordability. 1443 Disputes below this threshold should be solved by 
non-binding forms of dispute resolution or payment reverse mechanisms. 
6.3.2 Due process standards & their implementation 
The main concern of this thesis is the fair resolution of internet disputes and it has 
been argued that, in order to achieve this, minimum due process standards, set at a 
higher level than those pertaining to traditional arbitration, should be incorporated 
in all online arbitration procedures. This Chapter has already outlined these 
standards 1444 and how they could be implemented by professional bodies and 
1441 3_8 
144~ 8-5 
1443 S h d' , b '(> ~ ee t e ISCUSSlon a ove In 0-_1 
144~ 8-3 
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arbitration institutions, national legislation, a clearing house referral system and. on 
the international plane, a new convention 1445. 
6.3.3 Contractually mandated online arbitration 
The greatest challenge for online arbitration is how to bring the parties before the 
online arbitrator. As has been discussed in Chapter Four1446 arbitration is largelyl447 
based on the agreement between the parties and this raises the question of how to 
make this fOlm of dispute resolution available against an unwilling party, to protect 
the 'weaker' party in dispute resolution. Essentially a trusted party who commits the 
parties to use online arbitration is needed. As has already been discussed l44s there 
are two ways to achieve this. 
If the dispute arises from the activities of a platform (such as an online auction 1449, a 
social networking site1450 or a video sharing site l451 ) arbitration could be made a 
condition for the participation in the activity. Participants would agree to online 
arbitration for the benefit of other participants or third parties. The platform 
operator could refer the parties to online arbitration (maybe after online mediation 
has been attempted but failed) at no cost to the operator. 
Secondly, companies engaging in business activities on the internet should consider 
joining a trust mark scheme, which incorporates online arbitration (possibly as part 
1445 8-4 
1446 4-3.~ 
144"7 With the exception of statutory arbitration, for example in England 
1448 See the discussion above 8-2 
14~" eBay for example does not bind buyers and sellers on its auction platform to (online) arbitration 
14~(l Facebook, for example provides for arbitration of disputes between itself and its ~sers, bu~ not for 
disputes between users or between a user and a third party. The terms expressly pro\'lde 'no disputes or 
claims relating to any transactions you enter into with a third party through the Facebook Marketplace may 
be arbitrated', see Terms (24 /5.'2007) available from http: \\\\'\\ .i'accbook.com/terms.php [1 ... +' September 
~49?~~ouTube, for example also does not include arbitration between users or users and third parties in its 
terms and conditions, see http:. ,w""\\ .v0utube.colTI!1!tenns last visited in August 2007 
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of an escalated dispute resolution procedure, moving from assisted negotiation to 
online mediation and then to online arbitration). 1452 
For both ways of contractually mandated online arbitration, the costs should be 
shared between the parties, and the company should pay a greater share than the 
individual. 1453 Both, online platforms and online companies would benefit from 
such referraL as it would make their activities 'safer' and more trustworthy, as 
participants would know that binding dispute resolution and redress is available. 
Therefore it is highly recommended that online platforms and individual online 
companies refer the participants in their activities to online arbitration before a 
dispute arises. 
6.3.4 UK National Online Ombudsman Office 
The second answer to the challenge of bringing the parties before the online 
arbitrator is the creation of a national Online Ombudsman Office (000). This 
should be put on a statutory footing. The legislation should provide for the 
procedural rules of the 000 incorporating the due process standards outlined 
above1454 and addressing costs and payment issues. In order to keep costs down and 
avoid the need for legal representation, the procedure should be inquisitorial- the 
ombudsman should to a large extent managing the evidence and submissions. 
One design issue is whether there should be only one 000 (similar to the Financial 
Ombudsman or the Austrian Internet Ombudsmann) or whether there should be 
several providers (similar to the UDRP). The advantage of having more than one 
provider is that competition between providers reduces costs and means that 
companies have a choice as to which scheme to join (which makes it easier to argue 
that there is an arbitration agreement) 1455. However the disadvantage is that due 
145~ See the discussion above 8-2.1 
145.1 See the discussion above 8-5 
1454 8-3 
I~" . 
Discussion above 8-3.2.2 
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process may seriously be compromised as the providers will not only compete on 
the basis of cost, but also on whether they effectively represent the interests of the 
. 1456 In h d 'd . compames. ot er wor s prOVl ers wIll have to appear friendly to the interests 
of online companies 1457. This has been discussed in Chapter Seven 1458 and 
above l459 . For this reason it would be preferable to have only one 000. 
In order to bring the parties before the online arbitrator it will be necessary to make 
it compulsory for companies conducting business online to join the 000 
scheme. 1460 This would address the problem of companies avoiding the jurisdiction 
of the 000. The scheme should be asymmetrical- compulsory for companies to 
join, but voluntary for individuals in the sense that they can opt to agree to the 000 
online arbitration after the dispute has arisen, by submitting the dispute to the 000 
or by agreeing (or refusing) to defend a dispute brought against them before the 
000. Only if an individual refuses to agree to online arbitration before the 000, 
should the company be able to litigate before the courts. Individuals would be 
encouraged (but not forced) to use the 000. 
The legislation should impose an obligation on companies to join the 000 online 
arbitration scheme, by entering into an agreement with the 000. If a company 
flouts this statutory obligation it would be in breach of law and regulatory 
enforcement action can be taken. 1461 Such enforcement action could include 
undertakings by the company that it will join the 000 online arbitration scheme 
and, if this is not complied with, a power of the regulator to apply for an injunction 
to compel membership in the 000 scheme. However, the 000 would ha\'e no 
jurisdiction unless and until the company has agreed to the 000 online arbitration 
1456 Examined in the context of the UDRP. 
IW Albeit that this is not a homogenous group 
IN 7-3.2.1 
14598_3.2.2 
1460 D' , , . b 8 ') ..., ISCllSSlon a ove -_._ 
1461 The Enterprise Act could be amended to bring this within the remit of the OFT. ~he issue \\'ith this 
construction \\ould be that for the Model the definition of the weaker party not only Includes consumers. 
but all indi\'iduals. Another alternative would be to amend the Communications Act and establish the ~OO 
under OFCOM's super\'ision. Or, thirdly a new piece of legislation may est~blish a ne\,. regul~tor cre.al1~g 
and supervising the 000 and enforcing the statutory obligations of compames conducting online act1\ltl~S. 
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scheme. This is important, as for the N ew York Convention, arbitration must be 
based on agreement. Under this construction, the 000 scheme would be 
arbitration, with the consequence that an 000 award can be enforced in a foreign 
jurisdiction under the N ew York Convention. 1462 
Another design question relates to the jurisdictional reach of the 000. 1463 In 
particular the question arises whether the statute could bind companies established 
in a foreign jurisdiction to join the 000 scheme. If the foreign company can be 
said to have directed or targeted its online activities to the territory, the UK could 
assert prescriptive jurisdiction on the basis of the territoriality principle. 1464 
Even if the UK was justified to apply the statute to foreign companies under 
international law, nevertheless the question arises whether this assertion of 
jurisdiction would be practical or effective. If a foreign company did not join the 
000 scheme and if it refused to take part in any proceedings before the 000, the 
000 would have no jurisdiction. A UK based individual wishing to bring a case 
against the foreign company would be limited to bringing a complaint before the 
regulator, who may, in its discretion, decide to bring regulatory action against that 
company. Although the company's local regulator mayor may not enforce that 
regulatory action by the UK body, it would in itself involve negative publicity and 
put pressure on the company to join the scheme. At this stage it should be pointed 
out that the 000 effectively would be providing a valuable service for online 
companies by providing subsidized1465, fair dispute resolution, which should 
146~ S h d' . b ee t e ISCUSSlOn a ove 
1463 The Austrian Internet Ombudsmann covers consumers resident in Austria who claim against companies 
in Austria or abroad (this reach is limited to the EU). The difference is, of course that the Austrian Internet 
Ombudsmann is not compulsory, see the discussion in 5-3.2 
1464 States have asserted jurisdiction in cases, where all the relevant acts were carried out in another 
jurisdiction and all the r~levant actors were located outside the jurisdiction on the basis that the effects of 
those acts were felt within the jurisdiction. Intemationallaw has recognised for some time that states have 
authority to regulate activities: that originate abroad, but cause local harms, V Lowe, . Jurisdiction'. Chapter 
10 in M. Evans (ed) International Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2003). 3~9-355. 3~8-33?; A 
detailed discussion of jurisdiction under (public) international law is outside the scope of thIS t~esIs. The 
issue ofterritorialitv is raised here, but would have to be further refined in the details of the legIslatIon. 
14b' -
. See the discussion of costs below 
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enhance the reputation and branding of the companies involved. Therefore~ once 
foreign companies are aware of the scheme they are likely to join. 
Another question arises whether the 000 scheme as outlined above would be in 
breach of the country of origin rule in Article 3 (2) of the E-commerce Directive 
2000/31/EC.1466 However it is doubtful that it could be argued that a dispute 
resolution scheme is a restriction of the provision of online services. As has been 
pointed out in the previous paragraph~ the scheme ~ s purpose is to promote cross-
border services by providing subsidized online arbitration. 
Finally~ as to costs~ it has already been mentioned 1467 that the individual should 
have to pay a small contribution to the costs in order to deter vexatious and 
frivolous claims. The 000 scheme should only be available for claims where the 
amount of the claim exceeds £200 1468 . Companies should have to pay a larger share 
of the cost of online arbitration on a case-by- case basis. But most importantly~ the 
000 scheme should be subsidised by general taxation1469 to cover the gap between 
disputes where online arbitration is otherwise not cost-effective. It has been argued 
above that for claims below £10,000 such a subsidy is urgently needed. 1470 
6.3.5 New Convention to overcome two potential obstacles to New York 
Convention 
In the context of internet dispute resolution, there are important limitations to the 
enforceability of foreign awards under the N ew York Convention. These limitations 
d d ·· 1471 apply to consumer arbitration and may apply to statutory ombu sman eClSlOns. 
It is therefore suggested that a new convention should be negotiated which on the 
1466 Clearly an examination of the scope of the country of origin rule is outside the scope of this thesis. a<; 
there is no room to do this in detail. 
1-16: 8-5 
I-II)S S h d· . b 8 5 ee t e ISCUSSlon a ove -
1-169 In Austria the Internet Ombudsmann is not only subsidized but paid for by public funds (and 
donations), see 5-.3.2 
1-170 S h d" " b 8-ee t e ISCUSSlOn a oye -) 
1-171 See the discussion above 8-2.2 
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one hand incorporates strict minimum due process standards into online arbitration 
d -C'. d' 1472 b proce ures lor Internet Isputes ,ut on the other hand provides for 
enforceability of online arbitration awards and ombudsman decisions across 
borders. Politically, such a convention may have greater success than the Hague 
Jurisdiction Convention, as in the US consumer arbitrations are common and their 
enforceability in the EU may be desirable from an US point of view, whereas the 
EU may be interested in increasing due process for the arbitration of consumer and 
other internet disputes as a safeguard against exploitation of the 'weaker' party. 
6.4 Litigation 
The final piece of the jigsaw is, of course, litigation. This is only available for the 
largest of claims. 1473 There is nothing new about litigation in the Model and hence 
this will not be discussed further. 
7. Conclusion 
This thesis has (hopefully) shown that there is a need for online arbitration and an 
ombudsman scheme for the resolution of internet disputes, particularly for disputes 
where the parties are subject to a power imbalance. 
The issue here is that there is a great potential for providing greater access to justice 
through ODR, which has not been exploited. The main problem is bringing the 
parties to the dispute before the online arbitrator since pre-dispute arbitration 
clauses are prejudicial to individuals pitched against a corporate entity and since 
companies may not agree to participate in arbitration after the dispute has arisen. 
This Chapter has suggested two solutions to this: the creation of a compulsory 
ombudsman scheme for internet disputes and online arbitration schemes 
contractually mandated by the operator of the online activity. The disadvantage of 
14 -, 
- As defined in 3-6.3 
1473 " 9 
-'-
3=,9 
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an ombudsman scheme is that its jurisdictional reach and enforceability of awards 
under the New York Convention is unclear and here new international rules should 
be worked out. State funding should also be used to increase access to justice and 
minimise the burden on companies involved in internet disputes. 
This Chapter has also set out the minimum standards, which should apply to such 
online arbitration schemes, drawing on the conclusion from the previous chapters. It 
has discussed how these could be implemented. For implementation, a mixture 
between institutional rules, national framework legislation. an international 
convention to deal with recognition and enforcement and a regional or international 
referral system has been suggested. 
This thesis has developed a Model for the resolution of internet disputes between 
individuals and companies. While the combination of cross-border litigation and 
traditional arbitration, the latter curtailing due process on the basis of the principle 
of party autonomy and the waiver principle, is not sufficient as a model for the 
resolution of such disputes, this thesis has proposed a new Model adding online 
arbitration and an ombudsman with minimum due process guarantees to the existing 
methods. Hopefully this would avert any Michael Kohlhaases from making an 
apearance on the internet. 
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List of Abbreviations 
AAA 
ABA 
ACPA 
ADNDRC 
ADR 
B2B 
B2C 
BEUC 
CIArb 
CIETAC 
CISAS 
CCLS 
C2C 
CoE 
CPR 
CPR 
DIS 
DOC 
DTI 
ECHR 
ECtHR 
EComHR 
ECJ 
EEJ-net 
EU 
FAA 
FOS 
FSA 
FSMA 
FTC 
GAFTA 
G2B 
G2C 
HCPIL 
IBA 
ICAC 
ICC 
ICDR 
ICSID 
ICT 
American Arbitration Association 
American Bar Association 
Anti-Cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (US legislation) 
Asian Domain Name Dispute Resolution Centre 
Alternative Dispute Resolution 
Business to Business 
Business to Consumer 
Bureau Europeen des Unions de Consommateurs (European 
Consumer Organisation) 
Chartered Institute of Arbitrators 
China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission 
Communication and Internet Services Adjudication Scheme 
Centre for Commercial Law Studies, Queen Mary University of 
London 
Consumer to Consumer 
Council of Europe 
Civil Procedure Rules 1998 
International Institute for Conflict Prevention & Resolution 
Deutsches Institut fur Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit 
US Department of Commerce 
UK Department of Trade and Industry 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms 
European Court of Human Rights 
European Commission of Human Rights (before the 1998 reforms) 
European Court of Justice 
European Extra- Judicial Network 
European Union 
Federal Arbitration Act 1925 (US) 
Financial Ombudsman Service 
Financial Services Authority 
Financial Services and Markets Act 
Federal Trade Commission (US) 
Grain and Feed Trade Association 
Government to Business 
Government to Consumer 
Hague Conference for Private International Law 
International Bar Association 
International Commercial Arbitration Court (Moscow) 
International Chamber of Commerce 
American Arbitration Association International Center for Dispute 
Resolution 
International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes 
Information and Communications Technology 
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IP 
ICANN 
ICC 
ICPEN 
ICT 
IP 
ISP 
LCIA 
LMAA 
NAF 
NCAIR 
NYC 
ODR 
OCR 
OECD 
OFT 
OTELO 
SME 
UDRP 
UNTS 
UNCITRAL 
UNECE 
URL 
WIPO 
WIPO Center 
YBCA 
Intellectual Property 
Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers 
International Chamber of Commerce 
International Consumer Protection and Enforcement Network 
Information and Communication Technologies 
Internet Protocol 
Internet Service Provider 
London Court of International Arbitration 
London Martitime Arbitration Association 
National Arbitration Forum 
National Center for Automated Information Research 
New York Convention of 1958 
Online Dispute Resolution 
Optical Character Recognition 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
UK Office of Fair Trading 
Office of the Telecommunications Ombudsman 
Small and Medium Sized Enterprises 
Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Procedure 
United Nations Treaty Series 
United Nations Commission for International Trade Law 
United Nations Economic Commission for Europe 
Uniform Resource Locator 
World Intellectual Property Organization 
WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center 
Yearbook of Commercial Arbitration 
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Annex: The Jurisdictional Challenge of the Internet 
There is always a 'but' in this imperfect world. 
(Anne Bronte (1820-1849)) 
1. Introduction 
As we have seen from Chapter Three, global interactions on the internet lead to an 
increase in international contacts and hence ample opportunities for cross-border 
disputes and conflicts between different types of disputants. 
The function of this Annex is to show that cross-border litigation and enforcement 
is so expensive and time-consuming that access to this form of dispute resolution is 
barred but for the largest claims. For small claims the costs and delay of cross-
border litigation are frequently not proportionate to the remedy eventually 
obtainable. 
There are essentially three reasons for the high costs and delay: (i) the complexity 
of jurisdictional rules stalling the finding of the appropriate forum, (ii) cross-border 
enforcement (where necessary) and (iii) other cross-border aspects (such as the 
application of foreign law and the need for translation). This Annex will discuss 
these issues in tum. 
It explains why the existing rules on jurisdiction pose a significant challenge for 
internet disputes. As this Annex will demonstrate in detaiL the application of 
conflicting jurisdictional rules is enormously complex, unpredictable and uncertain 
in internet cases, as jurisdictional rules are based on concepts of territorial 
connecting factors which are highly ambiguous in internet cases. 
Secondly, if a judgment must be enforced across a border, enforcement also 
involves some procedure entailing costs and delay and differences between national 
approaches also mean that successful claimants have no right to have foreign 
judgments enforced against defendants' assets, introducing an element of 
unpredictability. 
Finally, other cross-border aspects, such as the application of foreign law, 
translation, the need to hire several legal advisors or advocates, and travelling add 
further expense and delay. 
This Annex concludes that international litigation is unsuitable to solve disputes in 
many small value internet disputes. For this reason this thesis focuses on Online 
Dispute Resolution as a way forward for the resolution of internet disputes. 
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2. Jurisdictional Rules 
2.1 Unsatisfactory rules for internet disputes 
Many authors have suggested that the traditional jurisdictional rules are not suitable 
for internet cross-border disputes. For example, Matthew Burnstein points out that 
'Where activities occur-or, more precisely, where we deem them to have occurred-
answers the traditional questions of jurisdiction and choice of law under 
conventional private international law analysis. But where activities occur might not 
be the right inquiry for private international law in Internet law disputes. I propose 
that we adapt private international law to the realities of the Internet. .1474 
Henry Perritt adds that the 
'Traditional dispute resolution machinery depends on localization to determine 
jurisdiction. Impediments to localization [on the internet] create uncertainty and 
controversy over assertions of jurisdiction. That uncertainty has two results. It may 
frustrate communities that resent being unable to reach through their legal 
machinery to protect local victims against conduct occurring in a far-off country. It 
also subjects anyone using the Internet to jurisdiction by any of nearly 200 countries 
in the world and, in many cases, to their subordinate political units.' 1475 
FA Mann recognised this problem already in 1964. He wrote that modem 
communications technology and cross-border media (referring to telephone. 
teleprinter, television and international advertising) mean that it is increasingly 
more difficult to localise facts, events or relationships. He pointed out that the 
distribution of content across a multitude of countries might mean that the territorial 
test is too readily satisfied and would generate suspicion of the rigidity of present 
rules. 1476 These deficiencies (and the suspicion) have grown with the use of the 
internet for global transactions and interactions. 
The next section will look at the jurisdictional rules in England and the EU. 
Because of lack of space it will focus on jurisdiction only and not look at applicable 
law 1477 • It will look at the consumer protection provisions of the Rome Convention 
1474 M Burnstein 'A Global Network in a Compartmentalised Legal Environment' in K Boele-Woelki. C 
Kessedjian (eds.) internet Which Court Decides? Which Law Applies? (Kluwer Law International The 
Hague 1998) 23-34, 27 
1475 H Perritt 'Dispute Resolution in Cyberspace: Demand for New Forms of ADR' (2000) 15 Ohio State 
Journal on Dispute Resolution 675-703. 675-676 _ 
i-P(l FA Mann 'The Doctrine of Jurisdiction in International Law' (1964-1) 111 Reclleil des COllI'S 9-1.)8. 
)5-37 
I-lT Hence there is no detailed discussion of the Rome Convention. or the proposed Rome I Regulation. or 
the Regulation 864/2007IEC on the Law Applicable to Non-contractual Obligations. (Rome II) of 11. July 
2007. OJ L199/40 of 31. July 2007 pp. 40-49 harmonising the rules on the law applIcable to torts (and other 
non-contractual obligations) for the first time at EU level 
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and the proposed Rome I Regulation, for the reason that they shed some interestina 
light on the consumer provisions in the Jurisdiction Regulation. b 
2.2 EnglishlEU law 
The rules on jurisdiction (determining a court's competence) are not international 
law, but part of the internal rules on civil procedure in each jurisdiction. 1478 Hence, 
they differ from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. 1479 In Europe there has been partial 
harmonisation on the basis of regional multi-lateral treaties and on the basis of the 
competency contained in Article 65 of the Ee Treaty on judicial co-operation in 
civil matters having cross-border implications. 1480 
The following sections look at English law and the harmonised EU rules to 
illustrate the twin problems of localising internet interactions and determining and 
limiting the reach of a particular activity on the internet. They have a greater focus 
on torts than on contracts, as in contracts the issue of jurisdiction is more frequently 
resolved by an express jurisdiction clause in the contract. If contracts contain a 
clause determining the jurisdiction of the court, this will usually be accepted 1481 
( b· . I I 1482 . I' su ~ect to specla ru es , e.g. In re atlOn to some consumer contracts). 
2.2.1 Contract-difficulty to pinpoint activities 
In the absence of an express choice, whether jurisdiction is covered by EU law (the 
Jurisdiction Rules) or English law (the common law rules), one of a list of grounds 
for assuming jurisdiction must be fulfilled, albeit these grounds differ under the 
common law and the Jurisdiction Regulation. Generally speaking, they are factors 
connecting the dispute with the (English) forum. If a contract does not contain a 
jurisdiction clause, one of these grounds must be relied upon. 
(a) Contract made within the jurisdiction 
One of the common law grounds for serving a non-EU defendant with a claim form 
outside the jurisdiction is that the contract was made within the jurisdiction. 1483 It 
has been the rule that if a contract is made via letter by parties in different 
jurisdictions, the contract would be made at the place where the letter of acceptance 
1478 FA Mann fn 1476 9, 19; P North, J Fawcett Cheshire and North's Private International La1\' (1 3th ed 
Butterworths London 1999) 13-14 
14"<) P North, J Fawcett fn 1478 9 et seq 
1480 Council Regulation EC/44/2001 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of ~udgments in 
Civil and Commercial Matters of 22. December 2000 OJ 2001 L12 pp.1-23: Brussels ConventIOn on 
Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters of 27. September 1968: 
Rome Convention of 19. June 1980 on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations of 26. January 1998. 
OJ C027 pp 34 -46 . .. . 
and the Lugano Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments 111 Onl and Commercial 
Matters of 16. September 1988 
14Rl Art.23 of the Jurisdiction Regulation EC44 2001 and CPR 6.205 (d) 
14X~ Articles 8-14 (insurance); 15-17 (consumers) and 18-21 (employment contracts) 
14S3 CPR 6.20 (5) (a) 
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. d 1484 H 'f h IS poste . owever, I t e contract has been concluded using means of electronic 
communication, it is not always clear where the contract was made. 
For example, if one of the parties made a contractual offer by email and the other 
party accepts that offer by emailing an acceptance to the offeror's email address, it 
might be difficult to detennine where precisely the offer has been accepted. There 
are two reasons for this, one is that the application of the postal rule is unclear and 
the other is that the email acceptance passes through several machines before it 
reaches the offeror. 
Postal rule 
The so-called 'postal rule' under English law mandates that an acceptance 
communicated through the post by letter or telegram takes effect at the place where 
it is handed over to the post office. 1485 By contrast, if the acceptance is sent by a 
method of instantaneous communication, such as teleEhone or telex, the contract is 
made at the place where the acceptance is received. 14 6 The immediacy of 
instantaneous communications enables the acceptor sending his message to notice if 
the communication is interrupted or breaks down. As Lord Justice Denning has 
pointed out in the Entores case: 
'In all instances I have taken so far, the man who sends the message of acceptance 
knows that it has not been received or has reason to know it. So he must repeat 
't ,1487 I . 
Hence it is the acceptor's responsibility to ensure that the message arrives at the 
offeror's machine (telex or telephone) and this is where the contract is formed. 
There is no direct authority on the question whether communication by email is 
instantaneous. Arguing by analogy, it becomes obvious that it is difficult to 
categorise email in either category. 
On the one hand, email resembles non-instantaneous, postal communication. Unlike 
telex or the telephone, email is not direct between the parties, since messages are 
broken up into packets and travel through a number of computers connected to the 
1484 L Collins Dicev Morris & COlhllS The Conflict of Laws (l4 th ed Sweet & Maxwell London 2006) 377 
1485 Adams v Lind;ell (1818) 1 B&Ald 681. In Cowan )' 0 'Connor (1888) 20 QBD 640, 642 Hawkins J 
held that if the acceptor replied to the offeror'S telegram by sending a telegram, the acceptor's reply was. 
considered to be given at the telegraph office from which the telegram was sent.. In. th~t ~ase the acceptor s 
telegram was sent from the City of London so that the Lord Mayor's Court had JunsdlctIOn, 
1486 Enforcs LD l' Miles Far East C01poration [1955] 2 QB 327 (CA) 334 confinned by the House of Lords 
in Brinkibon Ltd l' Stahag Stahl und Stahlwarenhandelsgesellschafi mbH [1983] 2 A~ 34 (HL) -+~ 
Interestingly, in a very recent case, Apple C01pS Ltd l' Apple Computer Inc [2004] F\\ HC 76R.(Ch) Para.37 
Justice Mann suggested that the rule in Entorcs and Brinkibon should be reconSidered. Regardmg 
instantaneous communications, he said that . 
'the law may have to move on and to recognise that there i~ n~th!n~ inherently \Vron~ or ~eretlcal 
in allowing the notion of a contract made in two lor more) JunsdlctIOns at the same time, 
1487 ibid 333 
39:! 
Annex 
networks, before they are re-assembled at the recipient's end. Secondly. emails are 
not always instantaneous, nor are they reliable. The process of sending an email 
normally only tak~s few ~inutes, mor~ commonly seconds. However, the transport 
protocols underlYIng emmls only provIde a best efforts service- instantaneous 
transmission is not guaranteed and the underlying protocols were not desi{ffied to 
confirm delivery for legal purposes. There is no sure means for the senderOto detect 
whether or not the email has reached the mailbox of the recipient (apart from the 
sender contacting the recipient to ask). Even where the acceptor has set his or her 
email software to provide a delivery receipt, this in tum is not instantaneous, nor 
does it reveal whether or not the contents of or attachments to the message arrived 
in uncorrupted form or have actually been read. 
H A d .,." 1488 . ence, n rew lVlurray suggests that the postal rule should apply to emaIl 
acceptances, as they are not direct, nor instantaneous and the acceptor sending his 
or her email does not know immediately whether or not the communication was 
successful. 
On the other hand, an argument can also be made that email should be treated by 
analogy to instantaneous communications and the postal rule should not apply to 
'1 1489 Al h h '1 . d' . . b h emm . t oug emm IS not a Irect commUnICatIOn etween t e sender and the 
recipient's machine, no third human party is involved- this distinguishes email from 
a telegram or normal post. Secondly, since email usually is quick and only takes a 
few minutes or seconds to arrive, it is not unreasonable for the parties to actively 
acknowledge the receipt of emails. One solution would be for the parties to agree 
that, as a matter of standard practice, an email is deemed to be received, when the 
sender receives the recipienf s acknowledgement of receipt. 1490 Thus, under this 
practice, if the acceptor does not receive an email back from the offeror that his or 
her email acceptance has been received, he or she can make enquiries-all of this 
without causing much delay. 
Treitel1491 also suggests that electronic communications such as email, website 
trading 1492 or fax occupy an intermediate position. According to Treitel, whether the 
1488 A Murray 'Entering into contracts electronically: the real www' in L Edwards, C Waelde Law & the 
internet (2nd ed Hart Oxford 2000) 17-35, 24-25; also C Gringrass The Laws of the internet (Butterworths 
London 1997) 25 
1489 R Stone The Modern Lml' of Contract (5th ed Cavendish London 2002) 52-54; also M Selick 'E-
Contract Issues and Opportuniti~s for the Commercial Lawyer' (2003) 16 Banking and Finance Lmt' 
RCl'ievv 1-45, 26-27 
1490 1996 UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce, Art.14 (3): if a data message has been made 
conditional on receipt, the data message is treated as though it has never been sent u~til the 
acknowledgement is received- however Art.14 is not concerned with contract formatIon Art.14 (7). 
Furthermore the EU E-commerce Directive 2000/311EC, Art. 1 1 (l) also provides that businesses must 
acknowledge a consumer's order by electronic means and without delay (again leaving open the ques~ion <1'; 
to when and where the contract is concluded). However this only applies to webforms and not to emaIl 
contracts. 
1491 GH Treitel The Law of Contract (lIth ed Sweet & Maxwell London 2003) 26 
14<): Arguably communication through .and. with a websi.te is more likely to be in~tantane~~\a~ :he .;ender 
wIll know whether or not the commUnIcatIOn has been mterrupted, see Murray tn 1488 _)-_6. the mam 
""9"" -~ ) 
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acce~tance has to reach th~ ~fferor depends in each case on whether the acceptor 
sendmg the message contmrung the acceptance had the means of knowin a at once 
whether the communication was or was not successful. b 
Ultimately, it is not clear whether email is an instantaneous fonn of communication 
(in the Entores meaning of the word) and whether the postal rule applies. Thus, in 
cases where the communication is successful and a contract is concluded and the 
only question is not ifbut where a contract was concluded this intennediate position 
does not provide the answer. If the parties are communicating across a border it is 
unclear where the contract was concluded. Returning to the example, if the acceptor 
sends his email acceptancefromEngland.itis unclear whether the contract was 
made within the jurisdiction under CPR 6.20 5 (a) and whether the English courts 
can assume jurisdiction. 
Message passing through several computers 
In addition, even if it could be assumed that the postal rule applies to acceptances 
communicated by email.this still leaves open the question of where an email is sent 
from, as the message may pass through several computers before it leaves the 
acceptor's network. This could be: 
(i) the computer on which the email containing the acceptance is generated or 
(ii) the computer which provides access to the internet. 
These two computers could be in different countries. For example the acceptor 
could be travelling in Russia, sending the acceptance from a mobile device, which 
is then forwarded to his or her internet access provider, whose computers are 
located in California. The email may well pass through a network of computers 
located in different jurisdictions before it is sent out via the internet. In this case, it 
will be difficult to determine the country from which the message was sent. 
Likewise, if the contract was legally deemed concluded where the message is 
received the same issue arises, as again the mail may be passed between different 
computers, located in different jurisdictions, before it reaches the recipient offeror. 
For example, the internet service provider of the offeror may host the offeror's 
mailbox on a server in California. The offeror may access his mailbox from a 
mobile device, while travelling in Kenya- this raises the question as to where the 
'1 . . d 1493 emal IS receIve . 
difference between click wrap contracts and email is that communications between web clients and servers. 
unlike email is instantaneous ( ... ) If either party goes offline at any point the other will be aware of this 
change in status.' 
1493 Because of these difficulties of locating dispatch and receipt of electronic messages. the 1996 
UNCITRAL Model Law provides in Art.I5 (-+) that an electronic message is deemed to be dispatched at the 
place where the originator has its place of business. and is deemed to be received at the plac~ where the. 
addressee has its place of business; see also to the same effect Art.IO (3) of the UN ConventIOn on the L'sC' 
of Electronic Communications in International Contracts of ~3. November 2005 
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(b) Place of performance of contractual obligation or breach of contract 
Further grounds for assuming jurisdiction are the place where the contractual 
obligation should have been performed or the place where the breach of contract 
has occurred. It might be equally difficult to define where a contractual 
performance should take place or where a breach of contract occurs on the internet. 
Jurisdictional connecting factors using these criteria are equally difficult to apply in 
internet cases. 
Under the CPR service out of the jurisdiction is also permissible where the claim is 
in respect of a breach of contract committed within England and Wales. 1494 
Under Article 5 (1) (a) of the Jurisdiction Regulationl495 , one of the grounds for 
special jurisdiction in a contract claim is that the obligation at issue should have 
been performed in the place of the forum. Article 5 (1) (b) clarifies that for the sale 
of goods, this is the place where the goods have been or should have been delivered 
and for services that is place where the services have been or should have been 
provided. 
In this context it might be difficult to determine the exact place of performance for 
the obligation under an e-commerce contract. 
By way of illustration there are four arguable possibilities if the contractual 
obligation is to make available for downloading software: 
(i) The location of the server which hosts the material being downloaded. 
This could be completely arbitrary and with no obvious connection to either party. 
By way of illustration, the provider of the software is a company incorporated and 
domiciled in France, the recipient a person domiciled in Luxembourg using an 
internet access provider domiciled in Belgium. The server hosting the software for 
downloading is located in Ireland. In such a situation it could be argued that since 
the contractual obligation is to make available the software, this has been performed 
in Ireland -albeit that this location is unconnected to the parties and could easily be 
moved (location being irrelevant for functionality). 
(ii) The provider's domicile could also be the place of performance. Since it is 
from this location that the provider creates and uploads the software onto the server 
to make it accessible, arguably this may be regarded as the place of performance 
(France). 
(iii) The recipienfs internet access provider. Since the recipient's browser 
sends the request for the software and the software is initially received on a ser.·er 
1494 CPR 6.20 (6) .... 
1495 Council Regulation EC/44'2001- This Regulation harmonis~s the rules?n Junsdlctlon and ~he 
recognition and enforcement of judgments in ci\'il and comm~rclalll1atters In the EU. and appiJ('~ 
according to ArtA (1) where the defendant is established within the EU. see fn 1480 
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of the recipient's access provider, it could be argued that this IS the place of 
performance (Belgium). 
(iv) Finally, it could be the location of the recipient's desktop since this IS 
where he actually downloads the software to (Luxembourg). 
In the physical world principles have been worked out which determine. for 
example when a seller has to deliver the goods and when a buyer has to collect 
them. The problem is here that equivalent principles have not been worked out in 
the metaphysical internet world. As this example has illustrated it may be difficult 
to determine the place of performance or the place of breach of a contract, where 
the contractual performance is carried out over the internet. 
2.2.2 Tort-ubiquitous effects 
Since the internet can be accessed from anywhere in the world, the harm caused by 
an information tort committed on the internet may, in some cases at least, fall 
anywhere and everywhere. 1496 
(a) The fear of being sued everywhere or in an unexpected location 
Depending on the circumstances of the case, the harmful effects caused by the tort 
might be limited to just one location, for example in the case of negligent medical 
advice provided on the internet causing personal injury to a person domiciled in a 
particular jurisdiction or defaming a person who only has a reputation in one 
particular locality (usually his or her domicile). On the other hand information torts 
committed on the internet can cause damaging effects internationally, with the harm 
being spread over many different jurisdictions. An example for the latter would be 
defamation of a person with an international reputation (such as a famous actor, 
politician or celebrity), trade mark infringement on a website of a mark registered in 
several jurisdictions or negligently spreading a virus through a website, imparting 
that malicious code to anyone who happens to access the website and which 
consequently damages computer equipment located in many different jurisdictions. 
Even where the harm resulting from the defendant's tortious activities de Jacto only 
occurs in one jurisdiction, the global reach of the internet can be troublesome for 
the unsuspecting defendant, who may be surprised at being hauled into a distant 
foreign court. 
Arguably, this additional burden on the defendant is fair if it was foreseeable for the 
defendant that he or she would be hauled before the courts of that particular 
jurisdiction. But this may not be so on the internet. For example. if a French 
architect operates a website which is directed at local, French customers and this 
1-196 H Kronke 'Applicable Law in Torts and Contracts in Cyberspace' in K Boele,-Woelki. C Kessedjian 
(eds.) i11fCrl/c{ Which COllrt Decides? Which Law Applies? (Kluwer Law InternatIonal The Hague 1998) 
65-87.65 
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we~site negligently c~rries a virus, which causes damage to the computer 
equIpment of a CanadIan user, should that Canadian user be able to sue in his/her 
~ocal courts? This question arises not only because of the ubiquitous nature of the 
mternet, but also because of the fact that most, even only local, businesses now 
have websites which can be accessed from anywhere in the world. 
Thus the main fear of users interacting on the internet is that they can be sued in a 
potentially distant jurisdiction (or multiple such jurisdictions ).1497 
From the claimant's point of view, the concern is whether he or she can sue at the 
place where he or she has suffered damage and whether any remedy can be 
enforced there. 
As the rules on tort jurisdiction discussed in the next section demonstrate these fear 
are amply justified. 
(b) Connecting factors: place of the commission of the tort and the place 
of damage 
Looking at the connecting or localisation factors under the rules of Private 
International Law for tort, there are two logical possibilities. One connecting factor 
is the place where the harmful act was carried out, ie the place where the tort was 
committed. The other connecting factor is the place where the damage occurred. 
In the EU if the defendant is domiciled in the EU, the EU Jurisdiction 
Regulation 1498 applies. 1499 If, on the other hand, the defendant is not domiciled in an 
EU or EEA state, the English courts apply the common law rules, now stated in the 
CPR. Both under the EU rules on jurisdiction and under the CPR (English common 
law) rules, the claimant can sue (at his or her choice) in either place. 1500 
In an early case1501 , Bier l' Mines de Potasse the ECJ had to rule on the meaning of 
the phrase 'place where the harmful event occurred' in Article 5 (3) of the 
Jurisdiction Regulation. The ECJ held that the phrase 'place where the harmful 
event occurred' could refer to either the jurisdiction where the event giving rise to 
the damage occurred or to the jurisdiction where the damage itself occurred. 1502 The 
relevant place under the EU harmonised rules is therefore either where the 
. 1503 
wrongfuL tortIOUS act was done or the place where the damage occurred. 
1497 See the Law Commission's consultation in respect of online defamation- the main concern expressed 
was the potential risk of being sued on a global basis. Law Commission 'Defamation and the internet' 
Scoping Study No 2 December 2002, para 4.21 
1498 Council Regulation EC!44/2001 fn 1480 
1499 Art.4 r~) 
1500 L Collins Diccl'. Morris & Collins fn 1484 388 
1501 C-217h Hand~lskwekerij G J Bier BY \ Mines de Potasse d'Alsace [1976] ECR 1735 
1502· . IbId para 19 
1503 L Collins Diccr. Morris & Collins fn 1484 388.416-417 
'9-
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Under the CPR the relevant connecting factors are that either the damaoe was 
sustained within the jurisdiction 1504 or that the tortious act was commi;ed within 
the jurisdiction 1505. 
(c) The place where the tort was committed 
As has been pointed out above, in the section about contracts, it can be difficult to 
pin down an activity, such as the commission of a tort, on the internet. If a tort is 
committed through the provision of information, is this the place, where the 
information is generated or accumulated, the place of uploading the information, the 
place where the information provider is physically located or legally established, 
the place where the server hosting the information is located or is it the place of 
downloading, as this is the place where the information is accessed and read? 
As the High Court of Australia has appositely pointed out in the Gutnick case: 
'locating the place of a tort is not always easy. Attempts to apply a single rule of 
location (such as a rule that intentional torts are committed where the tortfeasor 
acts, or that torts are committed in the place where the last event necessary to make 
the actor liable has taken place) have proved unsatisfactory if only because the rules 
pay insufficient regard to the different kinds of tortious claims that may be made. ' 
1506 
The answer to the question of where the tort was committed depends on the 
definition of the tort. 1507 For example if the tort is defined as using a trade mark in 
the course oftrade l508 , or making a misrepresentation or misstatement I 509, the place 
of the commission of the tort will be different from the place if the tort is defined as 
bl ' . 1510 pu IcatlOn . 
1504 CPR 6.20 (8) (a) 
1505 CPR 6.20 (8) (b) 
1506 DOlv Jones & Company Inc \' Gutnick [2002] HCA 56 (High Court of Australia) para 43 (first 
jUdgment) 
1507 Furthermore, sometimes a tort may consist of several acts raising the problem of defining the relevant 
act. A good example for this is the case of Ashton l' Rusal [2006] EWHC 2545 (Comm) para 62-64. In that 
case a Russian company 'hacked' into the computing system of a company in London and the court sai~ 
that the tortious acts were committed in London on the basis that this was the place where the confidentIal 
information was stolen, where the 'safe had been cracked', One could also argue that the misuse of the 
information in Russia was the place where the tort was carried out. This case is an example where t.he Court 
found that the relevant acts were committed within the jurisdiction. even though the actor was outSIde the 
jurisdiction when acting. . 
1508 S.l 0 Trade Mark Act 1994; here the defendant must trade in the forum. see also Euromarkct fn Desl,':!.//'\ 
Inc \' Petcrs and Crate & Barrel Ltd [2001] FSR 20 (ChD) ., . 
1509 Such as negligent misstatement. where the tort is deemed to be committed at the place ?f ongIn oj the 
communication. see the DomiCl'cst Ltd \' Sll'iss Bank C01P [1999] QB 548 (QB), However In other cases. 
the torts of negligent and fraudulent misrepresentation were found to be committed at the place of 
reception, see L Collins DinT. Morris & Collins fn 1484 387 
1510 See fn 1513 . 
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~ other words, not all torts committed by information disseminated through the 
mternet c~n b~ located. by reference to the same action (such as uploading or 
downloadIng InformatIOn) or by reference to the location of the same connecting 
factor (.such as. the serv~r hosting the information, the establishment of the pers;n 
producIng the InformatIOn, etc). Furthermore, even if a tort is defined in the same 
way, different courts may locate this activity in a different place. lSI I 
This can be illustrated by the example of defamation. Under EU law. the place 
where the tort of defamation was carried out is the place of publication. which has 
been held to be the place of the publisher's establishment in Shel'ill. 1512 This can be 
contrasted with the Australian/English approach which finds that. for defamation 
publication takes place where the information is read. A series of recent cases in the 
English and Australian courts have established that a text, which is accessible on 
the internet, is published at the place where it is downloaded. 1513 However. it should 
be pointed out that an English court has recently held that there is no presumption 
that an article merely made available on the internet has been published in this 
jurisdiction. The mere fact that the article could have been accessed in England is 
not sufficient for the claimant to establish jurisdiction here. 1514 
(d) The place where the damage occurred 
The second connecting factor is the place where the damage itself occurred. For 
example, the Mecklermedia case1515 illustrates the breadth of the assertion of 
jurisdiction on the ground of damage in the forum alone. Although on the facts of 
this case, the damage to Mecklermedia 's reputation in the UK was mainly caused 
by the defendants' active marketing operations in the forum (England) and only 
partly by the mere dissemination of the information through the website. the case 
illustrates how two commercial organisations, operating in a similar field with the 
same name in previously separate territories and different jurisdictions are brought 
into conflict, when commencing the use of a website, accessibly in all jurisdictions. 
In such a scenario jurisdiction based on damage to reputation within the forum, 
caused by users in the forum accessing the defendanf s website, is, to say the least, 
problematic, especially if the defendant had not targeted its conduct to the forum 
state. 1516 
1511 See fn 1509 
1512 C-68/93 Fiona Shevilll' Presse Alliance SA [1995] ECR 1-415 paras 24-25 
1513 Dml' Jones & Company Inc l' Glltnick [2002] HCA 56 (High Court of Austr~lia) para 98: Har~o~s Ltd \' 
Do)\' Jones & Company Inc [2003] EWHC 1162 (QB) para 36: Don King \' LeH'/S,~enl1ox [200..+ I E \\ He 
168 (QB) paras 9-10. confirmed by the Court of Appeal in Lelt'is Lenno.Y \' Don K111g [2004] E\\CA elY 
1329 (CA) para 2 and Richardson \' SchH'ar~('negger [2004] EWHe 2..+22 (QB) para 19 
1514 AI Amolldi \' Brisard [2006] EWHe 1062 (QB) The Court made,c1ear that there must be a platform of 
facts from which it can be inferred that publication in England was hkely, para, 37 
I~\~ Mecklcrl11cdia C01poratiol1 \' DC Congress GmbH [1998], eh -+0 (eh D), " , .. ' l' '. 
\)16 AI h h d' th C rt' fi dl'ngs Mecklermedla was drumming up bus\no~ from the Lk It t oug • accor In£ to e ou Sin, . . . ., 
on the facts the Court f~und that the defendant was targeting its conduct to the Uk ..+-
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However it also has to be pointed out that in two later cases l517 the Enalish/Scottish 
court has indicated that for trade mark infringement and passing off m:re access to 
a 'foreign' internet website by users in the proposed forum is not sufficient for a 
grant of jurisdiction, developing the law further from the Mecklermedia case 
discussed above. 
Thus both under the English and the ED rules, it is sufficient that the damage has 
occurred within the jurisdiction. This has potentially far reaching consequences for 
internet torts, where, as has been argued above, the damage can occur in many 
jurisdictions or in a completely unexpected jurisdiction. Noteworthy is also that the 
English nor European approach does not necessarily require an . intention' or 
foreseeability on the part of the defendant that the damage would occur in a 
particular location or jurisdiction and can be contrasted on this basis with the US 
approach. 1518 
The Eel has held in Shevill1519 that if the damage had been spread over several 
Member States the claimant could sue in each and every jurisdiction in which he or 
she had suffered harm, but only for the damage suffered in that particular 
jurisdiction. 152o If the claimant wishes to sue for the whole loss he or she has to 
bring an action in the courts of the place where the defendant carried out the tort l521 
. . 1522 15'1 j 
or where the defendant IS establIshed .-' 
The rule for multi-state defamation actions is similar under the English common 
law. Here also the claimant can sue for defamation in each and every jurisdiction 
where the statement has been downloaded. 1524 As under the European rules, the 
. . 1525 
claImant can only recover the damage suffered III that forum. 
This means the single publication rule applied in the US 1526 does not apply under 
EU or English law. In summary therefore a defendant can sue in each and every 
jurisdiction, where the immediate l527 damage has occurred. 
1517 Euromarket Designs Inc v Peters and Crate & Barrel Ltd [2001] FSR 20 (ChD) Para 21-25 contrast 
this decision with the decision of the US District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, which found 
jurisdiction in Illinois to hear the claim on the basis of minimum contacts established by the website: 
Euromarket Designs Inc v Crate & Barrel Ltd and Peters 96 F Supp 2d 824; and Bonnier Media Ltd \' 
Greg Lloyd Smith and Kestrel Trading C01poration [2002] SCLR 977 Court of Session, Outer House Para 
19-20 
1518 S b I ') 4 ee e ow _ .. 1 
1519 C-68/93 Fiona Shevilll' Presse Alliance SA [1995] ECR 1-415 
15'0 
- Para 29-33; under Art.5 (3) 
1521 Under Art.5 (3) of Regulation EC/44/2001, which for defamation is the place of the publisher's 
establishment, see the discussion above. I ~..., "'I )-- Under Art.2 (1) of Regulation EC/44/200 1 
152; L Collins Dice)', Morris & Collins fn 1484 418 . 
152-1 DO)\' Jones & Compmn' Inc l' Gutnick [2001] HCA 56 (High Court of AustralIa) para 98: H(J,.,~ods Ltd \' 
DoH' .Jones & Company Jn~' [2003] EWHC 1161 (QB) p~ra 36: ~on King \' Lell'is.~e111~ox [2004~ E\\ HC 
168 (QB) paras 9-10, confirmed by the Court of Appeal In Le1t'/s Lennox \' Don A1fIg [_00...+] E\\ CA CJ\ 
1329 (CA) para 2 and Richardson \' Sclnmr:;cnegger [2004] EWHC 2...+22 (QB) para 19 
1525 ibid 
1526 See the discussion below 2.4,3 
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(e) Limitation of jurisdiction under forum non conveniens under the 
common law 
Under the common law rules, courts may exercise their discretion to examine 
whether England is not the forum conveniens (appropriate forum).152f1 Under this 
test the courts take into consideration other places connected with the action. 1529 
Essentially under thefarum non conveniens doctrine l53o. the courts will consider l531 
the connection of the claimant with the forum, ie in a defamation action, his or her 
. . h 1 f h 1532 reputatIon III t e pace 0 t e forum , the location of the evidence and 
. 1533 d h h hI' wItnesses an w et er t e c mmant would be barred from obtainino- redress 
b 
elsewhere if the court strikes out the proceedings. 1534 
If publication in England is de minimis compared to the main place of publication, 
then the courts may also refuse to hear the case. 
In Chadha v Dow Jones both claimant and defendant were resident in the US and 
the libel was published in a US magazine. The total distribution figures were 
294,346, out of which 283,520 were sold in the US. Only 1257 were sold in the 
England. The court at first instance declined jurisdiction and the Court of Appeal1535 
confirmed this. 
Furthermore in the Court of Appeal decision of 3. February 2005 in Dow Jones & 
Co Inc l' Yo us ef Abdul Latif Jameel1536 the allegedly defamatory material inferring 
that the claimant had supported Al Quaeda in 1988, contained in the online version 
of the Wall Street Journal was only accessed by five subscribers (including the 
claimant's lawyer). Jurisdiction had not been challenged in this case, so that the 
issue offorum non conveniens did not arise. Nevertheless the court struck out the 
proceedings as an abuse of process finding that "the cost of the exercise will have 
been out of all proportion to what has been achieved. The game will not merely not 
have been worth the candle, it will not have been worth the wick' .1537 
1527 The ECl held in two cases that the claimant can only recover the direct damage. not any consequential 
harm: Dumc:: France l' Hessische Landesbank [1990] ECR I 49; Marinari " Lloyds Bank pic [1995] ECR I 
~719 
1528 The Spiliada [1987] AC 460 (HL); Berezovsky )' Michaels [2000] 2 AllER 986 (HL), [2000] EMLR 
643, 662: L('/1l/(xr Lewis l' Don King [2004] EWCA Civ 1329 (CA) 
1529 Lnt'is Lennox "Don King fn 1513 paras 25-26 referring to Diamond l' Sutton (18f,f,) LR 1 Ex 130 and 
Schapira l' Ailronsol1 [1999] EMLR 735 (CA) 
1530 L Collins Dicev. Morris & Collins fn 1484 476 
1531 All of these ha've been mentioned in Sclnrar:;cl/cggcr fn 1513 para 24 
-'1g 6.:'1-652 15)2 Don Kill'!, l' Lewis Lenno."\' [2004] EWHC 168 (QB) para 17; Bere::m'sky fn 1)_ 
15.\.~ Lord Goffin The Spiliada fn 1528,479 
15.1~ ibid 475-476 
15.'5 [1999] EMLR 724 (CA) 
1536 [2005] EWCA Ci\ 75 para 69 
IW ibid 
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Chadha and Dow Jones show that in extreme cases the courts in England are likel \ 
to strike out the claim because of forum non conveniens or as an abuse ~f 
1538 H h" 1 l'k 1 process . owever t IS IS on y 1 e y to happen in extreme cases. As several 
defamation cases have shown the English courts are slow to find that Enoland is 
b forum non conveniens: for example, in Harrods Ltd v Dow Jones/539 the court (1\1,. 
Justice Eady) granted jurisdiction, even though 'the evidence discloses a very small 
number of "hits" on the article as published on the web'. In Lewis Lem;o.y the 
English courts had jurisdiction, even though all parties were all resident in the 
1540 In S h . . US. c warzenegger the EnglIsh court (Mr Justlce Eady) assumed 
jurisdiction in a libel action brought by an English television presenter against the 
Californian Governor (and others), in statements made in the US during his election 
campaign, reported in an article by the Los Angeles Times (accessible on the 
internet). 1541 
Furthermore forum non conveniens does not apply where the defendant is domiciled 
in the EU and the Jurisdiction Regulation1542 applies. 1543 Thus if the court grants 
jurisdiction on the basis of the wide jurisdictional principles enunciated in Bier and 
Shevill it will have no discretion to stay proceedings on the grounds that another 
fi · . 1544 orum IS more appropnate. 
This discussion of tort jurisdiction has shown that the rules on jurisdiction in the EU 
and under the common law are complex and for internet cases, unpredictable. Links 
such as damage within the jurisdiction and harm to reputation held there have been 
sufficient. For defendants, therefore it is likely that they may be sued in more than 
one jurisdiction or in an unexpected jurisdiction. Conversely for claimants there is 
often uncertainty as to which court has jurisdiction and considerably opportunity for 
forum shopping. 
1538 See also L Collins Dicey, Morris & Collins fn 1484 468 
1539 Fn 1513 para 4 
1540 Fn 1513 
1541 Fn 1513 
154: Council Regulation 44/2000lEC fn 1480 
154.1 L Collins Dice}', Morris & Collins fn 1484 472; C Clarkson, J Hill The Conflict C?fLaws (yd ed 
Oxford University Press 2006) 59-60 
1544 C -412/98 Group Josi Reinsurance Company SA l' Universal General Insurance Company [2000] ECR 
1-5925; for the Lugano Convention Aiglon Limited l' Gau Shan & Company Limited [1993] 1 L~oyds Law 
Reports 164, 175; but the English Court of Appeal has held that it can still decide that England IS not the 
appropriate forum if the conflict is between English jurisdiction and a non-EU state (such as between an 
English defendant and a US claimant): In re Harrods (Buenos Aires) Limited [1992] Ch 74 (CA): ACE 
Insurance SA-NT'l' Zurich Insurance Co and Zurich American Insurance Co [2001] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 61 R 
(CA). However the ECJ has now explicitly ruled that if the defendant is domiciled in a ~U M~mber State 
(including the UK) and the Jurisdiction Regulation applies, the English courts have fl() d~sl'retJOn to apply 
. ., . . d" (h J a)' C-?8110" forum non conveniens, even where the conflict IS WIth a non-EU Juns IctJOn ere amalc . _- -
Oll'lISIi l' Jackson (fO /'illa Holidays Bal Inn Villas) Judgment of 1. March 2005 [2005] ILPr 2) (ECl) 
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2.2.3 Consumers 
One of the defining features of the European approach to private international law is 
that there are special rules for (some) consumer contracts. 1545 The policy behind 
special consumer jurisdiction rules is that the consumer is perceived as the weaker 
party to the contract. 1546 
To counterbalance the consumer's prima facie weaker position, the harmonised EU 
1 1· bl 1 1547 d' . d' . 1548 . ru es on app lca e aw an Juns lctlon provIde for consumer protection. 
(a) Asymmetrical jurisdiction rules 
If the special consumer jurisdiction rules apply, a consumer is allowed to sue a 
foreign supplier in the local court of the consumer's domicile. In fact the consumer 
has a choice: he or she can sue in the state of his or her own domicile or in the 
domicile of the supplier (to ensure enforcement, for example).1549 But in the 
reverse, the supplier can only sue a defendant consumer in the consumer's local 
1550 H h" d" I . I' court. ence t e Juns IctlOn ru es are asymmetnca III favour of the consumer. 
However, even if the consumer is able to sue' at home' he or she would still have to 
enforce the judgment abroad. 
(b) Applying (at least) consumer protection law mandatory in the 
consumer's residence 
If the special consumer protection provisions apply, the supplier cannot contract out 
of provisions of substantive consumer protection law mandatory in the jurisdiction 
of the consumer's residence (eg regulation of unfair contract terms).1551 Mandatory 
rules are defined as those rules of a legal system which the parties cannot deviate 
from by agreement. 1552 A provision of the chosen law is inapplicable on(v to the 
extent that it would deprive the consumer of the protection by the mandatory rules 
1545 Based on the EC Treaty (Treaty establishing the European Union (,Treaty of Rome') consolidated 
version incorporating the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties) Articles 3 (t) and 95 (3) 
1546 C-96/00 Gabriel v Schlank and Schick GmbH [2002] ECR 1-6367 para 39; L Collins Dicey. Morris & 
Collins fn 1484 440, 1635 
154" 1980 Rome Convention on the law applicable to contractual obligations of 26. January 1998. OJ C027 
pp 34 -46 
1548 Council Regulation 44/2001IEC on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in 
Civil and Commercial Matters of 22. December 2000 (,Jurisdiction Regulation') OJ 2001 L12 pp.1-23 
1549 Art.16 (1) Jurisdiction Regulation 44/2001lEC 
1550 Art.16 (2) Jurisdiction Regulation 4412001/EC . 
1551 Art.5 (2) Rome Convention fn 1480: see also Art.6 (2) of Directi\t~ 931131EEC of 5. Apnl 1993 on 
Unfair Tenns in Consumer Contracts:' Member States shall take the necessary measures to ensure that the 
consumer does not lose the protection granted by this Directive by virtue of the choice of I~w of a non-
Member country as the law applicable to the contract if the latter has a close connectIOn \\Ith the temtory 
of the Member States'. 155~ Art.3 (3) Rome Convention fn 1480. L Collins Dicey. Morris & Collins fn 1484 1b-+0. see al:-l) the 
discussion in 4-4.5 
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in ~is country of residence. 1553 In other words, in this situation, the applicable law is 
splIt: mandatory rules of the consumer's residence apply as a minimum and the law 
stipulated ~ t?e choice of law ap~lies concurrently. The consumer's mandatory law 
only prevaIls If the consumer receIves less protection under the chosen law. 1554 
This will be reformed if and when the new draft Regulation on applicable law 
(Rome I) will be in force. 1555 Article 5 (l) makes no distinction between mandatory 
laws and non-mandatory laws and the applicable law will not 'split'. In other word;, 
if there is a choice of law clause, it is either invalid and the consumer's law applies 
or it is valid, in which case the law of choice governs the contract. 
At present, under the Rome Convention, the law of the country of the consumer's 
residence will completely govern the contract only if there is no express choice of 
law. 1556 This 'split' of the applicable law is cumbersome and will make litigation 
even more expenSIve. 
(c) Applicablity of the rules on consumer protection 
The next question which must be examined is under what circumstances these 
private international law rules protecting consumers apply. 
Applicable law under the Rome Convention 
The consumer rules in the Rome Conventions apply to a contract for the supply of 
goods or services, where in the state of the consumer's domicile (a) the conclusion 
of the contract was preceded by a specific invitation addressed to him or by 
advertising in that country and (b) the consumer took the steps necessary on his part 
for the conclusion of the contract in that country.1557 Alternatively, the Rome 
Convention applies 'if the other party or his agent received the consumer's order in 
that country' .1558 
In Gabriel l' Schlank and Schick GmbHI559 the ECl stated that 'the concepts of 
advertising and specific invitation addressed ( ... ) cover all forms of advertising 
carried out in the Contracting State in which the consumer is domiciled, whether 
disseminated generally by the press, radio, television, cinema or any other medium'. 
This would certainly include internet websites (or other internet applications) as a 
form of general advertising medium 
155, . f 480 
. Art.5 (2) Rome ConventIOn n 1 
1554 L Collins Dicer. Morris & Collins fn 1484 1640: 'the correct interpretation of Art 5 (2) will enable the 
consumer to rely o'n the mandatory rules of the law of his habitual residence, if they are more favourable to 
him that the chosen law, or on the chosen law, ifit is more favourable to him than the mandatory rules' 
1555 See Art.5 (1) Commission's Proposal for a Regulation on the Law Applicable to Contractual 
Obligations (Rome I) COM(2005) 650 final of 15. December 200) 
1556 Art.) (3) fn 1480 
155" Art.) (2) of the Rome Convention fn 1480 
1558 ibid 
1m See fn 1546 44 
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R D · 1560 h I~ a~mer v avzes t e Court of Appeal stressed that these rules only apply in 
sItuatIOns where the defendant had actively marketed his services in the consumer"s 
jurisdiction. In this case the English claimant sued a defendant domiciled in Italv 
for an allegedly negligent survey of a yacht berthed in Italy. The claimant had 
travelled to Italy and all the negotiations for the survey contract had taken place 
there. The defendant surveyor then faxed a contractual offer for the sunev contract 
to the claimant, which the claimant signed and returned by fax to the defendant 
from England. The Court of Appeal said that the appropriate test was to "stand back 
from the factual scenario and ask who invited whom to do business".1561 Thus the 
relevant test was whether the defendant had invited the claimant to do business in 
England. Here the Court found that the claimant had taken the initiative by going to 
Italy and that there was no jurisdiction. 1562 
It is difficult to apply this test based on general advertising in the consumer's state 
to internet contracts, as websites (and other internet applications) can be accessed 
from anywhere and frequently it will be impossible to decide who invited whom to 
do business. At the Commission's public hearing on private international la\\' and 
the internet there was a long debate, whether consumers' contracting through the 
web is akin to the consumer travelling abroad and visiting a shop there or whether it 
is akin to traders travelling to the consumer's place of residence to market and sell 
their products there. 1563 However this debate is inconclusive as these analogies are 
meaningless, since the whole point of the internet as a communications medium is 
that neither party has to travel. In a hypothetical scenario if the consumer concludes 
a contract for services through a form on a website, paying by credit card and while 
sitting at a desktop in his or her country of residence, the conditions in Article 5 (2) 
(advertising in the consumer's state of residence and consumer taking the stepsl564 
to conclude the contract there) may well be fulfilled l565, depending on how the 
courts locate the advertising in the specific case. It is suggested here that a more 
logical test may be whether the business has targeted or directed its services at 
consumers in that country, albeit that in practice this second test is not radically 
different. 1566 Furthermore, the difficulty with targeting is that the parameters of such 
1560 [2003] 1 All ER (Comm) 394 (CA) 
1561 'b'd 26 I I para " , 
1562 The defendant surveyor had some sort of website- this was a point which the claimant faIled to explOIt 
in his argument. , 
156.1 On 5, November 1999- the author attended this hearing on behalf of a clIent. 
1564 This was meant to the factual rather than legal steps to conclude the contract. see Giuliano-Lagarde 
Report on the Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations OJ 1980 C2R2 p, 1. 24 and L 
Collins Dicev Morris & Collins fn 1484 1639 
15(15 R S h :T'h A I' bl Law to Consumer Contracts Made Over the internet: Consumer Prott'Clion 
cue pp Ica e , J I '19') '1'19 
Through Private International Law':' 5 International Journal of La)\' and b~formatlOl1 Tee 1110 Ogl ----, 
215 " I 
1566 The courts would ask themselves whether a business was directing ib adv~rtising to a partlcu ar state 
, ' "' I ' A CCI"dental a\"aiiabIlIt\' of an advertisement before finding that the bUSiness ad\'ertlsed In t lat state, mere a . " 
, , '". h G" I" no-Lagarde Report on the Con\'entlon on In a state would probably not amount to advertiSing t ere. IU la """ _ 
, ' OJ 1980 Ci8' 1'4 Howe\"er thl"; I..;..;ue I" contro\erslal. the Law Applicable to Contractual OblIgations - - p, . -".., - "-
see the discussion in L Collins Dic(l", Morris & Collins fn 14R4 1638-16_,9 
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an equally general test are also unclear. This will be discussed in the next section as 
this is the test which has been introduced by the Jurisdiction Regulation. . 
Applicability of the consumer protection rules under the Jurisdiction 
Regulation 
The special consumer jurisdiction rules in the Jurisdiction Regulation now apph 
(. l' 1567) 'f '( ) '. . mter a Ia I .... a person dIrects commercIal or professional activities to the 
Member State of the consumer's domicile (or to several states including that 
Member State)' . 1568 
As some authors point out, it may be sufficient for their application that consumers 
of a particular Member State are able to acquire goods and services through a 
website. This approach would mean that the consumer protection rules apply to all 
interactive, general audience websites. 1569 
However, it is more likely that the courts, in assessing whether a business directs its 
activities to a particular Member State, would make an overall assessment of the 
b ·· . 1570 I k . we SIte m questIOn. t may ta e Into account the nature and character of the 
website (eg the products sold), the language and currency used on the website l571 , 
marketing activities of the business external to the website (or other internet 
application), such as advertisements in national print or televised media in the 
consumer's Member State, banner ads or pop-up advertising on other websites, 
which are clearly targeted at a particular Member State, and finally whether the 
website contains a genuine disclaimer. 1572 
As can be seen from these criteria, targeting is a question of degree and it is unclear 
how much targeting is required for the special consumer protection provisions to 
apply. In particular the question arises whether there is a presumption that the 
business directs its activities to all (Member) States, if a business does not specify 
on its website to which Member States it sells and if the target states for its 
activities cannot be ascertained from the context. 
Hence businesses contracting on the internet are concerned that they may be hauled 
into court in an unsuspected jurisdiction or even multiple such jurisdictions and this 
1567 They also apply to a contract for the sale of goods on instalment credit terms or any other form of credit 
made to finance the sale of goods, Art.I5 (1) (a) - (b) of the Jurisdiction Regulation 44l~001iEC fn 1480 
1568 Art.l5 (1) (c) of the Jurisdiction Regulation 44/200IIEC fn 1480 
1569 L Gillies 'European Union: Modified Rules of Jurisdiction for Electronic Consumer Contracts' C~O~O) 
17 Computer Law & Seclwifl' Report 395-398.397; see also Recital I? of the Proposed Rome I.Regulatl?n 
see fn 1581; C Clarkson. J Hill fn 1543 85; also mentioned in L CollIns Dicey. Morns & Colll11s fn 14:-;4 
4.42 as a possible interpretation ..' . 
1)70 The issue is controversial. but see the discussion in L Collms Dicey. ;\jorns & CoIIllls fn 1484 1642-
1643 arguing that it is possible that the courts would adopt a targeting approac~ 
1571 However. Recital 10 to the Proposed Rome I Regulation see fn ISS 1 (applIcable law) expres"ly "tates 
t~~t language and currency are not determinative (interpretation ?fth~ Europea.n Com~ISSI(ln) ._ 
I) - See also FSA's reaulator\' approach as to when a person IS dlrectmg financial ~en Ice~ to the UK. 
similar cri~eria can' be found in the FSA Handbook. Release 022. August 2003 Chapter .~ COB para. :. .3.t-. 
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concern is not wholly unjustified considering the general nature of the 
directing/targeting test and the dearth of jurisprudence clarifying the test. 
The issue has provoked considerable debate. The suggestion that e-businesses are 
liable to be sued in every Member State has evoked great criticism from the 
business community on the basis that it would drive many SMEs 1573 out of business 
if they had to contend litigation in every Member State. 1574 
On the other side of the argument it could be pointed out that the burden or risk of 
litigation in foreign EU Member States is a natural consequence concomitant with 
the benefits of access to an EU-wide consumer market. 1575 
One solution to this conflict is increased use of Alternative Dispute Resolution 
(ADR)1576 or Online Dispute Resolution (ODR)1577. Interestingly, when the 
European Parliament was consulted on the draft Regulation, the European 
Parliament suggested tying the consumer jurisdiction provisions to ADR. The 
European Parliament suggested that service providers should have been able to 
contract out of the asymmetric rules on consumer jurisdiction if the supplier 
commits itself to co-operate in a specified ADR procedure. 1578 Hence EU policy 
makers actively acknowledge the use of ADR as one solution to the difficulty of 
cross-border litigation. This requires the development of standards for ADR and the 
development of suitable schemes as explained in the Model in Chapter 81579. 
Another solution to this conflict is to find a way which alleviates the fear of 
businesses that they may be sued in unexpected court(s) without diminishing the 
protection given to consumers. This could be achieved by making business ask their 
customers where they are based and denying consumer protection if a consumer lies 
about his or her location. Hence, business could use simple technology such as a 
drop-down menu and block consumers from jurisdictions they do not wish to target. 
This would prevent them from contracting with consumers in jurisdictions they do 
not want to direct their services to. This seems the approach adopted in the 
proposed Rome I Regulation, which will be discussed next. 
1573 Small and Medium Sized Enterprises. . 
1574 M Pullen 'EU's dangerous threat to e-commerce' September 1999 Legal Week: M Jordan 'SuffocatIng 
e-commerce at birth' December 1999/January 2000 European Counsel 15-17: M Powell & P Turner-Kerr 
'Putting the E-in Brussels and Rome' (2000) 16 Computer Lall' & Securi~v Report 23-27. ~6 . 
1575 BEUC position paper, BEUC 183/99 'Consumer Rights in electronic commerce-Junsdlctlon and 
applicable law on cross-border consumer contracts' of 8 October 1999: S Dutson S Dutson 'E-commerce-
European Union' (2000) 16 Computer Lml' & Secllri~l' Report 105-107. 107; G Ru~sell G Rus.sell -1· 
commerce Law and Jurisdiction' December 1999 Bllttenvorths Journal of InternatIOnal Bank1l1g and 
Financial LOll' 459-461.459 
1576 S 4 '"' ee -.' 
1577 S - '1 d ~ ~ ee )-- an ,1-, . . d" -
1578 Report of the European Parliament on the Proposal for the Council Regulation on Juns Ictlon. A,:,-
02532000 Final. Rapporteur Diana Wallis. Art.17a. p. 21. 
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Consumer protection under the new (Rome J) Regulation on the law applicable 
to contracts 
The provisions of the Rome Convention will soon be replaced bv a Rerulation 1580 
. I 5 (2) f h 1581. - 0 . ArtiC e . o. t at P~oposa~ .. provIdes that the consumer's local law applies if 
the supplIer dIrected Its actIvItIes to the consumer~s Member State. unless the 
supplier did not know where the consumer was resident and this ignorance was not 
due to the supplier's negligence. This wording however leaves open the extent and 
nature of the supplier's obligations to ascertain the location of its customers. Where 
the contract involves sending out goods to a delivery address and/or the business 
requires a billing address (as is the case for card payments), it would be difficult for 
the business to claim that it was not aware of the consumer's location. However, if 
the provider performs the contract by making files available for downloading, 
which are paid by a method not involving a billing address, the business may 
genuinely not know where its customers are located. 
However from the wording of the draft Regulation it is not clear whether. if the 
supplier does not undertake any steps to ascertain the location of its customers, it 
could be regarded as being negligent, with the consequence that the consumer's law 
applies. 
In addition to the consumer protection prOVISIOns discussed above. private 
international law is also affected by the control of unfair contract terms, which 
make the situation even more confusing. 
(d) Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Directive 
The Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Directive l582 provides that certain terms 
deemed unfair are not binding on consumers. This premise set by the Directive 
raises the question whether an express choice of jurisdiction can be unfair and thus 
not binding on consumers. Secondly if a choice of jurisdiction clause is not binding 
on the consumer, does this mean that the consumer can sue a supplier in the 
consumer's jurisdiction and/or challenge the jurisdiction of the supplier's local 
court on this basis? 
The starting point for evaluating the unfairness of a term is Article 3 (1) of the 
Directive, which establishes three requirements 1583 before a term is deemed unfair. 
First the term must not have been individually negotiated with the consumer. The 
1580 The first reading in the European Parliament is pending (scheduled for October 2007), see 
http:'\\'w\\'.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/file.isp?id=5301~~'::> [14. September 2007] . . 
1581 See the Commission's Proposal for a Regulation on the Law Applicable to Contractual ObhgatlOns 
(R?me I) COM(2005) 650 final of 15. December 2005.. _ ") 
158_ Council Directive 9:V13iEEC of 5. April 1993 on Unfair Terms In Consumer Contracts ?J L9) _9 of 
.21. April 1993, implemented in the UK by the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts RegulatIOns 1999 
SI1999/2083 . 
158) See also Director General of Fair Trading l' First National Bank [2000] QB 6 -:-.:: (CA) 686- t.h1S case 
has been further appealed to the' House of Lords, but not on the general interpretation of the unfairness test. 
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burden of proof is on the business to show that a tenn is not a standard tenn and has 
b . d' 'd 11 . d 1584 . een In IVI ua y negotIate. Secondly It must be contrary to <Jood faith. 
Thirdly, the term must cause a significant imbalance in the parties' 0 rights and 
obligations to the detriment of the consumer. 
Examples in the Annex 
The Annex to the Directive provides a non-exhaustive and merely indicative list of 
examples of clauses, which cause such an imbalance and are contrary to good faith. 
However Article 4 of the Directive also makes clear that all the circumstances must 
be taken into account, including the nature of the goods and services. on a case-by-
case basis. Thus a term not listed can be adjudged to be unfair, whereas a tenn 
listed may be considered to be fair in the circumstances. 1585 
The most relevant of the examples for unfair clauses listed in the Annex is that 
contained in (q), which is defined as 'excluding or hindering the consumer's right to 
take legal action or exercise any other legal remedy ( ... )'. While this example does 
not expressly mention jurisdiction clauses, arguably a requirement for the consumer 
to litigate in a foreign or far away court hinders his or her right to take legal action. 
1586 
There is also judicial support for this interpretation of the Directive. In Oceano 
Grupo Editorial SA l' Murciano Quintero1587 a publishing company selling 
encyclopedia on instalment credit tenns included in its standard contract tenns with 
consumers, who were located in different regions of Spain, a clause providing for 
jurisdiction in the courts at its place of business in Barcelona. Some consumers 
defaulted on the instalment terms and the company brought recovery proceedings in 
its local court. In that case, the ECJ in a preliminary ruling decided that an exclusive 
jurisdiction clause in a consumer contract falls within the example listed under (q) 
in the Annex. 1588 The ECJ argued that, since the value of the claim is likely to be 
small, meaning that the legal costs are disproportionate, consumers may be unable 
to enter an appearance. Furthermore. depending on the facts the clause may cause a 
significant imbalance between the parties, contrary to the requirement of good faith 
if as here the supplier can bring and defend proceedings conveniently at its place of 
. ' . 1589 busmess whereas the consumer has to do so at a dIstance. , 
1~8~ Art.3 (2) of Directive 93113/EEC nd 
i)S) GH Treitel fn 1491 274; D Oughton & J Lowry Consumer Law (2 ed Blackstone London 2000) .. +00: 
R Stone The Modern LaYl' of Contract (5 th ed Cavendish London 2002) 252. ., ') 
1586 Para 17.4 Unfair Contract Tenns Guidance. published by the Office of FaIr TradIng In February _001 
and available on their website . . 
<http: WW\\ .oft.!!o\". uk/Busi I1cssLe!.!nl+ Po\\ers Unfai r Terms-in-Consumer+Contract .... llnfal r- !.!Uldance. 
htm > [ 14. September 2007] 
1587 Joined Cases C-240-244/98 [2000] ECR 1-4941 . . 
1588 See para 22: Advocate General Saggio pointed out that even if it did not fall WIthIn the Anne,. f'.1ember 
States can add ne\\ categories. A17 
i \89 . A18 
. See para 23-24: Advocate General SaggIO. 
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Similarly in an English case, Standard Bank London Limited v Apostolakis J 5YO the 
validity of a non-exclusive jurisdiction clause was at issue, allowing the Bank to sue 
~he~r ?~eek clients at ~he Bank's place of business in England or any other 
Junsdlcbon where the chents had assets, whereas the consumer-clients were limited 
to suing before the English court. The Court found that the special rules on 
. . d" . h B I 1591 consumer Juns lctlOn In t e russe s Convention applied and that therefore Mr 
and Mrs Apostolakis could only be sued in Greece and were themselves entitled to 
bring an action in the courts of their domicile, Greece. 1592 However the Court obiter 
remarked that it would also consider the clause to be unfair under the Directive. 1593 
The clause caused a substantial imbalance in that the consumers would be put to 
substantial inconvenience and cost to sue in England, whereas the Bank could sue at 
its place of business or at the place where a judgment would have to be 
1594 
enforced. 
Good Faith 
Since there is no general all-embracing principle of good faith in English law, this is 
a novel concept for English trained lawyers. 1595 On the other hand as Lord Bingham 
in the First National Bank case has pointed out: 
'Good faith in this context is not an artificial or technical concept; nor, since Lord 
Mansfield was its champion, is it a concept wholly unfamiliar to British lawyers. It 
looks to good standards of commercial morality and practice.' 1596 
Lord Bingham summed up the good faith requirement as one of fair and open 
dealing. 1597 
It seems that the 'good faith' requirement in Article 3 (1) of the Directive has both a 
procedural and a substantive element. The procedural requirement is that the 
consumer is dealt with openly and that the terms are sufficiently drawn to his or her 
attention, so that they do not take the consumer by surprise. However the fairness 
test in the Directive goes beyond transparency requirements. Lord Steyn in the First 
National Bank case1598 cites Hugh Collins with approval that 'the test of significant 
imbalance of the obligations obviously directs attention to the substantive 
1590 [2001] Lloyd's Rep Bank 240 (QB); by contrast in Westminster Building Company Lt~ l' !3ec.kingham 
[2004] All ER (D) 343 (Feb) (Technology and Construction Court) the court upheld an adjudicatIon clause 
(not a jurisdiction clause) on the basis that it was not unfair in the circumstances. inter alia because the 
consumer had been professionally represented. see 7-2.2 
1591 Fn 1480 
159~ ~ [2001] Lloyd's Rep Bank 240 (QB) Para 42 
159:1 Para 51 
1594 Para 49 
159'i . ,.,nd dP . L d 199"')10110'" 105' DOughton&JLowr\ 
. R Goode Commc/"lcal LG11' (~ e engum on on - - -. . . 
Consumer LG11' (2 nd ed Blackstone London 2000) 404; R Stone fn 1489 250 
1596 The Director General of Fair Trading l' First National Bank [2002] 1 AC --l81 (HL) para 17 
1597 ibid . 
1598 ibid 
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unfairness of the contr~ct'}599: Lord ,St~yn makes clear that the examples listed in 
the Annex show that faIrness IS not hmited to a procedural test of ensurin G that the 
tenns ,,:,ere properly draw~ to the consumer's attention: 'any procedural or eyen 
predomInantly procedural Interpretation of the requirement of Good faith must be 
, d' 1600 L'k 'L' , b 
reJecte. 1 eWIse, ord Bmgham has pomted out that it is a composite test. 
'covering both the making and the substance of the contracf ,1601 
Some authors have criticized this incorporation of substantive consumer fairness 
, E l' h 1 1602 H h' . mto ng IS aw. ow ever t e pOSItion under the Directive clearly is that 
substantive factors must be included into the evaluation. The issue is not ~nl\' that 
the consumer makes a well-infonned, but also a free choice, as the consu~er"s 
inferior bargaining position frequently means that he or she can only choose 
between different suppliers offering all the same standard clauses. It was this 
market failure which the Directive was designed to address. 1603 
Causing a significant imbalance 
A more interesting question is whether an exclusive jurisdiction clause in favour of 
the supplier's domicile is to be considered unfair if the special jurisdiction rules 
contained in Articles 15-17 of the Jurisdiction Regulation do not apply.1604 By way 
of illustration, assume a Spanish consumer contracts with a provider domiciled in 
England for a survey of a house situated in London. The contract has been entered 
into via the world-wide-web or email l605 and contains the surveyor"s standard term 
and conditions incorporating a jurisdiction clause which provides for the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the English courts. The Spanish consumer alleges that the survey has 
been carried out negligently and wishes to sue the surveyor in Spain. rr the 
jurisdiction clause was considered unfair it would not be binding on the consumer. 
However this would not automatically entitled the consumer to sue in Spain. Under 
the Jurisdiction Regulation the consumer could sue in the defendant's domicile 1606 
(England) or the place where the services were to be providedl607 (also England). 
Thus, in this specific example the Spanish consumer would nonetheless have to sue 
1599 Para 37; H Collins 'Good Faith in European Contract Law' (1994) 14 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 
229-268 
1600 Fn 1596 para 36 
1601 Para 17 
1602 C Withers 'Jurisdiction clauses and the Unfair Tenns in Consumer Contracts Regulations' [2002] 
Llow/'s Maritime and Commercial Law Quarter(l' 56-65, 61 
16(l3 Office of Fair Trade Briefing August 2000 2. available from , . 
<http://wwvv ,oft. gO\'.ll k/Busi ness/Le!!al + PowerslUnfai r+ Tenns+i n+Consumer+Contrach LIn fal r~gLlI dance. 
htm > [ 14. September 2007]] , , 
160-1 Regulation EC/4412001; this issue did not arise in ApostolaA.-is or in Oceano. so there IS no direct 
authority on this point. , " 
1605 Assuming, of course that the supplier did not direct its acti\'ities to ~pam. \:'hlch IS, a factual assessment. 
which in this fictional scenario could be based on the fact that the webSIte was m EnglIsh. referred to pnce:--
in £ Sterling and stated expressly that the services where limited to properties situated in England and 
Wales, 
1606 Art.2 (1 ) 
1607 Art.S (l ) (b) 
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in the supplier's jurisdiction. ~or this reason one could argue that the jurisdiction 
clause does not cause a power Imbalance between the parties in this scenario and is 
therefore not unfair. 
This situation is changed if, without the jurisdiction clause in the contract. the 
Jurisdiction Regulation allows the consumer to litigate in his or her own local court. 
The consumer can litigate locally, eg where the obligation in question should ha\'e 
been perfonned in the consumer's jurisdiction under Article 5 (1). Such a case may 
arise, eg where goods are delivered to the consumer's address or services haye to b~ 
cd' th ' ' . d" 1608 prelonne III e consumer s Juns lchon. In that scenario, a valid jurisdiction 
clause providing for the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of the supplier's 
domicile would cause a power imbalance between the parties. This raises the 
question whether such a clause should be deemed unfair and therefore non-bindina 
b 
on the consumer, even though the jurisdiction clause is valid under the consumer 
protection provisions of the Jurisdiction Regulation 1609. It is only here that the 
Jurisdiction Regulation and the Unfair Contracts Directive clash. 
Christopher Withers emphasises in his article the clear policy of the hannonised 
rules on jurisdiction to recognise as valid jurisdiction clauses subject only to narrow 
exceptions. 1610 However this argument overlooks that there is a genuine clash 
between the Directive and the Regulations. 1611 
It is questionable which instrument takes precedence as lex specialis, The 
Jurisdiction Regulation provides in Article 67 that it does not prejudice the 
application of Community provisions governing jurisdiction in specific matters. It is 
doubtful, though, that the Directive can be described as . governing jurisdiction' .1612 
In tum, the Directive provides in Article I (2) that contractual tenns which reflect 
mandatory regulatory provisions are not subject to the Directive (and its fairness 
test). This provision does not give much guidance either, as a jurisdiction clause is 
not a mandatory regulatory provision- there is no obligation for the parties to 
include a jurisdiction clause in their contract. 1613 
1608 Presumptions in Art.5 (1) (b), albeit that it is difficult to think of a factual example where the supplier 
was not directing its activities to the consumer's Member State, but nonetheless had to perform the 
contractual obligation in the consumer's state, An example could be a business delivering to the 
consumer's jurisdiction by way of exception, eg where the website through which the contract is concluded 
is clearly op'erated by a local business in another jurisdiction, but by way of exception that business 
undertakes to deliver to the consumer's foreign address. 
1609 Assuming that the Jurisdiction Regulation, Articles 15-17 do not apply and Art.23 (1) a~plies, 
1610 See fn 1602 64-65 and see the special rules on consumer jurisdiction in Articles 15-17 In the 
Regulation discussed above, insurance in Articles 8-14 and employment Articles 18-2.1 . . 
1611 The OFT Guidance fn 1586 para 17.4 avoids this difficult issue by merely refernng to InternatIOnal 
conventions and the Brussels Convention and saying that jurisdiction clauses which are contrary to .the 
consumer provisions in these international conventions. are unenforceable fo: that .re~son, too. But It does 
not state what the position is where the Directive/Regulations clash with the Junsdlctlon prov1-;lons. 
161~ See also (agreeing) C Withers fn 1602 64-65 .. . . .. . 
161., See also GH Treitel fn 1491 276:'the use of the word "mandatory III the Regulations -;eems.to mean 
that the exception in them does not extend to provisions which are merely authorised but not reqUired by 
other legislation'. 
-l12 
Annex 
However Article 1 (2) .of the J?i.rective also provides that it does not apply to 
contractual tenns reflectlng prOVISIOns or principles of international conventions. to 
which the Member States are party. This is wider than the first exception. applym' £! 
b h I " I d .. 1614 ~ to ot genera pnnCIp es an concrete proVIsIOns. At the time the Directive was 
negotiated and entered into force, the relevant rules on jurisdiction were contained 
in such an international convention, namely the Brussels Convention. Hence it 
could be argued that a clause containing the parties' choice of jurisdiction and 
recognised according to the Brussels Convention would not be subject to the 
unfairness test. 
However, now, the Brussels Convention has been superseded by a Community 
instrument, the Jurisdiction Regulation EC/4412001 1615 , so that the question of the 
conflict between the hannonised rules on jurisdiction on the one hand, and the 
hannonised rules on consumer protection, on the other, is a conflict within 
Community law, and not a conflict between international treaty law and 
Community law. Ultimately the solution to this conflict is not clear. 
Summary 
Therefore, in certain circumstances, a jurisdiction clause may amount to an unfair 
tenn, not binding on the consumer if the requirements of the Directive are fulfilled. 
However whether this is the case where the Directive and the Regulation clash is 
not clear. Ultimately it is an open question whether the Directive or the Regulation 
are the lex specia/is. It is unclear whether or not the policy expressed in the 
Directive to protect consumers against unfair tenns in standard contracts should 
supersede that of the Jurisdiction Regulation, ie that jurisdiction clauses should be 
valid unless they fall within the exceptions narrowly tailored in the Jurisdiction 
Regulation. 
2.3 Conclusion 
Having discussed consumer protection through Private International Law in the EU 
and England it can be concluded that these provisions are very complex. 
Furthennore, business' fear that they may be sued in an unexpected location or in 
multiple locations is justified. If a business has directed its activ~tie.s ~o . the 
consumer a consumer may choose to pursue a claim in his or her own JunsdIctIOn. 
but may ~evertheless have to enforce a judgment abroad. For small clai.ms. whet?er 
it is the business or the consumer who has to litigate and enforce III a foreIgn 
jurisdiction, the costs may not be proportionate to the claim. F?r t~is reaso.n. ADR 
or ODR may be the only way forward for such claims. ThIS wIll be dIscussed 
161-1 Ibid 277 
1615 The EU received new competencies in the field of judicial co-operation in the Amsterdam Treaty .. 
Therefore under Art.65 of the EC Treaty it was empowered to cloth the update of the Brussds ConventIon 
into a Regulation. thus obviating the need for ratification by all Member States 
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below. However, first, by way of comparison the US approach to jurisdiction will 
be considered. 
2.4 The US approach to jurisdiction 
2.4.1 The due process tests 
A state or federal court in the US is constrained in exercising jurisdiction oyer an 
out-of-state defendant by the due process clause contained in the Fifth 1616 and 
Fourteenth1617 Amendments of the US Constitution which provide in their essential 
parts that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process 
of law. The due process clauses have been interpreted to impose a requirement that 
the out-of-state defendant must have minimum contacts with the forum and that the 
exercise of jurisdiction must be in accordance with traditional notions of fair play 
and substantial justice. 1618 
These principles have subsequently been interpreted by the various courts. In 
addition some states in the US have passed long-arm statutes establishing a list of 
grounds for the exercise of jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants, however in 
many states the long-arm statute is simply co-extensive with, ie as wide as, the due 
process principle. 
The first test of 'minimum contacts' is satisfied if the defendant purposefully avails 
itself of the privilege of conducting business in the forum state or if it is foreseeable 
that he or she would be hauled into court there as a consequence of harmful 
activities intentionally directed at the forum state. 1619 In tort cases the courts have 
established minimum contacts on the basis of the . effects doctrine'. This is not in 
fact (as the epithet may be taken to imply) jurisdiction based on mere effects but 
requires intent and knowledge on the part of the defendant. The defendant must 
have committed an intentional tort expressly aimed at the forum state, the harm 
caused thereby was suffered in the forum state and the defendant knew that this 
would be the case. 1620 For example, in Panavision v Toeppen Mr Toeppen 
registered the plaintiff s trade marks as domain names and offered to sell them to 
the plaintiff. The Court found that the defendant had directed its actions to the 
plaintiff s main place of business and knew that the brunt of the harm would be 
suffered there. 1621 
For the second part of the constitutional due process test, the test of traditional 
notions of fair play and substantial justice, the courts take into account the 
appropriateness of the forum (in terms of location of the evidence and the 
witnesses) and the interests of the respective competing jurisdictions in 
1616 ' Applymg to the federal government 
1617 ' Applymg to States . 
1618 In the seminal decision of International Shoe Company \' Washington State 326 US 310, 316: 66 S Ct 
154 (1945) 
1619 Calden'Jones 465 US 783 (1984) 788-90 
16~O Calden' Jones 465 US 783 (l9R4) 788-90: Panavision " Toeppen 141 F 3d 1316. 1321 (1998) 
lo~1 ibid 
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adjudicating t~e d~spute: In .inte~et cases more emphasis seems to be placed on the 
first test, so thIS dIscuSSIOn IS maInly focused on minimum contacts. 
Two distinctions from the European approach should be noted. First. unlike the 
European approach, the minimum contacts test has an intentional element, which is 
sometimes expressed as purposeful availment or know ledge that the defendants' 
actions would take effect in the forum. 1622 This intentional element theoreticallv 
limits the jurisdictional reach. By contrast, in tort cases. under the European . 
approach taken in the Brussels Convention and the Jurisdiction Regulation 1623 as 
. d' B . 1624 h f h mterprete In zer t e courts 0 t e country where the claimant suffered direct 
physical harm are competent to adjudicate on the dispute. even if the defendant 
does not conduct business there or did not direct its activities to that state. 1625 Thus, 
the intentional element is missing from the European approach. 1626 
For example, in World- Wide Volkswagen the US Supreme Court held that the 
claimants who had been injured in a car accident in Oklahoma, could not sue the 
retailer of the car there, as the retailer carried on 'no activity whatsoever in 
Oklahoma' 1627. The Court said that although in theory it was foreseeable to the 
defendants that the claimants might take the car to Oklahoma, this theoretical 
foreseeability was not sufficient. 1628 
By contrast, in Asahi a narrow majority of five out of nine judges of the US 
Supreme Court held that a manufacturer who regularly distributes a product through 
various distribution chains. knowing that a certain quantity of its product is likely to 
end up with consumers of a particular state, has the requisite minimum contacts 
with that state to be sued there in a personal injury action. 1629 It is difficult to 
reconcile World- Wide Volkswagen with Asahi, as arguably it was also foreseeable 
in the former case that some of the cars sold in New York might be driven to 
Oklahoma, albeit that in World-Wide Volkswagen the defendant was the retailer of 
the product, who sold directly to the consumer and not a large-scale manufacturer 
who distributes a mass-market product down a chain of sales. 
In a recent internet case a US Federal District Court in California held that it had 
jurisdiction to decide a copyright infringement suit against Sharman Networks Ltd. 
headquartered in Australia and incorporated in the Pacific Island of Vanatu 
1622 S Nauss Exon 'A New Shoe is Needed to Walk through Cyberspace Jurisdiction' (2000) 11 Albany 
Lml' Journal of Science and Technology 1-55, 5 
1623 See fn 1480 
1624 See fn 1501 , 
1625 See also above, the English common law rules allow for the claimant to sue before the English courts If 
he sustained damage in England CPR 6.20 (8) (a) 
1626 S b ') ') ee a ove _._ 
1627 World-l1'idc T 'olkswaaen COlporatiol11' Woodson 444 U.S. 286. 287. 100 S.Ct. 559 
I(,~~ 'b'd b I I , 
1629 Albeit that a majoritv held that it would constitute a violation of due process for California to exercise 
jurisdiction in the ci'rcu~stances (the claim was between a Japanese and a Taiwanese company), ,.J.saJII 
Metal lndustrv Co l' Superior Court of Cal(fornia 480 US 102. 107 sct 1026 
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concerning decentralised peer-to-peer file sharing software such as Kazaa. 1630 The 
Court said that there was evidence that the Kazaa software had been downloaded 
143 million times (and 20 million times in the US). Although there was no direct 
evidence as to how m~ny times the software had been downloaded in California the 
Court extrapolated a hkely figure of two million from the total number of 
downloads. This was sufficient for a finding of the required minimum contacts with 
C I·e . 1631 Th·· ··1 a 110rnla. IS IS a sImI ar approach as in the stream of commerce cases such as 
Asahi. 
Thus in some cases the purposeful availment or foreseeability requirement has been 
interpreted widely requiring little in terms of purposeful availment and hence 
leading to a wide assumption of jurisdiction. 
Hence, the principled approach to conflicts of law in the US is inherently more 
flexible, which makes an assertion of jurisdiction by the courts easier. 
2.4.2 Principles developed in internet cases 
Despite this flexibility, an examination of the defendant's contacts with the forum 
requires an analysis of the internet transaction or activity through the lens of 
territoriality, as it requires the answering of questions such as did the defendant do 
business in the forum or was it foreseeable that the defendant's actions cause harm 
to the claimant in the forum. Again, because of the difficulty of pinpointing 
activities and because of the ubiquity of access to the internet these questions are 
difficult to answer and the case law has produced contradictory outcomes on similar 
facts. The question of jurisdiction is therefore highly opaque and uncertain or as 
Susan Nauss Exon 1632 has put it: 
'The district court decisions appear to be highly individualistic and fact dependent. 
The result appears to be dragging jurisprudence deeper into a quagmire of 
uncertainty in how to confer personal jurisdiction in cyberspace. ' 
Contrast for example the Euromarket case discussed above with Millenium. 
In Euromarket the plaintiff alleged trade mark infringement against the defendant, 
an Irish retail business with one shop in Dublin who used the same name as the 
plaintiff. 'Crate & Barrel' as a domain name, on its packaging and on its 
website. 1633 The US District Court found that the defendant had the required 
minimum contacts in Illinois, taking into account the defendant's non internet 
related contacts, such as her participation in trade fairs and one sale to a person with 
an Illinois billing address, even though the goods ordered were delivered to an 
1630 lIfetro-Goldwl'l1-MQ1'cr Studios I1/c et aIr Grokster et al243 F Supp 2d 1073 (CD California 200~) 
1631 ibid 1087' . 
163~ Fn 1622 26 
I~" E . C & B . I L d 196 F S pp 'd 8')4 (NO IllinOIS 2000) lIromarkct Deslg1/s Inc" rate . an e t et a u - -
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address in Ireland and even though this sale was 'provoked' by the plaintiffs' 
lawfirm. 1634 
In M 'll . 1635 "1 . 1 enzum one mUSIC retal store III Oregon sued another in South Carolina for 
trade mark infringement and unfair competition. The South Carolina music shop 
made a small number of CD sales through its website. one of which had been made 
to Oregon (again arranged by the plaintiffs lawfirm) and it had some non-internet 
I d . 0 1636 re ate contacts In regon. Nevertheless the Court found that there were 
insufficient contacts with Oregon and dismissed the suit for lack of jurisdiction. 163"' 
As in Europe, mere access to a website as such is not sufficient to subject a party 
domiciled in one state to jurisdiction in another. 1638 However in Compuserve l' 
Patterson, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals found that electronic contacts can 
constitute the required minimum contacts with the forum jurisdiction. 1639 Mr 
Patterson used Compuserve' s services to distribute shareware software and he 
alleged trade mark infringement and unfair competition by Compuserve. Since he 
had electronically registered as a shareware provider with Compuserve. based in 
Ohio 1640, and repeatedly uploaded software onto their system, the Court of Appeals 
for the Sixth Circuit found that the courts in Ohio had jurisdiction to hear 
Compuserve's action for declaratory relief that it had not infringed Mr Patterson' s 
rights. 1641 
A frequently cited case in internet jurisdiction decisions is the 1997 US District 
Court case of Zipp01642 which established the influential, so-called sliding scale test, 
whereby jurisdiction depends on the degree of interactivity of a website. Under this 
test l643 , jurisdiction is contingent on the nature and quality of commercial activity 
that an entity conducts over the internet. Websites that only make information 
available are categorised as passive and access to such a passive website is not a 
sufficient ground for the exercise of jurisdiction. By contrast an active website, 
conducting business with residents in the forum state over the internet. would be 
sufficient for a finding of jurisdiction. The middle ground is occupied by interactive 
websites, which allow a user in the forum state to exchange information with a host 
computer. For these middle ground websites the exercise of jurisdiction is only 
1634 Fn 1633 829.835 
1635 Millenium Enterprises Inc 1'Millenium Music 33 F Supp 2d 907 (D Oregon 1999) 
1636 ibid 909 
16.1" ibid 920-924 
16.1~ Cl'bersell Inc l' Cvbersell Inc 130 F 3d 414 (9th Cir 1997) 419-420 
1639 Compuserce Inc~' Richard S Patterson 89 F 3d 1257 (6 th Cir 1996) 
1640 The click-wrap agreement made clear that Compuserve was based in Ohio and that the contract was 
deemed to be made there. ibid 1260-1261 
1641 ibid 1264-5.1269 
164~ Zippo MIg Co l' Zippo Dot Com Inc 952 F Supp 1119 (WD Pa 1997) ., ., -th . 
1643 An example for the application of Zippo is Mink l' AA.A.A De~'clopme~t LLC 190 F _,d 3.<~ (.:-- Clr 1999) 
orders were not taken throuoh the website. but the website contamed a pnntable order form. toll-free 
telephone number and a em~il address- this was not sufficient interactiyity 337 
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proper if there is a high degree of interactivity and if the nature of the infonnation 
exchange is commercia1. 1644 
It. is important t? keep in mind that the Zippo sliding scale test is only a frequently 
cIted test estabhshed by a US District Court. It cannot overrule or replace the 
. . 1645 I c: . 
mInImum contacts test. n lact It could be argued that the distinction between 
passive and active websites as a determinative factor is now technoloaically 
b • 
obsolete as very few websites are merely passive showcases of infonnation. I 114(, 
Recent decisions have placed more emphasis on targeting1647, ie on whether the 
defendant has purposefully directed its activities to the forum. Judge Barbara B 
Crabb in Hy Cite severely criticised the Zippo test: 
'First, it is not clear why a website's level of interactivity should be detenninative 
on the issue of personal jurisdiction ( ... ) Even a "passive" website may support a 
finding of jurisdiction if the defendant used its website intentionally to hann the 
plaintiff in the forum state ( ... ) Similarly, an "interactive" or commercial website 
may not be sufficient to support jurisdiction if not aimed at the residents in the 
forum state.' 1648 
Likewise, in the Step Two case the Third Circuit Court of Appeals emphasized that 
mere interactivity is not sufficient. but that the defendant must have intentionally 
directed its conduct at the forum state: 
'The Zippo court similarly underscored the intentional nature of the defendant's 
conduct vis-a-vis the forum state ( ... ) Since Zippo several district court decisions 
from this Circuit have made explicit the requirement that the defendant intentionally 
interact with the forum state via the web site in order to show purposeful 
'1 t ,1649 aVaI men '" 
However, other courts still rely on degrees of interactivity as set out in ZippO.1650 
For example, in Mar-Eco the court found that a vehicle dealer in Pennsylvania 
could sue a vehicle dealer in Maryland in their local court on the basis of contacts to 
. h db' . b' 1651 the forum estabhs e y an InteractIve we sIte. 
2.4.3 Jurisdiction in defamation cases 
In the US, the single publication rule, well- established in many US states, ~eans 
that an action in respect of the same defamation can only be brought once and If the 
16~~ . 2rppo fn 1642 1124 " _ 
I(,,)~ H1' Cite C01poration)' BadBlisinessBlireall.com [2004] WL 42641 (WD \\lIS! ='. . • ') 
1(,.)(, M Geist 'Is There A There There? Toward Greater Certainty For Internet JunsdlctlOn (_001) 16 
Berkelcr Technology Lm\' JOllrnal1345-1407 (1404): S Nauss Exon fn 1622 24.35 
1(,.)- ibid 
16~8 S f 1 1 - -ee n (1"t) ) 
16~9 Toys R US inc ). Step Two SA 318 F 3d 446 .452 ") - ') "'OO~ ~ 17-~ 18 16~O For example Mar-En»)' T&R and Sons TOll'll1g and ~e~01'.cl~· 837 A _d.:>1- (Pa Sup~r._ -) - -
16.'1 In that case the Court even found that it had general JunsdlctlOn oyer the defendant. Ibid 
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court accepts jurisdiction, it will consider the total loss to reputation alleQed bv the 
1 . 1652 Thi b d . ~ -c C aim ant. scan e contraste WIth the EU approach discussed above. 16:-3 At 
first sight the approach in Shevill seems more generous. as the claimant can brino 
several actions in respect of the same facts against the same defendant. Howe\t.~r ~ 
is costly and burdensome for a claimant to bring several actions in different 
jurisdictions. 
On the other hand, under Shevill the claimant can recover damages for the whole 
loss only in the courts at the publisher's establishment. In this respect. the US 
approach, based on minimum contacts and targeting is more generous, as the 
claimant is not limited to suing at the publisher's establishment, but can bring an 
action for the whole loss in any place where the due process criteria are satisfied. 1654 
Hence the claimant can recover the whole loss in several fora not just at the place 
where the publisher is established. 
Nevertheless in a conflict between US and English jurisdiction, most claimants 
prefer the English courts. However this is not motivated by any jurisdictional rules, 
but due to a more claimant friendly substantive defamation law, as in the US many 
defamation actions are defeated by the 'public figure' doctrine, which makes it 
harder for a famous person to bring an action against a media defendant. 1655 This 
will not be further discussed, as substantive defamation law is clearly outside this 
thesis. It suffices to say that private international law rules only suspend rather than 
solve the differences in the laws of different jurisdictions. 
165' • 
- US Restatement of Torts 2d (1977) § 577 A 
(2) A single communication heard the same time by two or more third persons is a single publication. 
(3) Anyone edition of a book or newspaper, or anyone radio or television broadcast. exhibition of a 
motion picture or similar aggregate communication is a single publication. 
(4) As to any single publication 
(a) only one action for damages can be maintained; 
(b) all damages suffered in all jurisdictions can be recovered in the one action: and 
(c) a judgment for or against the plaintiff upon the merits of any action for damages bars any other action 
for damages between the same parties in all jurisdictions. 
165) 2.2.2 (d) . ., 
1654 See in particular Keeton l' Hustler Magazine Inc 465 US 770 (1984). Initially the Single publIcatIOn rule 
came to be associated with statements that the single publication took place where the newspaper or 
magazine was published: Fried, Mendelson &Co l' Edmund Halstead Ltd (1922) ~ 96.NYS 285.28'7. Thi~ 
was then taken to mean that the applicable law should be that of the place ofpubhcatlOn: Zuck l' 1l1lcrs~ate 
Publishing Corp 317 F 2d 727,734 (2nd Cir 1963) and Restatement of the Conflicts 0.( L~ws 2d (1971) * 
159. However, a plaintiff can sue in other jurisdictions than that of the pl~ce of publIcatIOn '") 
165) New rork Times 1'Sullimn 376 US 254 (1964) and Gert~ ,. Robert n elch Inc 4.18 US 3_) ~ 1974 )-no 
public figure may recover without a showing of actual malice- this rule of substantIve defamatIon la\\ 
causes conflict in international cases. This is especially the case where the claimants argue that the law ~f 
England or that of Australia should apply: b?th. o~ which are more generous to the claImant. Howe\ ~r th~~7 
conflict can not be solved on the level of JUrIsdIctIOnal rules. See also the La\\ Comm 1~:--lon Repo~. tn 1 
4.24: 'Writing in the Sydney Law Review David Rolph has argued that the defendants. arguments In 
GlIfnick were "effectively seeking to entrench American libel law as the applIcable la\\ for the 
determination ofintemet defamation proceedings'''. 
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2.4.4 Consumers 
Another ma~or conceptu.al difference between the approach to jurisdiction in the EU 
and the US IS that there IS no overarching policy against jurisdiction clauses in 
consumer contracts in the US. 1656 The general principle in the US is that a forum 
selection clause is enforced unless it is fundamentally unfair. 1657 However, the mere 
existence of a jurisdiction clause is not decisive of the issue of jurisdiction. If the 
defendant can show that the jurisdiction clause was obtained through fraud. undue 
infl~ence or o-:erweening bargaining power, or ifit is against a state's strong public 
pohcy, exceptIOnally, the clause does not supply the basis for jurisdiction. 1658 
In Carnival Cruise Lines Inc v Shute1659 the terms and conditions of a cruise line 
contained an express and exclusive choice of forum (Florida). One of the 
passengers was injured in a fall onboard a ship and sued in the Western District of 
Washington- that suit was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The US Supreme Court 
held that jurisdiction clauses are upheld if they passed the judicial scrutiny of 
fundamental fairness. The Court said that it is not unreasonable for a cruise line to 
limit jurisdiction to one forum, as passengers come from different jurisdictions and 
the cruise line may otherwise risk being sued in multiple jurisdictions, ultimately 
constituting a cost factor, which will be passed on to consumers. 1660 Hence an 
express choice of jurisdiction could be in the interest of consumers, as a fonn of 
prudent risk management leading to lower prices. Furthermore the Court held that 
there was no evidence that the purpose of the jurisdiction clause was to make 
litigation inconvenient for the plaintiffs. 1661 The Court gave short shrift to the 
argument that the claimants are physically and financially unable to sue in Florida 
and emphasized that a heavy burden of proof is required to set aside a forum 
I . I h d f . . 1662 se ectIOn cause on t e groun s 0 Inconvemence. 
The starting point of any analysis of a jurisdiction clause is that it must have been 
. h 1663 In S h 7I.T C .. brought to the attentIOn oft e consumer. 'Pee tv lvetseape ommUnlCatlOns 
Corpn 1664 the courts have made a distinction between 'browse wrap contracts', in 
which the consumer is merely given warning of terms and conditions (for example 
through a link on the homepage of a website), and 'click wrap contracts', where the 
1656 Michael Geist fn 1646, 1386 A similar issue arises in respect of arbitration clauses which will be 
discussed in Chapter 7-2.3 . ' 
1657 The Bremen l' Zapata Off-Shore Co 407 US 1, 12-13; 92 S Ct 1907 (1972): 'a fre,el~ negotiated pnvate 
international agreement, unaffected by fraud. undue influence. or overweening bargaInIng power. ~uch as 
that involved here. should be given full effect.' The US Supreme Court in that case also saId that 'In ~he 
light of the present-day commercial realities and expanding international trade we conclude that the forum 
clause should control absent a strong showing that it should be set aside' 15 , 
1658 ibid and Carnival Cruise Lines Inc " ShIIte 499 US 585, 595 (1991 ): Burger King Corp \' Rlld=e\\'/c 
471 US 462.486 (1985) and cases in fn 1670. 1671 
165'! Carnim/ Cruise Lines Inc \' Shute 499 US 585. 595.499 U.S. 97'2. III S.Ct. 161-+ (1991 ) 
1660 ibid 593-594 
1661 ibid 594-595 
166~ ibid 
1663 Spataro \' K/oster Cruise Ltd 894 F2d 44. 45-46 (2nd Cir 1990) 
1664 306 F~d 17.48 UCC Rep Serv 2d 761 (2nd Cir 2002) 
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consumer is forced to scroll through the terms and conditions and click' I a!ITee' or 
something equivalent before the contract is concluded. The Court found tha~ the 
terms (in this case an arbitration clause) are not incorporated in a browse wrap 
contract, as the consumer may have easily missed the link to the terms and 
conditions l665 . Hence a jurisdiction clause in a 'click-wrap' contract is more likely 
to be enforceable than one contained in a 'browse-wrap' contract. 1666 -
More divisive is the application of the principles in Carnival Cruise Lines 1667 to the 
question whether a jurisdiction clause contained in a standard consumer contract 
concluded over the internet is valid. In particular the use of a standard jurisdiction 
clause in AOL's terms of service has created a spate of litigation about this issue in 
several States. 1668 
On the one hand, consumers contracting on the internet are also likely to come from 
multiple jurisdictions, so arguably, a supplier would be justified in reducing the risk 
of being sued in multiple states. Hence, under this appraoch, jurisdiction clauses 
may be regarded as a legitimate form of risk management, particular in mass 
consumer transactions on the internet. Therefore some courts have followed the 
C . I C . L' 1669 l' f 1670 arnzva rUlse znes Ine 0 argument. 
On the other hand, a jurisdiction clause in a consumer form contract may also 
deprive a consumer of protective laws in his or her local state, in particular of the 
right to bring a class action and/or make litigation inefficient if the value of the 
claim is small compared to the cost and inconvenience of bringing a suit in another 
state. Hence, some courts have found that a consumer jurisdiction clause in an 
internet transaction falls into the public policy exception and was unreasonable. 1671 
1665 Fn 1664, 30-33, 35 
1666 Caspi 1'. Microsoft Network, L.L.C, 323 N.J.Super. 118.732 A.2d 528, 530, 532-33 
(N.J.Super.Ct.App.Div.1999) - in this case upheld a forum selection clause, as the subscribers. to online , 
software were required to review the terms and conditions by scrolling through them and to click 'I Agree 
or 'I Don't Agree'; in Bruce G Forrest l' Verizon Communications Inc 805 A2d 1007, 1010 (DC Court of 
Appeals 2002) the Court also upheld a click-wrap contract forum selection clause. 
1667 Fn 1658 
1668 Fn 1670 1671 
1669 Fn 1658' 
1670 For example in Bruce G Forrest l' T"erizol7 Communications Inc the District.of Columbia Co~rt ?f. '. 
Appeals upheld a forum selection clause stipulating Virginia as the forum. despite the fact .that \ IrgI~la I~ 
one of two states that does not allow for class action procedures, Fn 1666. 1011-1013: s~mJi"ar reasonIng ~ 
can be found in AOL Inc l' Booker 781 So.2d 423. 424-425 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2001) and In ~och l' AOL 1.,9 
F.Supp.2d 690, 694-695 (D.Md.2000) . , 01 
1671 AOL l' Superior Court (Mendoza) 90 Cal.App.4th 1. 18; 108 Cal Rptr 2d 699 (Cal.. App. 1 n.IS\ _0 ): 
Sf' . 10" 819 N .... " S 'd '13 (N Y City Civ. Ct. 2006), Unpublished: AOL l' Paslcka 870 S(\._d 170. 
rliJan 1."1 .L • I. .- - .. d '-+ 1 
171-172 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2004): Dix v ICT Grollp Inc 125 \Vash.App. 929, 937: 106 P.3 fI 
(Wash.App.Di\ 3 2005) 
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2.4.5 Conclusion 
The US approach to jurisdiction is based on general principles, which are flexible 
and therefore uncertain and unpredictable in their application. This potentially leads 
to forum-shopping as claimants are tempted to argue that the defendant has 
m~nimum contacts, even where the links to the forum are tenuous. This tendency is 
shghtly, but not completely counter-balanced by a trend to base jurisdiction on 
targeting (so-called 'effects doctrine') rather than the interactivity of websites (or 
other internet applications). Such forum-shopping makes cross-border litiaation 
expensive and this is ultimately to the detriment of both claimant and def:ndant. 
The situation is even more unsatisfactory for consumer and other small claims 
disputes. Different state courts interpret the exceptions to the general enforceability 
of jurisdiction clauses in different ways. As a consequence, business are concerned 
to be sued in a different state and consumers, likewise cannot be sure whether or not 
a jurisdiction clause will be enforced. The need for alternative mechanisms 
becomes, again, apparent. 
3. Cross-Border Enforcement 
Even if a claimant succeeds in finding a court of competent jurisdiction and that 
court rules in his or her favour, if the judgment debtor does not comply with its 
terms, the claimant needs to enforce the judgment. If the judgment debtor does not 
have any assets in the jurisdiction where judgment was given, the claimant has to 
enforce in a foreign jurisdiction. The courts in this foreign jurisdiction are under no 
obligation under international law to recognise and enforce that judgment I672 , unless 
there is a bilateral or multilateral enforcement treaty. States may recognise and 
enforce judgments unless there is public policy or other ground which leads them to 
refuse recognition and enforcement. This has been enshrined in the notion of comity 
as described in the US Supreme Court case of Hilton v Guyot: 
'Comity is neither a matter of absolute obligation nor of mere courtesy and 
goodwill. But it is the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the 
legislative, executive, or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to 
international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens or of other 
d h . f' I ,1673 persons who are un er t e protectIOns 0 Its aw. 
It is important to note that in the US comity is more in the nature of mutual 
assistance 1674 and does not oblige a court to give effect to a foreign judgment and it 
167~ P Schlosser' Jurisdiction and International Judicial and Administrative Co-operation' (1000) 2g.+ 
RcclIcil des Cours 9-430. 137 
1673 115 US 113, 163-64 (1895) . . 
1674 Although, as Peter Schlosser points out, the rules on recognition and enforcement of foreIgn J udgmenh 
are conceptually separate from those regarding judicial co-operation and mu~ual assls~ance. as th.e court 
giving the judgment and the court enforcing the judgment do not co-~perate ~n the stnct sense of the \\l)rd. 
P Schlosser fn 1672 31-33; However he also notes that in the Amencan POInt of\:lew. transborder 
recognition and enforcement of judicial decisions is only a sub-category of intematlOnallegal assIstance 
together with transborder servic~ of process and extraterritorial disccnery. 35. 
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is usually based on good will and reciprocity. 1675 Although the doctrine of comity 
has played a role in England and Wales in the approach to recognition and . 
enforcement of foreign judgments~ it seems that it has been modified and 
superseded by a doctrine of obligation. 1676 The liability of the debtor of the foreign 
judgment is regarded as a legal obligation in and of itself~ without any requireme';lt 
of reciprocity by the foreign state. 1677 
Whether seen from the viewpoint of international comity or obligation~ enforcement 
of foreign judgments is not required by international law . Court can and do refuse to 
recognise judgments. In some circumstances this refusal to enforce can take a more 
active form. For example~ an English court which does not agree with the 
conclusions of a foreign court about the validity of an exclusive jurisdiction clause 
pointing to the English courts l678 can grant an anti-suit injunction (an order issued 
to a person in England demanding that such a person withdraw legal proceedings in 
a court outside England) in an effort to halt the foreign proceedings. 1679 
Thus~ although in many private disputes national courts are prepared to enforce 
foreign judgments~ absent any bi-or multilateral agreements~ there is no obligation 
on states1680 to do so and they can (and sometimes do) invoke public policy or other 
grounds in denying enforcement. Thus, in some ways comity is the opposite of what 
it appears to be at first sight. The principle of comity allows states to invoke 
principles of national law to justify non-enforcement of a judgment. Thus the first 
point to note is that a judgment may not be enforced. 
For enforcement of a foreign law judgment in England under the common law 
rules, essentially four conditions have to be fulfilled: (i) the original court must 
have been competent1681 (ii) the judgment must be final and conclusive~ (iii) the 
judgment must be for a fixed sum of money and (iv) the judgment debtor must not 
1675 M Akehurst 'Jurisdiction in International Law' (1972-3)46 British Yearbook of International Law 145-
257, 236; P Schlosser fn 1672 37 
1676 . f C Clarkson, J HIll n 1543 133-134 
1677 P. Schlosser fn 1672 39 
1678 The foreign court not giving effect to the jurisdiction clause and holding itself competent Roger 
Thomas Donohue,' ARMCO Inc and others [2001] lLPr 48 (CA). overturned by the House of Lords on 
different grounds, see [2001] UKHL 64 
1679 The Institut de Droit International at its Session in Bruges in 2003 has adopted a Resolution on anti-suit 
injunctions. It defines them as the 'practice of granting injunctions to restrain parties from commencing or 
proceeding in another country' (Recitals (b)). It states the anti-suit injunctions may be a breach of . 
international comity (ibid (f)), but may be justified in certain circumstances, such as the breach of a chOIce 
of court agreement or arbitration agreement (Resolution 5 (a)). 
1680 An exception has been established between the EEA states. see Council Regulation.44 2001/EC of 22. 
December 2000 on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgements in Civil and CommercIal M~tter.s . 
(replacing the 1968 Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcen:'ent of Judgments In CI\'l1 and 
Commercial Matters except for Denmark)- under the ConventionlRegulauon the ~EA ~:ates ~utually. 
recognise and enforce civil and commercial judgments of another EEA state (Artlcle~ .;.' a~d .,8). subJect to 
only very narrow public policy grounds. Similarly. the individual state~ ?fthe US are reqUIred to el1~orce 
judgements of other US states by operation of the "Full Faith and CredIt clause of the US Con:--t1tutIOn. 
See US Constitution Art 4. Sec 1. . 
1681 Thi~ is only given if the judgment debtor has either submitted to the foreign ~ourt or_ is..,pre~('nt there- It 
seems that a mere contact over the internet may is not sufficient. C Clarkson. J HIll fn 1 )4.; 138-139 
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be able to raise a defence (such as breach against natural justice. fraud, public 
policy or irreconcilable judgments). 1682 
For enforcement of judgments rendered by a court in a EU Member State in another 
Member State, the Jurisdiction Regulation 1683 provides for recognition 16f:4 subject to 
bl· 1· . 1685 very narrow pu IC po ICY exceptIOns and a simplified enforcement 
procedure l686 . Hence within the EU Member States recognition and enforcement is 
somewhat easier than with other states (in the absence of a treaty). Under the EU 
rules, for example, the courts must not examine whether the originaL foreign court 
was the competent court. 1687 The first stage of the application for enforcement is a 
purely formal ex parte procedure and the court will not consider any defences, 
which can only be raised if the judgment debtor appeals against the enforcement 
order. 1688 Hence the Jurisdiction Regulation proceeds from the premise that a 
judgment fulfilling the conditions is entitled to recognition and enforcement. 1689 
However even if there is an obligation to recognise and enforce a judgment, there is 
still an exequator (obtaining a declaration of enforceability/registration) procedure 
. d . h h' 1690 Th d· 1 .. 1 1 aSSOCiate WIt tIS. e proce ure mvo ves appOIntmg a oca 
. 1691 d 1· 1692 hi h k· . C' 11 representatlve an trans atIOn costs ,w c rna e It expenSIve lor sma 
claims l693 . This will be further discussed in the next section. 
4. Cross-Border Aspects 
As has been seen in the preceding sections, the rules of private international law are 
intricate, complex and uncertain in their application. Jurisdiction is frequently 
concurrent with different courts applying different laws, involving the need to 
determine the competent court and the applicable law by preliminary hearings or 
even anti-suit injunctions. Complexity means expense in terms of costs and delay. 
Further costs and delay are added if the judgment must be enforced against assets 
located in a foreign jurisdiction. 
International litigation is not only complex, but also greatly expensive for reasons 
apart from conflicts of law and, but for the largest or most urgent claims, the costs 
of cross-border litigation will be disproportionate to the remedy sought. Even the 
1682 C Clarkson, J Hill fn 1543 134 et sequi 
1683 See fn 1481 
1684 Art.33 (1) 'without any special procedure' . 
1685 Art.34 (l) 'manifestly contrary to public policy' and subs (2) - (4); Art.36 the Judgment may not be 
reviewed as to its substance 
1686 Art.38 
1687 Art.35 (3) 
1688 C Clarkson, J Hill fn 1543 162-163 
1689 ibid 
1690 An exception to this is enforcement in uncontested claims under .Regulati?n R05/2004,EC OJ L 143 30. 
April 2004, pp. 15-39, abolishing the exequator procedure and allowing for direct enforcement. 
ic>'il See for example ArtAO (2) 
1692 Art.55 (2) . 
169J In the UK this may well cost between £500-£1 000 for a small claim. 
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mere enforcement of a foreign judgment not involving high amounts does not 
economically make sense. 1694 
As P. Schlosser has remarked with respect to the cost of international litigation: 
'For the little fellow, instituting proceedings abroad is in practice unaffordable. 
Normally he does not know how to find a lawyer in a foreign country. Thus he must 
contact a lawyer in his own country, who in tum, must engage and instruct his 
foreign colleague. Hence double fees are due. The fees of the lawyer consulted at 
home are seldom recoverable from the debtor ( ... ) The costs for the translation of a 
judgment accompanied by extensive reasons may be enormous. The costs are 
seldom refundable.' 1695 
Foreign proceedings are rendered more expensive by travelling (of the parties, 
lawyers and, as the case may be, witnesses) and translation costs. If foreign law 
applies, experts (legal advisors and advocates) on the foreign law must be 
instructed. Furthermore, foreign nationals suing in a foreign court frequently have 
to overcome discriminatory obstacles inbuilt in civil procedure. For example in 
many states foreigners instituting proceedings have to pay a deposit as security for 
the defendant's costs and foreigners are discriminated against regarding legal 
aid. 1696 
As a consequence, for foreign litigants the costs of international litigation are not 
infrequently prohibitive, as in many claims the legal costs are disproportionate to 
the value of the claim. It is impossible to give a precise figure of these costs 
here 1697 - this will depend on the costs of litigation in a particular jurisdiction, on the 
distance between the parties, whether lawyers bill by the hour or on a fixed fee 
basis (eg as a percentage of the value of the claim), whether costs are awarded to 
the winning party, on the availability of legal aid, whether there are translation costs 
etc. By way of example, in a straightforward debt enforcement action, the 
registration and enforcement of a German judgment in an English court under the 
simplified (sic) rules in the Jurisdiction Regulation EC/44/2001 1698 may well cost a 
thousand pounds sterling in translation and lawyers' costs alone. 
An empirical study on the cost of litigation in EU cross-border consumer disputes 
99. . 1700 
conducted in 1995 16 found that If a consumer pursues a claIm of Euro 2000 at 
. 01701 dE the place of the defendant's reSIdence the costs vary between Euro 98 an uro 
1694 P Schlosser fn 1672 216 
169" ) P Schlosser fn 1672 215 
1696 P Schlosser fn 1672 216 
1697 See also the discussion in Chapter 3-7 
1698 Art" I ~3-'l 
IC es" -)- ~ C . h 
1699 H von Freyhold, V Gessner, E Vial and H v,'agner (Eds) Cost o.fJudici~~. Barriers o~ on~~lmers In t e 
Single Market, A Report for the European Commission, Zentrum fur Europalsche Rechtspolttlk an der 
Universitat Bremen, OctoberlNovember 2005 
1700 About £1344 
1101 About £659 
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66001702 depending on the combinations of Member States~ with an average of Euro 
24891703
. The average duration of such litigation would be 23.5 months, almost 2 
years. If a consumer pursues a claim of Euro 2000 at his or her state of residence 
and then enforces in the defendant's Member State the costs vary between Euro 
9501704 dE 8 1705·· . an uro 5 50 , agam dependmg on the combmation of Member States 
h b · E 243 1706 . ' t e average costs eing uro 7 . The average duratIOn would be extended to 
29.2 months, almost 21/2 years. 1707 
Another example is the Euromarket case, which involved an application for 
summary judgment, ie a preliminary hearing, brought by a US company against an 
Irish trader. 1708 The judge pointed out when dismissing the application for summary 
judgment that 
'In substance neither party trades in this country. Yet well over £100,000 in costs 
have been expended here. No one but a lawyer could call this rational. I expressed 
the finn view that the parties should attempt to reach settlement.' 1709 
This cost factor poses serious problems for redress mechanisms in international e-
commerce, especially in small claims. The cost of litigation, let alone cross-border 
1·· . hId 11 . 1710 d . 1711 ~. l17P It1gatIOn, as e to strong ca s In government ,aca emic , prolessIOna -
andjudicial l713 circles for an increased use of ADR mechanisms to settle small 
claims arising from e-commerce. For example Veijo Heiskanen writes: 
'As a practical matter, given the expected relatively low average value of 
international consumer transactions, it is unlikely that extensive cross-border 
litigation involving international electronic consumer transactions will ever become 
a reality' 1714 
170~ About £4435 
1703 About £1673 
1704 About £ 638 
1705 About £3931 
1706 About £1638 
1707 See the Table on p. 123 
1708 And in this case the claimant brought proceedings against the defendant in two courts, in England and 
Illinois, see above 2.2.2 (d) and 2.4.2 .. 
1709 Euromarket Designs Inc l' Peters and Crate & Barrel Ltd [2001] FSR 20 (ChD) para 8. ~ addItIOn the 
US company had started proceedings before its local court in Illinois. which led to a default Judgment (on 
the jurisdiction issue), as, presumably the defendant could not afford to defend herself before that court. 
1710 Art.! 7 of the E-commerce Directive 2000/31/EC published in OJ LI78'1 of 17. July 2000 encourage~ 
the Member States to establish out-of-court dispute resolution mechanisms 
1711 A Patel 'Consumer protection and redress-the wider context' (2000) 3 Elcctronic ~lIsi.ness Law 9-10. L 
Gillies 'A Review of the New Jurisdiction Rules for Electronic Consumer Contracts \\lthm the European 
Union' [2001] Journal of Information Lal\' & Technology (e-journal), V Heiskanen fn Error! Bookmark not 
defined. 38 et seq . . ' .. 171~ J Gunn & W Roebuck 'White Paper on Alternative Dispute ResolutIOn In a Supply Cham Tran"tormed 
by On-Line Transactions' May 2001, available from the ecentre Legal AdVIsory Group 
1'13 S f'11-216 ee n _ ). 
lil4 V Heiskanen, fn Error! Bookmark not defined. 37 
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Not just in the context of e-commerce, but more generally there is a noticeable 
tendency to overcome the cost factor of (even merely domestic) liti aation b\- the use 
of ADR. Courts in England have now accepted the importance of ADR in -
complementing litigation. Since the introduction of the Civil Procedure Rules the 
d bl" 1715 courts are un er an 0 IgatlOn to encourage ADR , if appropriate, and the courts 
are empowered to impose cost penalties on parties who unreasonably refuse to 
.. . ADR1716 h -partIcIpate In . Furt ennore, the courts have recognised the validitv and 
enforceability of ADR clauses in commercial contracts. 1717 -
5. A European Small Claims Procedure 
Essentially, a small claims procedure is a simplified court procedure, allowing 
individuals to resolve a dispute before a court with a procedure entailing lower cost 
and more infonnality. Twenty aCED countries have such a simplified 
procedure. 1718 These states limit the availability of the small claims procedure to 
claims below a certain monetary threshold, varying between Euro 300 and 
30000.1719 
This raises the question whether small claims procedures can help spec~ficalf1' with 
cross-border disputes. The preceding sections have shown the difficulties of 
litigating and enforcing a small claim in a cross-border action. In this context it is 
necessary to discuss the proposed European Small Claims Procedure. 
The European Commission has proposed the establishment of a harmonized, pan-
European Small Claims Procedure l720, which would apply to cases in which the 
value of the total claim (excluding interest, expenses and outlays) does not exceed 
Euro 20001721 . 
As has been discussed in this Annex, the obstacles to cross-border litigation in the 
form of disproportionate complexity, costs and delay stem from three factors: the 
complexity and uncertainty surrounding the application of jurisdictional rules, the 
fonnality of the court procedure itself and the fonnal requirements to achieve 
recognition and enforcement in a foreign jurisdiction. 
1715 CPR Part 1.4 (2) (e); Cowl v Pzvmouth City Council [2002] 1 WLR 803 (CA) _ 
1716 CPR Part 44.5; Dunnett l' Railtrack [2002] 2 AllER 850 (CA); Royal Bank a/Canada l' Secretan' of 
State/or Defence [2003] EWHC 1841 (ChD) unreported, para 11-13; but cf Hurst l' Leeming [2003] 1 
Lloyd's Rep 379 (ChD), where the refusal to mediate was justified on the baSIS that there was no real 
prospect of success 381. . . 
1'17 Cable & Wireless Pic 1'IBM [2002] 2 AllER 1041 (Comm)-upholding the valIdIty of an ADR cla~st.? 
1718F I' b t £"01 nd £"0160' OECD Report 'Consumer Dispute ResolutIOn and Redress In the or c aims e ween _ a _ , 
Global Marketplace' 2006 p.24 '. ' ') ') 
1719 OECD Report 'Consumer Dispute Resolution and Redress In the Global Marketplac.e _006 p._6 . 
I-~O Proposal for a Regulation establishing a European Small Claims Procedure, dated b. March 200). 
COM(2005) 87 final 
17~ I Art.1 (l) of the Proposal 
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5.1 Jurisdictional rules 
If the proposed European Small Claims Procedure is adopted, the normal rules of 
jurisdiction in Regulation EC/44/2001 would be applied to the Procedure. Hence 
the Proposal does not avoid or simplify jurisdictional rules. 1722 
5.2 Formality 
Its main significance is that it would establish a harmonized procedure for small 
claims, which would apply as an alternative to already existina national small 
I . d 1723 . b calms proce ures. For example, the Proposal prOVIdes that the procedure should 
normally be conducted in writingl724, providing for tight deadlines 1725, and leaves 
the presentation and admissibility of evidence to the judge's discretionl726, hence 
adopting an inquisitorial approach. The Proposal expressly envisages the use of 
video-conferencing and other online technology for the collection and presentation 
of evidence (such as witness statements) and for hearingsl727. This Procedure would 
simplify the 'normal' civil litigation procedure, which is particular relevant for 
those Member States who at present do not have a simplified small claims 
procedure and whose litigation costs are very high. It would make European small 
claims litigation more informal. 
5.3 Enforcement 
Finally, as to enforcement the Commission's original Proposal was fairly brief, 
simply stating that the party seeking enforcement of a foreign judgment merely has 
to provide the judgment and a certificate by the court having issued the judgment to 
be enforced. 1728 The Report of the European Parliament l729 proposes considerable 
amendments to the enforcement provisions. It stipulates that enforcement should be 
governed by the law in the Member State of enforcement, and that a European 
Small Claims judgment should be enforced under the same conditions as a domestic 
judgment. 1730 However it also states that, where necessary a translation must be 
supplied. 1731 This could make enforcement expensive in relation to the value of the 
claim. It is difficult to see how this translation requirement can be avoided unless 
the courts in all Member States provide foreign language translation services. 1732 
The Proposed Regulation speeds up enforcement by providing that the enforcing 
17" 
-- Art.l8 (1) of the Proposal 
17', . 
-. ReCItal 7 of the Proposal 
17'4 f I" R 
- Art.5 0 the European Par lament s eport 
1725 See for example Articles 4 (2), (3), 5 (1) and 10 of the Proposal 
17'6 I' , R 
- Art.9 of the European Par lament s eport 
1m Art.6(1) and Art.7 (1) of the Proposal 
1728 Art.l8 (4) 
17::!9 Text adopted by Parliament on 14. December 2006-Strasbourg. Reference A6-0387,2006 
1730 Art.:21 (l) Report of the European Pari iament 
1731 Art.21 (2) (b) Report of the European Parliament . . . 
173::! A translation requirement is also contained in the New York ConventIon on the Re~ognItIOn and 
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards. 330 UNTS 3 adopted New York 10. June 19).8. entered Into 
force on 7. June 1959, Art.!V (2). The New York Convention is discussed in 6-2.6 of thIs theSIS 
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party nee~ not provide se.curity for costs and that a judgment under the European 
Small ClaIms Procedure IS enforceable notwithstanding the availability of an 
11733 I h' d . appea , un ess t e JU gment has been challenged by the defendant 1734. 
Furthermore the Report of the Parliament also stipulates that enforcement can be 
refused if there is an earlier irreconcilable judgment in the same matter under 
certain conditions. 1735 
5.4 Summary 
Therefore while the European Small Claims Procedure would simplify 
enforcement, its main contribution is to provide a harmonized small claims 
procedure with a high degree of informality. Litigation and enforcement in a foreign 
jurisdiction, even under the small claims procedure still entails additional cross-
border costs. 1736 Furthermore, its main limitation is that it only applies to very small 
value disputes, not exceeding Euro 20001737 and that it would obviously only be 
applicable within the EU/EEA. 
6. Conclusion 
The purpose of this Annex was to show that there is a 'jurisdictional challenge' for 
cross-border internet disputes. 
For such disputes, litigation may involve multiple sets of private international law 
rules. even within the EU. despite some degree of regional harmonisation in the EU. 
Their application to internet disputes is uncertain and unpredictable. Activities on 
the internet are difficult to locate, since location is irrelevant for internet 
functionality. Hence the application of the rules may have surprising or ubiquitous 
effects and this uncertainty enables the parties to engage in 'forum shopping' 
entailing proceedings to determine jurisdiction and these by itself add significantly 
to the final legal bill and lead to further delay. 
On an international level, absent any harmonisation of jurisdictional rules and an 
agreement of reciprocal enforcement, courts at the place where a defendant has 
assets may refuse to enforce a judgment. By contrast to litigation, arbitration awards 
. . 1738 
are more eaSIly enforced, as a consequence of the New York ConventIOn. On a 
regional level in the EU this may be less of a problem, as for civil and commercial 
matters. recognition and enforcement of a judgment is guaranteed. However 
enforcement entails a separate procedure to delare a judgment enforceable and this 
enails additional costs and delay. 
1~" 
.. Art.13 of the Proposal 
17,4 P I' 
. Art,23 of the Report of the European ar lament 
1735 Art.22 (l) 
1736 OECD Report 'Consumer Dispute Resolution and Redress in the Global M~r~etplace' 2?06 p.28 
IT About £ 1344 Sterling, this is much lower than the ~u~ent small c~aims limIt,In the EnglIsh co~rts. 
which is £5000 for most claims and £1000 for personal InJuf) or hOUSIng dIsrepair. see CPR Rule _6.6 (1) 
1738 See 6-2.6 and 6-7 
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Cross-border litigation imposes higher costs and delay for the parties. because of 
the need to instruct a foreign lawyer (frequently in addition to a local lawyer). 
because of travelling costs of the parties and witnesses, translation costs and 
because enforcement is more expensive. For claimants the costs of international 
litigation are frequently prohibitive, as in small claims the legal costs are 
disproportionate to the value of the claim. 
These factors mean for claimants that legal redress is practically unattainable and 
effectively, that access to justice is barred in small claim cross-border internet 
disputes. 1739 For defendants, the 'jurisdictional challenge' in internet disputes means 
that they may be sued in a distant foreign court or even multiple foreign courts and 
that such a dispute may be impossible to defend, again because of cost reasons, so 
that a default judgment becomes inevitable. 
. . OECD Report 'Consumer Dispute 
1739 See also the OEeD's conclusions in relation to consumers In 
Resolution and Redress in the Global Marketplace' 2006 p ... 1-4 
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